Constitutional and Legal History – Page 2

A Prime Minister in Name Only

17th October 2022

For a good part of the history of Prime Ministers, the title of “Prime Minister” was informal.

Until the late nineteenth century it was not used in official documents and it was only in the twentieth century that, here and there, it began to leave a trace on the statute book.

It was a title that was used just to describe the most dominant minister of the day, the one who controlled the cabinet and had the confidence of parliament – usually the First Lord of the Treasury but sometimes not.

And if today one asked an alien looking down from space who was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, that alien would assume it was Jeremy Hunt.

Billy the Fish and the Green Baize Vampire

One of the features of our uncodified constitutional arrangements is that the power of the Prime Minister varies depending on individuals, events and politics.

The last three Prime Ministers before Truss all lost office between general elections and, as this blog has often pointed out, every Prime Minister since 1974 has either gained or left office between general elections (or, most recently, both).

But loss of office is not exactly the same as loss of power – our constitution is so flexible that not even loss of office is a requirement for losing power.

And what we have at the moment is power moving away from the nominal Prime Minister towards another figure in the Cabinet.

An allusion, in a playful way, to the distinction made by the greatest of our constitutional commentators, Walter Bagehot, between the efficient and the dignified (or, here, undignified) elements of the constitution.

Many assume there will have to be a general election in the current circumstances – and there certainly should be.

But if the cabinet and the government majority in parliament can accept the current arrangements then there is no way forward to an early general election.

And in the meantime, and like the personal tax rate reduction, any influence whatsoever of Truss over policy is “delayed indefinitely”.

For it is Hunt who has control over policy and has the confidence of parliament – and of the markets.

We now have a Prime Minister in name only.

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(Apologies to Billy the Fish and Billy the Kid and the Green Baize Vampire.)

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The Scottish independence referendum case before the Supreme Court

12th October 2022

Yesterday and today there has been a fascinating case argued before the Supreme Court.

The case is about whether the Scottish parliament can legislate not for independence but for a non-binding referendum on the question of independence.

There is no dispute that actual independence is a matter legally reserved for the parliament in Westminster.

Nonetheless the Scottish government has come up with this clever wheeze of saying that even though the union is a reserved matter, there should be nothing to stop it holding an advisory referendum on the issue.

But the really clever wheeze is how they have framed this case so that it is being heard at the Supreme Court even without a bill being presented to the Scottish parliament let alone passed by the Scottish government.

The Scottish government has done this by means of a “reference” – which allows the devolved governments to refer questions directly to the Supreme Court.

This is unusual both legally and constitutionally, as the Supreme Court is normally an appellate court and not a court of first instance.

And so this is a rare occasion where the Supreme Court is acting, in effect, as a pure constitutional court, rather than just happening to hear an appeal of a constitutionally interesting case.

The Supreme Court website sets out the following:

The reference is framed as being about whether it is open to the Lord Advocate to advise that a bill with such a provision can be brought forward – as set out in the Scottish government’s published case:

This is an ingenious approach.

And nobody knows if it will succeed – not least because there is no precedent to guide us.

The Scottish government needs to jump two hurdles.

The first is the jurisdictional hurdle of whether this is a question that can even be answered by the Supreme Court at this stage.

The second is the substantial hurdle of whether such an advisory referendum is within the competence of the Scottish parliament.

On the balance of probability, any party to litigation needing to jump two such high hurdles is unlikely to succeed.

But nonetheless this is certainly a case to watch with interest – and you should, if possible, watch the footage of the hearings linked to at the Supreme Court page.

My own personal view from having watched some of the hearing is that the Lord Advocate – on behalf of the Scottish government – put the case as well as it could be.

In particular, she explained the legal route that the Supreme Court could take should it want to do so.

In response, the United Kingdom government was less impressive, though this may just be my personal bias.

But little is likely to depend on the oral advocacy – the Supreme Court now has to digest the extensive written documents which have been placed before it by the parties, and that may take months.

So we may have some time to wait.

Whatever the decision, it will be interesting to read the court’s reasoning in this exceptional and potentially consequential case.

For we all know about “advisory” referendums, don’t we..?

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The end of an era? The death of Elizabeth II and the problem of periodisation

19th September 2022

True Historians, of course, do not like periodisation.

The very notion that there can be start-dates and end-dates to periods of study are, for True Historians, anathema, heretical, and blasphemous.

Or worse.

Even dates like 1066, or 1914, or 1945 will, for a True Historian, not be anything other than something which draws us away from understanding continuities.

There is no start-date and end-date which does not mask, for a True Historian, lots of things which carried on as before, and which does not interrupt some existing trend.

But.

For rest of us mere mortals, who will never become True Historians, periodisation is a useful device – as long as not too much reliance is placed on it.

For a good part of English history, periodisation was simple: it followed the reigns of the monarchs.

Dates likes 1485 and 1603 and 1714 were good dates to start and end a course of study or the content of a text book.

But after 1714 the dates began to slip, and the periods did not match the reigns of monarchs.

