21st February 2023
A few days ago I tweeted that there were only two ways the matter of Brexit and the island of Ireland can be ultimately resolved.
But that was wrong, there are seven.
By “ultimately resolved” I do not mean any of the work-arounds and quick-fixes being currently negotiated or proposed.
I mean instead that there is a situation where such work-arounds and quick-fixes are not needed, and that there is a settled and sustainable situation that means Brexit is not a problem.
These are the seven ways.
One: the European Union and/or the Single Market ceasing to exist.
This is highly unlikely.
Two: Ireland leaving the European Union and/or the Single Market.
This is also highly unlikely.
Three: the United Kingdom rejoining the European Union.
This is unlikely at least for a political generation – and it would require the European Union wanting the United Kingdom back, which given our ongoing political psycho-drama is difficult to envisage.
Four: Northern Ireland not sharing a Single Market with Ireland.
This is unlikely, as it would mean a trading border, and perhaps even border infrastructure, on the island of Ireland. Some would say that such invisible and visible borders would be a breach of the spirit, if not the words, of the Good Friday Agreement.
Five: the United Kingdom as a whole sharing in the Single Market, even if formally outside the European Union.
This was the preference of some “liberal” Brexiters and it was also pretty much the (infamous) “backstop” position of the withdrawal agreement negotiated by Theresa May, the last-but-two of our recent prime ministers. That agreement was voted down by Parliament and led to a change of Prime Minister.
Six: Northern Ireland sharing a Single Market with Ireland, but not the rest of the United Kingdom.
This is the current position under the Northern Irish Protocol, negotiated and promoted as an “oven-ready” agreement by Boris Johnson, the last-but-one of our recent prime ministers: the trade border down the Irish Sea. This is not acceptable to the Democratic Unionist party and some government backbenchers.
Seven: a united Ireland.
This would at, a stroke, resolve the matter of Brexit and the island of Ireland.
*
Given the first two options are literally incredible, the third is unlikely in the short-to-medium term, and the fourth is politically impossible, that leaves the final three. As the fifth and sixth do not have settled political support, that leaves only the seventh.
In my tweet I thought the third and the seventh are now the only real options of resolving ultimately the matter of Brexit and the island of Ireland.
The others were unlikely-to-impossible or politically unacceptable.
Many of you will prefer the United Kingdom to re-join the European Union, or at least the Single Market; and my own first preference is for a united Ireland, with participation in the Single Market for Great Britain by means of a close association agreement.
But whatever your preference, the ultimate resolution has to be one of these seven.
And until and unless one is accepted, there will be an ongoing problem in the matter of Brexit and the island of Ireland.
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I agree that this list is indeed exhaustive. The best solutions in my view are 3, failing which 5. Or more likely 5 as a precursor to 3.
7 will obviously happen in any event in due course, but 3 and 5 go well beyond solving just the NI problem. The also solve Britain’s problem.
I agree that this list is indeed exhaustive. The best solutions in my view are 3, failing which 5. Or more likely 5 as a precursor to 3.
7 will obviously happen in any event in due course, but 3 and 5 go well beyond solving just the NI problem. They also solve Britain’s economic problems.
Just for completeness:
Eight – independence for N.I., which then joins the EU as an independent state.
In market research, there is a questioning process where trade-offs are presented, and slowly a range of preferences are reduced to just two, so: number three or number seven?
Grasp the nettle and decide which you prefer/dislike least.
You say that only options 5-7 are incredible or impossible and rule out 5 and 6 as they don’t have settled political support, leaving only option 7 (a united Ireland). Do you seriously think a united Ireland has “settled political support”.
There is a further logical option which goes beyond your option 2, namely reunification of the British Isles. No-one wants it, as far as I know, but it would also “at a stroke” resolve the matter of Brexit and the island of Ireland.
Ireland left the UK over 100 years ago. Get over it.
Reunion of GB and IRL does not belong in this list because it’s not a distinct option; it could only be a gloss on either option 2 or option 3.
Rather bizarrely, I heard suggestions from the likes of Rees Mogg, just after the referendum, and as the fact that there needed to be a border started to come to the fore of consciousness, that the Republic of Ireland would be well advised to leave the EU because the UK had done so.
This was before the power of “little” Ireland as part of the EU in its negotiations with the UK became clear.
There was – and still is – a blind spot among Brexiters about Ireland.
There could have been an argument to be made* that, for the sake of preserving all strands of the GFA, the UK and Ireland should have been treated as a single bloc (SM & CU). But then if the population of the Irish Republic had been polled on the prospect of that smaller bloc leaving the EU, and the result aggregated with the 2016 referendum result, then the 5m overwhelmingly pro-EU Irish would have overturned the 1.6m UK Leave majority, and so Brexit would never have happened.
