7th February 2022
Today is the anniversary of the Maastricht treaty:
30 years ago today the Maastricht Treaty was signed: https://t.co/qOyek7PdU7
— Mr Memory (@AmIRightSir) February 7, 2022
And so I tweeted the following:
https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1490611449621884932
Being Twitter, the consequence of such a tweet was, of course, that I was told that the proposition was wrong – and that something else was the start of the road to Brexit.
(Click on that tweet to see those alternative views.)
But this post sets out, in brief, why I think that the proposition is sound.
Why the road to Brexit began at Maastricht.
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Let us go back to “1992”.
No, not the actual year.
But the once-pervasive campaign to get people ready for the completion of the single market.
It was to the date by which the integration put forward by the Single European Act was to be finally in pace.
As far as I can recall there was little political opposition to “1992” in the years leading up to that date.
Indeed the single market was a thing proudly promoted by Margaret Thatcher and practically implemented by another Conservative politician, the European Community commissioner Arthur Cockfield.
But.
Before we ever got to either “1992” or, indeed, 1992, there was already another determined push towards European integration.
This push was what resulted in the European Union – which replaced the European Community – at the treaty of Maastricht.
This movement has a quality different to “1992”.
In the United Kingdom – and elsewhere – this push was contested.
There was little of the general consensus with which “1992” was accepted and promoted.
Indeed, the passage of the legislation in the United Kingdom under John Major was politically controversial.
There is a direct line between the Maastricht rebels of the early 1990s and the post-2015 Brexit movement.
(I know this, as I was research assistant to one Maastricht rebel MP who also was a MP who voted in favour of Brexit.)
Maastricht created an organised reaction that – in my recollection and view, as someone there at the time – had simply not been there before with “1992”.
And the reaction, in turn, of those in favour of integration was, in my view, also polarising.
There was a range of ‘pro-European’ clichés – about not missing trains or not being at top tables, and so on – that did nothing to make a substantive or positive case for integration.
The Maastricht treaty also (purportedly) expanded the ‘competencies’ of the European institutions into areas such as justice and home affairs, and foreign and defence matters, which has not immediately obvious connection with the single market.
And in respect of these competencies, the United Kingdom government (and some other member states) then got into the habit of picking a choosing what areas to opt in or out of.
This half-hearted approach also can be seen in the opt-out from the Eurozone – membership of which many insisted was essential for participating in the single market.
(Though, even now in 2022, not all the countries in the single market are part of the Eurozone.)
So not only did Maastricht create the modern European Union it also enabled the semi-detached policy approach of the United Kingdom and the organised political opposition to further integration – both of which were significant after 2015 for Brexit.
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My recollection is that at the time I thought United Kingdom membership of the European Union was not sustainable.
I did not think the United Kingdom would ever go full-heartedly into accepting European Union competencies outside the single market, or that the United Kingdom would accept the single currency as being essential for being part of the single market.
I also did not think the approach of ‘pro-Europeans’ would ever win over those who developed their criticisms of the European Union in the Maastricht debates.
My view was (and is) that it would be better – and far more sustainable – for the United Kingdom to have an association agreement with the European Union.
After the early 1990s my views mellowed – and it seemed by 2015 that any departure would not be worth the time and energy.
That a cost-benefit analysis of Brexit would show more costs than benefits.
Others did not – and they kept pushing and pushing until they got a referendum and a departure.
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Had things stayed with a “1992” single market in a steady state, Brexit would have been more unlikely.
Of course, there was never going to be such a steady state – the belief in an ‘ever closer union’ was still then a thing.
It is not now really a thing, ironically, as there has not been a major European Union treaty since Lisbon in 2009 – and it looks like there will never be another one.
Indeed, the United Kingdom departed the European Union just as the belief in an ‘ever closer union’ ceased to have any actual political force.
All this said, there was no inevitability that there would one day be Brexit – just as there is no inevitability about the destination of any path.
Had things gone differently in 2015-16, it is conceivable that the United Kingdom would still be a member of the European Union – though the populism of Farage and others would still be pushing for an effect.
But if the path to Brexit can be said to have started anywhere, I think it was Maastricht.
So that is my view, as someone who followed both Maastricht and Brexit closely.
What do you think?
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The Lisbon Treaty was surely a substantial treaty which occured after Maastricht? The introduction of balancing or countering powers to the Commission (those unelected bureaucrats) such as the introduction of the post of President of the Council, substantially increased powers for the European Parliament, extension of areas subject to QMV (no national veto), and increased remit of the ECJ. Also the establishment of the EU with its own legal status. It wasn’t for nothing that the even stronger original proposals were rejected in referendums by the French, Dutch, Irish (twice) and Gordon Brown sulkily arrived a day late to sign it alone.
“The Lisbon Treaty was surely a substantial treaty which occurred after Maastricht?”
My post expressly refers to a treaty in 2009!
Hi David – interesting, and difficult to disagree. That said, as with the debate about a written constitution v. an ‘unwritten’ one, I do wonder if these debates cut much ice with ‘people’. As you said, you followed ‘Maastricht and Brexit closely.’ But with any debate on constitutions, did those who voted for Brexit do as you did – trace and follow the trail? My gut feeling is that an awful lot of people were fed up with austerity etc. etc. and the very fact that D Cameron was for staying must have been a good reason to vote ‘against’ him. Put differently, the EU referendum was the only protest vote on offer. Add to this the manipulations, fibs and porkies etc., it is easy enough to understand the result. My fear is that, although it is right to seek explanations, seek plausible answers from ‘history’, we must guard against analysing too much or over analysing. You’re obviously a very reasoned person, but ‘reason’ does not always influence behaviour – people can be as irrational as you are rational. Lastly, it is not only a matter of time before ‘reasoned’ commentators trace Brexit to 1066!!!!!!
