Category: Democracy, Elections and Voting

A close look at the law and policy of holding a Northern Ireland border poll – and how the law may shape what will be an essentially political decision

10th February 2024
This week Prospect posted something by me on the issue of a potential border poll in Northern Ireland.

Please click (and read!) here.

This post unpacks that Prospect post – a sort of “behind the scenes” perambulation of how that post came together – and a further discussion of the issues.

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The starting point is that a potential referendum in Northern Ireland has been in the news.

On one hand:

On the other hand:

The Sinn Fein quote was:

“What I firmly believe is – in this decade – we will have those referendums, and it’s my job and the job of people like me who believe in reunification to convince, to win hearts and minds and to convince people of that opportunity – part of which, by the way, will be really consolidating our relationship with Britain as our next door neighbour and good friend.”

Asked if she meant before 2030, Ms McDonald said “yes”.

The Prime Minister’s quote was:

Rishi Sunak has told Sinn Fein to focus on the “day to day” concerns of people in Northern Ireland rather than a referendum on Irish reunification.

The PM said “constitutional change” should not be a priority for the Irish nationalist party, after newly appointed first minister

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Now we will look at the relevant legislation – the Northern Ireland Act 1998.

There are two key provisions.

First, there is section 1, which should be read carefully:

(And legislative and literary purists will react pleasingly to that “But” at the start of the second sub-section.)

That section 1 needs to be seen in the context of, well, other sections 1s.

Here is section 1 of the Ireland Act 1949 – and look especially at sub-section1(2):

You will see at sub-section 1(2) what can be called the “consent” principle – though it would be for the then parliament of Northern Ireland to give that consent (which at the time would seem very unlikely).

By 1973 that parliament was suspended, and so the Northern Ireland Act 1973 switched the giving of consent to a majority of the people of Northern Ireland:

And as my Substack has set out at length before there had been such a border poll, just before the 1973 Act was passed.

The 1973 poll was heavily in favour of the union – and the nationalists largely boycotted the vote.

At the time the poll seemed pointless from a nationalist perspective, and it was also seen as a sop from the London government to the unionist majority.

However, sometimes, things change – and demographics change.

Those seeking the unification of the island of Ireland no longer see border polls as a necessarily unionist device.

Indeed, the roles are somewhat reversed: it is now the unionists that are wary of a border poll.

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Having set out that context, let us go back to the text of section 1 of the 1998 Act:

Here there is a declaration – and you will note similar wording was used in the 1949 and 1973 Acts. The use of a declaration is not new. And it really has to be a declaration (or affirmation) as it describes something as it stands, rather than providing for something new. Section 1 does not make Northern Ireland part of the United Kingdom – that status rests on other legal instruments.

The sub-section also repeats the requirement that consent is required for this declared status to change – and like the 1973 Act it then refers to a schedule to the Act.

But.

There is that second sub-section, beginning with a “But”.

And this is where it becomes interesting and departs substantially from previous legislation:

The word “shall” in that provision is highly significant.

For sub-section 2 creates an obligation. If the majority in such a poll supports unification, then the government of the United Kingdom has to bring forward the legislation that would make this so.

If you read carefully, however, you will note that the obligation only goes to putting legislation before parliament. It does not actually place an obligation on the government of the United Kingdom to ensure such legislation is passed. In this technical way, the supremacy of the Westminster parliament is maintained.

But if there was such a poll majority, it is difficult to see how the Westminster parliament would reject such legislation – though presumably some unionist and conservative MPs would oppose it, regardless of the “will of the people” on this one inconvenient occasion.

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So much for section 1 of the 1998 Act – for it is in the first schedule that the real excitement begins.

(Oh, for what it is worth, lawyers tend to call them sh-edules, not sk-edules when they are in legal documents, I do not know why.)

Here are the first two paragraphs of the schedule:

The two paragraphs are doing different things.

The first paragraph confers a discretion on the government of the United Kingdom (acting through the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland). The key word is “may”.

The Secretary of State may direct there to be a vote; or, then again, the Secretary of State may not do so. It is a choice.

