2nd May 2022
Did you know there is a Parliamentary Witness Oaths Act?
This 1871 statute – which is still in force – provides among other things that any committee of the House of Commons may administer an oath to the witnesses examined before such committee.
And, while an examination of witness by a parliamentary committee is not a judicial proceeding, it would still be perjury for a person to lie such an oath (or affirmation) – with the penalty being up to seven years in prison.
This information comes from a fascinating and informative article at the New Statesman by Alexander Horne, a former parliamentary legal adviser.
My first piece for the @NewStatesman looks at the powers of the @HoCPrivileges and poses the question: should the hearing to determine whether the PM misled Parliament be held in public and under oath: https://t.co/BKMGgJrPz2
— Alexander Horne (@AlexanderHorne1) April 30, 2022
In that article Horne contends that such an oath could be administered to the Prime Minister for any evidence he gives to the privileges committee.
If so. this would mean that the Prime Minister would be (to use the glorious legal phrase) ‘under pain of perjury’ to tell the truth to the committee investigating whether he deliberately misled parliament and/or failed to correct the record at the first available opportunity.
(The latter point is where this blog has previously set out that the Prime Minister is vulnerable, for it may be hard for him to maintain that once he had the Sue Gray report and/or any briefing for the Metropolitan police investigation that he still did not realise that he had misled parliament.)
On the face of it, administering such an oath has its attractions.
No sensible person doubts that the current prime minister lies fluently and repeatedly, and so placing him ‘under pain of perjury’ would have the advantage of concentrating his mind wonderfully.
Such an approach would also have the broader advantage of reminding the Prime Minister and others that evidence to parliamentary committees should be taken seriously – especially as the sanction of ‘contempt of parliament’ is, well, held in contempt.
Horne mentions where such oaths have been used:
“Committees rarely administer the oath to witnesses, although it has happened in recent years. The Home Affairs Committee chose to take evidence under oath in respect of its inquiry into child sexual exploitation in Rotherham. The Public Accounts Committee also controversially administered the oath to the general counsel and solicitor to the Inland Revenue in 2011.”
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But.
It may be one thing for witnesses who are not members of either house of parliament to give evidence to a parliamentary committee ‘under pain of perjury’ – but for a parliamentarian and minister to also do so is constitutionally problematic.
That what parliamentarians say in parliament is absolutely protected at law is set out (some would say ‘enshrined’) in the Bill of Rights.
And there is the principle that the responsibility of a minister to answer questions in parliament is politically enforceable (or not enforceable), and not a matter for any form of litigation.
Imagine if the Prime Minister (or other minister or parliamentarian) is caught out in a lie before a parliamentary committee, what would then happen?
(And the 1871 legislation does not expressly provide that parliamentarians are exempt.)
Would an outside court have to adjudicate the conduct of a parliamentarian in respect of parliamentary proceedings?
It is difficult to see how such a prosecution could be easily brought – and it could result in another (for constitutional commentators, splendid) constitutional mess.
And regardless of the legal(istic) issues in this particular situation, there is a sensible wariness of converting political issues into court matters.
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That said, however, it is unfortunate that there is so little that can be done to get the prime minister to give truthful answers in parliament.
This is certainly a constitutional problem that needs a practical solution.
The suggestion of getting a Prime Minister to give evidence to the privileges committee investigating him ‘under pain of perjury’ has the appearance of being such a solution to that problem.
The fear would be that in seeking go solve one constitutional problem, another is caused.
And so the problem remains: what can you do – constitutionally and practically – with a dishonest Prime Minister?
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POSTSCRIPT
Horne has provided a link to a useful post where he deals with the issues in more detail:
David raises some interesting and important constitutional points in his response to my piece in @NewStatesman
There are very few precedents relating to the prosecution of witnesses for perjury – but I address a couple here for anyone interested:https://t.co/pOi5ifQD5T— Alexander Horne (@AlexanderHorne1) May 2, 2022
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Could a solution/fudge be that whilst it would be for the courts to decide if perjury had been committed (i.e. they had lied in the eyes of the law) the penalty would be for parliament to decide?
I suspect that if a court did make such a finding, then “parliament” (i.e. the prime minister’s own party, since they’d be the majority) would decline to do anything, and play it off as a matter of principle, telling the judges to stay out of political matters.