Apologies for the typos etc.!
A frivolous comment, perhaps; but maybe the protest vote in favour of “Boaty McBoatface” a few months before the EU referendum, and the subsequent decision of the Natural Environment Research Council to name its new vessel “Sir David Attenborough” despite the overwhelming poll result, gave support to those who argued that the elites would always try to get their own way?
Spot on. Whatever appeared on the ballot paper in June 2016 would have got a damn good kicking.
The tiny majority to leave (“the people have spoken. “) was surely influenced by austerity and hopelessness.
The invisible people pulling the strings and now cleaning up were afraid of the impending EU proposals on dirty money.
My, how they must be laughing now.
Levelling up, my a**e.
Spot on!
Yet whenever the English electorate have been given an actual chance to vote against austerity over the last decade and half, they vote for more. Go figure.
They’re voting for the promise of lower taxes, not connecting the dots that this will lead to austerity.
The exception was 2010, where austerity was the overt offer of all three major parties.
How can you talk about Brexit without reference to Cambridge Analytica ? The « the EU referendum as the only protest vote on offer. » was exactly the psy ops message spread on FB. :-(
Interesting thing about Cambridge Analytica…
Despite Christopher Wylie’s testimony, despite the scandal, despite the company basically disbanding (and then reforming) in order to ditch the toxic name… despite all these things have you seen *any* legislation to outlaw psychological manipulation through social media? Have you seen *any* attempt to hold Facebook to account?
How about getting Zuck to the UK to testify? (Ho ho ho).
I have a horrible feeling that the powers-that-be would very much like for you to forget about that little oversight, about that unplanned disclosure of just how incredibly dangerous digital behaviour modification can be. About how desperately dangerous bulk data analytics is for democracy. About how toxic Facebook are.
Oh and bear in mind that the data that CA managed to get out of Facebook is a tiny, tiny fraction of their full manifest. And yet no regulator anywhere in the world has made any attempt to investigate and find out what they can really do.
Our response? Well, Nick Clegg managed to get a job there.
Snort.
Spot on! 1066 laid the foundations for our class-ridden society and the ongoing populist struggle against our ‘foreign overlords’ and their representatives within the ‘Establishment’. The popularity of our Hanoverians makes for a fascinating counterpoint. Plus ca change!
Fair enough. At the same time, the Lexit argument goes back much further than Maastricht, to the original EC referendum at least. And without Lexit there is no Brexit. Lexit voters swung it for Farage, either by voting Leave or by abstaining.
And at the same time, even without the Maastricht Treaty (or any subsequent treaties) the self-proclaimed Thatcherites in the Tory party would have objected to the “left-wing” EC that prevented them doing all sorts of things that they wanted to do. Whether that would have resulted in Brexit is anybody’s guess, but it’s a genie that Thatcher let out of the bottle well before the Maastricht Treaty.
Brexit happened because UK governments (and those across the EU) took any advantages that membership brought as “their achievements” and any unpopulr moves that they agreed were necessary (and all had vetos on (anything substantive) as the fault of “Brussels”.
The EU has made a catastrophic failure of its outreach programme both at the governmental and public levels. When you add that to shifty politicians looking for a scapegoat for domestic failure and a rabid, xenophobic, right wing popular press, Brexit was an accident waiting to happen. The other failure was one of rhetoric: “towards ever closer union” is as meaningless as the “levelling up” agenda (or any other political slogan you care to name. Whilst synergies have been and will continue to be found that work for the common good, the idea that sovereign states will surrender that sovereignty to “Brussels” is as real as the herd of Brexit Unicorns – no sovereign state would ever do that. But it played on the fears of (mainly) the little Englanders. Almost none of the British public understood what the EU was about and the vote was lost by a narrow margin, so the outcome was never “inevitable” – merely tragic.
Was it inevitable since 1992, as your piece tends to suggest? No. We were not the only signatory to the Maastricht Treaty, but we are the only Member State dim enough to have withdrawn. Brexit has served a sole useful purpose for the EU: nobody seriously talks of leaving the bloc anymore. The UK has shown what a stupid decision that would be.
As to the future, once we purge ourselves of this excuse for a government, we will march down the road to “ever closer union” with the EU until we rejoin and regain our influence at the heart of the bloc, mitigating the act of economic flagelation that we have embarked upon. Brexit is like the fairytale of Jack and the beanstalk except we traded our prized family cow for five beans. none of which were magic (or even edible).
Just one little point, Dr. Mike.
When you write, “…we will march down the road to “ever closer union” with the EU until we rejoin and regain our influence at the heart of the bloc… ”
I am afraid you are sorely mistaken. There was considerable resistance – and resentment – among fellow member states at the opt-outs that Britain negotiated [for example like the Maastricht opt-out over joining the Euro].
That resentment has, is, and will continue to drive a determination to “punish” the UK for the decision. If the UK re-joins, no opt-outs will be offered, no retention of the pound, no other abilities to defend the interests of the British people. There is no influence to be regained – other EU member nations will make quite sure of that!
