The Lucy Letby case: some thoughts and observations: what should happen when a defence does not put in their own expert evidence (for good reason or bad)?

26th July 2024

Often the criminal cases that feature prominently in the news are really not interesting from a legal(istic) perspective.

One could quite happily commentate on interesting legal issues and never engage with a case which has been on the front pages.

And one could follow ‘true crime’ stories and never come across an interesting legal issue.

There is usually not much of an overlap: ‘true crime’ and earnest, plodding legal commentary normally do not have that much in common.

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The Lucy Letby case has been prominent in the news now for some time.

She has been convicted of multiple murders and attempted murders.

But is there anything in her case which is of wider interest – or of concern – in respect of the legal system?

Is there an issue here about the process of criminal justice?

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Some people maintain she must be innocent; and some people insist she must be guilty; and there are many websites and social media posts setting out both of these positions.

This blogpost is not one of them.

I do not know if she is guilty or innocent. That is a matter for a jury – or an appeal court.

She may be a serial killer, or she may be a victim of a miscarriage of justice; that is for others to decide.

But there is, I think, an issue here of potential wider concern.

This may be a rare example of a front page ‘true crime’ story which also raises an important issue about the legal system.

And that issue is about the role of prosecution expert evidence in an adversarial criminal trial when the defence elects not to put in their own expert evidence (for good reason or bad).

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Lucy Letby was convicted, in part, on the basis of expert evidence.

The case against her was not entirely based on expert evidence; there was other evidence put before the jury.

But, on any view, it was an expert evidence heavy prosecution.

And that is not unusual – or wrong: there are many criminal prosecutions which depend on expert evidence.

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In our adversarial system, what often happens in a jury trial when there is reliance by the prosecution on expert evidence is that there is also expert evidence put forward by the defence.

In principle, the expert owes their duty to the court – and not to the party who has instructed him or her.

In practice, of course, the prosecution will put forward expert evidence that supports their case, and the defence puts forward expert evidence which supports their case; the experts are then examined and cross-examined by lawyers; the judge sums up; and the jury then weighs the evidence of the experts in its deliberations.

This system is not perfect, and indeed no litigation process is perfect; but it generally works.

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But what happens when the defence, for some reason, does not put in their own expert evidence?

The prosecution expert evidence will still be examined and cross-examined by lawyers – and the judge will still sum up, and the jury will still deliberate.

But the questions of the lawyers – especially the cross-examination – are not themselves evidence.

The only expert evidence is that put in by the prosecution.

The jury do not get to compare and contrast the expert evidence of the prosecution and the defence; the judge gets only to sum up the expert evidence of the prosecution.

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In the first Lucy Letby trial, for some reason, there was no expert evidence put in by the defence.

We do not know that reason.

What we do know is that the defence team continued to act for her on appeal and so it would seem that their client is not dissatisfied with the conduct of the defence. This would indicate that there was, at least for their client, a good reason for not putting in expert evidence, else – presumably – she would have instructed new counsel for the appeal.

If so, could there be a good reason?

Yes, indeed there could be more than one good reason – though this is supposition, for we do not know the reason.

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One possible good reason for there not being expert evidence put in by the defence has been identified by the experienced criminal barrister Adam King in a strong piece setting out why there may be a miscarriage of justice in this case:

“One reason the defence might have chosen not to call Dr Hall (and I am speculating here) is if they felt they had so thoroughly undermined Dr Evans that they were better off leaving it at that. That would be a big tactical call, but covering your own back is not always consistent with protecting your client’s interests.

“So, for example: if your own expert would contradict much, but not all, of the Crown’s expert’s conclusions, and you believe the credibility of the Crown’s expert has been totally destroyed, you might judge it prudent not to put your own expert in the witness box. Avoiding the potential for future criticism and hindsight regret by putting your client in what you believe will be a worse position — by calling your own expert — is not a boss move. This is all speculation, but I guarantee that careful thought went into the decision not to call Dr Hall. None of this, though, would mean the conviction is safe.”

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Another possible reason not to call expert evidence is that your client’s case is that the relevant area of knowledge is such that no actual expertise is possible. This may be because of the lack of reliable data, or because it is a novel or developing area.