Abolish the monarchy. Replace it with a constitutionally valid officer (a democratically elected president would have the mandate) who can act as a check or balance.
Then we would have a legitimate person, who does not hold their job on the whim of the Prime Minister, who can do something.
What that something is and how the balance should be set up is, of course, up for debate but there are quite a few examples out there.
The fundamental flaw in that idea, or in any idea involving elected positions, is that our electoral system is so badly broken that any such posting would most likely make things very much worse.
Better to appoint Rupert Murdoch as Supreme Overlord and drop the pretence.
The absolute last thing the Commons will even contemplate let alone allow is constitutional reform resulting in an elected Head of State since that the holder of that office would then be a legitimate rival center of power.
It’s the very thing that has for decades prevented meaningful reform of the upper house and indeed a problem not limited to the UK but also true in Australia & Canada. In all of these nations the upper house is dysfunctional and full of patronage but in each the lower house will never allow a real rival to emerge.
Merciless use of the ballot box.
+1 for that, Adam.
I can’t see an argument for him giving evidence any other way, or any other minister for that matter. It matters not how inadequate the procedures for dealing with any perjury are. These people need to be seen for what they are, not allowed to hide behind privilege.
I think this would, however attractive it looks, a bit of a smoke screen. The issue is, as you say, what to do with a serially dishonest prime minister and a system that doesn’t allow for their removal other than by the ballot paper (General Election) or a vote in the House. I am wholly unconvinced testifying in this way would create sufficient pressure/impetus for him to finally go. This is a PM who needs to be forced, not persuaded or he will not think there is any special reason for his departure.
‘be a bit of a smoke screen’ rather.
It seems to me that it must be up to the Speaker to enforce any rules in Parliament. It could be the same mechanism as is used to discipline an MP for calling another MP a liar.
Someone else would need to identify whether lying had happened, because the Speaker can’t really do that and remain neutral. But I think that’s a solvable problem.
I’m not sure that I follow.
To the extent that there is any issue with article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, surely the 1871 Act explicitly repeals the Bill of Rights? Under the (by now) regular approach to constitutional statutes, it seems unavoidable to read the 1871 Act as authorising proceedings in court that scrutinise things said and done in Parliament. Reading it any other way would render the entire 1871 Act pointless, and that’s something we’re meant to avoid when interpreting statutes.
And as a matter of constitutional principle, there seems to be nothing wrong with a court determining that certain factual statements made in evidence to a parliamentary committee were knowing falsehoods, and punishing the offender accordingly. We’ve already established that the PM can receive a fine and stay in office. It would be up to Parliament to decide whether a PM who receives a fine or prison sentence for perjury can stay in office. All the court is doing is hearing a perjury case that can be run like any other perjury case.
Is this how I think the matter would ideally be handled? No. Clearly it would be better for Parliament to simply punish liars/perjurers itself. Remove them from office, hold them in contempt, etc. But if Parliament or a committee of Parliament prefers to outsource all that unpleasantness to the courts, I don’t see the constitutional problem.
I think you have confused implicit and explicit repeal.
No, because my point hinges on the 1871 Act explicitly repealing Article 9, rather than doing so implicitly. (Since the Bill of Rights is a constitutional statute after all.)
A situation such as here, where the inconsistency between the later statute and the earlier one must have been on everyone’s mind in 1871, because otherwise the whole exercise would be devoid of purpose, falls on the “explicit” side of the line as I understand it, even if the earlier statute isn’t mentioned by name.
If the Committee could agree to attempt to administer such an oath it would then have to persuade the PM to take it. If it is clear that he has lied to it, the pain of perjury surely comes, under current rules, as:-
a)a vote of confidence in the PM on the floor of the HofC.
b)similarly (if he or she is a Tory) in the 1922 committee.
c)the verdict of the next electorate given the opportunity or
d)resignation under the pressure of public opinion that might ensue
e)assassination (for completeness, not recommendation).
If a) or b) is not available because the PM’s political colleagues are frit or lazy then the electoral or public pressure solutions may work. This dance has some similarities to the US Impeachment process, which, as we have seen, has weaknesses.
For more certainty, writing the process so that the PM is explicitly answerable, if he perjures himself in these circumstances, to the Law in the person(s) of the Supreme Court , who could imprison him/her just like any other citizen, would get my approval. But for this to be the case, a future PM, seeing political advantage in looking virtuous, would be required to make such law.
