18th April 2022
The home secretary has issued ‘a ministerial direction’ for her proposal for a ‘migration and economic development partnership’ with Rwanda for the processing of asylum claims.
Such a direction is significant – but it is also important to realise what it does not signify.
The direction by itself does not mean that the proposal is wrong, or will not work, or is unlawful.
What it does mean is that there is sufficient concern within the home office that the most senior official wants Priti Patel to own the decision to go ahead with it.
And this is worth exploring.
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The partnership proposal was published last (Maundy) Thursday – which is odd, given that parliament was not sitting and we are around the time of the start of the central government ‘purdah’ for the local election campaigns.
Also published was a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Rwanda.
In general terms, an MoU is a document that is supposed to impress you as as being effective and formal, but is not actually effective nor formal.
A political (and legal) sleight of hand (SoH).
And followers of this blog will enjoy the wording of paragraph 2.2 of the MoU:
“2.2 For the avoidance of doubt, the commitments set out in this Memorandum are made by the United Kingdom to Rwanda and vice versa and do not create or confer any right on any individual, nor shall compliance with this Arrangement be justiciable in any court of law by third-parties or individuals.”
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So that was (Maundy) Thursday.
On (Easter) Saturday, in the late afternoon, two letters were published by the government.
These letters were dated 13 April 2022, that is the Wednesday before the proposal and the MoU were published on the Thursday.
The first letter was from the most senior civil servant at the home office.
He was insisting on a ministerial direction.
Why?
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To answer that question we need to understand government policy on ‘managing public money’.
This policy is not the sort of partisan policy which politicians announce or publish in a manifesto.
It is instead the sort of policy which any government has, regardless of which part is in power.
And within each department the most senior official – in this case the permanent secretary – is the ‘accounting officer’ responsible for ensuring the policy is complied with.
When I was a government lawyer fifteen years ago, it was known as ‘VFM’ – value for money.
Part of the ‘managing public money’ policy provides:
The fine folk at the Institute of Government have provided this excellent explainer on ministerial directions which you should now read.
And this is the government’s own page for such directions.
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Now we go back to the permanent secretary’s letter.
You will see the first three paragraphs set out his understanding of the policy and what it is seeking to achieve – and this is set out in positive terms to which the home secretary herself cannot object.
The fourth paragraph then sets out his role as the accounting officer, and the fifth paragraph sets out the extent to which he sees there is no problem with the Rwanda proposal (emphasis added):
“The Accounting Officer advice that I have received comprises a rigorous assessment of the regularity, propriety, feasibility and value for money of this policy, drawing on legal, policy and operational expertise. I have satisfied myself that it is regular, proper and feasible for this policy to proceed. We have incorporated learning from Windrush in developing this policy and the plans for its implementation.”
So, according to the official it is generally “regular, proper and feasible” for the proposal to proceed.
But.
There is something about which he as accounting officer is not satisfied, and this is set out out in the next paragraphs (which I have separated out for flow):
“However, this advice highlights the uncertainty surrounding the value for money of the proposal.
“I recognise that, despite the high cost of this policy, there are potentially significant savings to be realised from deterring people entering the UK illegally.
“Value for money of the policy is dependent on it being effective as a deterrent.
“Evidence of a deterrent effect is highly uncertain and cannot be quantified with sufficient certainty to provide me with the necessary level of assurance over value for money.
I do not believe sufficient evidence can be obtained to demonstrate that the policy will have a deterrent effect significant enough to make the policy value for money.
“This does not mean that the MEDP cannot have the appropriate deterrent effect; just that it there is not sufficient evidence for me to conclude that it will.”
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The proposal has a “high cost” – but there is no sufficient evidence that the high cost will be offset by savings from it having any deterrent effect.
The evidence for such an effect is not only uncertain but “highly uncertain”.
He therefore cannot sign off on the policy as accounting officer.
He instead needs to escalate it to the minister to sign off personally.
And so (again broken up for flow):
“Therefore, I will require your written instruction to proceed.
“I consider it is entirely appropriate for you to make a judgement to proceed in the light of the illegal migration challenge the country is facing.