For all the clamouring voices that declare the UK economy to be in tatters after Brexit, neither the IMF nor OECD see it that way:-
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn02784/
Not passing judgement on the rightness or wrongness of leaving via Brexit – that’s too inflammatory: I would simply observe that any return to the EU would absolutely guarantee that the UK became a true vassal state – obliged to be a significant net contributor thanks to economic performance, but without any of the “emergency brake” provisions once enjoyed.
The big concern that leaves us, then, is that today the UK economy might be significant, but it is so imbalanced, so “out of whack”, and nothing done by the present administration is addressing that. For example, forget HS2 – if the government had spent the estimated £77 billion on developing industry in the north, improving sea ports, offering grants to start-ups and innovators, improving transport within the Industrial Triangle, that would have been money well spent.
HS2 was a scheme to funnel vast sums of money to land-owner and construction industry friends. Don’t believe me? Look at the cost-per-mile for HS2 and compare it with *anywhere* else in the world. California’s high speed rail is a good example: fraction of the cost…
We just can’t afford that sort of corrupt thinking any more.
All fair points Sproggit. The U.K. will not rejoin the EU any time soon, not because the EU wants to punish the U.K. (an all too familiar refrain), but because the U.K. ‘defines’ itself in relation to the image it has of itself – with dire consequences as far as I am concerned. The point I would like to pick on, though, is that of ‘net contributor’. I think the U.K., and Brexiters, somewhat miss the essential point, which is that it is better to trade amongst equals than to seek to impose one’s will due to one’s economic might – the days of the British Empire are over. I guess many will wonder what I’m on about, so perhaps the best way to consider the issue is to ask: why are parents ‘net contributors’ to their children’s upbringing? Is it because they seek some financial returns? I don’t think so. They do it for the greater good of the colony.
I’d be happy to concede if “punish” is the wrong description to use. But let me give an example from personal experience.
I’ve In late 2020 I spent £12,000 building a computer for (some pretty esoteric) work requirements. It’s so powerful that the only way to keep it cool is to use liquid cooling. I shopped around and bought the best cooling components possible, from a fabulous company in Germany. Then I hit a problem with two gaskets that resulted in leaks. I suspect – don’t know – that I fitted them badly or incorrectly. But I can’t afford to have water leaking on a 2000w power supply. So last April, when this happened, I went back to the company web site to order spares. I can’t get them. They are no longer willing to ship to the UK. Why? Because the process that they have to follow to handle tax for shipping to the UK are a nightmare. so I asked them, “Do you ship to the United States?” They do. “Do you have the same tax problems shipping to the United States?” No, of course not.
Single example. Anecdotal. I still have a £12,000 computer system in pieces. I either need to literally go to Germany myself to get the parts. Or completely dismantle and rebuild using different, incompatible parts and hope I can make everything work. I’ve been to forums on line, asked for advice. So many people I’ve spoken to have had the same problems.
I’m jumping to a conclusion that this is being done in the EU because that’s what Sven, my contact tells me. I’ve spoken to couriers, like UPS, DHL and so on. “Can you get a parcel from me to Germany?” Yes, no problem. “Can you collect a parcel for me, from Germany?” No.
I don’t really care what the excuses are. I pay my taxes. I abide by the law.
I do not accept that a situation which is now *worse* than it was before the EEC was formed has happened by accident. I’ve written to my MP who has passed on details to Lord Frost. Nothing. Of course I respect that we each have our own views, but we also have our own experiences. And in my experience I see deliberate obstructionism. I won’t say where, because it isn’t clear. But it’s there. And it’s unacceptable.
I’m sure that millions of people who have had their rights to live, work and learn across the EU ripped up find that “unnacceptable”, too. But there we are.
That’ll be the customs paperwork the UK is now requesting. British exporters have the same problem with customs paperwork the EU requires. It isn’t the EU punishing the UK. The UK wanted a quick no tariff trade deal and nothing else. Wouldn’t accept anything like equal standards to make customs procedures simpler. A quick political win rather than a proper trade deal, which could take years. The EU offered extended transitional arrangements in the meantime but the UK rejected that. Lord Frost is primarily responsible for this mess.
“I do not accept that a situation which is now *worse* than it was before the EEC was formed has happened by accident.”
What was your experience of ordering components from Germany before 1973, or before 1958?
Old adage -‘ when you’re due a slap, take it like a man’ .
We Brit’s had the audacity it vote to leave the EU – there were bound to be formal and informal consequences.
I suspect what you’re seeing is an informal consequence – it ought not to happen ( even with Non tariff barriers) which undoubtedly cause friction at borders. – you’re not alone.
The key question for Germany and member states is to conform to EU rules as opposed to ad hoc rules used as a potential punishment beating.
Portugal seems to be having severe issues with exports to UK – worse, it doesn’t even appear to be able to sell these displaced ‘exports’ to the rest of the EU internal market – just imagine what it’s like for other EU members.
Customs and tax issues encountered be EU exporters be those imposed by the UK. Just as barriers to trade, this is as a result of the UK insistence on a quick no tariff trade agreement, will be imposed by the EU country exported to.
Blaming all this on EU punishment of the UK for leaving is not borne out by the facts. Its the UK’s fault for the way it left the EU. We could have had a much better trade agreement than we got by impatience, brinkmanship and megaphone diplomacy.
