“Not a promising start” – a close read of the Covid Inquiry ruling against the Cabinet Office, and why it may be very significant

24th May 2023

(This is the first in a planned series of posts on the Covid Inquiry – the next will be on Boris Johnson’s lawyer difficulty.)

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Today the Covid Inquiry made what may be a significant ruling that could shape how it will go about obtaining information and documents from unwilling to provide those documents.

This post explains today’s ruling – and sets out what the ruling may signal about the inquiry as a whole.

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To begin: public inquiries are powerful legal creatures.

Very powerful.

That is why governments tend to avoid having inquiries under the Inquiries Act 2005 if it can possibly be avoided.

For example, the Daniel Morgan panel inquiry was not under the 2005 Act.

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One of the immense powers of a public inquiry is in obtaining evidence.

The key provision here is section 21, which should be read in full by those following the Covid inquiry generally.

Section 21 provides:

We also need to look at Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 for how an Inquiry can obtain information without resorting to a section 21 notice:

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Real legal power, however, lies not so much in having a right to request something, but in what happens if that request is denied.

Here we go to section 35 of the Act:

Whack.

Not complying with a section 21 request is a criminal offence.

There are narrow exceptions to compliance with a section 21 request – for example if a document is privileged.

But subject to narrow exceptions, there is an obligation to comply with a section 21 request to provide evidence.

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In respect of documents, the Act provides that a person is required to provide documents “that relate to a matter in question at the inquiry”.

The crucial word here is “relate”.

It is a broad word, and it means that the scope is far wider than say a requirement to provide documents that are, say, directly relevant.

Documents that can “relate” to something can merely be documents that, although not directly relevant, contextualise other documents.

For example, a document may show what a decision-maker may have been preoccupied with at the same time a more relevant document was created, and so on.

And the provision prompts an obvious question: who decides whether a document “relates” to the work of an inquiry?

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The Covid Inquiry has broad terms of reference (and these also should be read in full by anyone following the inquiry).

And it seems earlier this year, the Inquiry was in correspondence with the Cabinet Office.

Significantly, the Inquiry was only relying at this early stage on requests under Rule 9 – and not (yet) the supercharged legal power under section 21.

According to documents released by the Inquiry today, there was substantial correspondence earlier this year between the Inquiry and the Cabinet Office.

But it seems the Inquiry was frustrated with what was (not) being disclosed and what was being redacted.

And so on 28 April 2023 (though not published at the time) the Inquiry chair issued a Section 21 notice:

Such a notice has to be taken seriously – very seriously.

The government, however, contended that it did not need to comply.

And instead made an application under the Act for the notice to be revoked.

The Cabinet Office even went so far to instruct the Treasury Devil – the government’s most senior external legal adviser – to set out the application.

And so we have a ten-page legal(istic) submission which looks far more like a court pleading than anything else.

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The primary objection of the government is what it calls “jurisdictional”.

In essence, the government contends that the Inquiry cannot order disclosure of documents which are “unambiguously irrelevant”.

The published application is very reliant on the phrase “unambiguously irrelevant” – even though that is not expressly mentioned in section 21 of the Act.

It is almost as if the government’s lawyers have devised this test for themselves, and now insist it has to be applied.

Of course, the section 21 power is for documents “that relate to a matter in question at the inquiry” – and here we have to remember that the Covid Inquiry’s remit is very wide.

In simple terms, the government’s position is that if a requested document does not relate to a matter in question at the inquiry then the Inquiry has no power to order disclosure.

And the crucial point is that the Cabinet Office says it is for them to decide whether a document is “unambiguously irrelevant” – and not the Inquiry:

“It is also important to note that the Cabinet Office has explained, in correspondence, the measures it has taken as a result of which the Inquiry can be assured that the appropriately high threshold has been, and will be, accurately and properly applied. The ability of parties to distinguish between potentially relevant material (including adverse material) and unambiguously irrelevant material is seen day in and day out in all litigation contexts. Such judgements are made by qualified legal representatives, owing professional obligations beyond those owed to their client, up to and including Leading Counsel.”