Dates like 1815 or 1865 began to be the bookends of courses and textbooks, and for the twentieth century (at least for the United Kingdom) the dates of the world wars were convenient marker dates.

But what of the post-war period?

If 1945 is seen as the start of a period of British history, when should that period end?

1990, with the end of the Cold War and the fall of Thatcher?

1997, with the coming of New Labour?

2001, with 9/11?

2010, with the going of New Labour?

2016, with the Brexit referendum?

2020, with the actual UK departure from the European Union?

Or is there a case to be made for 2022, a year where, in a single week, we had a change of Prime Minister and a change of monarch?

And a year in which Putin and Russia so obviously overreached themselves in Ukraine.

From a constitutionalist perspective, the start-dates and end-dates are perhaps different.

For a constitutionalist, the key dates may be: 1660 (the restoration); 1688-89 (the revolution); 1707 (the union between England and Scotland); 1714 (the succession of George I); 1745-46 (with the final failure of the disputed succession); 1801 (the union of Great Britain and Ireland); 1828-32 (the collapse of the “ancien regime” with Roman Catholic emancipation and the Great Reform Act); 1867 (the extension of the vote to some working men); 1911 (the defeat of the House of Lords with the Parliament Act); 1918 (votes for women); 1922 (the Irish Free State, effectively ending the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland); and 1936 (the forced abdication).

Each one of these dates, which signal some re-configuration of our constitutional arrangements, would be a good start-date or end-date for a work of modern constitutional history.

(There are other possible dates too – but that paragraph was already long enough.)

But what more recent date would be a marker for our constitutional history?

Some would have said 1973, with our entry into the European Communities; or 2020, with our departure from the Communities’ successor, the European Union.

Others would say the various legislative changes of the first Tony Blair administration, with devolution and the Human Rights Act.

And a strong case can be made for the Good Friday Agreement.

My own view, for what it is worth, is that – from a constitutionalist perspective – the marker date is yet to come.

The next marker date in our constitutional history will be when there is a border poll in Northern Ireland, especially if there is a vote for unification.

(Or it may be a pro-independence referendum vote in Scotland, if that is sooner.)

For that will bring to an end the constitutional history of the entity which came into its current form in 1922, with the Irish Free State.

And a good historical periodisation is always around a century-long.

(Shh, don’t tell True Historians.)

If so, then today’s funeral provided a fascinating and highly significant piece of evidence:

Today I respectfully join leaders from Britain, Ireland & the international community at the funeral of Queen Elizabeth II as she is laid to rest. It is a sad day for her family who mourn her loss, and all those of a British identity from across our community who grieve also.

— Michelle O’Neill (@moneillsf) September 19, 2022

This tweet may well be one of the most important things ever tweeted in respect of our constitutional arrangements.

For the Sinn Féin First Minister (Designate) of Northern Ireland to write in such terms means that the sensibilities and concerns of the Unionist community are not only being acknowledged but respected.

And the more the Unionists are made to feel more comfortable, the more likely there will be a united Ireland.

That tweet was huge.

As this blog has averred before, the great achievement of Elizabeth II was to take a throne which seemed precarious, and to hand it on with more security to her successor.

And so for her monument, you could look around today at the state funeral.

Of course, in a way, with the death of Elizabeth II it can be said in general terms that the twentieth century came to an end.

She was our last major link with a good part of the twentieth century: somebody born the same year as Marilyn Monroe who died in the era of TikTok:

Somebody who served in uniform in World War II, and whose first Prime Minister – Winston Churchill – was born in 1874, lived on so that her last Prime Minister was born a century later, in 1975.

When she died, Elizabeth provided the sort of continuity at which any True Historian will clap and cheer.

She ensured that the end of her reign was not to be a start-date or end-date.

And so our start-dates or end-dates, at least from a constitutionalist perspective, will not include 2022, and so we will have to be different dates instead.

One suspects Elizabeth II would be happy with that.

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What is wrong with the Crown

16th September 2022

When the Queen died and a national period of mourning was announced, I thought it would be an apt thing to devote the posts on this blog to the monarchy during that period.

This is not to say that there are not more pressing problems in our polity: there certainly are, and they are urgent.

But this blog often engages with constitutional matters – and the organising principle of our constitution is the monarchy.

There is almost no developed and distinct concept of the “State” in English law.

Instead, we have the Crown, from which the legislature (the “Crown-in Parliament”), the High Court, and the executive (the “Royal Prerogative”) all – theoretically – derive their power.

Criminal proceeding and applications for judicial review are done in the name of the Crown, and so on.

There is even an entire species of law – from the Privy Council and including Royal Charters – that is parallel to parliamentary legislation and is just as much of legal effect.

This general nature of the Crown co-exists with certain privileges and rights.

This blog has previously covered the so-called “Queen’s Consent” – which enabled the monarch to have prior approval of legislation which would affect the Crown.

The procedure even makes a private law firm in Lincoln’s Inn part of our constitutional arrangements.

This is in addition to the advantages that the Monarch and the Royal Estate have in respect of taxation matters.

It is not a satisfactory situation and, although a republic is unrealistic (at least in the foreseeable future) there are things that can and should be done to remove these consents and privileges.