I’m really rather taken with (e).
There is simply no tenable justification for *not* requiring that every Select Committee receives all evidence from witnesses who are under oath.
This isn’t about the Prime Minister, PartyGate, or the fact that the Metropolitan Police found that the PM had broken the law.
This is about the fact that Select Committees are used for the most incredibly important reasons: after their findings are published in a report, the government of the day is expected to respond to the report and this may lead to better regulation.
I am not sure if readers have seen this footage:-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruKIfw5g55Y
It is testimony given by Corey Lewandowski before the House Judiciary Committee. He was shown film record of interviews he had given to news media and when asked if he ever mis-represented his actions on behalf of President Trump he demurred. When shown evidence of doing exactly that, his response was, “I have no obligation to be honest with the media,” which perhaps unsurprisingly garnered quite a response in the committee room.
The thing is, a British Select Committee without witnesses placed under oath would be *exactly* like Corey Lewandowski talking to the media – they would be free to lie as much as they liked and there would be no downside.
I’m an employee. If I gave misleading information, knowingly false information, in response to a question in my workplace I can (and likely would) be dismissed for gross misconduct.
I’m also a tax payer. That means that the Prime Minister and every other elected parliamentarian is an employee of mine.
I expect them all to be held to the same rigorous standard that I am required to demonstrate and I expect there to be adequate consequences – including dismissal – when they fail to live up to those standards.
This isn’t some malcontent at a church fête organising committee. This is the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. He needs to tell the truth and he needs to be lose his job if he is not completely honest with the committee.
No if’s. No but’s.
“I’m also a tax payer. That means that the Prime Minister and every other elected parliamentarian is an employee of mine.”
Alternatively it means you are a victim of his de facto power to levy taxes. (Yes, I know it’s also de iure, but, as when the school bully is robbing you of your lunch-money, it’s the de facto bit that counts.)
A number of commenters here and elsewhere assume that because the Speaker presides over debates and has certain disciplinary powers, it falls to that office to enforce all the rules and conventions of the House.
Not so. Although the Speaker might be said to have a general responsibility to maintain order in debate, he does so on behalf of the House.
The powers to maintain order – eg on occasion inviting disorderly Members to leave the Chamber – derive from a standing order of the House. The Speaker himself does not have the power to suspend grossly disorderly Members from the service of the House: this is done by decision of the House following ‘naming’.
A Speaker who tried to enforce a supposed rule about truthfulness, without the express authority of the House, would soon be in hot water.
The House typically deals with such matters by substantive motion (as DAG has pointed out on several occasions) – the order of the House remitting the matter to the Committee of Privileges is the most recent example. The failure of the Government to muster support for its amendment is instructive.
Yes, of course, it needs to be under a Standing Order. The Speaker is akin to a judge, not a law maker. But the way people are censured for telling lies is by Standing Order. It is hard to justify telling lies is less serious.
I agree with Mr Horne. Out in the open and under oath. Anything less and it will be a whitewash.
One of the greatest problems in the current situation is that so many outside Westminster apparently don’t appear to care about the dishonesty of the current office holder. Johnson’s appeal has his dishonesty baked in, as the saying goes. However, it might be helpful to ask those who currently will answer that it’s just how he operates (and, by inference, that they will make allowances for him) if they feel the same about other politicians lying. Of course, some will answer that all politicians are liars, but this is a view that should always be challenged. The need for honesty in politicians, especially those in high office, is more important than whether they can tell a good joke – and it’s time we all woke up to that.
If politicians cannot be put on oath, that’s surely something that has to be addressed. I seem to remember that Tony Blair had to take the oath when he testified at the Leveson Enquiry. Nobody should be exempt from the requirement to take the oath on such occasions.
“what can you do – constitutionally and practically – with a dishonest Prime Minister?”
Much the same as the US can do with a similarly inclined President: everything, if sufficient of his party agree; nothing if they don’t. The written US Constitution and the unwritten British one both assume that there may be one or two ‘bad apples’ but are helpless in the face of a corrupt, or at least careless, majority. Indeed the USSR’s constitution was, as I recall, a wonderful document – but it did nothing to impede Stalin and his successors.