“I will of course follow this direction and ensure the Department continues to support the implementation of the policy to the very best of our abilities.
“Should you issue a direction, I am required to copy all relevant papers to the Comptroller and Auditor General (who will inform the Public Accounts Committee) and the Treasury Officer of Accounts.
“I anticipate publishing our exchange of direction letters as early as practicable.”
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So this is not any usurpation of ministerial responsibility and democratic control, but a reinforcement of the priority of minister over officials.
The minister will get their way – but they have to take the decision themselves.
And so the home secretary replied, giving the direction.
Her letter is also worth looking at – though this time for what it does not say.
Her letter does not engage with the value for money points but sidesteps them (again broken for flow):
“While we understand it is not possible for HMG to accurately model the deterrent effect from day one, together with Rwanda, we are confident this policy is our best chance at producing that effect.
“It is only by introducing new incentives and effective deterrents into the system, as our international partners like Denmark, Greece, and Australia have succeeded in doing, that we can take on the criminal gangs facilitating illegal entry and break their lethal business model.
“I recognise your assessment on the immediate value for money aspect of this proposal.
“However, I note that without action, costs will continue to rise, lives will continue to be lost, and that together we have introduced safeguards into our agreement to protect taxpayer funding.
“And while accepting the constraints of the accounting officer framework set out by HM Treasury, I also think there are credible invest-to-save arguments in the long term.
[…]
…I also believe there is an imperative to act now to mitigate the impact on staff wellbeing as well as departmental operational and financial pressures in the longer term.
“It would therefore be imprudent in my view, as Home Secretary, to allow the absence of quantifiable and dynamic modelling – which is inevitable when developing a response to global crises influenced by so many geopolitical factors such as climate change, war and conflict –– to delay delivery of a policy that we believe will reduce illegal migration, save lives, and ultimately break the business model of the smuggling gangs.
“I am therefore formally directing you as Accounting Officer to take forward this scheme with immediate effect, managing the identified risks as best you can.”
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For the home secretary, the lack of sufficient evidence of any deterrent effect does not matter.
She believes the Rwanda proposal will work, and so it shall be taken forward.
She is confident that in the longer-term there will be value for money, and – in any case – modelling is not easy for this sort of things.
Her decision; her call.
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Of course, one should be wary of taking documents such as these two exchanged letters seriously at face value.
Such exchanges can be choreographed and it sometimes (though not here one suspects, given the disjoined nature of the reply) the same official will draft both letters – ‘sign here minister’.
It could be that the request for a direction here is a manifestation of deeper unease within the home office at this proposal – and that such a request, framed in VFM terms, was the only way of signalling publicly this unease.
The bureaucratic equivalent of the blinking hostage.
On the other hand, the home office is certainly capable of nasty and expensive policies.
And the permanent secretary in his fifth paragraph goes out of his way to say it is “regular, proper and feasible for this policy to proceed”.
Who knows?
Perhaps the permanent secretary knew the value for money objection could not be gainsaid and that it would not look like he was criticising the merits of the proposal.
Perhaps, perhaps, perhaps.
We do not know the realities behind the scenes.
The request for a direction is significant – but what it signifies generally is not clear.
But what we do know from this exchange of letters is that on the very eve of the publication of the proposal, the most senior official in the home office said that there was not sufficient evidence that the proposal would have any deterrent effect, and in response to this the home secretary could not provide any such evidence but wanted to go ahead with the policy anyway.
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VFM is a tricky concept.
What is the value of stopping one unpleasant activity – people trafficking – and replacing it with virtually the same activity delivered by the UK government funded by the taxpayer?
It isn’t VFM that’s done that. The Home Secretary’s plan, which the Home Office civil service questions the VFM of, has done that.
Questioning the VFM makes the Home Secretary wholly accountable for the consequences if it doesn’t save money as she claims. Quite right too.
I know. I was only pointing out the difficulty in assessing what value might mean in this case.
In this case VFM would surely be that the Rwanda deal provides the savings Patel claims. In other words the policy is cheaper then the existing cost of dealing with “illegal” asylum seekers. The Permanent Secretary thought she hadn’t made that case.