On the face of it, it is an absolute discretion – the Secretary of State may direct as many such border polls as he or she would like. One poll a day, every day even.

But in invisible ink, so to speak, there are limits to be discretion that are implied by law.

The discretion has to be exercised in the public interest and for the purpose of section 1. And given it is part of a statutory scheme implementing the Good Friday Agreement, it would also be necessarily implicit that the discretion should be not be exercised in the selfish interests of the United Kingdom government in maintaining the union.

But those are very wide parameters, and the courts would not intervene if the paragraph 1 discretion is never exercised in favour of holding a border poll.

(If such a poll is held, however, and a majority is in favour of unification, that would mean section 1(2) applies and legislation would have to be brought forward.)

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Now let us look at the fascinating and significant second paragraph:

This is distinct to and separate from the discretion conferred in the first paragraph, for this paragraph imposes an obligation.

The government of the United Kingdom has to hold a border poll if the condition in that paragraph is met: the government of the United Kingdom cannot choose not to do so.

The condition is framed in wide terms and contains two elements, which I will call (A) and (B): the Secretary of State shall exercise the power under paragraph 1 if (A) at any time it appears likely to him [or her] that (B) a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.

The first element (A) is about as wide as you can have as a ministerial discretion under public law (the law governing public bodies). This means a court will not intervene readily to gainsay what the Secretary of State considers to be the position.

But.

Element (B) limits that subjective discretion.

Consider the following: that there is, over a period of time, an accumulation of evidence that the nationalist parties are securing majorities both of the popular vote and of the seats on representative bodies, in successive elections, and especially for seats in the Assembly and the Westminster parliament. And that such support is not a blip but a sustained trend.

There will come a point – a tipping point – where it will be come impossible for a Secretary of State to plausibly maintain that it is unlikely that a majority would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.

It would become literally incredible.

At that point, the so-called Wednesbury doctrine (named after this case which my Substack has examined before) will apply.

The Wednesbury rule is that, as a matter of law, it is not open for a public law decision-maker to make a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable public law decision-maker would make it.

A refusal by a Secretary of State to direct that a border poll take place in certain circumstances would be Wednesbury unreasonable.

And that would then make it potentially a matter for the courts.

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The courts will not want to deal with it.

The courts will view this as a political question.

And the two judgments in the McCord litigation (here and here), where an application was made to make the government of the United Kingdom publish (and thereby abide by) a policy on when it would call a border poll, show that judges really REALLY do not want to get involved.

But.

The judges may not get to duck out of it, as much as they would like to do so.

For that second paragraph was placed on a statutory basis deliberately, so that it could have effect in a certain situation.

Here we need to look at the Good Friday Agreement.

The parties to that agreement, including the governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland, agreed the following:

Section 1 and Schedule 1 of the 1998 Act are both express parts of the Good Friday Agreement.

And the United Kingdom undertook to place the provisions on the statute book as part of their obligations under the agreement.

The sentiments behind the provisions could have been put in a mere political declaration, or a recital, or something else without any (real) legal effect – but no. The other parties to the Good Friday Agreement required the United Kingdom to place these provisions into law, and the United Kingdom freely accepted that requirement.

The other parties were wise to do so.

For by placing the obligation into legislation, a legal backstop was created where, if – if – the point was eventually reached where there was simply an abundance of evidence that a majority supported the unification of the island of Ireland, the United Kingdom could not maintain an unreasonable refusal to hold a border poll.

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Of course, in that extreme scenario, the judges may still wish not to get involved – and it is unlikely that the courts would grant a so-called mandatory order requiring the Secretary of State to direct a border poll.

But there would be no reason why the court could not grant a declaration saying instead that a refusal would be Wednesbury unreasonable.

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Another ground on which the courts may intervene is if the second paragraph was used by the government of the United Kingdom to cynically hold a snap border poll hoping that they would win, so as to gain the protection of the stipulation that another such poll could not be held within seven years.

Such a ploy would be in bad faith, and for a collateral purpose, and this would mean that a court could quash such an order.

