Four truths about the Northern Irish Protocol

16th May 2022

Here are, to begin with, a couple of truths about the Northern Irish Protocol – both of which will be familiar to those who are hostile to or critical of Brexit.

First, the protocol was negotiated, signed and implemented by the Boris Johnson government – who even had changed government policy from Theresa May’s previous backstop.

Indeed, Johnson even went to the electorate for a mandate for this ‘oven-ready’ deal.

He and his government owns the protocol.

Second, triggering Article 16 will not do what the more excited media and political supporters of the government say (and perhaps think) it will do.

As this blog has previously set out, triggering the provision only means there will be talks and possible remedial measures within a narrow compass.

All because a thing can be triggered, it doesn’t make it weapon.

But.

There are other truths which those hostile to or critical of Brexit may not so easily want to admit.

For a third truth is that there is an issue not of black-letter law, but of – for want of a better word – application of the protocol.

This point is deftly summarised in a recent thread from Hilary Benn, who is hardly a fire-breathing Brexiter:

Of course, the European Union – including Ireland – are right to be concerned about maintaining the integrity of the single market.

Yet, it is less clear that that goods going to Northern Ireland from across the Irish Sea put the single market at risk – or at least at sufficient risk so as to justify the current regime of checks.

And ‘proportionality’ and ‘subsidiarity’ are, after all, concepts drawn from European Union law and policy.

In other words – without breaking (or amending) the Northern Irish protocol, a great deal of the commercial – and political friction – could be allayed – by a less strict (or more realistic) approach to concepts such as ‘at risk’.

Just because there are rules, they do not need a maximalist interpretation.

And fourth, and as this blog has averred before, Northern Irish politics do require there to be consent from both the unionist and nationalist communities.

Overall majorities are not enough.

Of course, the Democratic Unionist Party has only itself to blame for supporting Brexit – and the Johnson government – what else did they think would happen?

(And why the Democratic Unionist Party supported Brexit is a genuine mystery of the Brexit story.)

But the the practical political problem is that the protocol appears not to be supported by any elected unionist politicians.

You may think they should support the protocol – and you may be dismissive of them for not doing so – but the need for consent from both communities cannot be waved away.

So: there is a problem – of the Prime Minister’s own making and for which triggering Article 16 will not – by itself – solve.

But it is also a problem that needs to be considered flexibly and sensitively.

As this blog has said many times, not all problems have solutions.

Yet there is sometimes no alternative to seeing if there is a way forward – and such attempts should be given a chance.

It is just unlikely that a solution will come from the current government with its current bombastic silliness and confrontational gesturing.

The attitude of this government is a problem that can be solved – and as soon as possible.

 

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50 thoughts on “Four truths about the Northern Irish Protocol”

  1. As ever great clarity. The ” at risk” issue surely needs to consider matters beyond UK-EU. For instance the UK-Australia Trade Deal allows for Australian foods that would not be allowed in EU to come to the UK. So, country of origin rules are important here and affect SPS regime. If a GB exporter of processed foods uses Australian growth hormone components then that is at risk for the single market. Similarly, if Australian meat is exported from GB to NI, how can the border with EU be protected?

    1. I hope this isn’t a foolish question…

      If we stick to the relatively narrow topic of cross-border shipment of human foodstuff, then I would have thought that existing rules regarding the labeling of origin and additives would suffice. For example, Australia is quite a significant exporter of things like sugar, molasses and honey. So if your concern is that a UK importer could bulk-buy Australian sugar (for example), then refine and bag it in the UK for retail sale, then ship it to Ireland, it could in theory cross the border in to the Irish Republic without the true origin (Australia) being known.

      If that’s the concern, can’t this just be handled under existing food labeling requirements? (I appreciate that it would require additional text on existing labels or perhaps additional labels). Where I’m struggling to see why this should be an issue is why this has to turn in to a major regime of inspection, paperwork and delay, *unless* the primary motive is either protectionism in favour of EU producers, or a more targeted move to harm the UK.

      Obviously if either of those were probable, we would expect the UK to raise concerns and, if necessary, seek redress.

      Put another way: if you were to order an obscure product from, say Amazon, it would be sourced from anywhere in the EU and could be shipped by lorry, aircraft or train until it reaches your local delivery depot. It’s possible to track that parcel through every step of the journey and it’s all completely automated.

      This isn’t rocket science, so is it the case that UK are incompetent at organising, or is it the case that the EU are using “paperwork” as a “barrier to entry”?

      1. “If that’s the concern, can’t this just be handled under existing food labeling requirements?”
        Whose food-labelling requirements? Are you suggesting the EU should out-source the protections that their consumers (and businesses) are guaranteed by laws made by the EU parliament to a third country that has declared its intention to diverge from those standards? What makes you think they could even legally do that?

        “Where I’m struggling to see why this should be an issue is why this has to turn in to a major regime of inspection, paperwork and delay, *unless* the primary motive is either protectionism in favour of EU producers, or a more targeted move to harm the UK.”
        Why must you assume a ridiculous antagonism?