Arguably, this is as it should be in a democracy. If the People vote for a corrupt, or careless, government then that is what they – we – should get. Not very satisfactory but unless absolute power is given to someone’s who can be trusted with it, i.e me, there may be no better solution.
What to do with a rogue when the rules are written for decent people ?
We would not be happy with a Highway Code which assumes all drivers are courteous and law-abiding. So we make the rules more realistic. And enforce them through the legal system. The risk of being caught is not negligible.
But it would be a mistake to think that changing the rules can somehow reform the particular rogue occupying 10 Downing Street. Because the game he is playing is not similar to carrying out a daily activity subject to the law. And, in that, he is no different to other occupants of his post. The question is, as David Allen Green says, political not legal.
So where to start ?
The first clue is provided by recalling the effort he and his minions put in to suppressing the evidence. Because that tells us that the most important first step is transparency. In this case, we got lucky from the efforts of journalists and bloggers who shone a light on what was happening. But it was luck. Why not make those who work in the government system subject to a legal requirement of transparency, rather than, as now, of secrecy ?
The Rogue behaves as he does because he doesn’t think he will be caught. Without transparency, he is unlikely even to be discovered.
But transparency only gets us part of the way down the road. The road to remedy.
And that means, even if he does get caught, the Rogue has to know he will face the consequences.
But in Westminster he knows he will have the backing of his Tribe. And since the rival tribe is smaller, the balance of power favours him. Why not keep on lying ?
That’s the structure of our political system. One or the other. For or against. Winner takes all.
The whole issue is presented as an argument within the ruling Tribe. And because that tribe is in the majority, other voices – even if they are heard – don’t count.
Who knows what to do? Do other parliamentary democracies not have problems with liars and rogues ? Of course they do.
But their tribes don’t have almost absolute power to do what they want. Because different voices in public opinion are represented in Parliament. Parliament may be messier, but often stronger.
So the rogue knows that he is more likely to face unpleasant political consequences. He will still try to play the power game. But because other voices are heard, he will find himself having to reason and argue more, and maybe lie less.
Transparency and Voice. The enemies of the Rogue.
“What to do with a rogue when the rules are written for decent people ?”
Write better rules.
“The Rogue behaves as he does because he doesn’t think he will be caught.”
Or, because the Rogue is a narcissist who believes the world revolves around him, that the rules don’t apply to him because he is above the law.
That’s the structure of our political system. One or the other. For or against. Winner takes all. The whole issue is presented as an argument within the ruling Tribe. And because that tribe is in the majority, other voices – even if they are heard – don’t count.
There are two important elements here. Let’s get to the first, the “Who knows what to do” element. Elected politicians must be free to set policy in the manner they believe encapsulates the will of the electorate, but in so doing they must be required to operate inside a legal framework and set of constitutional guard rails that are distinct from the administration, by design. The party or coalition in power must not have the ability to alter that legal framework or those constitutional guard rails *in any way*, so as to ensure that the integrity of the political/representative element of democracy cannot be undermined.
Companies with publicly traded shares will have a “Board of Directors” and will almost certainly include a number of NEDs – Non-Executive Directors – who are there entirely to act as a check and balance on the insider/salaried executives. Shareholders require this to help ensure that their investments are properly managed. As citizens and voters in UK plc, we need the equivalent of NEDs in government. I suspect that someone may point to the House of Lords as a vehicle to achieve that, but the HoL is not valid given membership is down to the “sitting Board of Directors” and therefore entirely partisan in nature.
While government polices itself, it is not possible to state that, in the UK, “No one is above the law”. That must change.
Second, you offer us a fascinating and erudite insight to the state of UK politics by describing it as tribal in nature. Your comment is important for several reasons. First, it is an accurate encapsulation of the “dumbing down” nature of British politics that everything – everything – has been reduced to “two choices” – two main political parties with a hope of securing a majority; two views expressed on any given topic or law; two choices offered: “for” or “against”. The problem with “dumbing down” is that it is “the illusion of choice”. It is also remarkably vulnerable to manipulation.
Donald Trump intentionally and deliberately exacerbated the divisions in US political discourse; he painted the “Do-Nothing” Democrats as intolerable and contemptible, knowing that it would attract a backlash. He kept doing it, goading them, so that when he did something entirely inappropriate and the Democrats cried foul, his supporters would respond with their own outrage, rather than pause, consider the nature of the complaint and realise that, perhaps, the Democrats had a point. Hyper-partisan politics is the incubator of the dictator, the authoritarian leader.