There may be a way to demonstrate that in pure monetary terms. Was the PS writing that it was better value than the existing policy? He was concerned that value for money had not been demonstrated because it depended on deterrence. Counter-factuals might show that others policies could be more successful in deterring and therefore better ‘value’.
As I understood it saving money was one of Patel’s arguments for her plan, hence the VFM objection.
But do you think the purpose was genuinely and solely VFM?
Maybe I’m reading too much in to this, but when I think of all the flagrant abuses of spending – e.g. HS/2 – that HM Government has undertaken under Conservative leadership, calling out this seems, well, a bit odd.
Almost as though Rycroft was using VFM as a mechanism to make it crystal clear exactly whose brilliant idea this was…
VFM as a deterrent.
The policy document states that this will be a deterrent to migration.
The Strategic Business Case is “reduce incentives for migration by creating deterrents”.
This raises two questions for HO policy officials and analysts , “will reducing incentives to migrate reduce migration?” and “will this policy reduce incentives for migration”
Ministers will have been told no by policy officials and offered alternatives, but will have declined to pursue these alternatives.
That’s when letters are sent, to prevent officials being blamed later.
But these letters can be ‘career enders’, as it’s almost an admission of failure.
Gosh yes, as I sat there in some dubious inflatable, struggling to make it across the channel between the steady stream of massive container ships and their disruptive wakes, the one thing that kept going through my mind was,
“I feel bad about this. I might be forcing the UK government to deport, I mean temporarily transfer me to Rwanda – and just think how much that is going to cost the British tax-payers.
Yes, I was obsessively worried about that, all the way across the Channel.
Pace 3.6.6, following the minister’s direction “without further ado”, where is the line to be draw? If the minister wants internment camps built, is the civil servant to acquiesce? What if the instruction from the minister is for gas chambers and crematoria?
Both letters seem to me to be very poorly drafted.
My understanding was that ‘purdah’ (is it still referred to as that?) started on Thursday 14 April and the expectation is:
“Ministers, whether in the UK Government or in the devolved administrations, remain in office and in charge of their departments but it is customary for them to observe discretion in announcing initiatives that are new or of a long-term character in their capacity as a minister.”
So much for discretion!
Even more interesting is that:
“The general principle for UK Government ministers, as outlined in the Ministerial Code of Conduct, is that ministers may campaign during elections, but public money and departmental resources should not be used for party political purposes.”
I think an awful lot of people think that this announcement was designed as electioneering – again, another example of where the ‘good chap’ element seems to have gone AWOL.
Not just designed for electioneering but used for it. Note that both Home Secretary and PM were announcing it in Rwanda do out of reach of U.K. press but on our media channels!
Not sure why this was not raised with Election Commission forthwith.
Before I get to the narrow element of this topic on which I’d like to comment, can I first recommend the excellent book, “On Liberty”, by (Baroness) Shami Chakrabarti, CBE, who writes with compelling eloquence on the fates of immigrants and refugees alike.
One of the most interesting aspects of these recently announced arrangements are that they prioritise “theatre” over substance.
In his letter to the Home Secretary, Matthew Rycroft writes of the government’s policy: “The policy is also intended to support the Government in its objectives of preventing tragic loss of life in the Channel, deterring hazardous and illegal journeys to the UK and maintaining public trust and confidence in border controls.”
We need to unpack this. Lets start with, “preventing tragic loss of life in the Channel”. Ask yourself, for a moment: if you were a criminal gang involved in illegal trafficking of migrants from Africa, through Spain and/or France to the English Channel, that you are going to receive news of the Rwanda plan and decide to stop? Colour me cynical, but it seems, well, unlikely.
How about, “deterring hazardous and illegal journeys to the UK?” Well, it’s April, and according to the weather web site, “windy.com”, the prevailing wind in the channel mid-way between the Cherbourg peninsula and Swanage is a barely-moving 8 knots. The swell? 1.2 *metres*. Typcail boats used for the illegal passage across the channel? 20-foot-long inflatables, chosen for their dark colour and virtually non-existent RADAR signature. But I digress. How is the knowledge that if you successfully make it all the way to the UK, braving criminal gangs, countless nights sleeping rough, not one but two dangerous sea crossings (the other being from Morocco or Algeria to Spain, France, or Italy), that the news that you would, if caught, be sent to Rwanda for “processing” serve as a deterrant?