There are also questions to be addressed about the scope and use of the Royal Prerogative.

In both the Miller cases, for example, the contention was seriously made that the matters in hand were no-go areas for the courts, and that these decisions to be made by a Prime Minister were not justiciable.

In both cases, the Supreme Court said “no”.

But the impulse of those who hold prime ministerial power will continue to use powers that are beyond the reach of legal challenge.

The fiction is, of course, that these powers are being exercised for and on behalf of the Crown – but that fiction is unlikely to convince many as the twenty-first century continues.

I would recommend that we have a – well – Royal Commission on the remaining and residual powers and privileges of the Crown within our polity, with Parliament then legislating to place the retained powers and privileges on a statutory basis and discarding the rest.

The monarchy of the United Kingdom has had a “re-set” from time-to-time, and this may be a good time for such an exercise.

The late Queen was acutely aware – from what happened to her own uncle and to other twentieth century monarchs – of the precariousness of her position.

And seventy years later – by employing such a approaches as “the firm” – she was able to hand the Crown safely to her heir.

Such a “re-set” could not sensibly be done while the later Queen was alive – and some would say that she and Philip did their own subtle “re-set” so as to meet the challenges of the monarchy in the modern media age.

There is no reason why we cannot now have a broader “re-set” – with a hard look at all the Crown’s powers and privileges in the round.

Every constitution – and every element of the constitution – should be regarded as a work in practice.

Next week – after the funeral – national media attention and focus will return to other political problems, including the urgent cost-of-living and energy crises.

There may not be another time for a while to discuss the sort of Crown that we want as part of our Constitutional arrangements – and what realistic and practical reforms can be made.

Yes – there will be some how will just assert that simply they want a republic – but I would prefer for as many as possible to think realistically and practically about what can be done to improve what we have got.

And if such a “reset” is not done, we will find ourselves at the next funeral and accession decrying the lack of sensible reforms to this central part of our constitution.

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The Queen

8th September 2022

While we wait for news from Balmoral – from which the last reports were of the Queen’s ill-health – it is good to remind ourselves of what an extraordinary thing she achieved in securing the future of the monarchy.

It was not inevitable that the United Kingdom would stay, well, a kingdom.

When she was young the Crown was weak.

The United Kingdom over which her grandfather ruled – that of Great Britain and Ireland – had already been re-confingured in the years before her birth.

Her uncle had been forced from the throne in circumstances which showed the relative weakness of the king to the political class.

Monarchies and royal families throughout Europe were being removed and exiled.

The Empire was being decolonised and it was not certain the “Commonwealth” would take off as an idea.

The politics of the 1930s and 1940s in Europe and elsewhere often pushed in radical and extreme directions.

Any young royal in the Europe of the 1930s and 1940s would have seen the monarchy as precarious.

Even by her coronation in 1953, it was not obvious that the Crown would survive.

Yes, with hindsight, it looks as if it would not have been any other way.

But the devices of what became known as “the Firm” – the use of the extended royal family and the “balcony” royals, and the clever use of the media and imagery – were not as familiar as they once were.

Looking at the challenge before her in 1952/3 must have been daunting.

The monarchy now seems secure for at least another generation or two.

It will slim down, with more empty space on the balcony, but there seems no prospect of there being a republic in the next twenty or so years.

Even if her successors are unimpressive (or worse) the consequences will be likely to be dealt with within a monarchical framework, rather than a huge constitutional upheaval that would make Brexit seem like a jubilee street party.

Of course, the kingdom itself may be reconfigured further – with Irish unification and Scottish independence.

But something called a United Kingdom will survive – even if it will be akin to a pop band on the nostalgia circuit with only two of its original members.

A wise historian friend once said that while the Queen survives the twentieth century has not yet fully ended.

Such has been her longevity – and how with hindsight the period since 1952 seems all as one coherent piece – the sheer amount of change (and lack of change) can be overlooked.

She took a monarchy that was not in good form in the inter-war years and ensured that it has lasted to deal with the problems of the mid twenty-first century.

Even liberal republicans (of which I am one) can respect what she has achieved, even if a different model of state still would be preferred.

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Judicially reviewing a political party – and why Tortoise has a point as well as a weak legal case

30th August 2022

Before I became a lawyer, I wanted to be a historian and, in particular, a historian of the concept of the “state”.

The “state” – forgive the quotation marks – is, in one way – something which exists only in the mind, as a label we give certain things around us.

Yet in another way the “state” has a real existence – and some on the left demand “the state should do this” or on the right that “the state should not do that”, both presupposing that something called the “state” exists, and it can be called on to do or not do things.

Some attribute to the “state” the same qualities of omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence that some people even now ascribe to various gods (or “gods”).

But.

I did not do the envisaged postgraduate work on intellectual history, and I fell into being a lawyer instead.

And part of the reason was that with law there were debates and discussions about what the “state” should do and not do, and what were its limits, that seemed more practical, urgent and uncertain in their outcomes than in the academic study of political ideas.