If so, calling an expert on that point would contradict that position.

We do know that Letby’s defence lawyers put in a detailed submission at the end of the prosecution case in the first trial that the prosecution had shown no case to answer and that prosecution expert evidence should be ruled inadmissible. It may have been that calling expert evidence would have undermined the prospects of what may have been a successful application.

We don’t know.

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In essence, the decision not to call expert evidence may have been a perfectly legitimate one for Letby and her lawyers to make in the circumstances of her case.

And one should remember – and this is a crucial point – it is for the prosecution to make out their case.

It is for the Crown to prove their case to the criminal standard of proof, and not for the defence to disprove it.

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But.

While it may have been in the interests of Letby and her lawyers not to put in expert evidence, this has the knock-on effect of there being no expert evidence from the defence for the jury to consider.

That prosecution expert evidence may be subject to robust cross-examination – but the questions of the barrister are not evidence, and the jury have to decide the case on the basis of the evidence.

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At this point, many legal folk and others would say that the fault here is with Letby and her lawyers. The defence had the opportunity to put in their own expert evidence, and they did not do so. And that the convictions were the consequence.

But it may be that response avoids a key issue.

It is for the prosecution to prove their case, and not for the defence to disprove it.

It is thereby for the prosecution to ensure that the expert evidence on which it seeks to rely is as sound as possible.

The prosecution cannot shrug off this responsibility and say that it can be cured by the defence expert witnesses.

And there is concern that the prosecution expert evidence in the Letby case was not sound to begin with.

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If that concern about the prosecution expert evidence is well-based – and this is a legal blog and not a medical or science blog, and so like many of you I have no idea – then the question is what, if anything, can and should the legal system do about it – especially when the defence (for good reason or bad) do not put their own expert evidence in.

Here there are rules on what experts can and cannot do and say, and on what their duties are to the court; here there are also rules on the admissibility of expert evidence; and there will also be cross-examination of the expert by defence lawyers.

There are safeguards.

But.

The key safeguard against poor prosecution expert evidence in our adversarial system is that the defence can put in their own expert evidence for the jury to weigh against it.

But when the defence do not do that (for good reason or bad) then there is perhaps a system failure of the adversarial system.

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Here one can (again) say that is the fault of Letby and her lawyers.

But even taking that (fair) point at its highest, there is a potential wider problem.

A lot depends on the soundness of the Letby conviction.

Indeed there is an important public inquiry which is predicated on the basis of the convictions being sound:

If, as some insist, the prosecution expert evidence in the Letby case was unsound, then any inquiry based on that expert evidence being sound will have challenges.

“MD” in the current edition of Private Eye sets out the implications:

“…[the] Thirwall public inquiry may inadvertently be derailed by experts who say under oath that Letby wasn’t stopped sooner because there were far more plausible reasons for the deaths than murder.”

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The cases involving Roy Meadow show that we should always be alert to the problems of expert evidence.

If – and it is an if – the prosecution expert evidence in the Letby case was unsound, then there is a hard question of what else the criminal justice system could/should have done when a defence does not put their own expert evidence.

Given her decision not to put in expert evidence, is it the case that she had the fairest trial possible in the circumstances?

Or is there something else the criminal justice system could/should have done in this case – and similar cases?

It may be that there is a lacuna here – and not one which is easy, or even possible, to address in our adversarial system.

In essence: what can a criminal court do in respect of unsound expert evidence when the defence elects (for good reason or bad) not to put in their own expert evidence?

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Donald Trump is convicted – but it is now the judicial system that may need a good defence strategy

Trump’s case – a view from an English legal perspective

24th April 2024

I am not an American lawyer, but here are some thoughts from an English litigation perspective.

Trump is adept at what he calls (or his ghost writer called) ‘the art of the deal’ – that is a transactional approach based on exploiting leverage.

Such an approach is not unhelpful in pre-trial shenanigans, where it is one party dealing with another party.  Pre-trial litigation is often deal-making by another name.  But when a dispute gets to court (and most Trump-related litigation does not get to a courtroom) then such bilateral game-playing becomes far less important.  A third party – the judge (and sometimes jury) takes power.  Trump’s blustering and bargaining is not well suited for this.  Bullying will now not be enough.