        How would such an issue *not* be one of documentation and inspection? What do you think happens at the port of Rotterdam or at the Turkish-Bulgarian border? Are goods, foodstuffs in particular, simply waved through without inspection of documentation?

        What is “special” about the UK that would make any product that may pass through it exempt from normal procedures?
        What, indeed, is the difference in shipping such goods across the border in NI as opposed to crossing the channel to Calais? Are we to demand that all checks at Calais also be dropped or claiming that for these normal standard procedures “the primary motive is either protectionism in favour of EU producers, or a more targeted move to harm the UK”?

  2. Well, the DUP, despite representing people in Northern Ireland largely descended from Scots, looks an awful lot like the English Nationalist wing of the Conservative Party – devotion to the Queen, the pound, mistrust (or worse) of brown people, gays, foreign languages, garlic, technology and evolution – and fell for the same delusion that the clock could be turned back to the 1950s simply by leaving the EU.

  3. I lived in NI for much of the 1970s when ’the Troubles’ were real and as the Republic and the UK joined the EU at the same time.

    It is my observation that since then progress has been made only when extremism is confronted by the British Government. The Belfast Agreement was based on resolution of the conflict through both Unionist and Irish Nationalist political positions compromising and working with each other. This was most outstandingly represented by Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness, neither known for shrinking from their positions, working together in the first NI Executive.

    The NI border conundrum was a key reason to object to Brexit. However, since we have Brexit, the ‘border in the Irish Sea’ approach is reasonable if and only if you discount the strong Unionist model in NI.

    What we have now is a UK government that first looks as though it will stand up to the DUP and now will not. This must change. Johnson and his team must focus their political energy on establishing a functioning system of Government in NI that includes the DUP but without the resistance to the Protocol solution. Only the UK government has the heft to do this. I am not convinced that Johnson has it himself, but his history of facing all ways at once on this issue in order to Get Brexit Done now haunts all of us. (note that the the NI border issue is mirrored by EU/GB border issues of similar cost and complexity).

    The Westminster Government must face down the DUP on this issue and get the system up and running. There is undoubtedly room to improve the operations through negotiation, but only when the ground on which the discussions take place has stopped shaking as Johnson jumps up and down on it.

  4. For one thing, I would submit that so far Northern Ireland has only benefited from its continued membership of the Single Market. Whoever is hurt by the Protocol, it isn’t people in Northern Ireland.

    https://www.politico.eu/article/experts-brexit-protocol-is-boosting-northern-ireland-economy/

    As for whether there are any unionist politicians that support the Protocol, that depends on how you define “unionist politician”. In the most recent election a substantial number of – let’s not worry about terminology – unionist or protestant voters have abandoned the DUP and the UUP and voted for the Alliance Party instead. And the Alliance Party does support the Protocol. Now Alliance MLAs are by definition not unionists, but it seems a bit odd to observe a shift of votes from the DUP to Alliance and then to complain that there is no support for the Protocol on the Unionist side of the aisle.

  5. I think one of the issues underlying all this was that the EU assumed that the Joint Committee would get into huge technical detail and sort out the issues, and that the UK would enthusiastically engage with this detail. Expecting the current government to be enthusiastic about detail is akin to expecting a toddler to grasp the concept of putting up with a bit of boredom before the fun starts, and the EU should perhaps have been less surprised what the UK sat itself down in the middle of the supermarket aisle and started howling.

    The other issue, over cross-community consent, is one of my favourite Brexit ironies. The lack of need for cross-community consent was established by a court case in which Remainers sought to convince the Supreme Court that Brexit was invalid. The court of course was having none of that, and pointed out that there was no such requirement, international treaties being a matter for the UK government not for Stormont. Brexiteers (to borrow a phrase you are fond of in other contexts) clapped and cheered at that. But now they would want to apply the principle to the Protocol, and while morally I think they have a point, legally they have a bit of a problem. Karma…

  6. There is no mystery to the DUP supporting Brexit. From it’s foundation it was opposed to the existence of the EU (or EEC). This opposition was instinctive and deep seated. Of course, that did not stop party members, and indeed leaders, taking every opportunity to avail of every advantage of EU institutions. However, their pro-Brexit stance was as predictable as a knee-jerk. It’s also possible that they calculated that the referendum would be lost, but supporting a lost cause can sometimes be a useful position. Especially in NI.

    1. I think the DUP wanted, and want, a hard border between NI and Ireland, and they weren’t expecting to be sold down the river by Boris Johnson.

      There are rumours that loyalist drug-smugglers were, in practical terms also fans of the single market, and they don’t welcome checks on goods, but hard to verify!

  7. My email notifications truncate the titles of this blog.
    It amused me that I read it as: “Four truths about the Northern Irish Potato…”.
    Somehow this doesn’t seem any more absurd than current reality!

  8. On your comment as to the mystery of why the DUP supported Brexit, the old maxim of follow the money might yield dividends-This does not been adequately explored up to now.