OK, but where next? Are there solutions out there? How do we take excessive partisanship out of politics? I would argue for greater voter participation. Make it easier and cheaper to vote – use ATM machines, smartphone applications and lottery terminals to vote – and it becomes possible to consult the electorate on a much wider range of issues. This has both advantages and disadvantages. It reduces our reliance on MPs [who all too frequently do not represent the wishes of their electorate], but it also risks “log-jam” politics, where nothing gets done because no clear majority view can be found. Clearly we can’t use voter participation as a cure-all. But it could take the edge of the most risky political decisions a nation may make – things like going to war, for instance. The other thing we could do is make it much easier to de-select and replace an MP; as the “cost of elections” falls, it becomes easier and cheaper to hold by-elections. This helps keep MPs accountable.
And one of the reasons that “The Rogue” continues to act with impunity is because, today, they can. So the changes we need to make must be those which eliminate that impunity. Running the country isn’t a game. PMQs isn’t an opportunity to trade bon mots with friends and insults with the opposition, it is a place to hold the government of the day to account. The fact that PMQs, one of the fundamental mechanisms for applying a check-and-balance on the actions of the government, has become a regular jeering match tells us in no uncertain terms that our government is out of control, un-tethered, un-checked, un-caring. And that needs to be addressed.
“Where next?’ – Next is an electorate in large part disenfranchised by a recent Act of Parliament.
The prime minister has a duty to uphold the ministerial code.
That the duty exists and is justiceable has been established in the Patel bullying case.
The office of Prime Minister is without question a public office, and if a public officer neglects his duty to such an extent that it amounts to abuse of the public’s trust, then that is a criminal offence with a maximum sentence of life.
Here, Mr Boris Johnson has clearly repeatedly and wilfully neglected his duty to hold the member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip accountable for the very many breaches of the code.
It is as far as I can see, an unambiguous series of acts of misconduct in public office.
Sincere apologies to regular readers, I may have mentioned this before…
This seems eminently reasonable until we look at the details.
Helen MacNamara, then the civil service’s head of ethics, investigated Patel’s conduct in the bullying case. The Prime Minister was advised by Sir Alex Allan, Whitehall’s independent advisor on ministerial standards. Note that at the time of MacNamara’s investigation there were claims of No. 10 applying “pressure” to have the investigation exonerate Patel…
The Prime Minister, sole arbiter “of the rules”,
1. Commissioned a report into a minister he had appointed
2. Elected to withhold the full report from the public
3. Left Patel in post and un-sanctioned, unless you count instructing her to issue a non-apology as a “sanction”
4. Prompted Sir Alex Allan to resign his post.
5. Promoted Helen MacNamara to Deputy Cabinet Secretary.
If we look at this objectively:-
1. The Prime Minister has total authority to select Ministers.
2. In response to Ministerial misconduct, the Prime Minister has total authority to ask someone that he may have appointed and almost certainly has the power to fire the person he would ask to “investigate” that alleged misconduct
3. The Prime Minister also has total authority to publish or suppress any report written on findings of a “Code of Ethics” investigation
4. After any such investigation has run its course, the Prime Minister also has total authority to decide whether or not sanctions are appropriate for a person he appointed.
In short, while I think you are entirely correct to point us to the Ministerial Code, all the available evidence we have is that:-
1. When used, it has been proven to be completely ineffective.
2. When operated, it would appear to have all authority “roll up” to the Prime Minister, which would rather suggest that it may not be an appropriate mechanism for applying governance to that individual…
Like yourself, I am repeating a previous comment… but I think the only valid mechanisms here would either be a completely independent body with the authority to investigate the sitting administration, or something more akin to a republican model, with co-equal branches of government, perhaps designed in such a way that a single political party cannot sit in power in both branches at the same time.
Power corrupts, etc.
Well, the second sentence of section 1 of the Parliamentary Witnesses Oaths Act 1871 says: “Any committee of the House of Commons may administer an oath to the witnesses examined before such committee.”