Whoever said ‘every success is national, every failure is European’ was onto something.
A couple of almost completely disconnect observations. First, trying to understand why nations such as France and Germany continue to push for ever-closer union, for things like a European Army, I suspect that we may misunderstand their motives and mistake it for, to be a little blunt, “trying to take through political manipulation that which they have twice failed to take by force”. To the contrary, I think that it is the fear and disgust at what happened which propels the project – the idea that by forcing everyone to come together, this can in time break down our differences and ultimately achieve the aspiration that, “There is no they, only us.”
But at the same time I think that the route chosen to get there is particularly fraught. I think it was Mayer Rothschild who said, “Give me control of a nation’s currency and I care not who writes her laws”, a sentiment that we have seen play out during recent financial turbulence and the fate of the so-called PIGS – Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, who effectively had to bend a knee to the north.
Ridiculed by various American friends over European antics, I counter with, “OK, but suppose that Canada and Mexico decided that the USMCA would be a political union, that there would be a rotating chair, that the US would be bound to honour decisions and that the US, being 1 vote among 3, could be out-voted by Canada and Mexico. Now suppose that those nations decided that the US would be a net financial contributor to the project, subsiding the other economies.” The good humour stopped – and quickly.
The members States of the US Union grappled with harmonisation through tools such as the Filibuster and the Electoral College, but the EU was less sophisticated and ultimately a price was paid – I won’t presume to say by whom.
I broadly agree with your analysis, although rather than identify a single event or conference or treaty or ‘thing’ that planted the seed of dissonance, how about the thought that it was ‘lack of candour’ that ultimately formed the trigger. Whether that was a difference in the desired end goal – i.e. whether to stop at a USMCA-like trade agreement, or whether to push for full integration; whether individual members states put this to the vote or simply pushed it through (as we did), it’s hard to say.
But with zero evidence either way, I wonder if it was the decision to *not* put ratification of the formation of the EU from the EEC to the UK electorate that was at least one pair of butterfly’s wings.
I broadly agree with you about the T of M , but also concur with an earlier comment that you might have given more weight to the 2009 T of Lisbon because it did a lot of consolidation of various issues, created the role of appointed President of the Council and gave the Euro parl a lot more say in many things, including appointing the commmission President.
“.. But with zero evidence either way, I wonder if it was the decision to *not* put ratification of the formation of the EU from the EEC to the UK electorate that was at least one pair of butterfly’s wings….”
Furtiveness has certainly played much part in the creation of the EU as it is today – one only has to read the papers of Monnet & Sir Arthur Salter.
Furtiveness & a lack of candour has a price – you might call it Brexit today. As a young boy growing up in the early 60’s ,on hearing of the old adage ” you can’t lie to the people, all of the time” , I couldn’t think of the EC/EU as a better exemplar of that lie.
I completely agree that sunlight is the best medicine.
Rather than look backwards – why don’t you start by explaining how Brexit is going to create lots of opportunities for the UK?
Something concrete for existing businesses, please, rather than Dominic Cummings’ cyberpunk techno-utopia.
Thanks
I recall reading the Maastricht Treaty – I think it was published as a special supplement by The Independent or maybe The Observer. I also recall the opposition to it from “the usual suspects”. In that sense, yes, Brexit could be said to start with Maastricht. But it was by no means inevitable.
I believed then, as I believe now, Dean Acheson’s prescience in 1962 in observing that Britain had lost an empire but not yet found a role for itself. The EU offered UK an opportunity to find that role as an important and influential member State and gradually shed its post imperial “punching above its weight” pretensions and over a period of time come to terms with the reality of being a middling sized European country with an economy that was also predominantly based on trading with Europe. But that was never good enough for the anti-Europeans. The shame is that neither Labour or Conservative politicians, nor the media, could not bring themselves to admit in public that the EU was a very good thing. The EU was always a useful whipping boy for politicians of both major national parties. And all this despite the historical fact that the fate of all post maritime imperial nations has been one of rapid decline and global irrelevance, followed by a long slow path to acceptance of a more realistic understanding of their place in the world.
The tragedy of Brexit, apart from the economic self-harm it has and will continue to cause, is that Dean Acheson’s statement is cruelly and painfully even more acutely true now. The idea of “global Britain” is ludicrous. Instead, a very real prospect is the break-up of the Union itself. It will take a generation, if not two or even more, for UK, or rump England, to find its own realistic place in the world and for the English (for Brexit was predominantly an English phenomenon) to be comfortable “in their skins” with that reduced place in the global firmament. Brexit has ironically given us less sovereignty: we will be at the mercy of stronger countries and groupings and like the elderly in the psalm, pulled where we do not wish to go. The EU could have provided us with a “soft landing” on that journey. Now it will be hard, long and much more painful.
The EEC was always about much more than a Common Market. Heath had committed to a European Union, and Wilson later confirmed it. The 1992 Single Market project had to be understood as one dimension of a much more ambitious political project.
But that project was not about the creation of a federal superstate (though there had always been eager enthusiasts for that, of course). The EU remains, as I think it was always going to be, a hybrid federal/confederal construction. After the heroic steps taken at Maastricht the pendulum was already swinging back towards inter-governmentalism, with a weaker E.Commission and a stronger Council. The sadness is that Brexit occurred just as the EU was beginning to find its natural equilibrium, and as the UK was coming to terms with its place in the structures. (The EU had shown remarkable flexibility and imagination to accommodate us….).