(*N.B. I am not making this argument myself, just pointing out the logical outcome of an argument which some Brexit supporters did seem to moot at times, in their desperation to resolve the Irish Trilemma.)
Why stop at Ireland? If you’re going to include other countries in the UK’s democratic decision-making, what about Spain?
Brexit causes issues with Gibraltar’s border. Perhaps the Spanish too should have voted in the Brexit referendum?
And Cyprus, because of the UK’s « sovereign base areas » there; and, for that matter, the several million British citizens living outside the UK who, having left more than 15 years ago, were excluded from voting in the Referendum, even though anyone of British nationality was directly concerned by the outcome no matter where they live. At the same time, citizens of Commonwealth countries residing in the UK at the time of the Referendum WERE entitled to vote, and some Australians and Indians boasted of having done so in the interests of their country of nationality/ origin rather than those of the UK/ British.
Bitter, moi?!
Option seven doesn’t resolve the issue, because if there’s not to be a new cycle of terrorism then the large Unionist minority in the north of a united Ireland will need guarantees of no borders between them and the UK in the same way as Republicans now have a guarantee of no borders between them and Ireland. It simply reverses the problem by perhaps putting internal borders within the united Ireland to permit the north of the country to stay in the UK’s market. The only permanent solution is for Ireland and the UK to follow the same rules for product and business regulation with the same highest court interpreting those rules when needed, which is your options three or five (or perhaps the highly unlikely one or two).
Unionists currently make up roughly 50% in Northern Ireland. They would be quite a small minority in a united Ireland. Maybe max 10% given that current unionist numbers would have to drop before a UI could happen.
And if there were many “pieds-oranges” – such as Arlene Foster has indicated she would be – that 10% could be a lot lower again.
More amenable than the 7 DUP tests.
Logical listing of options. I suspect that any possible solution will now require a UK general election first. The Tory civil war seems to have made progress without one impossible.
I suspect the current situation (6) will survive and be made to look like it is working to avoid any of the other options having to be contemplated.
That is until the next labour govt does what it really needs to do, but what it currently denies it intends to do, which is to start to act on implementing (5).
“As the fifth and sixth do not have settled political support, that leaves only the seventh.” That’s a very odd conclusion. Does it imply that the seventh *does* have “settled political support”? No 6 is what the DUP we have now and the DUP find “unacceptable”. No 7 the DUP would find *even more* unacceptable. Indeed, No 7 carries a real risk of a return to serious violence. Very likely No 7 will come about eventually, but now is too soon: better to wait 20-30 years for a generation that have direct memory of IRA atrocities to die out.
I agree 1-4 are, in various degrees, incredible to impossible; No 6 is what the DUP are currently blocking. That leaves 5 and 7.
No 5, the whole of the UK sharing in the SM, would not only solve the Northern Ireland border problem but would also significantly ameliorate the post-Brexit trade problems suffered by the whole of the UK. It would be far less objectionable to NI unionists as NI would be treated pretty much the same as the rest of the UK. Polling evidence suggests it would have significant UK-wide support. It would be a more realistic medium-term prospect than rejoining.
With anything to do with the EU the temporal axis is often the least underappreciated – let’s turn to the options with ‘time’ as an important variable.
Option 1 – unlikely currently but certainly a possibility in the next 20 years or next generation ( option 2 goes with obviating the EU). Much depends on next 5 years & on going instability in Ukraine inc reducing living standards in the EU & especially the Eurozone ( think Italy, still after 20 years on a downwards trajectory).
Option 3 – it’s a possibility – but very unlikely – already we’re diverging by default & incrementally – maybe 20 years change of heart but a very difficult call currently.
I discount 4) and 5) for the fantasists.
Option 6 – but with a continuing large dollop of fudge & treacle – both UK & EU are renowned for kicking into the long grass – it looks likely that the EU will give significantly more concessions on Customs but not the ECJ role in NI/SM – clearly Option 6 isn’t sustainable long term but could with the right spin go on for another 10-15 years.
Option 7 – absolutely but 15-20 years down the line but only if EU still exists in current form ( about which I’m doubtful).
Time will tell.
I don’t think you can dismiss option 5 as being for the fantasists. HMG did in fact negotiate and sign up to a version of option 5 but it was voted down in Parliament. With the still-progressing shift in public sentiment against Brexit, and with the feeling that what the UK demanded and got in place of option 5 (i.e. the NIP, option 6) is either not desirable or not functional, it’s not at all certain that some other variation on option 5 would be voted down by a future Parliament.