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The Application was considered by the chair of the Inquiry.

And the chair of the Inquiry said No.

Her ruling was published today, and it takes the government’s objections to jurisdiction head on.

The chair observes:

“The Notice was, as I have explained, premised on my assessment that the entire contents of the documents that are required to be produced are of potential relevance to the lines of investigation that I am pursuing.

“The essential thrust of the application therefore appears to be that this assessment is irrational, and thus there was no power to issue the Notice, because the Cabinet Office has reviewed the documents for itself and has concluded that those parts which are sought to be withheld from the Inquiry are “unambiguously irrelevant”. 

“I do not accept that my assessment was irrational.”

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(Please note I have broken up longer paragraphs from the quoted documents for flow.)

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The chair then makes a strong point about breadth and who makes the choice (emphasis added):

“First, it is self-evident that the Terms of Reference of this Inquiry are of great breadth. It is equally obvious that in order to discharge those Terms of Reference I will need to undertake a large number of extremely diverse lines of investigation.

“Those lines of investigation are bound to involve factual matters that are not specified in, and which may be collateral to, not only the issues identified in the Terms of Reference itself, but also the issues particularised in the published provisional scope document for any particular module of the Inquiry, and/or any more detailed lists of issues that the Inquiry may provide to Core Participants.

“For example, in order to evaluate the response of the government and/or of any individual Minister to the pandemic, it may be necessary for reasons of context for me to understand the other (superficially unrelated) political matters with which they were concerned at the time.

“Such matters may acquire greater significance where it appears to me, or it is otherwise suggested, that a Minister dealt with Covid-related issues inadequately because he or she was focusing (perhaps inappropriately) on other issues.

“For similar reasons, I may also be required to investigate the personal commitments of ministers and other decision-makers during the time in question.

“There is, for example, well-established public concern as to the degree of attention given to the emergence of Covid-19 in early 2020 by the then Prime Minister.

Moreover, the need for me to investigate allegations that have been aired publicly regarding disagreements between members of the government and breaches of Covid-19 regulations by those within government provides a further basis upon which material such as diary arrangements and content which may not appear to relate directly to the response to Covid-19 are of at least potential relevance to the investigations that I am conducting.

“The fact that the Cabinet Office has asserted that matters such as “entirely separate policy areas with which the Inquiry is not concerned” and “diary arrangements unconnected to the Covid-19 response” are “unambiguously irrelevant” to the work of my inquiry 4 demonstrates that it has misunderstood the breadth of the investigation that I am undertaking.”

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“Misunderstood.”

Ouch.

The chair continues:

“Second, it does not follow from the fact that the Cabinet Office has itself reviewed material, and considers it “unambiguously irrelevant”, that my assessment that the material is of potential relevance is irrational.

“The application seeks to establish a principle that the Chair of a public inquiry will be acting ultra vires in requiring the production of material where the recipient of a section 21 notice declares that material to be “unambiguously irrelevant”.

“I reject that proposition.

“The key flaw, as it seems to me, is that it wrongly allocates to the holder of documents, rather than to the inquiry chair, the final decision on whether documents are or are not potentially relevant to the inquiry’s investigations.”

Well, quite.

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She adds:

“It cannot be right that a mere assertion by such a person of “unambiguous irrelevance” has the effect of extinguishing any power in the inquiry to require the production of the documents so that it can determine for itself the relevance or otherwise of the material.

“In this case the document holder is a government department, but, in another, it might be, for example, a private individual or entity suspected of criminality.”