The last time I saw political theatre as pointless and pathetic as this was on Sunday 16th September, when I flew from the UK to New York (to help my employer recover from 9/11) via Heathrow Terminal 3. Parked across from the main entrance was an Army armoured vehicle that looked for all the world like a baby tank – tyres instead of tracks and a bored-looking Corporal sat in a turret so as to be nice and visible. Apparently the travelling public were expected to believe that if “something bad” happened, this “baby tank” would swoop in to action. To compare this latest action with that is telling…
What I find most interesting about this development is not what the Home Secretary thinks would be a good idea, but what she most assuredly is *not* doing. According to, of course, Wikipedia, the Royal Navy possesses 8 off-shore River Class Patrol Vessels, 11 Mine countermeasure vessels, 16 coastal and fast patrol vessels and 5 survey vessels. Obviously I’m not counting the “hard power” fleet such as frigates, destroyers and the like.
So: has the Home Secretary asked the Defense Minister if the Navy would mind terribly if asked to patrol the English Channel?
When actively engaged in Afghanistan, the Mod operated Britten-Norman Defender aircraft to provide surveillance and early warning to troops on the ground. The BN2T-4S is a capable, long-endurance aircraft that would be absolutely ideal for monitoring the channel. So, the Home Secretary could ask for those to be re-tasked, right? Sorry, no. You see, the MoD sold the BN2T-4S aircraft it owned back to the manufacturer… last August.
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/uk-sells-defender-aircraft-back-to-manufacturer.
Meanwhile, France continues to reject British offers of joint patrols on beaches in northern France. Feels a bit like their decision to build a migrant camp in Sangatte, next to Calais, as opposed to, say, Montpellier or Narbonne on the French south coast.
Lets be clear: developed western nations have a moral imperative to offer shelter and a future to refugees. But what we’re talking about here is organised crime, using economic migrants as a commodity. If these criminals were moving a similar weight of class-A drugs through France, I somehow think that the French authorities would hold a very different view. What we see instead is the turning of a blind eye on the unspoken condition that these migrants only transit through France en route to the UK…
Neither the Home Secretary nor the broader government appear willing to do anything about the root of the problem. Instead, they appear intent to treat the symptoms, not the cause. I wonder how effective this will prove to be?
Who can tell? He’s clearly attempting to ensure Patel gets all the flak for the policy. The VFM argument also makes it her fault he can’t go along with it. She didn’t make a proper case for her claims about savings. But if the Home Office really isn’t bothered about making a good financial case unless it suits them then it is an appalling state of affairs for this country to be in.
This is a really interesting piece – thank you for the analysis.
I am linking a Guardian article https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/27/priti-patel-blames-evil-gangs-for-channel-crossings-but-the-reality-is-far-more-complicated as I think it provides useful background to Mrs Patel’s thinking.
Thank you Mr Green for bringing the exchange of letters to the front. Always helpful to look at the documents, rather than relying on journalists and commentators who may or may not have read the documents and if they have read them may or may not have understood them.
What I had not understood before is that Patel’s case is based on “deterrence”. She has no evidence that the proposed deterrence will work, but that has not, as one might say, deterred her. The correspodence is framed as a value-for-money question, but at root the problem is that there is nothing there. Given such schemes have been in operation in Australia from 2001, these might have provided helpful evidence. In a way they do provide evidence, but not in a way helpful to Patel, as it appears that the schemes were and are a shambles. So, on the limited evidence available, it will be in line with everything else this government has done and does.
The toadying tone of the Permanent Secretary’s letter is surprising and disappointing.
The silver lining to this very dark cloud is that, in his frantic attempts to keep his job, Johnson is digging himself ever deeper into the populist cess-pit. I never thought I should live to see the day when this country should be run by the National Front, but here we are.