  9. The GFA states that the UK PM must act as an “honest broker” in NI. @thepouca – a lawyer commenter in the FT gives chapter and verse from the GFA. Johnson (and May before him) have been as partisan as it is possible to be in their support of the DUP. The DUP’s support in the elections only days ago dropped from 29% to 21% and it lost its position as the party with most representatives. All the other non Unionist parties, which represent a majority of the voters (who voted) are happy with the Protocol – even the UUP. The DUP is now spuriously claiming that the Protocol is endangering the GFA. That’s pretty rich coming from the DUP, which together with a certain Michael Gove, campaigned against and voted against the GFA at every turn. The hypocrisy reeks. Johnson is, as usual, all bluster. And in fact, economic reports indicate NI business is profiting from the Protocol. Before this goes too much further I imagine Johnson will receive a short and curt telephone call from the Oval Office. Followed by the collapse of stout party. Apparently, his visit to NI was to get all parties back to work. Indeed, all of them are very willing to get back to work, with the exception of the DUP, whose sole interests he is supporting – until expediency (probably in the form of Biden) demands he flings them under another bus.

  10. Political posturing is usually the enemy of finding workable solutions and consensus. And the rhetoric here from our PM, the FS, the former Brexit Minister and many others almost seems calculated to hinder attempts to solve the problem.

    History will surely not be kind to these self-centred dissemblers.

  11. sorry pressed send too fast
    comment above should read

    On your comment as to the mystery of why the DUP supported Brexit, the old maxim of follow the money might yield dividends-This does not seem to have been adequately explored up to now.

  12. The likelihood of this Government coming up with a pragmatic approach to the Northern Ireland Protocol appears to me to be wishful thinking. Observing Boris Johnson in Northern Ireland since he became leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister is an exercise in bombast, lack of realism and downright lying to all involved parties. I agree some realism is needed but I cannot see it coming before a change in the U.K. Government.

  13. While there is a plausible case that the EU can be quite legalistic and take a zero-risk approach to protecting its borders (as it does, in fairness, seem to do with most of its undertakings) even when it may seem as if this is heavy handed – it is important to consider that the current government (and the previous ones, in the recent past) have given the EU very little cause to trust the UK in being entrusted with such an important issue for the EU.

    Apart from the posturing, threats, and, at times, illegal acts, we have to remember that the UK keeps on postponing border checks as it is in no way ready for these. How, and why, is the EU meant to have confidence in the protection of its borders and the integrity of its market (when the UK is not in a position do so for its own internal market)? Not to mention the fact that the UK is facing a massive fine from the CJEU over lax border controls that enabled a scam to be run to falsely import significant quantities of goods from China that had been falsely declared.

    While I was disappointed that there were enough people who voted to allow these charlatans (behind the Leave EU campaign) to undertake a massive hijacking of the British political system, and am angry (if not furious) at what they are doing, there is no doubt that the decision could have well been legitimate (I say could have been because there are grounds to question if there has been informed consent for what is taking place), the EU is not, in my eyes, beholden to provide the requested trust to the government.

    Moreover, the current government is showing that even if it ultimately does not actually start tearing up the agreements it has signed, the possibility is no longer theoretical, but a concrete possibility, which means that theoretical concerns can no longer be assumed to be theoretical, and as such, requires stronger mechanisms than should normally have been required (or expected).

    1. “While there is a plausible case that the EU can be quite legalistic”

      The EU *is* a legal construct. While the UK media may like to fetishise it or characterise it a some ruseful evil genius enemy seeking to thwart our constant heroic struggle for freedom, the reality is that the EU does what it must do according to its treaties and laws and does not have the choice to do otherwise.

      Indeed, suppose I were, to take a random example, a Sicilian citrus grower: were the EU to risk allowing diseased plant products into the the territory of the Single Internal Market that could ultimately damage my crops by failing to implement the mandated border controls, then I would be entitled to raise a case against the Commission at the ECJ. In addition, the Parliament could censure or even dismiss the Commission for failing to implement the (highly detailed) budget established each year by Parliamentary vote.

  14. The present British government’s attitude to the NIP is a problem that certainly should be solved. The present ecology of the Conservative Party and its courtier press make it highly unlikely that it will or even can be.

    1. The perspicacity of your comment bears repeating.

      If you go back far enough, you might find that the word “politics” – well, at least “diplomacy”, which is relevant in this context – is intended to mean “the activity or skill of managing international relations”.

      Behind both of these words lies a simpler truism, that the aim of both is expressed through building consensus, negotiating for mutually beneficial outcomes and reaching agreement.

      I don’t want this to come across as a party-political observation (it would not be fair as there were Pro/Anti Brexit views in both major parties), but at the moment it seems as though our government actually doesn’t really care to solve any of these problems.

      Our elected representatives, from time to time, like to talk about our nation as “Great Britain plc” and talk up the fact that they believe us to be “competitive in the marketplace”. Well, having worked in the commercial sector for the last 23 years, I can observe that no company would remain commercially viable if staffed with management who demonstrated the indifference to solving problems that we see from Westminster today.