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And then the ruling gets very interesting, as she illustrates one particular point (again emphasis added):

“…it is apparent that some important passages (relating for example to discussions between the Prime Minister and his advisers about the enforcement of Covid regulations by the Metropolitan Police during the public demonstrations following the murder of Sarah Everard) were initially assessed by the Cabinet Office to be “unambiguously irrelevant” to my investigations and therefore redacted from copies of the WhatsApp messages initially provided to the Inquiry.

“Whilst those redactions have now (very recently) been removed, it was not a promising start.”

Not a promising start.

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The Application was dismissed, and the government has to disclose the requested documents by next Tuesday 30th May 2023.

The Cabinet Office may make a judicial review application to quash the notice – but unless it takes such a step, the only choice now is compliance or criminality.

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More generally, the chair’s ruling may be highly significant: an early sign that this Inquiry is not to be messed with, and that it will see through legalistic disclosure points of the government.

As such it is a very encouraging development.

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I plan to do a further post in the next day or two focusing on Boris Johnson’s particular problems with this disclosure decision.

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26 thoughts on ““Not a promising start” – a close read of the Covid Inquiry ruling against the Cabinet Office, and why it may be very significant”

  1. A hacked off Morse, trailing Lewis in his wake, “I, Sir, Madam, am Chief Inspector Morse and I am heading up this murder investigation so I will decide what is and what is not pertinent to my inquiries.”

    “Now, I hope I will not have to repeat myself on that point in the future.”

  2. This is Freedom of Information with sharp teeth. The Chair of the Inquiry is clearly not to be messed with. Quite right too. Go in hard early on so they get the message.

    A very promising start from Baroness Hallett.

  3. Not a quality comment, I’m afraid, but I can’t resist saying Thank You for yet another timely, concise lesson on the legal side of our national affairs. Very much appreciated by a mere engineer!

  4. If the cab office refuses to provide the requested info to the inquiry, and it is a criminal offence, they will have broken the law. But the gov have broken laws before, and there appears no penalty.

    1. I suspect that the ‘controlling mind’ in the cabinet office will be considering their approach as time on D Wing may cramp their promotion prospects and chance of an honour come retirement.

  5. She doesn’t mince her elegant words.

    Mr Johnson and his erstwhile government can run, but they’ll find it hard to hide. Which it is as it should be.

    1. DAG may comment here, but my reading of the article suggests the key point is that the chair of the inquiry (rather than, say, the CPS) can institute proceedings against someone not responding to a section 21 notice. Everything said so far certainly implies she would do exactly this, to me at least, even if the met and/or CPS have been reticent to do so previously.

  6. If the offence is commited by the Cabinet Office (as recipient of the s21 notice) then who receives the sanction (financial or otherwise)? Is there an individual responsible for such a department who’d be ‘on the hook’ or would this criminality be dealt with in a different way?

  7. For all that this is officially the Cabinet Office engaging with the inquiry, it’s plain that the primary motivation is protecting Johnson from the consequences of his (in)actions. And that cavalier brush-off (“…the Inquiry can be assured that the appropriately high threshold has been, and will be, accurately and properly applied”) entirely chimes with those famously clear characterisation of Johnson’s Housemaster in 1982:

    “Boris really has adopted a disgracefully cavalier attitude to his classical studies . . . Boris sometimes seems affronted when criticised for what amounts to a gross failure of responsibility … I think he honestly believes that it is churlish of us not to regard him as an exception, one who should be free of the network of obligation which binds everyone else.”

    His toadies bleat about “witch hunt” like a Trump tribute act but they pretend not to understand that the analogy is deliberately flawed, for while an actual witch trial is a snipe hunt, the search for the dishonest, dissolute, and corrupt in public office may indeed find its quarry.

  8. Section 21 (1) (a) .. ‘to give evidence’ .. does this mean that witnesses can be called, cross-examined, and are effectively being interviewed under caution?