The UK’s real failure, in my view, was that our Parliament never tried to make a constructive contribution to the EU legislative process. Nor did they ever hold UK Ministers properly to account (which would have done so much to establish greater democratic legitimacy). Having Bill Cash presiding over scrutiny all those years was a disaster. Nor did UK leaders – even Blair – have the courage to explain the the British population that Brussels was ‘us’ not ‘them’, and that the EU was a multiplier of UK potential.
I wouldn’t myself say that Brexit began at Maastricht. Nor do I think it was ‘inevitable’, even as late as 2019.
Very good contribution !
By union, you appear to imply federalism.
Maastricht “resolved to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.”
Amsterdam (1997) clarified “…in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen”
The wording has not been revisited in treaties since.
The treaties do not provide a basis for federalism. The word “peoples” does not mean “states”.
If I had intended to “imply” federalism I would have said “federalism” but I did not, so I did not
I chose the words I meant instead!
You chose to say “union” instead of “union of peoples”. Why did you leave out “of peoples”?
Not deliberately – but it would not have made any difference had I done so
Well it seems to me that there is a world of difference. The statement in the treaties is essentially a statement of the obvious, and does not in any way foretell political union. In a shrinking world, as people get to work together more, they become closer and in the process choose to collaborate on supranational issues. But also in a shrinking world it is paramount to protect a diversity of cultures – including nations – in much in the same way as bio-diversity needs to be protected. If ever there was a noble model for future world governance, the European Union is it.
But to participate requires trust, and knowing who you are. Both been lacking in the Eurosceptic UK for decades, at Westminster level at least. Edinburgh and Cardiff on the other hand understood the benefits.
De Gaulle thought the UK was not European. I don’t agree with that interpretation but he had a point and no doubt his wartime experience was very much part of that.
Maastricht was just one step on the way in the post WW2 era.
‘Great’ Britain could not get over the loss of empire and the `Commonwealth was no substitute. That realisation will return and maybe one day the UK will be a member of the EU.
I’m in complete alignment with you on Maastricht – I’ve discussed this with many a Brexiteer ( aka leaver) of a certain age ( >60) and many of us think that it was Maastricht that helped galvanise a disparate band of MPs ( Major called them ‘ the bastard’s many of whom went on to form the ERG) and the public in general to turn away from the more integrationist aspects of the EU.
Few remember it went from EEC to European Community to European Union in 20 years .
You mention the Single Market but the laying down the formation of the euro and Monetary ( currency) Union also put a spotlight on the future of the EU and its more grandiose political intentions. It became pretty apparent what the cost of the single currency was – rather fortunately this was a bridge too far for the UK ( which even the dim witted Major understood).
So, all in all, whilst Maastricht, in my view, was intellectually acceptable to the establishment, it led to the public’s emotional detachment to a project that , frankly, few believed in ( even Gaitskill and Peter Shore and Tony Benn all quality labour politicians really didn’t like much about EEC ,ok, all well before Maastricht).
Selling a product ( EU) the public didn’t want at a price ( sovereignty) it didn’t want to pay was always a hard sell.
Maybe Maastricht ought to go down as the EU treaty that few saw or thought through the law of unintended consequences.
Maastrict was certainly significant. It was when the Eurosceptics in Parliament began to make a lot of noise. Lisbon reinforced the feeling about creeping federalism. Yet that was really when the federalist argument was lost as public opposition to it was made clear during the ratification process. Yet Eurosceptics continued to loudly rail against the creep towards federalism.
I dont think Brexit was ever inevitable. Support was for it was not the majority view until 2016 referendum campaign was nearly over.
I think that the path to Brexit began earlier. There was Mrs Thatcher’s increasing disillusionment with the EEC after the completion of the single market. Even earlier, and maybe right from the beginning, was the bureaucracy’s tendency to over-regulate the implementation of directives. (Mea culpa as I was part of it.) There was also the unwillingness of politicians of both main parties to try to sell to the British people the deep strategic rationale for European integration as expressed in ‘ever closer union’ rather than just the economic benefits of a common market.
The Maastricht Treaty gave anti-Europeans a powerful weapon to wield in their cause.
David,
I agree with much of the thrust of your argument. In fact it would be hard to argue against. I remember the days, and nights, of debate during the passage of the Maastricht Treaty through the House of Commons.
Whilst I agree that Maastricht galvanised the future ‘Brexiteers’, I would argue that there was already the root of this movement in the wake of Thatcher’s Bruges speech (the ‘Bruges Group’).
But that was very much in response to Delors speech to the European Parliament talking about 80% of economic legislation being of Community origin. It’s when we got into the whole “Up yours, Delors” syndrome.
You can keep going back in time, yes. Conference of Messina, anyone?
But the Delors speech and then the Bruges speech laid the groundwork for the whole Maastricht debate, in my opinion.
That is a fair counterpoint – also Delors’ speech to the TUC
Quite. “Up yours Delors”. The clever but poisonous Sun’s popularist opposition was a brilliant vehicle to disseminate Murdoch’s hatred of the EU among the unthinking English. His malign influence on British politics has yet to be fully appreciated. Not Russian agitprop but instead a naturalised American (for tax purposes) Australian with a deep loathing for the Establishment and the Monarchy. His motives? From every conceivable but unlikely conspiracy to well balanced Antipodean with a chip on both shoulders…
For many there was no feeling of community in the EU. Now there is none in the UK either.