  15. I thought this was interesting:-

    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-53724381

    Another interesting element of this to consider regards the movement of money – rather than goods – between the UK and the EU. There, funnily enough, the EU have been much, much more reasonable. The UK and EU have largely been able to reach entirely amicable agreement – for example see here, a brief outline of post-Brexit anti-money laundering provisions:-

    https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/en/topics/brexit/anti-money-laundering-after-brexit

    What makes this interesting, then, is that when it comes to the “movement of value” that would benefit the UK – i.e. sale of UK-produced goods to EU customers – the EU are demanding all sorts of measures and controls… but when it comes to the movement of actual cash value – i.e. in an industry where the UK has leadership in the EU, thanks in large part to strong ties with the US, well, in those cases the EU want to make it easy for the flow of money in to the EU.

    None of which excuses our current government from the would-be-funny-if-it-wasn’t-so-serious situation in which we now find ourselves.

  16. FWIW, I don’t think there’s any mystery about why the DUP supported Brexit, apart from the £1.5 billion bung – to get the GFA undone. It’s hard not to see the NIP as little more than a proxy/backstop for the GFA – which the DUP still wants undone. *Boris* looks likely to disappoint all the headers here. Again. If civil unrest in *the province* is to be avoided, this is delicate stuff and *Boris* and/or his lieutenants, with the possible exception of Julian Smith aren’t exactly renowned for ideological politesse.

    1. “…exactly renowned for ideological politesse.”

      Is that, “like a Boris in a China Shop…” ?

  17. Lucid as ever, and fair. However, I have a sense that the fuss and bother about the protocol, by the DUP and fellow travellers, is something of a cover for their unwillingness to share power in the new political landscape in NI. Therefore, they might be exceedingly slow to arrive at any amelioration and management of the protocol, since doing so would bring them up against another of their own red lines. What think you?

  18. David,
    I had read Hilary Ben’s Twitter Thread with interest. It was perhaps the first balanced analysis of the NIP issues that I had seen and while I hate Brexit with a passion, I am realistic enough to understand the need for a practical solution to the multitude of problems that it has caused, at the moment.
    What is also currently clear, as you rightly point out, is that this government, in their need to create a Machiavellian enemy, is incapable of working towards a solution.
    Thanks for bringing these threads all together in a coherent way.

  19. “But the the practical political problem is that the protocol appears not to be supported by any elected unionist politicians.”

    Brexit is not supported by any elected Nationalist politicians, and as far as we know no elected Alliance Politicians either (the middle ground). Yet here we are, with a Protocol that is a solution to the Brexit that did not have cross community consent.

    If the Principle of Consent can be thrown aside for a Brexit that was voted for by the the wider UK population, then a Protocol that had a mandate from the wider UK population in General Election 2019 also does not require the Principle of Consent.

  20. The DUP’s euroscepticism is no mystery if one considers the party’s roots in evangelical fundamentalism. In vintage Paisleyite thought, the EU is a Roman Catholic conspiracy to bring all of Europe back under the dominion of the Pope.

    1. This is my understanding too. I recall read several commentators that draw the same conclusion: that Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland conflated the Catholic traditions of “continental Europe” with the European Union. Or perhaps, more simply, any project emerging from continental Europe must somehow be associated with Catholic traditions. And therfore must be opposed.

  21. Is there any monitoring of how much or how little of the imports from GB to NI find their way south of the border, or off the island of Ireland into the rest of the EU?

    Could the UK assist the EU to get comfortable with taking a relaxed approach to enforcement by agreeing to keep some of its standards the same as the EU?

  22. “goods at risk” sounds like a crux definition in relation to the current dispute. With a bit of goodwill and some mutual trust that should be able to form the basis for for decent progress. Presumably that’s what the signatories hoped.

  23. It may be that a majority is not sufficient and it requires both Unionists and Nationalists support, but are the DUP and UUP any longer the sole voice of Unionists? The growing support for the Alliance shows otherwise. There is a substantial difference between political parties who have “Unionist” in their titles, and ordinary supposed Unionist voters in the electorate. And at some point, the democratic choice of voters has to hold sway. That choice is for the protocol, and NI’s continuing membership of the single market and customs’ union.

  24. The protocol is only a function of the hardest of hard Brexit. What Parliament has approved can be changed and a coalition of the reasonable can and will seek to start the rejoin process by signing up to the single market as a first step. The DUP will just have to take it.

  25. Thank you for an excellent post on the vexatious Protocol problems; I too read Hilary Benn’s ‘thread’, and thought he made an obvious analysis of the sensible way to proceed.
    I’m not particularly optimistic about the chance of ‘sense’ being followed, however; we have been here before!

  26. This is my understanding too. I recall read several commentators that draw the same conclusion: that Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland conflated the Catholic traditions of “continental Europe” with the European Union. Or perhaps, more simply, any project emerging from continental Europe must somehow be associated with Catholic traditions. And therfore must be opposed.