And there will also be another thing he now cannot control: evidence. And this evidence will feed into the media mainstream, with the added credibility of being on oath.  For somebody who is a deft manipulator of the media and his public image this los of information control will also be painful for him.

I have no idea if Trump will be convicted.  I suspect it will be hard to get a conviction.

But he is now a fish out of water, at least for a while.

 

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Law and lore, and state failure – the quiet collapse of the county court system in England and Wales

(And, of course, it may not always be plain what the law actually is, in any case.)

Another theme of my blogging is state failure. By ‘state failure’ I mean the acts and omissions by and on behalf of public officials and public bodies that indicate fundamental and/or systemic failings.

Sometimes these state failings can be hidden deliberately from the public and indeed politicians and the media, and sometimes there is perhaps no need to deliberately hide them as too few people care. In either case the ultimate problem is either lack of resources or lack of accountability, or both.

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Over at Prospect I have done a piece that illustrates these two themes: the unsexy and perhaps uninteresting topic of local civil justice – and in particular, the county court system.

Please click and read here.

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I fell onto this topic by chance. I was looking at the transcript of the recent ‘liaison committee’ of the House of Commons for something I am writing about parliamentary accountability. This committee, comprised of select committee chairs, is one of the few recent improvements in holding the executive account, with its periodic examinations of the Prime Minister.

At the most recent session, I saw that the Justice committee chair devoted about half his allotted questions to the county court system. He could have chosen many other topics – from international law to prisons – but this was the subject he selected. That in turn led me to seeing that the justice committee has started an investigation into the county court system. Such an inquiry is welcome.

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The reason the county court system combines state failure (of which it is an example) with law and lore is that, for most people the county court system would be where they would enforce their everyday legal rights and obligations in respect of civil law – contract, torts, family law, property law, and so on.

Few people would be able to commence such litigation in the more expensive and exclusive High Court – just as few people would be able to lunch at the Ritz.

Of course, most people will not ever litigate. Indeed most people will happily go through their lives without attending a county court – or even knowing where their nearest one is situated.

But they will conduct themselves often on the assumption that certain rights and obligations can be enforced ultimately.

However, if the county court system continues to collapse, then that assumption will become increasingly academic. In essence, what people believe they can enforce at court will become more lore than law.

This is not to say that there will suddenly be anarchy and lawlessness: systems of customary oral law can be very enduring, and some systems of non-enforceable law can be rather resilient.

But eventually the mismatch between what is understood to be the law and what can actually be enforced will have some effect, and that effect will, in turn, modify behaviours – and in an adverse way.

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We are getting close to local civil justice not being meaningful to many in the community.

Let us hope that, unless local civil justice is somehow revitalised, that the lag between law and lore is a long one.

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Could the Post Office sue its own former directors and advisers regarding the Horizon scandal?

16th January 2023

Time is a problem for the Post Office, and its government owners, in making any legal claim against Fujitsu.

This is because any claim would probably be for breach of contract, and the limitation period for suing for breach of contract is normally six years from the breach.

Unless there was concealment – and here it is plain that the Post Office knew there were serious problems by 2013 (and no doubt for a long time before) – it is rare for a court to extend the limitation period.

At the House of Commons business select committee hearing today Fujitsu accepted a “moral obligation” to provide compensation. This indicates that Fujitsu’s response is PR-driven rather than strictly legalistic, as there is probably no legal obligation to compensate for any breaches obvious before six years ago.

(There may be a possible indemnity that may still be legally live in the Post Office Horizon contract, outside the limitation period, but that is unlikely.)

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But.

The Post Office, and its government owners, may have claims against its own former directors and advisers for any wrongs in respect of how the scandal has been dealt with in the last six years.

In essence: could Paula Vennells and others be sued?

It would be interesting if any such recovery is sought.

 

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How the legal system made it so easy for the Post Office to destroy the lives of the sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses – and how the legal system then made it so hard for them to obtain justice

 

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A role-reversal? – a footnote to yesterday’s post

1st December 2023

Discussing yesterday’s post with a long-suffering friend, the following thought came to mind.