Wednesbury and bad faith are among the very widest parameters in the public law of the United Kingdom – and they only apply in exceptional cases. But they are there, and this means that paragraph 2 of the schedule is not a law-free zone – as much as politicians (and judges) may want it to be.

There will be circumstances where nationalists can and will apply to the courts to enforce a provision freely agreed to and legislated by the British state. And so the government of the United Kingdom cannot just refuse a border poll forever, regardless of what happens in Northern Ireland.

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Of course, the condition in paragraph 2 may never be met. It may well be that the evidence never becomes that overwhelming and stark, and that support for unification (like support for independence in Scotland) never solidifies into an ongoing, sustained majority.

But that a condition is not (easily) met does not make it any less of a condition at law. The government of the United Kingdom knows it is there, and the nationalist community knows it is there.

It is no longer an absolutely free choice by the government of the United Kingdom whether there is a border poll or not.

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Holding a border poll for Northern Ireland is essentially a political matter.

And in the real world, it is a matter that will undoubtedly be decided by politics, and not by courts.

Yet it is not a situation where the law is entirely absent. The 1998 Act sets a longstop where, if a certain condition is ever met, a border poll has to be held – even if the United Kingdom does not want to do so – and that a majority in that poll for unification has to be respected.

And this is a key and express part of the Good Friday Agreement, that carefully crafted (and extraordinary) document which has had so many long-term effects on our polity.

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Going back to the quotes at the top of this post:

The suggestion is that Sinn Fein believes they will be able to show a sustained majority for unification within ten years; while the British government wants the political majorities in Northern Ireland to signify other day-to-day things, unconnected with the unification question.

You can see why, for both, these are the lines-to-take.

An objective of the nationalists is to create a “majority” situation where it would be unreasonable for a border poll not to be held; while an objective of the British government is to have a situation where a Secretary of State in good faith can reasonably believe that no such majority (yet) exists.

But if and when a political decision is made for the poll to take place, there will be some regard to the ultimate legal position under the first schedule to the 1998 Act.

As always: law shapes policy and politics; and politics and policy shape law.

And the policy and politics that shaped the extraordinary and consequential Good Friday Agreement (and the 1998 Act) in turn continue to shape the policy and politics of the United Kingdom.

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How the next general election in the United Kingdom is now less than a year away

29 January 2024

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The next general election in the United Kingdom is now less than a year away.

The latest possible date the next general election can be held is 28 January 2025.

How is this so?

Well, let this blog explain.

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The maximum length of any parliamentary term is governed by statute.

Historically, the maximum term of a parliament has varied.

Once there was no limit. (Imagine that.)

Then there was a three year limit. (Imagine that.)

And then under the Septennial Act of 1715 the maximum length of a parliament was set at seven years. (Imagine that.)

That was then amended under the Parliament Act 1911:

The position is now governed by the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022 (which repealed the fixed-term legislation you may recall):

The current parliament first met on 17 December 2019:

This means that under the 2022 legislation, the current parliament has to end by 17 December 2024.

Then under another Act, there will be a period of six days after that dissolution for nominations:

And then the poll has to take place nineteen days after that deadline:

That makes twenty-five days.

On the face of it that would mean a date in early-to-mid January 2025.

But.

We also have this provision:

As the period in question goes over the Christmas and new year period, this moves the maximum date to 28 January 2025.

This is the House of Commons’ own reckoning:

You are welcome, as the sort of people who read and comment on blogs, to see if you can reckon the date differently.

But even if you do reckon the date differently, it is unlikely to be later than 28 January 2025, and so the contention of this post stands: we are less than a year away from the next general election.

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Of course, parliament can now dissolved by (the Crown on the advice of) the Prime Minister before the maximum length of parliament.

Perhaps the Prime Minister will go for May, or for October/November, or some other date?

Who knows?

Perhaps not even the Prime Minister.

Perhaps they may not even still be Prime Minister at the time.

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Is there anyway the maximum period can be extended?

In theory, yes.

It is possible for a parliament to extend its own duration.