Thanks Farage.
We could indeed go back in time. The UK missed its chance to guide the direction of the EEC, from the foundation of the ECSC onwards. Perhaps that was understandable, post-war, pre-Suez, with the focus on the Empire and then the Commonwealth, but we then regretted it through the 1960s (and De Gaulle’s repeated “non”) until we joined in 1973. Having left again recently, we are going through the process of reminding ourselves why we joined in the first place.
And in passing let us remind ourselves that “union sans cesse plus étroite entre les peuples européens” – that is, “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” – was not a new federalist impulse springing from an EU bureaucrat in Brussels: it was plainly there in the Treaty of Rome from the start.
Maastricht was at heart a project pioneered by British Conservatives to create a functioning European single market for goods and services, and to reform the EEC’s internal governance to overcome the Commission-dominated Eurosclerosis of the 1970s and 1980s.
It is one of the ironies that the UK has had a leading role in creating several intergovernmental bodies in Europe – the ECHR is another example – but then has remained semi-detached at best.
Your analysis explains very well how the decisions taken at Maastricht turned a part of the Conservative party off Europe.
Does this help to explain the journey to Brexit?
Well it certainly gets us some way down the road, because the entire project grew out of that same disillusioned part of conservative opinion. And Maastricht pushed some of those to harden from being sceptics to leavers.
So it gave the initial impetus. Without it, we would probably not have had Brexit. But why am I doubtful that it actually got us to the final destination ?
Because few of the problem issues at Maastricht had a profile in the referendum. Nor did they even figure in public opinion in the decade before it.
The biggest Maastricht problem issue – the Euro – didn’t figure much at all, since the EU had evolved to accommodate both Euro and non-Euro countries as full members.
The extension of EU powers into justice and home affairs, or even foreign and security policy were played up at the time of Maastricht. But only in theoretical terms. Because in practice few people found objections to the EU naval force against piracy off Somalia, or issues like EU cooperation in the fight against organised crime, or strengthening external borders. And these very issues actually turned some conservative opinion in favour of ‘more Europe’.
What did seem to matter very much in the referendum were the economic issues – the costs of EU membership, immigration from Central Europe, and ‘sovereignty’ often expressed in terms of ‘regulations being imposed by Brussels’.
But the first two of these have nothing to do with Maastricht. They arise from the expansion of the EU to include Central Europe. A project supported at the time by UK public opinion, although again in theory since people balked at the arrival of the Polish plumber.
What is linked to Maastricht is the single market bit.
But, wait – that was supposed to be the positive part of Maastricht, wasn’t it ? The ‘economic’ thing. The ‘common market’ bit.
If we’d stayed with the 1992 part of Maastricht, you felt that Brexit would have been more unlikely.
Well, here we come to the gap between public opinion and reality.
Because if you ask people to give an example of an actual problem caused by a regulation ‘imposed’ by Brussels, you will wait in vain for a substantial answer.
You might get a reference to the sort of thing which appeared in Boris Johnson articles of the time – bent bananas, prawn cocktail crisps, condom sizes. But almost nothing he wrote then was really true, as he admitted. We just like to read about the stupidity of foreigners in cooking up ever more absurd things to impose on us. So the ‘sovereignty’ argument took a real hold on public opinion. Many years of negative publicity, true or not, didn’t gain many friends for the EU. Maybe this drove us down the road to Brexit more than anything arising from Maastricht. Because these stories appeared before 1992 as well. They’re not really about extending EU powers, EU overreach or sovereignty.
It’s instructive that the one piece of EU legislation for which the Daily Mail campaigned just before Brexit – restrictions on plastic bag use (oddly enough a single market issue) – was considered by the EU itself, not without some reason, as potential overreach and a breach of sovereignty.
Where I have some sympathy with those Conservatives who objected to Maastricht on sovereignty grounds is the case of the EU working time directive. This was voted through under the single market in a way which was debatable at the time. In that sense, it is a case of ‘imposition’.
But have you heard them cite it as an example ? Certainly not in the referendum. Because the substance is overwhelmingly popular – it gave a statutory basis to holiday pay, maternity leave and some worker protections which were cited by leave campaigners as Britain having even higher standards than Europe.
Well, so much for the rant.
Maastricht gave us a push along the road. But it didn’t get us to the destination. Immigration, costs and other more intangible factors and feelings seemed to play the key role.
Some of these feelings we don’t seem to understand yet. It’s something of a mystery that public opinion in England and Wales moved against the EU between the two referenda in 1976 and 2016 whereas in Scotland there was a significant move in the opposite direction. In every region, prosperous or not, industrial or rural. With voters who probably felt pretty much the same as their English cousins about EU immigration or costs. And maybe even more so about sovereignty, or being told by a bigger neighbour what to do.
These differences may say more about England than Scotland. What is really going on here ? Who knows ? But it’s probably something more than Maastricht.
Alan – you make some valid points but fail to share some of the key learnings of 45 years membership of the the EU by the UK.
Most agree that both Maastricht and Lisbon took the EU onto more political and integrationist path.
Both treaties took away national member state competencies ( per DAG analysis) and introduced significantly more Qualified Majority Voting – most of this happened without most member states explicit consent.
Is it wonder that the public ( ok in the UK) didn’t feel consulted let alone loved. PM Brown signing the ‘tidying up ‘ Lisbon Treaty a day late ,like a furtive fox, just happened to make an opaque treaty even more opaque.