  9. I look forward to the heart warming aroma of political feet held close to the fire. Smelly but delicious.

    But, but with one almighty bound he was free – that couldn’t happen could it…

  10. The statement by “Boris Johnson’s spokesman” in which the enquiry’s proceedings are described as “politically motivated” has stylistic qualities redolent of utterances by the man himself, which, if BBC journalists are to be believed, is usually who is meant by “spokesperson for X” or “a source close to X”. I find it hard to believe there is anyone left of his former entourage who is still willing to be tainted by the Johnson brand. But it’s a funny old world.

  11. Thank you for shining a light here and sharing with us all, think I may have missed my lawyerly calling…

  12. It’s interesting to me (not a lawyer) how the power in such a review lies with the side requesting disclosure, whereas the Government’s view seemed to be more like the criminal justice system in which the police & CPS decide which documents are disclosable to the defence. If only the defence had such power, there might be a great deal fewer miscarriages of justice.

  13. Is “unambiguously irrelevant” a term of art in a so-called “litigation context” – perhaps derived from legislation or case law? Or is it entirely made up? My search of legislation.gov.uk, BAILII and Lexis Library for that precise term (in quotes) has not a single hit. So no legislation, no judge, and no commentator (captured within those resources) appears to have used that term.

    The Cabinet Office is a department of the UK government. The Covid Inquiry is a statutory inquiry, established by a minister of the UK government to investigate matters of public concern and make recommendations about them. So why is the the Cabinet Office treating its dealings with the Covir Inquiry as a “litigation context” anyway. Section 2 of the Inquiries Act 2005 expressly says this is not about determining any person’s civil or criminal liability.

    Has there been any public commitment from the government to cooperate with the inquiry? Perhaps some pointed questions need to be asked about why the Cabinet Office appears to be minded to obstruct the inquiry in its work. Do we need to wait until people are summoned to give evidence under oath?

    1. I think government lawyers have made up the “unambiguously irrelevant” test as a shorthand for something being outwith the scope of section 21.

  14. Thank you for setting this out together with hyperlinks.

    Looks like the judge says I want to see X and the government says we will be the judge of what you can see. Is that, basically, it?

    This legislation gives Ministers a lot of control over any inquiry. Wasn’t the Act rushed through without proper examination back in 2005 just before the election?

    A Canadian judge once said that he could not see any self-respecting judge accepting appointment to any inquiry held under this Act. Maybe that judge will now be proved right.

    Serious question arises. A criminal offence under section 35. OK but can the Cabinet Office be charged. If not, who in the Cabinet Office could be? Requires consent of DPP. Does that mean government could have any prosecution stopped.

    I do wonder about inquiries. Too many lawyers, take too long, costs massive. Look at Grenfell Tower. Still no final report years after the event but it did manage to crucify the firefighters.

    Anyway, as you say – Not a promising start !

      1. Possibly. Baroness Hallett is of course highly respected. I can’t not think of a better choice to chair this.

        There are valid criticisms of the legislation though because of the degree of control given to Ministers. That said, as far as I know, there have been no examples where Ministers have abused those powers. It is really in their interests to let the inquiry takes its course and co-operate with it fully. It is certainly in the public interest for them to do so.

        1. It is very much not in the interests of Boris Johnson though. Do the current government comply and drop him in the nasty stuff? That could be tricky for Sunak.

        2. I’m sure Peter Hargeaves’ double negative, “I can’t not think (sic) of a better choice to chair this”, was wholly inadvertant. But if it’s what he meant, and albeit I’d disagree, how beautifully elegantly put.

  15. Presumably much of the evidence under dispute consists of government business conducted by WhatsApp messages. It was my understanding that the ICO had directed that any messages of this type should be fully transcribed at the earliest opportunity. Does the practicalities of this have any bearing on the ability of the judge to gain access to what may be required?

  16. This government not getting on with public inquiries is getting to be a theme. First they completely ignore the IICSA recommendations, to the fury of Alexis Jay the IICSA chair. Now they are in a row over providing the Covid inquiry with the evidence it wants.

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