Indeed it was a 1996 article about whether the Jockey Club was amenable to judicial review that first started me thinking seriously about a career in advising on public law.

Judicial review is the term lawyers in England and Wales give to both procedure and the substance of holding public bodies to account in the courts.

Often what constitutes a public body – such as ministers of the crown or statutory corporations – is obvious.

But the test is functional – if you are an entity exercising a public function then you are amenable to judicial review.

And this means you are subject to certain special legal duties and remedies that may not otherwise be the case.

So it matters – practically – whether you fulfil the test of exercising a public function.

(Related areas of law – such a freedom of information – have fixed lists of what are public bodies and do not have a functional test.)

The folk at the Tortoise news and commentary site have decided to send a legal letter threatening an application for judicial review against the Conservative Party.

The letter is worth reading in full.

There are two things worth saying about the letter.

First, the application is what a judge would say is “ambitious”.

Each element of the application is arguable (sometimes only just) – but that an element of a case is arguable certainly does not make it strong.

In essence, that a point is arguable is the test for simply getting it before a tribunal – the minimum required.

Perhaps a positive judge on a sunny day and after a hearty breakfast may give the envisaged claim the judicial thumbs up.

Predicting litigation is never an exact science.

But.

It is unlikely that any court will want to bolt political parties onto the state for the purposes of judicial review – especially when political parties have their own special regulatory regime, and it is the Queen who choses who is invited to be Prime Minister.

The case is likely to fail.

Two, Tortoise has a point – despite the weak legal merits.

A membership-based national political party is conducting an exercise that will lead to the successful candidate being – almost certainly – invited to become Prime Minister and we know very little about how that exercise is being conducted.

(The position would be different if only members of parliament were involved.)

Tortoise are asking for disclosure of the following information:

“(1) Anonymised data you hold on the demographic of the Party’s membership:

(a) Particularly, we invite you to provide, where held, the number of Party members who:

(i) Live abroad;

(ii) Are foreign nationals; and

(iii) Are under voting age.

(b) We also ask you to provide data in respect of:

(i) The age range of members;

(ii) The geographic distribution of members; and

(iii) The genders of members.

(2) An explanation of whether, and if so how, the Party keeps its membership database up to date, ensuring that it sends ballot papers to correct addresses.

(3) Anonymised data you hold on variations in member numbers over time, presented quarterly over the past 10 years. The public interest is particularly acute in respect of quarterly membership numbers for the past twelve months.

(4) An explanation of the Party’s system of compliance, including but not limited to the following questions:

(a) How does the Conservative Party check that new members are who they say they are?

(b) Who oversees compliance? i.e. who independently checks whether the Conservative Party is checking?

(5) What is the number of efforts at infiltration which the Party has thwarted, i.e. how many cases have you discovered of a fictional person, a dead person, a person of non-voting age, a member of another political party or a pet registering as Conservative member?

(6) An explanation of any third party compliance mechanisms in place to ensure that only those eligible to vote do so, that they vote only once each, and that the election is not manipulated.

(7) An explanation of the circumstances by which GCHQ came to offer advice on the distribution of Conservative party ballots.

(8) An explanation of why non-UK citizens who join the party abroad are eligible to vote even if they pay no tax and spend no time in the UK.

(9) Confirmation of whether Party members under the national voting age can vote in the election of Party leader and Prime Minister.”

On the face of it, this is the sort of information which should be in the public domain – and this would apply equally to the Labour Party or other political party in a similar situation.

The (likely) legal fact that judicial review is not the appropriate way of getting such information does not take away from this being information which should be publicly known.

Indeed, that Tortoise is resorting to judicial review indicates – if not demonstrates – that the special regulatory regime for political parties is deficient.

And it is that special regulatory regime that should change – rather than the ambit of judicial review be extended.

Political parties are not private clubs, where there is a limited public interest in their internal affairs.

Political parties are a central feature of our political system.

They are not part of the “state” as such (though views may differ) but they are part of the oil that enable the engines of state to work.

So one can sympathise with the objective of this legal claim, even if one is doubtful of its legal merits.

That objective should be achieved by changes in legislation, and not by judicial expansion.

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The question of whether Boris Johnson, in effect, lied to the Queen

[ADD – I have now done a short summary of the argument advanced in this post here.]

15 August 2022

On Twitter a number of accounts have recently commented in respect of front page of the Daily Mirror from 12 September 2019:

The online version of the article is here.

The comments are critical of the headline and of the apparent source of the headline, which is me.

I am quoted in the article, on the front page, as follows:

“Legal expert David Allen Green said: “In effect, the court held that Boris Johnson lied to the Queen.””

This seemingly renders me the source of the “Boris lied to the Queen myth”.

Another tweeter has said of the use of the word “lie” here shows that we cannot have civil discourse until adults control how they use language and that, in our system, the law of defamation is supposed to police such silliness.

I also cannot be regarded as a credible legal commentator, I have been told, because of this statement.

(I have deliberately not named the critics here, as I have a bigger platform than they do, and do not want to cause a pile-on.)

Do these critics have a point?

One preliminary point I can make straight away is that I do not think the newspaper headline accurately conveys the argument I was making in the text quoted.