Thing is, this ratchet mechanism or ‘engrenage’ used by the EU to take away national competencies means that a) integration gets much deeper b) Treaty by treaty nation states necessarily lose competencies in the name of EU integration.
Add the creation of the Euro in the Maastricht Treaty and what’s really happened since then is ( natural) greater Eurozone caucusing that leads to greater problems for non EU countries.
The referendum in 2016 at least gave some of us with a knowledge of the more arcane ( some would call it the democratic deficit) knowledge of EU procedures the chance to move away from the EU.
Whilst the outcome has been mixed, it looks likely that any thoughts of rejoining are with the fairies.
You talk as if the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties were imposed by the EU on member states and that no one knew what the changes were in detail. It was all discussed and negotiated over a long period. Neither treaty could have been signed if all nations had not ratified them. Different nations had different mechanisms to do that but to say national competancies were lost explicit consent is a very parial view.
For further changes to happen further treaties would be required. Further development could not happen by stealth. The UK negotiated opt outs on a number of things which isolated us from some of the integration, notably the Euro. The lack of popular support for Federalism was clear in the opposition to Lisbon and it’s highly doubtful if further moves towards that old goal are likely.
Membership of the EEC and later the EU always did involve some shared sovereignty. The benefits of this were largely lost on the din of the Brexit referendum and were never properly debated. You talk about a mixed outcome, but mixed implies gains and losses. Any gains are unclear (we could always have had blue passports and we would have been able to approve Covid-19 vaccines outside of EU joint actions) but the economic losses are significant. Not to mention the loss of international influence. The bits of sovereignty we regained really were not worth the pain which will continue for decades.
That’s not to say we will rejoin in a hurry (we wouldn’t have the opt outs that we had previously so the terms might not be attractive). To say thought of rejoining are with the fairies is pushing it though. It’s not as if remainers have changed their views (any more than leavers would have if we’d stayed in the EU). The reasons to join (massive trading benefits and greater political influence) remain the same.
“Different nations had different mechanisms to do that but to say national competancies were lost explicit consent is a very parial view.”
Don’t conflate the UK with other nations.
Sure France, Ireland & Denmark in the past had referendums in the past but Lisbon was modified twice to ‘appease’ the French & Irish to eventually get the ‘right’ answer.
J C Juncker knew that ‘lies’ had to be told inorder to get treaties past certain members.
Important to know that both Maastricht /Lisbon didn’t necessarily have consent of the people as opposed to consent of HoP – we were not offered referendums for Maastricht or Lisbon – both treaties not in Labour or Tory manifesto either.
Very few folks in the UK understand how the arcane principals of the EU work – especially ‘enhanced cooperation clauses, “diqule procedures”*
and passerelle clauses.
*An important aspect of diqule is the ad hoc/standing committee’s which is standing committee’s by any measure I know. The ad hoc quality of them is that membership is transient, it consists of whichever civil servants are relevant for the issue on the agenda, but it is never listed whom these civil servants might be. The agenda is also not published anywhere. Diqule is sort of a black box where issues go in, magic happens, and regulation come out in the other end years and decades longer.
Its only when you really begin to understand how the EU works , does it become apparent that it isn’t the democratic paragon of virue its made out to be by Brussels.
No matter – I’m sure in the next 50-60 years we’ll be given the opportunity to vote to rejoin a new EU , or whatever it becomes. I’m not holding my breath.
If we are concerned, rightly, about the ‘democratic deficits’ of the EU, can we pause and also discuss the ‘democratic deficits’ of the U.K.?
I didn’t coflate anything. I said different countres had different mechanisms to ratify treaties. That is a fact. The UK ratifies treaties in Parliament. Referenda are not the norm and there’s no reason to have expected one. Most people voting in the 2016 referendum didn’t fully understand the issues, only knew what they’d read in the press, and so the UK’s future was decided by an ill informed electorate. This is contrary to our Parliamentary democracy where we entrust decision making to elected representatives.
The Lisbon treaty was necessary to manage the enlarged EU and give it more international influence (beneficial to all member states). It had to be passed to progress enlargement. The Irish government didn’t simply keep asking until it got the right result. The treaty was amended and that changed version was accepted. This applied to all member states that had difficulties in agreeing until all were satisfied. Absolutely nothing wrong with this. Getting 28 states to agree to a treaty isn’t easy. It’s difficult enough between two.
I don’t know what lies Juncker says were told or to who, but the British people have been lied to by their own Parliament throughout the Brexit process.
Arcane procedures in Brussels aren’t a good reason to leave the world’s largest trading bloc, or to give up the huge home market it provided UK businesses to freely trade with.
In response to K Hall:
“…Referenda are not the norm and there’s no reason to have expected one. Most people voting in the 2016 referendum didn’t fully understand the issues, only knew what they’d read in the press, and so the UK’s future was decided by an ill informed electorate. This is contrary to our Parliamentary democracy where we entrust decision making to elected representatives…”
It really wouldn’t be too hard to argue that matters pertaining to the EU actually are the norm, re the 1975 referendum.
Many will feel it patronising that they didn’t know what they voted for in the 2016 referendum – the argument swings both ways – if we’d remained you think they would be any the wiser. Sometimes accept with good grace the outcome actually obtained rather than the one you would have liked.