  27. It is just possible that the DUP supported Brexit because they actually believe a United Kingdom of Ireland and Great Britain is still an achievable and realistic objective.

    They miss the good old days.

  28. France is a Republic and treats overseas territories equally. It has 15 land borders which it controls daily.

    There are some disputes still eg with Italy but these are not treated as major issues. Catalonian Independece could also pose a threat.

    The UK has basically one land border.

    It could be argued that OffàsDyke and Hadrian’s Wall constitute other land borders but such arguments are largely unconvincing because of political union and free movement of people.

    Northern Ireland is of course unique and the « Belfast Good Friday’ agreement should be preserved. in the sage words of the DT we all need to ´’roll up our sleeves’ to make the Protocol work.
    ´

  29. The problem is not so much flexible implementation of the Protocol, as its very existence. The DUP have been very open about their insistence that it is replaced, wholesale.
    (Btw, the mystery as to why the DUP supported Brexit in the first place may be connected to the £1bn bribe they were offered by Theresa May during earlier negotiations).

  30. The issue of cross-community consent raises a difficult and important point. The current interpretation of consent assumes that people fall into two neatly delineated camps, unionists voting for parties containing the word Unionist, and those who aspire to a united Ireland and vote for Sinn Fein or the SDLP. Moderates supporting the Alliance Party, or indeed any other party are ignored.
    The effect, on the unionist side, is that the smaller and more extreme the staunch unionist vote becomes the stronger is their veto. If they lose more moderates, in this case those who support the Union but were opposed to Brexit and wish to keep the Protocol, the more unacceptable is a Protocol that requires cross-community consent.
    The Good Friday Agreement requires the consent, or rather at least 40%, of the MLAs who choose to designate themselves as representing the minority community. The Alliance Party is ruled out of this calculation. they currently have 19% of the MLAs. That is a large constituency to ignore. What if it grows further at the expense of the DUP and UUP?
    Is there any limit to how far the hardline unionist vote can shrink while still claiming to represent the entire unionist community? What if it declines to a few percentage points, represented only by a couple of MLAs, Jeffrey Donaldson and Jim Allister who would have a veto?
    The more people who move to the Alliance Party the greater is the mood for compromise and consensus. In other settings a problem such as the Good Friday Agreement’s definition of consent could easily be resolved if a widespread desire for compromise emerged. However, there is nothing in the history of Northern Ireland to suggest that hardline elements will shrug and meekly accept that they are out of line with majority opinion. I do not see any simple way for the current definition of consent to be removed, adapted or finessed when that would require the agreement of those who would regard it as treachery. Perhaps the Alliance Party MLAs could choose to designate themselves in such a way that they can override the requirement for consent? That would be ethically highly questionable, and also an extremely provocative act towards people who are very easily provoked.
    If only someone (other than every expert obviously) had taken the trouble to warn Boris Johnson of the inevitable consequences of his actions.

  31. The full value of a ‘truth’ often lies in detail and context.
    In that respect, your third and fourth points have a slightly ‘truthy’ quality to them that might be firmed up a bit with some detail.

    The third truth – ‘It’s not the law, it’s the way you apply it’ – has some merit in being explored in order to find a practical solution.

    But before rushing into that, it’s worth recognising that there is something peculiarly unattractive about a culture in Westminster that encourages us to leave a club, and then lectures the remaining 27 members on how they should change their own internal rules to accommodate us.
    Especially when we, as a club member, wanted those very same rules to be rigorously enforced to the letter when it came to trade and customs arrangements with ‘third countries’. And prided ourselves on our rigour while denigrating the laxity of others.
    And when the government knew what those rules implied before they agreed to them. The exact detail of each movement of goods was known before the Protocol was agreed, as shown in the impact assessment, the uncertainty being the number of movements subject to control across the Irish Sea.

    OK, so they were liars and hypocrites who gambled the peace process in order to save their own skins, but what’s the solution ?

    I would suggest that a form of risk-based solution is more or less on the table, proposed by the Commission and in some respects already tacitly accepted by the government.
    It could go further in reducing the extent of customs checks, but for one ingredient – trust.
    The world of customs controls is especially dependent on mutual trust. The world’s most efficient customs border – between Norway and Sweden – works because trust is very high, computerisation is highly developed and both sides want it to work.
    None of those three elements is present in UK-EU relations.

    The government won’t discuss the details of the Commission’s current proposals. They are even refusing access to their current computerised systems, let alone discussing refinements.
    This won’t work. In the world of informatics and customs, seeing is believing. Taking the risk means trusting your partner.

    So one can be as flexible as one likes about ‘how the rules are applied’ but it won’t get us far towards an actual agreement.

    For sake of completeness on the fourth truth, there is, in strict legal terms, a discussion on how far the meaning of ‘consent’ under the Belfast Agreement applies to the Protocol.
    OK, so a strictly legal approach might not get us far towards a political solution.
    But some of the parties are insisting very much on strict legal approaches – just not to the ones they don’t like.
    In the current context, it would be worth taking into account the range of opinion within the ‘Unionist’ community rather than assuming that consent has to apply in the exact way the Belfast Agreement specifies.