In the Rwanda judgment, the Supreme Court goes into detail as to the work needed on the ground to make the removals policy robust and practical; and, in turn, the government is seeking to use parliament to simply declare a policy legal instead of illegal.

This seems quite the role-reversal: the court setting out what needs to be done as a matter of policy, instead of the executive and the legislature, and the executive threatening to use the legislature to decide whether something is lawful.

Strange, if you think about it.

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The three elements of the Rwanda judgment that show how the United Kingdom government is now boxed in

30th November 2023

This post is about three elements of the judgment of the Supreme Court on the Rwanda policy – and how the Supreme Court decision means that the Rwanda scheme cannot be saved by legislation and treaties alone.

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These three parts indicate the difficulties for the government if they seek to use legislation so as to circumvent the judgment.

And two of these parts are about things which the Supreme Court did not decide.

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The first of these is about, of course, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Here it should be noted that the court had granted permission for the Convention to be raised as a ground of cross-appeal:

(The government appealed – as they lost at the Court of Appeal – but some of the asylum seekers cross-appealed on points on which they had lost.)

The Supreme Court dutifully set out the Convention point in two paragraphs of the judgment:

You will see, however, that even in these paragraphs the court is careful to set out the Convention position alongside other applicable laws.

The court then makes this point about other applicable laws explicit:

In essence, the court is stating that the ECHR point does not stand alone.

And then in paragraph 106, towards the end of the judgment, the court says (with emphasis added):

This means that even if the ECHR did not apply directly, and even if the Human Rights Act did not exist, then the court would have decided the case the same way anyway, because the key legal principle is in other other applicable law.

That key legal principle is non-refoulement – that is the legal rule that requires that refugees are not returned to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The court found on the evidence before it that there was such a risk if the asylum-seekers were removed to Rwanda.

It thereby follows that if the government were to bring forward legislation to limit the effect of the Convention in Rwanda removal cases it would not make any difference. The courts would just rely on other laws for the same point.

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And this brings us to the second part, which is rather fascinating.

This is the thought-provoking – indeed, provocative – paragraph 25:

Now this is quite the passage.

So-called “customary international law” is, almost by defintion, outside the power of any one nation state to change. It will apply anyway. As the court says:

“the significance of non-refoulment being a principle of customary international law is that it is consequently binding upon all states in international law, regardless of whether they are party to any treaties which give it effect.”

A nation state may break that law, but they cannot unilaterally change it.

In other words there is no legislation whatsoever the government can bring forward that will mean that this rule would not apply to the United Kingdom.

Deftly, the court ends this point with “as we have not been addressed on this matter, we do not rely on it in our reasoning”.

This suggests that if the Rwanda policy is re-litigated to the Supreme Court, even if the government somehow excludes all the applicable legal instruments (and not just the ECHR and Human Rights Act) then the court may well still hold that the policy is unlawful, on the basis of customary international law.

That is quite the marker.

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The third part is about what the court did decide.

Here paragraph 105 is worth a very close look:

Here the court is stating that mere formal changes – such as placing the Rwanda policy on the basis of a treaty, as opposed to a flimsy MoU with no legal effect – will not, by themselves, render the policy lawful.

A treaty – which would provide for enforceable rights for individuals – would be necessary, but it would not be sufficient.

The real change required is that there be compelling evidence that, in practice, the Rwanda scheme will “produce accurate and fair decisions”.

And this is also outside of the scope of what the government can push through parliament: for no mere Act of Parliament can by itself change the situation on the ground in Rwanda.

Either the Rwanda scheme can be shown to produce the results required by the applicable laws – and, if need be, customary international law – or it cannot.

And if it cannot, it would seem that the Supreme Court will again hold the policy to be unlawful, whatever legislation is passed at Westminster.

This case now comes down to evidence, not law.

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Without relying on the ECHR the Supreme Court has placed the government in a rather difficult situation if the Rwanda scheme is to continue.

It would seem that only actual improvements in practical policy can now save the scheme – not clever-clever “notwithstanding” legislation.

And for a Supreme Court that had developed a reputation for being deferent to the executive and legislature on “policy” matters, this is a remarkable position.