Option 5 – the backstop was considered but couldn’t get agreement in the May government. She tried 3 times ,each unsuccessfully in Parliament.
There were two options WA1 – the original, with the UK wholly inside the SM & CU importantly with backstop – this was, in effect, what was euphemistically called BRINO – or Brexit in Name Only when the penny/euro dropped it meant that until the EU decided otherwise ( or in perpetuity) the UK would remain lockstep with EU/SM/CU regulations, no ability to create FTA’s or Common Commercial Policies with non EU countries oh, and no veto over any SM rules/directives.
Funnily enough this didn’t fly.
WA2 is what we’ve ended up with in the NIP – effectively colonial status for NI given NI have no democrat say over the many SM laws that govern them.
With hindsight many people ( inc leavers and remainers) foresaw the eventuality that we find ourselves in.
More fudge Vicar?
Hence option 5 would probably, if put forward (and it is a big IF still), get agreement from the forthcoming labour government. So not quite as fantastical ans you originally suggested. Interesting times await us.
Even if Labour tried to back Option 5 ( with Backstop) it would be BRINO likely in perpetuity – few if any believe that the EU would release the UK out of its regulatory ambit a second time & no veto?
Remind what the attraction is?🤔
For this reason putting ourselves willfully in a protectorate straight jacket is wishful thinking.
No thanks Vicar.
Logically, if there is a border between Calais and Dover, there needs to be an equivalent border somewhere between Cherbourg and Rosslare, or between Dublin and Belfast, or between Belfast and Cairnryan/Birkenhead. If each of these is impossible, we have an insoluble conundrum.
For what it is worth, given the lack of a clear political consensus for any different position, I expect we will find a way to muddle through with the current awkward dispensation, with mutually agreed relaxations where necessary and appropriate (#6 please, with fries on the side).
Having “got Brexit done” the UK is not really a priority for the EU any longer, but the position of Ireland as a member state certainly is – and that includes the citizens of Ireland living in the north.
If the UK was ready to rejoin the EU, I fully expect they would agree to take us back, but the terms would be different than when we left, and I can’t see it happening for at least 10 more years and probably longer.
There is an eighth option.
The original proposal for NI was for a four county country. It was felt that was too small and so two Catholic majority counties were added to the original four.
The eighth option is to have a referendum by county, or smaller areas.
Those that want to unite with the Republic can do so.
The remaining areas will form the reduced size Northern Ireland and presumably have a Unionist majority.
Those Unionists can then decide whether to remain in the UK or be independent.
Don’t talk nonsense. Only Antrim and N. Down have unionist majorities. Belfast straddles both counties and Belfast is now a majority nationalist city.
N. E. Antrim is nationalist. S. Down is nationalist.
What you are proposing are unionist enclaves. Not going to fly.
It’s delightful to see the illegal partition of Ireland in 1921 coming back and causing havoc fir the rest if the UK
You are currently reaping what you sowed.
The gerrymandered partition of Ireland was undoubtedly a mistake in retrospect, but it was perceived to be a success at the time at least on the British side, and I think there is a good case for it becoming the unfortunate model for other equally mistaken partitions in other places such as Palestine/Israel and India/Pakistan which remain problematic.
But what is the case for it being illegal? What laws were broken?
Partition was seen as a success for Britain if only to forestall a unionist / protestant armed revolt led by Carson. But as elsewhere in Britain’s colonial world, it was disastrous & costly for the local populations, and as we’re seeing today, still is. Sadly nothing was learned from the experience and Britain went on to inflict the same chaos in India, Palestine & Cyprus to name a few.
As for legality, Britain had jurisdiction over all of the territories in each case and as we’ve seen with brexit, the government can still make it up as it goes along; and if all else fails there are always statutary instruments. Some call it democracy.
On illegality of partition in Ireland, perhaps there is a case to be made under Irish or international law, but I have not heard it.
On Cyprus, can you remind me when the UK sought or implemented a partition there? My understanding is that many Greek Cypriots wanted union with Greece (enosis). Many Turkish Cypriots favoured a continuation of British rule, but on independence in 1960 (the entire island as a single country, not two) many Turkish Cypriots sought instead a separate state (taksim). And then after a coup in 1974 led by Greeks in the military, Turkey invaded the north, since when there has been de facto partition.
The UK has a lot to answer for, but some nations are partitioned (e.g. Korea) without much influence from the UK.
Indeed it’s not the UK that partitioned the island of Cyprus between the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC; but when the former Crown Colony of Cyprus became independent, the UK retained the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. There is therefore a British Overseas Territory (same status as Gibraltar) on the island as well as the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot territories.