The “in effect” was not mere surplusage – I used the phrase for a reason.

Had I wanted to stated plainly that I knew that the Prime Minister had lied to the Queen, I would have said so.

But I did not say that, because I did not mean that.

I said what had happened showed that, in effect, the Queen had been misled, and that this had been deliberate.

And so I cannot defend the Mirror headline, and I do not do so.

It is not the headline I would have chosen for the piece that quoted me.

And there is another preliminary point.

The view I expressed was not (and was not intended to be) a précis of any judgment – I know what the judgments say just as much as anyone who can read the relevant judgments.

No court was asked to determine if the Queen had been lied to, and so there is no judgment which sets out whether the Queen was lied to or not.

The view I expressed was based on my own reasoning, as a commentator, based on what I had read in a particular judgment and my understanding of the relevant circumstances.

Any judgment is a text and my role as a commentator is to place that text in a context.

This is what I do with many judgments in my commentary, and so this was the view I formed about this particular case.

But.

That is not good enough.

Can I still defend the view that I actually did express: that, in effect, the Queen was lied to?

Let us see.

We now need to go back in time and remind ourselves of the relevant dates.

It was 2019, and the United Kingdom was still a member of the European Union.

The original departure date of 29 March 2019 had been missed, and the exit date was then rearranged a couple of times, with the departure date eventually being set for 31 October 2019.

Johnson became Prime Minister in July 2019.

On 28 August 2019, the Queen made the following order:

“It is this day ordered by Her Majesty in Council that the Parliament be prorogued on a day no earlier than Monday the 9th day of September and no later than Thursday the 12th day of September 2019 to Monday the 14th day of October 2019, to be then holden for the despatch of divers urgent and important affairs, and that the Right Honourable the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain do cause a Commission to be prepared and issued in the usual manner for proroguing the Parliament accordingly.”

The prorogation of parliament was therefore to be for five weeks, which was unusual in and of itself.

But what made this prorogation politically controversial was that it would deprive parliament from sitting in the key period running up to the then exit date of 31 October 2019, meaning that there was a real prospect of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union without a withdrawal agreement.

As it happened, parliament quickly passed the so-called Benn Act on 9 September 2019, which required the Prime Minister to request an extension in the event that there was no withdrawal agreement in place (which is what Johnson then had to do).

But the legal question at the time was whether the prorogation was lawful.

And the political question was whether Johnson had sought the prorogation for cynical reasons of expediency.

The prorogation faced legal challenges, including one in Scotland.

The appeal judgment of the Scottish case dated 11 September 2019 set out the following events:-

15 August 2019 – a memorandum went to the Prime Minister recommending prorogation, with the reason stated as “The current session is the longest since records began, and all bills announced as part of the last Queen’s Speech have now received Royal Assent, or are paused awaiting carry over into the next session: this makes it increasingly difficult to fill parliamentary time with anything other than general debates. As a new Prime Minister, there is an expectation that you will set out a refreshed domestic programme and it would be natural to do so when the House returns in the autumn.”

16 August 2019 – the Prime Minister wrote the following response:

“1. The whole September session is a rigmarole introduced [REDACTED] to show the public that MPs were earning their crust

2. So I don’t see anything especially shocking about this proposition

3. As Nikki notes, it is OVER THE CONFERENCE SEASON so that the sitting days lost are actually very few”.

23 August 2019 – there is a further memorandum to the Prime Minister, which the court described as a handling plan, saying:

“It refers to the PM’s agreement to approach HM theQueen with a request to prorogue Parliament within the period Monday, 9 to Thursday, 12 September and for a Queen’s Speech on Monday, 14 October. A telephone call between the PM and the Queen was fixed for the evening of 27 August. The Order in Council was to be signed on 28 August. On that day, the Chief Whip and the Leaders of the Houses ofCommons and Lords were to go to Balmoral to form the necessary meeting of the PrivyCouncil. After the signing, the members of the Cabinet would be informed, followed by theParliamentary Party and the press. The planned announcement to the Cabinet was to focus on the extraordinary length of the current parliamentary session. A statement would be made that this could not continue and that the PM would bring forward a new legislative agenda which would take matters “through our exit from the EU and the months that follow”. At the heart of the agenda would be the Government’s “number one legislative priority” (Brexit). If a deal was forthcoming, a Withdrawal Agreement Bill could be introduced to “move at pace to secure its passage before 31 October”. The PM would confirm that he was committed to facilitating Parliament’s ongoing scrutiny of Brexit. He would deliver a statement and take questions on the “first sitting back” (presumably14 October). A draft letter to Conservative MPs was provided. This re-iterated the message to Cabinet Members. It stated that the NIEFA 2019 would be debated on Monday, 9 September and that thereafter the Government would “begin preparation to end theParliamentary session ahead of a Queen’s Speech”.”

The court then noted that on 28 August 2019 three Privy Counsellors attended at Balmoral where the Queen promulgated the Order (which I quote above).

So we now have a sequence of events, which included the Prime Minister telephoning the Queen on 27 August 2019 and for privy councillors to attend for the Order to be made the following day.