The parliament elected in 1935, for example, was extended on annual basis until the second world war had ended in Europe, and there was similar legislation in first world war:

Similar legislation could, in theory, be passed again, invoking some supposed emergency (and some of you may suspect that some government supporters would like to do so).

But even if the House of Commons was to pass such legislation, it cannot be forced through against rejection of the House of Lords as a matter of law (emphasis added):

And, in any case, there would not be enough time to force an extension through against House of Lords opposition (emphasis again added):

So this parliament could be extended, but only with the agreement of the House of Lords, and not just by the government forcing through legislation with its House of Commons majority.

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And so less than one year to go.

The end of this parliament is in sight.

 

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The coming constitutional excitements in the United States

2024 will be a test for the very notion of legitimacy at the basis of the United States constitution

Sir Keir Starmer and the Litigation Turn of Mind

31st July 2023

The leader of the opposition is a former litigator, and many litigators have a certain strategy – or at least a set of tactics: a certain cautious approach.

This approach is to think backwards from what may happen at trial – indeed sometimes to think backwards from what may happen with any appeal.

This sort of litigator anticipates what can go wrong with a case and thereby acts to, as far as possible, close the potential problem(s) down.

Other litigators can be more gung-ho, trying to make the most of their case at each and every point, from aggressive letter before action to expansive claim forms. Such litigators often encounter set-backs.

The more cautious litigator looks at everything the other way round, focussing on the strengths of the other side and the weaknesses of their own.

The merit of this approach is that if and when one gets to trial one is less exposed to defeat.

And often not being defeated on key points is enough for a good result.

If both sides adopt this approach then the “winning” party will be the one who has made the fewer mistakes.

But.

Politics is not law, and a general election is not a trial.

Yes, there is a place for mitigating or even eliminating predictable lines of attack.

And that may be enough for a political party to at least avoid a heavy defeat.

It may not, however, be enough to mobilise sufficient support so as to make an outright victory more likely.

For that there needs to be a positive message: to have points that the other party instead needs to mitigate or eliminate.

This is not to say that closing down lines of attack is a bad thing, just that it is not a sufficient thing.

A cautious litigation turn of mind has its place, but campaigning is not litigation.

A political leader – even those who were once lawyers – also needs a political frame of mind.

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Why the Northern Irish Border Poll of 1973 was both unimportant and profoundly important

19th July 2023

A possible implication of the recent “Will of the People” rhetoric of ministers

15th May 2023

Last week there was a newspaper article under the names of two cabinet ministers.The piece was a warning to the House of Lords about the government’s illegal migration bill.

The “will of the people” in the headline is eye-catching.

And what is also eye-catching is that the new Lord Chancellor put his name to this piece.

One would perhaps not expect too much from the current Home Secretary, but it is striking that Alex Chalk is content to have this under his name too.

The “will of the people” in the headline could have been disregarded as an editor’s embellishment if it was not for the last paragraph of the article (emphasis added):

“We urge the House of Lords to look at the Illegal Migration Bill carefully, remember it is designed to meet the will of the British people in a humane and fair way and back the bill.”

So the “will of the people” line is quite deliberate.

The cabinet ministers are being serious.

And if they are serious, this line perhaps has serious implications.

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The United Kingdom is, of course, a representative democracy and a parliamentary system.

As such, the United Kingdom is not a direct democracy.

Even the few referendums that have been held only had any legal consequence to the extent that a parliament provided for that consequence.

In this system, the notion of a mandate has weak purchase.

An incoming government can ignore a manifesto commitment after a general election.

A government can even flatly reverse a manifesto commitment, as the Conservative government in 1987-92 did with the poll tax (“community charge”).

The only significant effect that a manifesto commitment has for a government after a general election is that, in the event a Bill has opposition in the House of Lords, ministers can say it is an issue on which the democratic element of the polity has conferred a mandate.

And then, by convention – but not by any hard constitutional law – the House of Lords will pass the legislation, rather than delay it or defeat it.

Now, let us look at the Conservative manifesto for 2019:Oh.

(That is the manifesto’s only express mention of asylum seekers.)