The proposed scheme is morally repugnant.
I think the toadying tone of the PS’s letter should be seen through the lens of “Yes Minister”
The Memorandum of Understanding brings flippantly to mind the Foreign Office’s jittery list of “[c]ertain words [which] should never be used” lest a (non-binding) MoU be construed as a (binding) Treaty. https://twitter.com/RichGreenhill/status/930027499567960064
Such trigger words range from the fundamental to the seemingly innocuous:
• “agreement” instead of “arrangement” (carelessly undermined by § 21.5 of the Rwanda MoU: “terms of reference…not contrary to those provided in…this agreement”)
• “oblige” instead of “commit” (implicitly undermined by § 5.4: “Nothing…obliges the United Kingdom to disclose information if [but only if?] it would be contrary to domestic laws or…international obligations”; similarly for Rwanda, § 12.2)
• “shall” instead of “will” (cf § 2.2: “nor shall compliance…be justiciable”; § 15.3: “terms of reference shall include information”)
• “clause” instead of “paragraph” (pointlessly undermined by § 1.3: “References…to Paragraphs are references to the clauses and sub-clauses of this Arrangement”).
Of course paragraph (sub-clause!) 1.6 takes care to provide “This Arrangement will not be binding in International law.” But then, if that provision is itself not binding, who is to say that “certain words” aren’t to contrary effect?
ps: Puzzled why § 1.1.k defines “Year” to mean “a full calendar year”, which sounds like a synonym for “a clear year” (1 January to 31 December exclusive of any part years before or after), despite the defined word being used as though “calendar year” (start day to eve-of-anniversary) were the intended meaning in all three occurrences. Thus, in § 23.1, twice: “This Arrangement will last 5 years [from 1 January 2023?]. It may be renewed upon request one year from the end of the period.” Moreover, in § 23.2: “the period during which the transfer arrangements cannot be implemented lawfully will not count towards the 5-year period” – such adjustments would make it even stranger to measure the revised 5-year period only in complete calendar years, with even a brief suspension resulting in the term being prolonged by an entire calendar year to compensate for the affected calendar year becoming less than full. Just as well, then, that § 23.5 provides “This arrangement will cease to have effect upon agreement[!] by both participants.”
As a non lawyer I am really grateful for being able to learn how to read government documents. Understanding importance of distinctions between terms used is clearly essential.
It makes me wonder whether ministers read this document in detail of it was all delegated to SPADs and civil servants. If it is the latter, could it be that apparent discrepancies in use of binding and non-binding terms as if they were interchangeable was not mere carelessness?
I find it interesting that Matthew Rycroft’s letter did not question the regularity or propriety of the plan. So he considers it legal and of good conduct. Much of the outcry against it has stressed the potential breaking of international law and the immorality of such a plan. Presumably the Home Office only takes UK law into account and considers good conduct can by immoral, which is a pity.
I note he also says the lessons of Windrush have been learned. I don’t see how that can be, since this also results in the transport of people not considered to be British citizens to a country they have no experience of.
I understand why he only used a very specific point, that the minister cannot argue, to request a ministerial direction. However the commentary about Windrush sounds like he otherwise approves the plan. Seems to me the Home Office has been thoroughly politicised by years of converting Conservative policy into action.
The use of “For the avoidance of doubt” in the MoU with Rwanda did make me smile. Very appropriate to the nature of the document in the circumstances.
A little more Easter handwashing perhaps.
Rather a good wheeze on Priti’s part – a bit of vapourware for the DM/DT demographic to chew on up to May 5th after which all options are open depending on the elections and Boris’s survival when all the photos become visible. I suspect this is just a bit of electioneering and will go the same way as those jet skis that were going to spin rubber boats around and back to France.
But could it work and could it save money. After all, who is going to spend the thick end of $10K to risk drowning and the certainty of a plane ride to Rwanda. Tackling the business model seems a smart idea – but. This idea rather assumes the migrants/traffickers keep to pitching up on Dover beach with their hands up. That may not stay the case, systems adapt.