  32. Thanks for providing a forum on this topic. I’m from NI and going to come out straight away and say only your first two truths are true.

    1) During the day before you uploaded this particular blog I had read Hilary Benn’s series of tweets and in particular I commented about his contention that;
    ‘The key point about the Protocol is that it talks about “goods at risk” of entering the EU from Northern Ireland.’

    Yes its a ‘a’ key issue but it’s not ‘the’ main point of the NIP which is to, as much as possible, preserve the constitutional status of NI as both a self governing part of the UK Union and a part of the whole and ‘indivisible’ island of Ireland.

    Here a bit of history is needed: The 1998 GFA (a peace treaty ending a long civil war) made the deal that for the Catholic population NI was Irish, and for the Protestant population NI was British. This was quite feasible with the UK & the ROI in the seamless borderless EU.

    However the hardline Unionists (a subsection of all Protestants) never accepted the GFA precisely because it did not make the 1919 Partition permanent. They had never accepted the 1920 Government of Ireland Act which set up the then SI and NI as self governing parts of the whole and indivisible island of Ireland and which accepted that ‘one day’ Ireland would be reunited.

    Indeed the civil war in the North started because the Northern Protestants tried to make partition permanent by starting a systematic program of extirpation of the Irish culture and language in NI, removal of civil rights from Catholics, turning the Police into a Protestant only paramilitary, and gerrymandering the FPTP constituencies for the NI Parliament to ensure a permanent Protestant majority despite a growing Catholic population in NI (it was 40% in the 1926 Census so always a large minority)

    So ever since 1998 hardline Unionists have sought to overturn the GFA and they seized on Brexit as the perfect opportunity to force a hard border across the island and make partition permanent.

    They and their ERG allies in London claim that the NIP is the EU taking ‘British’ territory. I’m sorry but that is a 180 degree opposite of the real truth which is that the ERB/DUP axis is trying to take NI out of Ireland.

    Constitutional law about NI (1920 and 1998) is clear that the status of NI can only be changed by a binding referendum called by the NI Assembly – quite different to Scotland and Wales where what Westminster decides goes. The 2016 Brexit Ref does not count in NI and NI voted Remain anyway plus in the May 2019 EU Parliament Election & the Dec 2019 UK GE which were both de facto 2nd referendums on Brexit, a consistent 67% of NI voted for unequivocally pro-Remain parties.
    So with a hard Brexit GB can leave the EU totally but not with NI which must remain in the EU customs union. This means a customs border in the Irish Sea.

    So back to Hilary Benn – in his tweet thread he goes on to say that he thinks the UKG proposal that NI be considered as primarily in the UK internal market and that any customs checks only be applied to goods going from NI to the ROI or wider EU is perfectly reasonable.
    In saying this he misses the reality entirely which is that the UKG and DUP want this precisely because it means the EU and USA accept that NI has left Ireland and partition is permanent.
    Its not going to fly in any way.
    What’s really happened is that GB has left NI and a consequence of this hard Brexit is that there is a NI-GB customs border. Now the level and nature of customs checks are not dependent on the NIP but on the EU-UK TCA which is a terrible trade deal with lots of friction by deliberate choice of Tory Brexit hardliners. Fix the TCA and make it a proper FTA and most of the NI-GB border friction will disappear.
    When I read what Hilary Benn wrote the key point I immediately thought of Plato’s cave and how the shadows cast on the wall by the firelight are not reality.

    2) On your 4th truth about how Unionists have not given consent and so its not valid under terms of the GFA.
    I’m afraid you have fallen for the DUP claim that Unionism = the Protestant community. Under the arcane system we have all parties must choose to be either Protestant or Catholic in the NI Assembly. Certainly in 1998 the official Unionist parties of the time represented the large majority of Protestants but in the years since huge social changes have occurred with the rise of moderate (and de facto non-sectarian) parties on both sides. The moderate ‘Protestant’ party Alliance won the second largest number of seats for Protestants in the recent NI Assembly election and they campaigned for the Protocol (with all the bespoke easements the EU has offered and the UKG refused)’
    Today the two communities are at parity and the NI Assembly election result shows that the same two thirds of all voters support the Protocol and so that means the hardline Unionists have support at best of 50% of the Protestant community.
    Yet the DUP claim that they speak for all Protestants.

    Its curious that the DUP, and especially its current leader Jeffery Donaldson, now go on about no Unionist consent for the NIP when in 1998 he physically tore up a copy of the GFA in front of UUP leader David Trimble who along with SDLP leader John Hume had negotiated & signed the GFA.
    The GFA was approved by a huge majority in a binding referendum in 1998 (as per stipulation of the 1920 Act) and yet a majority of Unionist pols of the time refused to accept it and would not sign it and most defected from the UUP (then the largest Unionist party) to the then much smaller hardline DUP – including Donaldson, Foster, Poots.
    As to where now? IMO call the DUP bluff and after 3 months has passed by call a new election for 3 months time – its entirely likely that tactical voting will ensure Alliance win the largest number of ‘Protestant’ seats. Its going to take a long time.