Your proposal is not envisaged in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, which encompasses only Yes/No Re-Unification Referendums north and south in Ireland.
You may remember the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement under the form of the British Irish Agreement is an international treaty which cannot be easily set aside
This is theoretically possible, but not workable in practice. Belfast city has a nationalist majority and so a coherent rump NI is not very feasible. Independence is not possible either except as a sort of Transnistria. There are quite a few middle of the road people in NI who are in no particular hurry to leave the UK, but who would not want to end up in an impoverished loyalist banustan.
Other objections aside, redrawing the border wouldn’t really address the problem. Absent large-scale ethnic cleansing, reduced NI would still have two distinct communities in it, and the issue of whether it would have a hard land border with IRL would be as salient as ever. You’d be faced with the same seven options that David has already outlined.
You’re suggesting recreating the original Northern Ireland model, by reducing its size in order to return to a built-in Protestant/Unionist majority? Why not? That original model has been such a roaring success over the last 100 years.
Even better, you want the Catholic/National minority to start off this time by knowing that the rules/borders will be changed if they win anything by democratic means?
What could possibly go wrong?
That is in fact wrong. The original proposal was for all nine counties of Ulster – it was in many ways a bluff, a spoiler threat for Home Rule. The problem was that 5, indeed 5 and two ½ counties had nationalist majorities. A democratic Ulster taken out of Ireland would, if nine counties, promptly vote to rejoin an independent or Home Rule Ireland. However, taking the 4 majority Unionist Counties (two of which at least had huge areas like South Down and South Tyrone) that were majority nationalist) was deemed to make Northern Ireland too small, so Armagh and Fermanagh were included and Ulster partitioned too.
The whole cynical history is related in Simon Heffer’s The Age of Decadence: A History of Britain: 1880-1914 … well worth reading. Heffer is by the way an arch Tory, was pro-Brexit (now who knows) and usually pro-Unionist.
Well done. Admirably clear and pretty unchallengeable.
Inquistors of the Government should immediately, and continuously, ask Ministers which of these seven options are acceptable to them. Of course, they don’t have to be restricted to just one.
Even if the Government refuses to answer, on the grounds of revealing its negotiating position (a category error because you can’t gain something in a negotiation if you don’t make clear you want it) Ministers and Civil Servants should be clear which would comprise the UK’s BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). The same applies, of course, on the EU side (but knowing EU procedures I’m pretty sure they will already have done that exercise).
I’m not sure myself: as I see it, the Brexit/Northern Ireland problem is down to conflict between the Good Friday Agreement (which was essentially a fudge, letting Northern Ireland act as both part of the Republic of Ireland and of the UK, as people wished, requiring borders neither with the RoI or the UK), premised on and requiring UK and Irish membership of the EU single market; and Brexit, which – removing UK from the EU single market – requires a border between them.
So resolving the Brexit-island of Ireland matter requires a situation with (A) no borders (GB-NI, NI-RoI/EU or GB-RoI/EU); (B) a border across the island of Ireland (NI-RoI/EU) as well as GB-EU; (C) an Irish Sea border (GB-NI) as well as GB-EU; or (D) a full set of borders (GB-NI, NI-RoI/EU or GB-RoI/EU) – whatever (or hence how acceptable) the political or trading arrangements to provide these might be.
Of David’s options, 1 & 2 don’t actually resolve things, just redefine it as a purely an RoI v UK issue, without the EU being involved; 3 & 5 give (A – no borders); 4 leads to (B); 6 & 7 lead to (C – Irish Sea Border). An independant Northern Ireland (as others have suggested) would, if it joined the EU, also lead to (C) – or, if it didn’t, but decided to have its own market, would lead to (D). The other suggestion made, of the RoI joining the UK – or at least its single market – is another way of getting to (A).
Which of these possible resolutions is the most likely – or least unlikely – I shall leave others to judge… But I do recall someone’s suggestion that the only real solution to the (i.e. Britain’s) Irish problem was the wholly impracticable one of towing the island out into middle of the Atlantic and sinking it…
In my view the characterisation of Theresa May as merely “the last-but-two of our recent prime ministers” serves to diminish the vision, ambition and accomplishments of the Conservative Party.
I think “first of the four most recent Tory Prime ministers” more accurately reflects the magnitude.
Indeed, May was the first of four Conservative Prime Minsters in the last four years.
Or the second of five Conservative Prime Minsters since the Brexit vote in June 2016.
This is “strong and stable” leadership in action.