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On yesterday’s Supreme Court judgment on the Rwanda policy

16th November 2023

Yesterday the Supreme Court handed down its appeal judgment in the Rwanda policy case.

For an informed view on the case, it is worth taking the time to watch Lord Reed, the President of the court, giving the summary of the judgment:

A court-approved summary can also be read here – and the full judgment is here.

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I wrote a couple of quick posts on the case yesterday for the mainstream media.

At the Financial Times, I did an “instant insight” (and it certainly had one of those two qualities) which emphasised two things which were immediately evident about the case.

First, it was remarkable – and, to me, a surprise – that the current Supreme Court under Lord Reed, which is generally regarded as deferent to the executive and legislature on “policy” matters, went unanimously against the government.

In essence, and to echo John Kander and Fred Ebb’s New York, New York: if a government cannot win on a “policy” matter before a Lord Reed Supreme Court, it cannot win that case anywhere.

Second, the court – perhaps showing more political sense than the entire cabinet – deftly avoided resting the case on the European Convention of Human Rights or the Human Rights Act.

Both instruments were, of course, mentioned in passing – but the effect of the judgment would have been just the same had neither instrument applied to the facts.

The court instead had regard to a range of other legal instruments and sources of law, including what is called customary international law.

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Over at Prospect, I approached the judgment from a different perspective, and I averred that the government could have won the case had they wanted to do so – by which I meant that the government could have negotiated a treaty with Rwanda that would have addressed the concerns ultimately expressed by the Supreme Court, instead of relying on a flimsy Memorandum of Understanding.

And this was not just a commentator-with-hindsight, it was what the government had been explicitly warned about a year ago by a House of Lords committee:

Some other commentators are not with me on this point – and they say that even a substantial treaty with Rwanda, which ensured there was no risk of asylum seekers being wrongly returned to their country of origin, may not have been enough to save the policy in this appeal.

Perhaps they are right and more would have been needed, but on any view such a treaty would have been necessary, if not sufficient: a non-enforceable MoU was inherently inadequate.  It would not have been relied upon had the government been actually serious about this policy.

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I am now thinking about writing a detailed post on the case from a constitutionalist perspective; but in the meantime, let me know below what you think about the decision and what you reckon to be its significance.

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The courts have already deflated the Rwanda policy, regardless of the Supreme Court judgment next Wednesday

10th November 2023

Even if the United Kingdom government wins on the lawfulness of the policy, it has already lost in respect of procedure

Those interested in day-to-day politics in the United Kingdom are now looking to next Wednesday for the Supreme Court decision to be handed down on the lawfulness of the Rwanda policy.

The conventional wisdom is that if the current Home Secretary is still in post on Wednesday, a Supreme Court defeat for the government may be the basis for the Home Secretary to resign and campaign for the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Convention on Human Rights, or something.

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Nobody outside the court will know the result in advance and so the hand-down will be a moment of drama and excitement.

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On balance, any legal challenge to “policy” – that is an approach to general political problems – is likely to fail.

For an entire policy to be quashed it would require that each and every possible application of the policy in any concrete situation must be unlawful – that there is nothing that can be done to save a decision in a particular case.

Courts are reluctant to do this – not least because policy is usually the province of politicians, and judges will not want to trespass.

And the current Supreme Court under Lord Reed often seems cautious in dealing with “policy” challenges.

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There perhaps are reasons why this particular policy may be unlawful in the round – and if it was not arguable that the policy was itself unlawful the Supreme Court would not have heard the case – but it would not be shocking if the Supreme Court sides with the government and holds that some applications of the policy may be lawful, subject to certain conditions.

And here is the nub of the situation, which many in politics and the media seem to be overlooking: the courts have already held that there are strict and onerous conditions in particular cases.

These conditions are so strict and so onerous, it may well be that few if any asylum seekers will be relocated to Rwanda, even if the Supreme Court rules that the general policy is legal.

Followers of this blog may recall posts about this at the time of the initial High Court decision and the Court of Appeal decision:

As this blog has before averred, the government can both win and lose a legal case at the same time.

And even if the government wins on whether the policy is lawful, the procedural protections already insisted upon by the courts in the application of the Rwanda policy will present difficulties for a Home Secretary after next Wednesday.

Whoever that is.

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