    1. Andrew, thank you for your analysis. It has always seemed to me that the provisions made in the GFA for the protection of “nationality” and “identity” for people living in NI would inevitably be put under stress by any of the harder firms of Brexit. I now have a better grasp of the motives and aspirations of some of the actors.

      Which leaves me with a different question. Rather than wondering why the DUP are anti the NIP, I’m puzzled as to why Boris Johnson seems so pro the DUP. What does he stand to gain?

      But then I try never to apportion to intention that which can be explained by incompetence. He has a stellar track record of the latter, but it worries me to think that even he cannot be so mind-bogglingly stupid so as not to see the probable consequences of his actions in this matter.

  33. I’m from NI.

    Isn’t it a rum state of affairs when a minority party in a devolved region can shape UK foreign policy …

    Here are some quick points on this fake Protocol crisis:

    1. The DUP and the Tories are no fans of the Good Friday Agreement. Their “concerns” about it are insincere, even cynical.

    2. Despite the usual sock-puppet witterings of Braverman, there is no legal linkage between the Brexit Protocol and the Good Friday Agreement. The Brexit Protocol is not a power-sharing matter.

    3. The Brexit Protocol, despite being not given even half a chance, already is working economically. Recent figures show that, relative to their respective starting points, NI’s economy is now outperforming GB’s economy. Cross border trade is booming.

    4. There is no unrest – at all. Shops are stuffed to the rafters with the usual stuff. The vast, vast majority of people in NI, on either side, couldn’t care less about the Brexit Protocol. Even those who are supposedly fervently against the Brexit Protocol rank it very far down their list of priorities. A poll of DUP voters, taken just prior to the recent local elections, revealed that DUP voters ranked the Protocol a lowly TENTH in their list of priorities – see: https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2022/02/14/news/protocol-matters-most-to-little-more-than-one-in-10-unionists—poll-2588056/
    Tenth! And that’s about as important as it gets for the voters of the party who are most “opposed” to it.

    5. The recent elections were not a poll on the Protocol. Elections here are always a poll on what your nationality is – a chance to declare your Britishness, or your Irishness, or, as with the soft-Unionist Alliance party, a chance to declare that you couldn’t care less about which flag waves over you. That is what EVERY election in NI is always about; to assert that it was about the Protocol or any other issue is outsider piffle. The DUP top brass hate the EU and they want to build a big Trump-style wall between NI and ROI, but their voters have more sense – they are not supporters of the Protocol, far from it. But, equally, they’re not that bothered about it either. The Tories’ wild talk of societal breakdown and dire economic hardships, all supposedly stemming from the Protocol, is astonishing balderdash; mendacious self-serving, distorted propaganda more akin to something you’d see on Russian state TV. It’s an easy narrative to sell to a lightly-informed GB electorate, and it of course allows them to use NI as a stick to beat the EU with in their efforts to outflank the ERG et al, but, please good folks of Blighty, please recognise that, on this issue, the Tories are feeding you kool aid hogwash by the gallon.

    6. Recently, leading DUP Brexiter agitator, Jamie Bryson, brought a bus-load of Brexiter bandsmen and assorted yahoos to Enniskillen (a rural town near the EU border) for a “massive show of strength against the Protocol“. Fermanagh is a county with lots of Unionist people, so Jamie thought he was on to a winner. However, hardly anybody showed up, and egg-on-face Bryson was left sermonising to his bussed-in rent-a-mob while sensible local Unionists ignored them in their thousands. So much for Johnson’s alarmist nonsense. In that context, it is instructive to read an editorial in Co. Fermanagh’s main pro-Union (with GB) newspaper, The Impartial Reporter. It’s much more reflective of a pragmatic border Unionist view of Brexit / the Protocol – this is a quiet majority opinion within sensible Unionism which is drowned out in all the cynical DUP-BoJo tub-thumping:

    =======================
    https://www.impartialreporter.com/news/19550692.denzil-mcdaniel-madness-area-return-impact-border-past/

    “Everything changed with the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement and movement back and forth became easier; indeed better than ever and people returned to a more normal life. People just want to get on with their lives and we’ve become used to it.

    The impact that the previous Border had for decades was enormous. It would be madness to go back to the Border of the past with all its difficulties.

    Yet, one gets the impression that Jamie Bryson and Jim Allister would quite welcome such a scenario here, whatever the inconvenience for people in this area. Bryson, according to Twitter found the journey to Enniskillen “quite the trek” and was thankful for a SatNav. He’s distant from the problems here.

    This smacks of a sense of entitlement from a certain constituency of loyalism, which hasn’t quite grasped the changes which have taken place in Northern Ireland, both in terms of the demographic and the attitudes, particularly among younger people that the old symbols of past division aren’t as relevant to modern life for them as they were.”
    ========================

    The above is a take on Brexit and the EU from a Northern Irish British Unionist. It’s a million miles away from the hysterical anti-Protocol narrative being fomented by the Tories.