There is also this:

The key passage here is “Only by establishing immigration controls and ending freedom of movement will we be able to attract the high-skilled workers we need to contribute to our economy, our communities and our public services.  There will be fewer lower-skilled migrants and overall numbers will come down”.

The introduction to the manifesto also promised that there would be“an Australian-style points based immigration system”.

And there is a promise to “overhaul the current immigration system, and make it more fair and compassionate”. 

No particular legislation is proposed, and – in respect of “illegal” migration, there is no specific measure promised or even a policy stated.

There are just very general objectives.

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And now let us look at the bill before parliament.

This bill does not introduce “an Australian-style points based immigration system”, the only (relatively) specific policy mentioned in the manifesto in respect of controlling borders.

There seems nothing in the Bill which was spelled out in the manifesto.

Contrast this with, say, the 1987 commitment to introduce the poll tax:

“We will reform local government finance to strengthen local democracy and accountability.

“Local electors must be able to decide the level of service they want and how much they are prepared to pay for it.

“We will legislate in the first Session of the new Parliament to abolish the unfair domestic rating system and replace rates with a fairer Community Charge.

“This will be a fixed rate charge for local services paid by those over the age of 18, except the mentally ill and elderly people living in homes and hospitals. The less-well-off and students will not have to pay the full charge but everyone will be aware of the costs as well as the benefits of local services. This should encourage people to take a greater interest in the policies of their local council and in getting value for money.”

Legislation was then promised and the content of that legislation described – both in what will be repealed and what would replace it.

There is nothing in the 2019 Conservative Manifesto which has similar detail about the current illegal migration bill.

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What this means is that ministers are contending that broad-brush statements in a manifesto confer a mandate, rather than any detailed proposals.

As long as ministers can say a general objective is stated in a manifesto, they can seek to browbeat the House of Lords.

The two ministers in their article say:

“It is entirely right that the Lords should scrutinise this important piece of legislation — that is the purpose of parliament’s second chamber. At the same time, it must be balanced against the clear desire of the British people to control immigration. This was a government manifesto commitment in 2019, with a pledge to take back control of our borders.”

Note the weasel word “clear”.

“That is why we have taken robust measures, with the assistance of some of the country’s finest legal minds, to ensure our bill can meet the expectations of the British people.”

Note the implicit admission that these measures were not before the electorate at the 2019 general election, but have been developed afterwards – by “some of the country’s finest legal minds”.

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Is the Conservative manifesto of 2019 sufficiently precise for this bill to have a mandate?

No, of course not.

Statements of general objectives in a manifesto do not – cannot – confer mandates on particular measures.

It is not, and should not be, open for a minister to declare that a measure should not be delayed or defeated in the House of Lords because of general statements of intent in a manifesto.

Many measures could be said to meet that intent – measures different to the ones before the House of Lords.

Had the governing party specified the actual measures in the manifesto, then ministers would have a point.

But the governing party did not, and so ministers do not.

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The implication of this “will of the people” rhetorical device is that the government does not wants  be subject to the rules and conventions of representative democracy and of a parliamentary system.

The implication is that a minister’s interpretation of broad statements in a manifesto cannot be gainsaid.

What the minister wills is the will of the people.

Members of parliament and peers would then be left with no role other than to approve what a minister says is the will of the people, just because of general statements in a manifesto.

That would create a significant constitutional imbalance.

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And on a more mundane level, if this approach catches on then it may mean that even those (like me) who are sceptical of proportional representation and electoral reform will have to change their (our) minds.

For the one-member-per-constituency model only makes sense (if it makes any sense at all) if MPs are not delegates but representatives.

And the so-called “Salisbury doctrine” – that provides that the House of Lords does not block manifesto commitments – only makes sense in respect of things that have a degree of specificity in a manifesto.

What Braverman and Chalk are seeking to do here may be attractive to them (or their article writers) in the short-term, but for each constitutional push there is (or should be) an equal and opposite counter-push.

And so seeking to bully the House of Lords with rhetoric about “the will of the people” for measures which were not actually set out in a manifesto could be counterproductive.

If ministers are acting like there is a direct democracy, then the current system is not sustainable.