The Scottish court decided as follows:

“When regard is had to all the material now before the court, it is my opinion that the petitioners are entitled to be sceptical of the proposition that the reason for making the Order was simply in order to prepare a new legislative agenda for announcement in a Queen’s Speech at the beginning of the next session of the Parliament. Further, I consider that they are entitled to ask the court to infer, as I would infer, as submitted on behalf of the petitioners, that the principal reason for the advice to the Queen to make the Order for the prorogation of Parliament was to prevent or impede Parliament holding the Executive politically to account in the run up to Exit Day; to prevent or impede Parliament from legislating on the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union; and to allow the Executive to pursue a policy of no deal Brexit without further Parliamentary interference.”

The Scottish court did not believe the reasons which had been given in those quoted documents were the true reasons.

They were false reasons.

The court stated that there had been an improper purpose.

Now we come to something which was missing from the case – and from the concurrent case in England.

The dog that did not bark in the night.

As a former government lawyer, it fascinated me that the court was being invited to look at the original documents for the reasons for the prorogation, and not a comprehensive witness statement of a minster or senior official setting out the reasons.

This lack of a witness statement was referred to in the judgment:

“[Advocate] was also critical of the absence of any affidavit, whether to explain the documents or otherwise to support the reasons for advising the Queen to make the Order. It was for the Prime Minister, submitted Mr O’Neill, to commit to a position on oath and render himself liable to cross-examination. I do not agree with Mr O’Neill on any of these points. In my opinion it is open to a court to look at any documentary production which is tendered to it and give it such weight as the court considers that it is worth.”

This absence, in my opinion, was and is highly significant.

Why would no minister or official commit themselves to a signed witness statement, which would put the minister or official under the peril of perjury?

If the reasons as set out in the quoted documents were the true reasons, then there would be no reason why a minister or official would not sign a witness statement.

The only plausible explanation, it seemed – and still seems – to me is that no minister or official was willing to commit themselves to those being the true reasons for the prorogation, under pain of perjury.

If so, this would mean that they knew those were not the true reasons. So not only were those reasons false, they were known to be false.

This is when I wrote the article which was quoted by the Daily Mirror.

My reasoning was as follows:

1. There had been contact with the Queen by telephone, as well as a formal advice.

2. The Queen would have been give reasons for the prorogation, consistent with the documents quoted above.

3. Those reasons were not the true reasons for the prorogation.

4. Those giving the reasons knew that that they were not the true reasons for prorogation.

Point (1) is from the judgment; point (2) I inferred from the circumstances [ADD – and can be taken from John Major’s witness evidence, quoted below in the POSTSCRIPT]; point (3) was based on what the Scottish court found; and point (4) I inferred from the lack of a signed witness statement.

Based on this reasoning, I stated that – in effect – the Queen had been lied to. She had been given reasons which were false and which those giving the reasons knew to be false.

The Scottish case, like the concurrent English case, then went to the Supreme Court.

This was after my statement which was quoted by the Daily Mirror.

The Supreme Court approached the case differently from the Scottish appeal court – and in particular, the Supreme Court did not base its decision on improper motive.

It approached the case as follows (my emphasis added):

“For the purposes of the present case, therefore, the relevant limit upon the power to prorogue can be expressed in this way: that a decision to prorogue Parliament (or to advise the monarch to prorogue Parliament) will be unlawful if the prorogation has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive. In such a situation, the court will intervene if the effect is sufficiently serious to justify such an exceptional course.”

The crucial element here is the requirement for a “reasonable justification”.

And again, that lack of a witness statement made all the difference (emphasis again added):

“It is impossible for us to conclude, on the evidence which has been put before us, that there was any reason – let alone a good reason – to advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for five weeks, from 9th or 12th September until 14th October. We cannot speculate, in the absence of further evidence, upon what such reasons might have been. It follows that the decision was unlawful.”

That dog was still not barking.

Had the Supreme Court had a witness statement from a minister or official setting out the reasons for a five-week prorogation then, in my opinion, I think the government would have won the case.

(I have since spoken with a number of people involved in the case, and they agree.)

The potential importance of the lack of such a witness statement would have been known to the government’s litigation team, and that would have been conveyed to ministers and officials.

But still no signed witness statement was forthcoming.

So: I do not defend the Daily Mirror headline, and nor did I pretend to be summarising the reasoning of the court.

But, for the reasons set out above, I think I can maintain that, in effect, the Queen was lied to.

And if this was not the case, then there needs to be a better explanation than the ones that I have reached for (a) the reasons that were given to the Queen when the Prime Minister telephoned her, and (b) the reason why there was no signed witness statement setting out the reasons for the prorogation.

If someone can come up with a better explanation than the above for (a) and (b) then I will change my view and recant.

But given the reasoning above, I am afraid I cannot escape the view that, in effect, the Queen was lied to.

POSTSCRIPT

I have been reminded that the former Prime Minister John Major, in his witness statement for the legal challenge in England, expressly stated that a Prime Minister would give reasons to the Queen:

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The “written constitution” debate after Boris Johnson

15th July 2022

There is no doubt that the deed was done.