    7. Due to the outdated rules governing Stormont (the rules, drafted in the last century, only recognise unionists and nationalists – the constitutionally agnostic of the soft-Unionist Alliance party are deemed not to exist), the DUP’s absence from Stormont paralyses Stormont and disenfranchises the voters of every other Stormont party. After the Alliance party’s recent thumping success (doubling their representation), this veto right is obsolete, and should be scrapped.

    8. If we’re stuck with this outdated veto right rule, then perhaps its use at least could be *confined to matters that properly are within Stormont’s remit*. As the recent Court of Appeal case confirmed, Brexit (including the Brexit Protocol) is not a devolved matter. While the DUP tail-chasers are entitled to oppose the logical ramifications of the hard Brexit they lobbied for, the DUP should not be entitled to collapse local democracy to do so. Where a party purports to walk off with the ball in relation to a reserved matter, that purported boycott automatically should be a nullity, and the remaining non-freeloading parties (despite giving 2 fingers to local democracy, the DUP still showed up for 5 minutes to sign on and to claim their publicly-funded salaries) should be permitted to continue running the local administration. There

    9. Most people in NI, of whatever persuasion, are sick to the back teeth of Tory Brexiter alarmism. I’m from a nationalist (pro Irish unity) background, but I find myself in 100% agreement with this letter written recently by a Unionist bloke in Belfast, when he notes, inter alia: “ Let’s be blunt, when an English MP talks about getting rid of the protocol, their focus is on getting Boris re-elected, not the interests of Northern Ireland.” See: https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/opinion/letters/we-unionists-who-foresaw-that-brexit-would-cause-problems-at-the-northern-ireland-border-were-ignored-3694129

  34. I have also wondered why the DUP supported the Protocol – it has always seemed astonishing to me. My knowledge of NI politics is superficial, but I have wondered whether the DUP MPs in Westminster got carried away by the power they had in this unique situation. The power to be part of a decision that would have a lasting impact not just on NI but on the whole of the UK ‘went to their heads’; and overwhelmed a more rational consideration of the implications of the decision.

    1. I’ve now had chance to read all of the amazingly well informed comments here and better understand the politics behind this. Thank you all.

      1. Siobhan McSweeney – who played Sister Michael in Derry Girls – was on the Today Programme on Radio 4 this morning. She mentioned that some viewers have praised the television comedy for educating them about the situation in Northern Ireland, which is a sad indictment of the state of historical and political education in England.

        I’d go so far as to say that history at school – Romans, 1066, Tudors, English Civil War, Victorian England, First and Second World Wars – left me largely ignorant of the relevant background. It hadn’t progressed much beyond “Our Island Story” and “1066 and All That”. “The English, the English, the English are best; I wouldn′t give tuppence for all of the rest!” Nothing really on Henry VII and the Pale, Cromwell’s campaign, William of Orange and the Boyne, the Protestant ascendancy, Daniel O’Connell, the Great Famine, Home Rule, the Easter Rising, Partition, or the last 100 years.

        There is also a remarkable lack of this nuance in the mainstream coverage of the situation in Northern Ireland, so thanks to the other commenters here, and particularly to David for providing this space.

        1. As regards history teaching in England, I have thoughts. Tldr, I blame the Queen.

          Well, I blame the tenderness around the subject of the monarchy. The Tudors can be safely taught because they died out, so no threat.

          If the Cromwellian wars are taught, then discussions would be had on the legitimacy of monarchical rule and on the Plantations in Ireland. Tricky.

          If the Williamite wars are taught, then discussions on the legitimacy of the Hanoverian succession would follow. Also tricky.

          Without basic knowledge of these wars you can’t even ask the Irish question, much less answer it.

          Other neulalgic topics exist.

          The greatest loss of life in the history of the UK was the Irish Famine. Barely taught.

          The greatest loss of UK territory was Irish independence. Barely taught.

          There is an argument that teaching the Tudors and the Blitz help to understand modern Britain, but it’s hard to see how proper teaching of Britain’s history in Ireland isn’t at least as relevant to current affairs.

          1. An interesting thesis. Thanks. History is a narrative discipline, and we can create our own narrative by selecting what we talk about and what we don’t.

            Well, in fairness, there is a lot of history, and so you can’t expect schoolchildren to be taught it all, but it helps to have a framework within specific historical people and events can be located, linked, and contextualised. Sequins glittering amid the warp and weft.

            It is similar to the way visitors to London develop knowledge about specific locations around Tube stations, without realising how those locations link together geographically in the real world.

  35. Granted I am in my mid-40s, and schools may be totally different these days, but I don’t think my bog standard comprehensive would have shied away from such discussions.

    I agree with the other commenter that there is a huge amount that _could_ be covered in the curriculum, and every minute wasted on Gove’s grammar addiction takes away time for more useful stuff.

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