And if there is electoral reform and proportional representation, then it is likely that such stridency in policy will be far more difficult.

The ministers may tell peers that the measures are good and practical (even if they are not), and thereby promote the bill on its merits.

But if they keep playing with this “the will of the people” rhetoric, Conservative politicians may discover that, if there is electoral reform and proportional representation, the actual will of the people will be a very different beast.

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Big “P” Party vs little “p” party

9th May 2023

I once listened to a Young Conservative’s spirited explanation to two passers-by about how the Conservative Party did not actually exist.

There was, you see, the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations; and then, you see, there is the parliamentary party, which is quite separate; and then, you know, there is Conservative Central Office.

As the Young Conservative then went onto explain how professional party agents did not fit into this neat scheme, I could tell those being canvassed-in-the-street were both impressed and bewildered.

Surely a “Party” is a thing?

Well, actually, the Young Conservative was more-or-less correct.

And “parties” are still quite difficult to define.

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Of course, there are legalistic definitions.

In the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, “party” is to be interpreted as including “any organisation or person” and “registered party” is defined as a party registered under that Act.

This is not illuminating.

Once registered, parties have certain obligations and rights, but that will not help us understand what is meant by “party”.

Halsbury’s Laws of England tells us the effect of that Act:

“In order to field candidates at elections, political parties must be registered.

“A party may not be registered unless it has adopted a scheme which sets out the arrangements for regulating the financial affairs of the party and which has been approved in writing by the Electoral Commission. The scheme must include such information as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Commission and must determine in particular whether the party is to be taken to consist of a single operation with no division of responsibility for the financial affairs and transactions of the party, or a central organisation and one or more separate accounting units. Where a registered party is a party with accounting units, each unit has a treasurer and an officer.”

Again, informative but not illuminating.

Elsewhere in the law, there are hints

For example, one of the (many) contributions by James Goldsmith to the law of defamation was to bring a case which resulted in it being established that a political party cannot sue for libel.

In this way political parties are like public authorities.

But again, this does not tell us what a “party” is.

Outside of law, we can point to the defintion of the eighteenth century Irish philosopher and British politician Edmund Burke:

“a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.”

One may quibble with at least a couple of words in this defintion – but it is helpful because it does not constrain us to just looking at professional politicians, professional staff, and/or volunteers.

It is a body of [people].

And once one adopts this broad and practical defintion, one can begin to see what are perhaps the real parties.

For example, the fluid movements between think tanks and media organisations and news desks and op-ed gigs and special advisors and hired consultants – and elected politicians and peers – show bodies of people united by their joint endeavours to promote what they see as the national interest upon various agreed principles and policies.

A Martian looking down at Westminster, Whitehall and (what used to be called) Fleet Street would assume, by observation alone, that the sum of the interactions and communications between various bodies of people were the real political parties – regardless of formal nomenclature.

And this is not necessarily a thing about the political right – for there is also, often on the political left and in the political centre – fluidity between pressure groups and campaign groups and trade unions and public bodies and campaigning organisations and civil servants.

These small-p Burkean parties can overlap and sometimes correspond to the big-P Parties.

The big-P Parties indeed seem to be coalitions of these teeming small-P Parties, sometimes spilling outside.

And as big-P Parties decline – for changes in media and communications mean the information-dissemination and organisational purposes of the big-P Parties are falling away – these small-p parties will become again more important, as they were in the days of Burke.

It will not be a complete reversion – big-P Parties will still be significant because of enduring brand loyalty (and recognition) and lingering tribal allegiances.

And these small-p parties – although highly influential – are impossible to regulate with ease.

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We will have to get used to the boundaries between media and politics and business becoming more blurred – individuals casually going from news rooms to parliament to commerce, and so on, working in tandem with others similarly moving around.

And if enough of us object to this trend in our political culture?

Well: we can form our own a body of people united, for promoting by our joint endeavours the national interest, upon this particular principle on which we are all agreed.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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The prehistory of referendums in the United Kingdom – this week’s Substack essay on legal history

11th March 2023

Over at my Substack, this week’s essay on legal history for paying subscribers is on the prehistory of referendums in the United Kingdom.