The body politic, finding Boris Johnson repugnant, spat him out of the premiership.

His political collapse was remarkable.

Two-and-a-half years ago, he had the greatest prizes that our constitution can bestow.

He had a substantive majority from a general election – and so he could get his programme through the House of Commons.

He had a mandate for a manifesto – and so he could also get his programme through the House of Lords without rejection or delay.

He could handpick his cabinet – without having to accommodate major party rivals, for he then had none.

He could handpick his Number 10 staff – including appointing controversial figures.

And circumstances and events were also favourable for him politically.

He had “got Brexit done” – or at least he had done to the (then) satisfaction of his party and the electorate.

Covid, and then Ukraine, provided unifying issues on which the country would look to the Prime Minister for leadership.

He even had the benefit of being Prime Minister during the Platinum Jubilee.

(Can you imagine what, say, Benjamin Disraeli would have done with that.)

Yet Johnson spaffed it all away.

And he lost power before the new parliament was even halfway through.

It is an astonishing political collapse.

It is difficult to think of a precedent – not even Anthony Eden’s failed premiership compares.

But.

What, if anything, does this tell us about the constitution – and about whether we need a codified (or “written”) constitution.

(Yes, we all know the constitution is already largely written down, though just not in one place – but this is the phraseology we have to work with in this debate.)

On one hand, the swift ejection of Johnson from the gut of the polity shows that something is working.

This is especially so when you realise he did not lose any formal vote, and that he recently won a vote of confidence from his own parliamentary party.

A more formal position for the Prime Minister may have meant we would have had to suffer Johnson for a fixed term – as codes can fortify as well as restrain.

In the United Kingdom, the office of the Prime Minister has little formal recognition, and it has few mentions in statute.

It rests on the twin stools of the royal prerogative and the supremacy of parliament – and when a Prime Minister loses the actual (if not formal) confidence of their cabinet and/or their parliamentary party, they become politically weak very quickly.

And as this blog has frequently mentioned: every Prime Minister since 1974 has either gained power or lost power between general elections – and, in the cases of May and now Johnson, both

On the other hand, we come to one of the most wonderful phrases used in politics.

“We should not be complacent.”

What is wonderful about this phrase is that nobody would ever say sincerely “we should be complacent.”

No one yells, “yay, complacency!”

But complacency can be a state of mind, even if it is not admitted.

And there is force in the point that with Johnson we were lucky he was a buffoon.

The reason for his departure from the premiership was not policy.

It was not his constitutional trespasses and subversions.

And it was not any of his various forms of unlawful behaviour.

The reason for his departure was his personal failings.

A Boris Johnson clone, stripped of the personal failings, but with the same policy (or lack of policy), the same contempt and disdain for constitutional norms, and the same mix of casual and directed unlawfulness, would still be in power.

We were lucky Johnson was a charlatan and a fool, but what if we were to have a fanatic and a knave?

The leading public law academic Mark Elliott has asked the question about whether recent events show the need for a written constitution on his outstanding blog.

My view is that this is not an easy question to answer.

There will be those who will say – as a reflex – that “this shows the need for a written constitution”.

One suspects that this is what they would say in any conceivable situation.

But those with the opposite reflex need to reflect and re-consider – even if they re-adopt the same view.

The decline and fall of Boris Johnson’s empire was an extraordinary event.

But the lessons of extraordinary events are often not immediately obvious.

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How the Government refusing a Confidence Vote subverts our Constitution

13th July 2022

The essence of our parliamentary democracy is confidence – that is its lifeblood, its electricity.

The United Kingdom is not a direct democracy, and it is not an absolute monarchy.

The government instead rests on having the confidence of the House of Commons.

That is: the confidence of the majority of elected Members of Parliament.

Without that confidence, a new government must be formed or there must be a general election.

In this way, the test of confidence of the House of Commons is the most important political test for the government in our constitution.

This confidence is of more immediate import than, say, the results of a general election – for a government will only resign after an adverse general election once it realises it does not also have the confidence of the House of Commons.

Confidence is therefore fundamental, crucial.

The test of confidence thereby provides both the authority and the legitimacy of our government in this parliamentary system.

And because the test of confidence is so important, then the application of that test must take priority over any other parliamentary business.

In the last week the governing party of the United Kingdom has imploded.

The Prime Minister announced his impending resignation after dozens of ministers resigned, leaving at least one department without a minster.

The governing party is now seeking a new leader, as we have the public spectacle of ministers campaigning against each other, and even attacking each other publicly.

Instead of collective cabinet responsibility, we have a collective cabinet free-for-all.

The government of the United Kingdom is in a dreadful state.

And as this government – as with any other government of the United Kingdom – derives its authority and legitimacy from having the confidence of the House of Commons – then whether the government has the confidence of the House of Commons must be tested.

For, if that confidence is not to be tested in this current remarkable situation, when should it be tested?

Yet the current government is refusing to allow a confidence vote in the House of Commons.