Moving on, the plane ride to Rwanda looks a bit of a problem. Can you shackle people to seats for the duration, what are the risks of riots in flight. Would not fancy that job nor loaning my aircraft unless for a big risk premium. Imagine the screaming and raving after a crash. To say nothing of legal challenges from now to eternity. VFM is a very flexible concept and I doubt any will materialise – but who cares.
Perhaps Priti has factored in these unknown unknowns – or perhaps she does not care, or this is all pure puff for May 5th. Happy is he who expects little…..
Irrespective of the validity of any particular person’s claim to asylum, we owe it to ourselves as a supposedly civilized nation to entertain such claims seriously, and deal with them promptly and justly. However criminal the activities of those who may have helped them reach these shores, we must not attack such criminality by “sub-contracting out our responsibilities.” The manifest intention of the Home Secretary is to frighten other potential asylum-seekers into another, unspoken, route. This is simply using the transported persons as pawns, not humans.
Incidentally, I do not wholeheartedly agree with the Archbishop of Canterbury in his assessment of Rwanda as “a country that seeks to do well.” Any so-called democracy whose head of state was last elected with 98.79% of the vote cannot be trusted, in my opinion.
Perhaps it is because I am myself an (emmigrant from UK &) immigrant to France earning an above average salary that I have aye thought Brexiters & their ilk myopic. If Africans and other migrants from the South wanted to just lay about, surely they would do so in a zone with better weather ? Also being usually poor (compared to NW Europeans) their family bonds are generally strong. So it is not logical to conclude that if they come here, then for most if not all, it is in order to work and to get on but want to go home after earning? And do we not need those hands ?
As there is an objective argument to décriminalise but to control the sale of certain drugs (and so to atrify criminal earnings) so should there not be a means of allowing in immigrants with say a 3 or 5 year pass ? With a safety net which is limited to the points you rack up. Many would then go home with professional training and business experience to enhance their Native Villages, those who wanted to stay could be means tested. Better to have such immigration controlled overtly for NWE and better for the NVs where middle classes would grow faster.
I know that in theory the Home Office follows a selective immigration system, but the HO has long been unfit for purpose on immigration and forever try to shove a camel through the eye of a needle.
Immigrants fit for labour can still be tested for aptitude and motivation. They can be given formal and protected second tier status until they return or earn citizenship here. The Romans managed this with huge success, the HO are aye straining away doused in camel sh !t.
Is it not the case that Rycroft was arguing that the policy would be ineffective in deterring the people traffickers and breaking their business model? It just won’t work. He had to do this under one of the four rubrics you identify, and value for money was the one he chose. But he was not really arguing about money.
Is it possible that this rather revolting proposal has been on the back-burner for some time? In 2017 Ms Patel visited Israel, and was very coy about who she met and why. She did lie about her visit at one point, she also claimed, the Foreign Sec. now PM, knew all about her visit. Israel also exports unwanted immigrants to Rwanda. It may be coincidence, but surely not beyond the bounds of possibility.
I question the assertion, “In general terms, an MoU is a document that is supposed to impress you as as being effective and formal, but is not actually effective nor formal.”.
In the past, I have heard arbitrations in which the basis of the argument was an MoU and my Award was written in its terms.
To lose one Permanent Secretary, Ms Patel, may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose two would look like carelessness.
I had wondered whether Ruanda was going to be paid by results, ie per head of asylum seekers taken for good. The Permanent Secretary’s letter suggests to me that Ruanda is going to get its £120million however many or few it takes.
If we believe this is a gimmick in advance of the local elections it looks as though it’s going to be a very expensive one for the taxpayer.
Nowhere have I read that the £120million is other than “new money.” My cynicism about this government leads me to wonder why the money isn’t being taken from the overseas development budget.
I see Priti Patel now says critics of her plan don’t offer alternatives. On the contrary, they do. Just not alternatives she’s prepared to consider.
I would have thought the issue of alleged “illegality” both as a description of people arriving and of the arriving might hav e bee challenged on here. There is, deliberately, no official safe route provided. This is a nasty racist policy.
I agree and got into a minor twitter discussion with someone who I do not follow who claimed that everyone arriving was ‘illegal’. I am now following her to widen my bubble.