The essay begins as follows:

For Philip Larkin a certain kind of intercourse began in 1963 – between the Lady Chatterley obscenity trial and the Beatles’ first LP.

Similarly referendums can appear to have started, at least in the United Kingdom ten years later in 1973 – not long after the Oz obscenity trial and the Beatles’ last LP.

For 1973 was the year of the border poll in Northern Ireland, which is usually considered to be the first referendum in the United Kingdom; and 1973 is also the year that the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (EEC), the membership of which was then to be subjected to a referendum in 1975.

For many of us in 2023, fifty years later, the most notable referendum was the one in 2016 on whether the United Kingdom should depart the successor to the EEC, the European Union.

Others are preoccupied with other referendums. Some are seeking a further Scottish independence referendum, to reverse the result of the result of the 2014 vote. And there is also the real prospect of a further border poll in Northern Ireland which may, in turn, lead to Irish unification.

Our recent politics are dominated by one referendum in particular, and the future of the United Kingdom itself may depend on two referendums yet to come.

And this is in addition to the referendums which led to the current devolved settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, all of which are now fundamental parts of our constitutional order.

But there was once a time before any of these referendums had been mooted or taken place or were even contemplated.

A time when 1973, and what then followed, was decades in the future.

And so this essay tells the story of the early history of referendum issue in the constitutional and political affairs of the United Kingdom.

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You can read the rest of the essay here.

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These essays are on topics to do with legal history and legal lore – and they are in addition to my free-to-read topical law and policy commentary here and at Substack every weekday.

Other essays include:

The lore of Lady Justice.

Dr Bonham’s case (1610) – and the question of whether parliament is really sovereign.

The 1712 case of Jane Wenham and the last of the English witch trials.

Taff Vale (1901) – perhaps the most important case in trade union history.

Wednesbury (1948) – the origin of the modern principle of legal unreasonableness.

Malone (1979) – perhaps the most significant constitutional case of the last 50 years.

How the courts improvised legal solutions in the hard case of George Blake between 1990 and 2000.

When William Rees-Mogg and James Goldsmith in 1993 asked the courts to declare that the United Kingdom could not ratify the Maastricht Treaty

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A look at Keir Starmer’s proposal for a “Taking Back Control” Bill

5th January 2023

Today the leader of the main opposition party in the United Kingdom gave a speech.

You can read a version of Keir Starmer’s speech on the Labour party website.

One part of it which seems possibly interesting from a legal perspective is a proposal for a “Taking Back Control” Bill.

This is what the speech said:

“So we will embrace the Take Back Control message. But we’ll turn it from a slogan to a solution. From a catchphrase into change. We will spread control out of Westminster. Devolve new powers over employment support, transport, energy, climate change, housing, culture, childcare provision and how councils run their finances.

“And we’ll give communities a new right to request powers which go beyond this.

“All this will be in a new “Take Back Control” Bill – a centrepiece of our first King’s speech. A Bill that will deliver on the demand for a new Britain. A new approach to politics and democracy. A new approach to growth and our economy.”

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This call for de-centralisation and devolution will face the two fundamental problems every such call has faced since the nineteenth century.

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The first problem for de-centralisation and devolution is the doctrine of the supremacy of the Westminster parliament.

This doctrine, which in good part was a Victorian innovation not known to earlier jurists, tells that all legislative power in our polity rests with the Crown-in-Parliament.

This means that no other body in the United Kingdom can legislate other than to the extent permitted by the Westminster parliament.

Recently this doctrine was illustrated by the Supreme Court decision on a reference by Scotland’s Lord Advocate.

In effect, the Scottish parliament is merely another statutory corporation, subject to the rule of ultra vires.

The Westminster parliament will not easily forego this legislative supremacy and – if we adhere to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy – it may be impossible for the Westminster parliament to do so.

This means that any de-centralisation and devolution is at the Westminster parliament’s command: Westminster can grant this seeing autonomy, and Westminster can easily take it away.