It amuses me greatly that you think that Parliament knows better than the voters – lest we forget that most of the 2017-2019 Parliament were 75% ‘remainers’ despite having voted for triggering Article 50 – they then spent the next two years trying to prevent the government from negotiating a successful Brexit with the EU – that we had a hard Brexit is , in my mind , partially due to the remainer/remoaner MPs of all parties ahead of the 2019 election that brought Johnson into power.
But we digress too far from the blog meme.
“It amuses me greatly that you think that Parliament knows better than the voters – lest we forget that most of the 2017-2019 Parliament were 75% ‘remainers’ despite having voted for triggering Article 50 – they then spent the next two years trying to prevent the government from negotiating a successful Brexit with the EU – that we had a hard Brexit is , in my mind , partially due to the remainer/remoaner MPs of all parties ahead of the 2019 election that brought Johnson into power.”
Parliament certainly knew more about the likely outcome of Brexit than the voters, that’s for sure. You simply cannot blame our hard Brexit on remainer oppostion, and your use of the term “remoaner”, a Leaver slur, has no place here.
During the referendum campaign leading Brexiteers, including ERG MPs and Farage, repeatedly said that of course we wouldn’t be leaving the single market, hinting at a soft Brexit. Yet May’s red lines led directly to this. If the Brexiters had properly understood EU treaties they would have realised this was inevitable. Remainer MP opposition had nothing to do with the hard brexit outcome. Negotiations with the EU took place before any votes on the withdrawal agreement. The ERG and DUP were determined to have the hardest Brexit possible. A softer Brexit might well have got a Parliamentary majority. Remainer opposition was mainly aimed at stopping no deal or a hard Brexit, not leaving itself. After all, most MPs had voted to trigger Article 50, this committing the UK to leave.
As for Johnson coming to power at the 2019 Election, that’s not the case. He came to power in the summer of 2019 after May resigned. Then we had all the brinkmanship to push for no deal. His “oven ready” Brexit was May’s agreement with the NI backstop removed and replaced by the NI protocol. None of this was influenced by remain MPs. The awful quick and dirty Trade Agreement, plus all the refusals to extend transition, were down to the Government. Remain MPs didn’t force their hand.
We are where we are, but Brexiters cannot blame Remain opposition for the hard Brexit outcome. It’s entirely the Brexiters doing.
“…A softer Brexit might well have got a Parliamentary majority…”
Again, how naive.
There were a number of indicative votes in the latter stages of the 2017-2019 Parliament to try and derive options that could be taken forward – all were significantly softer Brexit than the one actually achieved yet none, including Nick Boles’ Common Market 2.0 gained any traction – not least because all tied us to either a Customs Union or to the Single Market with Freedom of Movement.
My own initial preference was for EFTA/EEA interim ( inc FoM) – unfortunately both Cameron & Osborne both made this toxic pre referendum.
That we got a thin TCA is probably the best that we could have got without BRINO and May’s first and vassel state Withdrawal Agreement & backstop.
It transpires that given what hasn’t happened subsequently in Financial Services, Horizon and Legano ‘bad faith’ by the EU was most certainly on the agenda.
Don’t call me naive when it’s you who have misunderstood my point. I was talking about early on, before May drew her red lines (without any thought for the inevitable consequences). A softer Brexit could well have got a majority. You say yourself you would have accepted freedom of movement, but May ruled it out. By the time the indicative votes happened things had moved on and Tory brexiteers would never have considered anything softer. It’s not surprising that by that time there was no majority for any option.
Johnson’s deal was exactly the same as May’s apart from deleting the back stop and putting the border down the Irish Sea. In what way do you think it prevented the vassal state? Not that that was ever going to happen anyway. It was nonsense floated by Rees-Mogg. Norway and Switzerland aren’t vassal states.
“What hasn’t happened afterwards” are issues deliberately excluded from the WA and Trade negotiations by May and Johnson. It was astonishing that services, and especially financial services, were left out. It’s not surprising the EU is playing hardball now we’ve left.
“..Don’t call me naive when it’s you who have misunderstood my point. I was talking about early on…”
Now he tell us. 🥴
So, as I said before, and I’ll repeat – Both Cameron & Osborne effectively poisoned the EFTA/EEA option* before & during the referendum.
*sometimes called The Norway Option – this was, in my view eminently liveable – unfortunately it was too far out of the EU for Cameron – he & Osborne spiked the option early , made it effectively toxic and still managed to lose the referendum – Laurel & Hardy style.
May’s WA1 inc Backstop was near full on vasselage. It needed EU agreement to terminate the backstop** and allow the UK to leave the/a Customs Union about which we’d have no say /vote apart from likely observer status.
Thus we’d have been in the EUs customs regulatory orbit inc the CAP & CFP – this would have obviated the whole concept of Brexit – it was called Brexit in name only ( BRINO) for this very reason.
** the EU had no incentive ever to terminate WA1 and Cox, the Attorney General at the time reluctantly accepted this.
The NIP remains per euphile John Major a dog’s dinner – only time will tell whether it survives together with the TCA.
I’ve a suspicion that relations have still a long way to go to improve between UK and EU – the TCA is workable but might need 5-10 years of experience before building on it – the awful
truth is that even now, UK trade is rising with RoW and stabilizing with the EU – the zenith of UK/EU trade has gone.
‘a successful Brexit with the EU’
A fine oxymoron if ever there was one.