Surely it is valid to be able to criticise something without being in a position to suggest an alternative. I have no idea how to conduct open heart surgery, but would recognise that attempting to perform it with a JCB would be unwise.
As you hint in your last paragraph, it is in the public interest that this exchange of letters is revealed.
Even if, as you suspect, there is choreography behind the scenes. Or that value for money is the pretext for bringing to light the ‘because I say so’ nature of the argument on the part of the politician in this story.
The more information we have available, the better the quality of the decision.
Which is why it would be good if all documents preparatory to legislation were in the public domain.
Before the decision of parliament is taken.
In other words, all drafts of legislative proposals. All public consultations. The minutes of all lobbying meetings. All preparatory studies. The full detail of the impact assessment. All the comments of other departments of the civil service.
Then we wouldn’t need to rely just on the, ultimately self-serving, exchanges of letters on ‘value for money’.
The first letter still repeats the words “travelling illegally to the UK”, whether or not the Permanent Secretary understands that the act of travelling to the UK cannot, in and of itself, be considered illegal in terms of International Law remains unclear.
Sadly, the empirical evidence of Israeli attempts to enact this very same absurdist policy (who knows what pecuniary advantage may be gained by whom in this tawdry government) between 2014-17 would appear to have been expeditiously ignored
see Times of Israel here:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-precedent-prompts-outrage-as-uk-plans-to-send-refugees-to-rwanda/amp/
Yet defenders of Patel’s plan are using the fact it happened elsewhere as justification of it’s acceptability. The failure of the Israeli attempt is never mentioned of course.
Border Force are going to see familiar faces on boats in future. Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis arriving from Rwanda.
As I understand it, the similar “offshoring” policy in Australia has cost approaching A$10 billion over 10 years, to “process” around 3,000 refugees, which is a small fraction of the total number claiming asylum in Australia each year. That is around £7 billion – ridiculously, over £2 million per person.
If the UK’s Rwanda policy costs £120 million to “process” say 100 people per year for five years, again a tiny fraction of the total, that is £240,000 per person.
Rather than funding a nightmarish bureaucracy, perhaps we should just give some of that money to the people as a lump sum and encourage them to set up a small business. Or pay the people smugglers an amount so they don’t put people on small boats. We could employ them to process asylum claims.
While I understand its interesting I’m astonished at the pharisaical arguing around if the policy is VFM or not when the proposed policy is predicated on the idea that the UKG can arbitarily designate those who cross the channel in a boat and then claim asylum are “travelling illegally to the UK” and instead of getting due process in the UK as per UK law, UN and ECHR treaty law (to which the UK is a signatory) they are to be seized and flown 4000 miles to Rwanda for ‘processing’ in Rwanda
Under the UK-Rwanda MOU (as pointed out by Sunder Katwala)
1. This UK-Rwanda deal is a Deportation and Transportation Deal.
2. Under this plan, the UK won’t assess the asylum claims of those who come across the Channel, but Rwanda won’t process them for the UK either.
3.People deported by UK to Rwanda could apply for asylum in Rwanda, to Rwanda, for Rwanda (if they choose to).
But UK has no further involvement in their Rwandan asylum claim, nor any stake in its outcome.
Asylum claims to the UK are ignored and the persons sent to Africa
4. Under the UK-Rwanda deal those whose asylum claims succeed get to STAY in Rwanda while those whose asylum claims fail might get to STAY in Rwanda too. (Or they could get deported to a 4th country, or probably left to wander off from Rwanda of their own volition)
But supporters of this plan have deliberately been given a false impression
eg. Daily Mail wrote “Only if their claim succeeds will they be allowed back to Britain”
But actual UK policy: If you are a genuine refugee, the doors are shut to you anyway.
What is the basis for this in UK law? Johnson & Patel know its dodgy because the MOU supposedly lasts for 5 yrs (renewable) but has a clause that if legal action delays implementation then the 5 yr clock does not start. Its instructive that when pressed on this issue of legality the UKG does not answer but resorts to claiming that its very ‘popular’ with a majority of the people and that makes it right somehow.