When was the last time of such turbulence at the top? Perhaps Liverpool-Canning-Goderich-Wellington-Grey, from 1827 to 1830? When the electorate was around 400,000 adult men, out of about 17 million people.
Something like the status quo option 6 might still work if the current government had the strength, some of it probably borrowed from the opposition, to vote through a new deal solution and to impose direct rule from Westminster if this solution, democratically decided by the Parliament of the Union, is not accepted by the DUP, who could chose to accept it at any time thereafter.
Sadly my choice of options, the U.K. rejoining the EU is, as you say at the moment politically impossible with this government. But support for this government is dwindling due to the many other Brexit related difficulties the country faces. We know the pandemic and the Ukraine war led to economic pressures. But the U.K. has in addition the cost of living crisis, the loss of vital EU staff, the loss of Erasmus, Horizon, the Medical Agency and freedom of movement for the creative industry- the list is endless.
Once this government is gone, we hope PR has a chance, as well as a step by step process towards rejoining the EU. It is not just the most successful trading union (and every country in the world apart from Nth Korea I believe belongs to its regional trading bloc), but beside China and the US, only the EU as the third international power can address climate change and other global issues.
You omit two admittedly unlikely propositions –
1. The Republic stays in the EU but in a customs area common with the UK.
2 Southern Ireland returning to the UK.
Merely added for completeness!
Finding a solution to the row over the Protocol is far more pressing than the time scale in which the achievement of a united Ireland could realistically be brought about. This is a point a number of comments on the post have already made. But even worse the most plausible circumstances for such an outcome (since it would require the support of a majority of the electorate in Northern Ireland) would be if GB and/or England was engulfed in a political and economic catastrophe. Multiple failures would have had to happen before that situation was reached. It is fine to want a united Ireland, but it is wishful thinking to imagine that the obstacles to its achievement in the foreseeable future are not formidable. They include the reality that a considerable number of even the supporters of nationalist parties in Northern Ireland are likely to be resistant to voting themselves into a civil war, particularly as long as they can continue to enjoy the benefits of the Good Friday Agreement. The problem that needs fixing is Brexit, not the Irish political settlement.
“..The problem that needs fixing is Brexit, not the Irish political settlement…”
As I argued above, the likelihood of the UK rejoining the EU is extremely remote currently – besides the EU of 2016 is forever gone – the new EU would require us to pay significantly more fees, commit to joining the Euro ( which is, in my view, a harder sell than rejoining the SM) and, in all likelihood to lose the national veto ( given a wholesale move to QMV projected in the next 3-5 years).
It’s a great shame that during the preceding 45 years of EU membership, the relationship remained fractious to the end & the UK still didn’t (& doesn’t) buy into the Europa project or embryonic United States of Europe/direction.
It is interesting that how there is of a semi-consensus (a contradiction in terms, I know) that a United Ireland is inevitable – but not for at least 20 years. This seems to have been true of the issue during my lifetime, going back more than half a century.
I suspect that a United Ireland, when it happens, will come quicker than we think. Like going bankrupt, it may be “gradually and then suddenly.”
Prior to contemplating all possible ways of solving this conundrum stands the need of a thorough reflection on the honesty within the British body politic.
At the moment the UK of GB/NI is obviously tempted to sign treaties which they do not want to honor.
It is nice that the EU has not abandoned their sense of diplomacy.
Brussels could just have said : The treaty is signed, works well for the majority of the people in Northern Ireland, does not harm the GFA.
Nothing to negotiate. We’re off for the weekend.
They haven’t. The EU will still look for diplomatic ways to reach an outcome, that is effectively the same as the NIP that was oven-readily signed. No EU border on Ireland, EU border in the Irish Sea. Marginal adjustments as proposed by the EU. Disputes effectively settled under EU law.
Regarding option 7:
Am I alone in believing that GB has a huge credibility gap when stating that Putin is wrong to annexe part of Ukraine, whist still insisting that it is right to annex part of Ireland into the UK?
It seems that the “oven-ready” Brexit is still raw. And will stay that was as it was always too big to fit in the oven. We need to carve bits off it and cook them separately.
But don’t worry. If our current PM cannot get Brexit done, there’ll be another one along in a while to have another try. And we’ll keep at it until it’s done or has been left so long it has gone off and is toxic.
Viability aside (though I appreciate your points), I prefer 5 (or 7), it being idiotic to have broken a strong trading agreement. I fear 3 as I think the EU would be difficult with us on a return, not least imposing the Euro. We should not have left but going back could be a nightmare. In theory 7 is best but I’m not sure many NI feelings and beliefs accord with this.