The pretext for this refusal – though not a good reason – is that the wording of the confidence motion, which refers to the current Prime Minister as well as the government is not within the convention for such votes.

But this excuse is wrong both as a matter of precedent and as a matter of principle.

Previous confidence motions have expressly mentioned the Prime Minister.

And as the function of such votes is so that the authority and legitimacy of the government within a parliamentary democracy can be affirmed, it is not for the government to refuse such a vote.

Either parliament, through its elected representatives, is supreme or it is not.

Either the government of the day has the confidence of a majority of Members of Parliament, or it does not.

There is no doubt that a debate and a vote on a motion of confidence is unwelcome not only to the current (though departing) Prime Minister and to the governing party.

There is also no doubt that in political reality the governing party has no confidence in the current Prime Minister and thereby in how this government is currently constituted.

But these are not good reasons to deny a vote – indeed these are reasons why such a vote should take place.

Once a new Prime Minister is in place then it is likely that the newly constituted government will allow the confidence of the House of Commons to be tested.

And so, in a way, the practical effect of a vote of no confidence is being put in place, but without an actual vote.

It can thereby be argued that having such a vote is superfluous.

But.

The problem here is not that the government will not be reconstituted when it needs to be reconstituted, for that is happening.

The problem is that it should never be for the government of the day to gainsay when votes of confidence are to take place and not to take place.

It is not good enough for ministers to say that such votes are not necessary, for it is not for ministers to make that decision.

There is no doubt that the majority of Members of Parliament have lost confidence in the currently constituted government.

That is as plain as a pikestaff.

There is also no doubt that the government and the governing party have lost confidence in themselves.

And by refusing to allow a vote of confidence, they are subverting what gives a government its authority and legitimacy in our parliamentary system.

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The resignation of Boris Johnson – and why that is not enough for good government to return

7th July 2022

Well.

This morning I was writing a Twitter thread on what would happen if all government minsters resigned.

For such a surreal thing to be of any practical concern, rather than for academic speculation, indicates that it has been an odd few days in the politics of the United Kingdom.

And now the current Prime Minister has announced his resignation.

He is not going immediately – but the process for a finding a new Conservative party leader will now start and it seems to me that Johnson cannot now do anything to stop that process.

Once that process produces a new leader, that leader will be invited to form a government by the Queen, and Johnson – by automatic operation of the constitution – will instantly cease to be Prime Minister.

He may go even sooner, with a ‘caretaker’ Prime Minister put in place until a new Conservative leader emerges.

Johnson may remain in office, but his announcement today means he has lost ultimate control of his political fate.

His resignation shows the operation of another constitutional rule – perhaps the most fundamental constitutional rule of all.

That rule is that Hubris is usually followed by Nemesis.

Wise politicians know this – and so they run tight ships, knowing that the pull of the tides can result in capsizing or being wrecked.

Less wise politicians assume their moment of great power will last forever.

Johnson – a successful electoral politician – was brought down not by any great policy issue or national crisis.

From Partygate and the Owen Paterson affair, he and his circle made unforced error after unforced error.

He and his circle believed that they could casually defy rules and conventions.

And so the ship of state became a ship of fools.

Johnson in December 2019 had the greatest prizes that the constitution of the United Kingdom can bestow on a Prime Minister.

He had won an emphatic general election victory – and so he had the “mandate” that meant he could translate his programme into practice without delays in the House of Lords.

And he had a substantial majority – of eighty – which meant he could get through the House of Commons legislation and revenue provisions without opposition.

He even had, with Covid and then Ukraine, two huge unifying issues for him to pose as a Churchillian leader.

Yet, two-and-a-half years later, he is resigning.

And the mandate and the majority have been wasted.

The latest Queen’s Speech was an embarrassing sequence of proposals, showing that the government had no direction.

And the one thing that Johnson and his government did do – Brexit with a withdrawal agreement – he was seeking to break.

Power without responsibility, as another Prime Minister once said in a different context.

Brexit was begat by the Conservative and Unionist Party.

The 2016 referendum was an exercise in party management, and it was from that egg that Brexit first emerged.

After 2016 the Conservative and Unionist Party said Brexit should mean Brexit, and they campaigned on that basis.

And under Johnson, the Conservative and Unionist Party “got Brexit done”.

But Brexit, being ungrateful, is destroying the Conservatives and dismantling the Union.

The revolution is devouring its begetters.

It is a political morality tale.

And so good bye then Boris Johnson, if not now but soon.

The curious thing is that he may not even be the worst of the post-2010 Prime Ministers.

It was David Cameron who risked the future of the country on a single turn of pitch-and-toss – and with no preparation for a Leave vote.

It was Theresa May who insisted that Brexit had to be done, at speed, with its ‘red lines’ that kept the United Kingdom outside the Single Market.

These macro political mistakes were profound.

And we now have the greatest political mess in living memory, if not modern history.

It is time for the excitement to die down, and for a return to the dull work of taking government seriously.

The ejection of the repugnant Johnson from the body politic is a necessary step towards such political good health – but it is not a sufficient one.

Let us hope that we have not left it too late for there to be a recovery.

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