‘I’m astonished at the pharisaical arguing around if the policy is VFM or not’
As I hoped to explain above , the only way such a request for a ministerial direction can come about is on that sort of basis. Without such a basis, no such request would be made, and we would have no such letter to examine. It may be that VFM is a proxy for wider internal concerns – but that VFM was used to force the issue should not have ‘astonished’ any reader of my post.
If you are genuinely ‘astonished’ then my blogpost has failed, and I am sorry.
Thank you for the reply. I have re-read the post carefully.
Firstly let me be clear that the use of the word pharisaical was not in any way aimed at you personally or your decision to discuss the topic of ministerial direction and I apologise if it offended you.
I will try and explain why I wrote what I did earlier.
I first read of Minister Patel’s use of ministerial direction in something David Henig wrote and he commented that it was rare for a minister to do so as it meant they assumed responsibility in the face of opposition from senior civil servants.
I was then ‘astonished’ to learn that the objection by the Permanent Secretary was over the issue of cost effectiveness (which you elucidated very well in this blog) and not on the face of it opposition to a policy which IMO is both frankly evil and according to internal and external refugee advocacy organisations (including the UNHCR) is illegal under UK & international law.
As you have noted in this blog the Permanent Sec may other concerns about the MOU that are not been overtly expressed,
“a manifestation of deeper unease within the home office at this proposal – and that such a request, framed in VFM terms, was the only way of signalling publicly this unease.”
but, on the other hand the Perm Sec does also say ‘I have satisfied myself that it is regular, proper and feasible for this policy to proceed.’ which would imply no concerns about its legality.
The comment “in the light of the illegal migration challenge the country is facing” is also concerning since any person arriving on British soil and requesting asylum on arrival is not committing the offence of illegal entry under UK and international law no matter how often the current government claims they are.
I’m sure you read Chris Grey’s weekly blog and are aware his comment this past week that something is very rotten in the UKG, so much so that many are giving up on the UK both internally and externally.
So you can see how it looks in the broad sense when seemingly (unless they read this specialist blog) the only civil service objection to a MOU that will do a monstrous thing to vulnerable people in need is that it is not a cost effective policy.
As the estimable Institute for Government say, there have been only 97 ministerial directions since 1990. Only three during the 2010-2015 coalition, all in 2015, but (with the exception of 2017) several or more each year since then, including a veritable cascade of 20 in 2020, mostly Covid measures.
Of those 97, the highest number (25) was sought by BEIS and its predecessors, and then next (14) or the MoD (but none since 2010). For some reason, the ministers at the departments responsible for supporting industry in general (and the defence industry in particular) are particularly unable to demonstrate to the satisfaction of their civil servants that their policy decisions are good ones. I wonder why.
Most of the directions (59) were sought on grounds of value for money only, and another 12 on grounds of value for money plus one or more other reasons.
Just two on all four grounds – value for money, regularity (broadly, whether it is legal or within he agreed budget), propriety (broadly, whether it meets the expected “high standards of public conduct”), and feasibility (broadly, can it be done as and when intended?).
The two that needed a direction on all four grounds were both in 2020 – one for BEIS, which seems to be an expansion of the CBILS loan scheme.
See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-ministerial-direction-for-changes-to-the-coronavirus-business-interruption-loan-scheme-cbils
And a second one for DEFRA, but I’ve not been able to locate the details.
In those 32 years, there have been only two ministerial directions sought and given at the Home Office.
The first was Sir Philip Rutnam (remember him) seeking a ministerial direction from Sajid Javid in 2019 to start the Windrush compensation scheme, on the single ground of regularity – specifically, the expectation is that a scheme making payments for a period of more than two years will be authorised by specific legislation, so it would not be “regular” to start making payments without that parliamentary authorisation.
See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/letter-from-the-permanent-secretary-to-the-home-secretary
The second is the Rwanda scheme. If it is ever used, perhaps in due course we might see a scheme for compensation for those whose legitimate claims to asylum in the UK are ignored, but instead are deported to Rwanda and “processed” there against their will.