When originally enacted, there was a third sentence that use to say: “Any person examined as aforesaid who wilfully gives false evidence shall be liable to the penalties of perjury.”
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/34-35/83/section/1/enacted
Nothing about “pain” there. But what were the “penalties of perjury”? And why were those words repealed?
Well, perjury was a common law offence in 1871, but now we have the Perjury Act 1911, which repealed those words in the 1871 Act. Instead, we have a statutory code in the 1911 Act which provides for imprisonment or a fine or both if a “person lawfully sworn as a witness … in a judicial proceeding wilfully makes a statement material in that proceeding, which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true”. And “judicial proceeding” includes “a proceeding before any court, tribunal, or person having by law power to hear, receive, and examine evidence on oath.”
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/1-2/6/section/1
Seems pretty clear to me. The committee could require evidence under oath (or, in case of doubt, could refer the matter back to the House to determine whether the evidence should be under oath or not), and a person who wilfully gives false evidence could be prosecuted in the criminal courts.
That said, I suspect there are relatively few “normal” perjury prosecutions each year. And I suspect the CPS would be very reluctant to prosecute the sitting prime minister on indictment (that is, in Crown Court) without an open and shut case.
As Father Jack may have said, “That would be a political matter”. It would be better to vote the fecker off the island.
Andrew, click on the links in the piece, and you will find section 2 of a certain Act? Will that affect your view?
Sorry, did you mean s.2 of the Perjury Act 1911? https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/1-2/6/section/2
Or did you have a different Act in mind?
Whether a situation might be in s.1 or s.2 turns on whether there is a “judicial proceeding” within s.1(2) – “a proceeding before any court, tribunal, or person having by law power to hear, receive, and examine evidence on oath”.
That sounds broad enough to me to include a committee of parliament using its statutory power to require evidence to be given, received and examined under oath. But I’m not a criminal lawyer and I admit it might not. Is there authority either way?
Would it change my view if we are in s.2 rather than s.1?
A criminal offence under s.2 – a person who is required “to make any statement on oath for any purpose, and being lawfully sworn (otherwise than in a judicial proceeding) wilfully makes a statement which is material for that purpose and which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true” – can also be prosecuted and if convicted sentenced to similar penalties, so no I don’t think it does change my mind.
But, as you say, it feels more like a political offence punishable in the court of public opinion and in parliament, than one for the criminal courts.
I note that the 1911 Perjury Act has seven years penal servitude as one of the possible penalties.
Could there be one of those weird quirks which left it in place even though everyone thought transportation had been abolished? (Please say “yes”.)
If so, the prospect of shipping Johnson off to Australia is so delicious that I say “stuff any constitutional crisis: do it”.
It’s not fair to inflict Johnson on Australians. Rwanda would be a more appropriate choice.
As I understand it, penal servitude (prisoners being being forced to work, often “hard labour”) replaced transportation from the 1850s.
Both penal servitude and hard labour were abolished by the Criminal Justice Act 1948, which also abolished flogging and privilege of peerage. More post-war reform by the Attlee government.
Some interesting discussion over here: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/hojo.12419
No, we should not be exporting our problems, to Australia or Rwanda or anywhere.
As I see it, only the “High Court of (the) Parliament” could deal with the contempt. I think there is power to commit a contemnor to prison. (Won’t happen because it would depend on MPs votes).
Theoretically, there is the legal possibility of impeachment but the process is obsolete and myriads of issues would arise if there were to be even an attempt to start the process.
Essentially, the whole powers of the Houses and their committees ought to be overhauled to make the processes fit for purpose in modern times. (Powers of committees have been examined before but I haven’t time today to find a link. I don’t recall much happening as a result but Alexander Horne would know for sure).
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15630606
I watched to Public Accounts Committee as it happened in 2011 (linked report above)
Mr Inglese admitted that alcohol was taken at the meeting between Mr Hartnett and Vodaphone. Mr Hartnett confided in Mr Inglese that he suspected he had made a mistake regarding interest due. Mr Inglese confirmed that it was a mistake. They both decided that they couldn’t open the negotiations again. There was a lot of concern at the time about Mr Hartnett in his HMRC role was like a poacher turned gamekeeper. The evidence above was disclosed by Mr Inglese on oath, which the chairperson, Margaret Hodge, insisted he take. Until the oath, Mr Inglese had stonewalled questions.