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What we do have are numerous devolution and local government statutes, all defining and limiting what various authorities can and cannot do.

There is no real autonomy – even for the Scottish parliament.

No ability to do things despite what the Westminster parliament would like an authority to do.

Ambitious projects by local authorities – such as when the Victorian town of Birmingham (not even yet a city) went and bought and operated its own gas and water industries – would be impossible now.

That is real de-centralisation and devolution – doing things the centre cannot stop.

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The second problem for de-centralisation and devolution is in respect of policy and administration, rather than law.

It is the sheer dominance of HM Treasury in Whitehall and the public sector more generally.

For example, HM Treasury has a monopoly in respect of almost all fiscal and financial – that is, tax-raising and borrowing – powers.

(Even the Scottish parliament has limited autonomy to vary income tax rates and the Scottish government power to borrow money.)

And no public body has complete fiscal autonomy – and, indeed, many public bodies rely on central government for grants and financing.

It is unlikely that Whitehall will happily allow regional authorities and devolved administrations absolute power to raise taxes and borrow money.

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And now back to the word “control”.

Unless regional authorities and devolved administrations have absolute power to raise taxes and borrow money, or to make rules and mount ambitions problems, then they do not have “control”.

Instead, “control” will stay – as it always does – with Westminster and Whitehall.

Westminster and Whitehall can extend the leash, but they can pull the leash back.

That is not “control”.

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Looking more closely at Starmer’s speech, it is not clear to whom this “control” is to be actually given.

Consider the following passages (emphases added):

“…the Britain that Labour can build. A fairer, greener, more dynamic country with an economy that works for everyone, not just those at the top. And a politics which trusts communities with the power to control their destiny.”

“Giving communities the chance to control their economic destiny. The argument is devastatingly simple.”

“It’s not unreasonable for us to recognise the desire for communities to stand on their own feet. It’s what Take Back Control meant. The control people want is control over their lives and their community.”

“We need to turbo-charge this potential, but Westminster can’t do that on its own, it can only do it with communities. That’s why Labour will give them the trust. The power. And the control.”

And so on.

There is noting specific here as to who will get this supposed “control”.

Will it be existing local authorities or new regional bodies?

Will it be new legal entities smaller than existing councils?

And – most importantly if this really is about “control” – what will happen if those “communities” want to do something which Westminster and Whitehall do not want them to do?

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Starmer did list some of the topics where there could be devolution of powers: “employment support, transport, energy, climate change, housing, culture, childcare provision and how councils run their finances”.

But devolution is not granting “control”, as there will be limits to what even the most ambitious local authority will be able to do in the face of any opposition from Westminster and Whitehall.

And there is also a respectable argument – which you may or may not endorse – than on issues such as transport and housing, there needs to be far less local autonomy, not more, so for us as to escape the ongoing blight of NIMBYism.

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Starmer insisted in his speech that the “Take Back Control” will be turned from “a slogan to a solution”.

And it we missed the import of that rhetorical turn, Starmer then said it will be turned from “a catchphrase into change”.

(This is reminiscent of his predecessor Tony Blair’s wonderful statement once that “[a] day like today is not a day for soundbites, we can leave those at home, but I feel the hand of history upon our shoulder with respect to this, I really do.”)

But there is nothing in this speech which does go beyond slogans and catchphrases.

There is no substance to the supposed “controls” which are to be given “back”.

And there is nothing specific as to whom or what those “controls” are to be given.

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You may have Very Strong Opinions on de-centralisation and devolution.

You may welcome Starmer’s speech as a good and welcome signal of change.

You may oppose it as it may mean impediments to policies which may need to be directed at the national level.

But what one cannot say is that it tells us much, if anything, about how de-centralisation and devolution is to work in practice.

And it says nothing about how – at least in England – local authorities can break free from the real controls of Westminster and Whitehall.

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Do referendums now have a special constitutional status? And has the Supreme Court made it far harder for the UK government to ignore the results of any further “advisory” referendum? Some fascinating passages in today’s Supreme Court judgment

23rd November 2022

This morning the United Kingdom Supreme Court gave judgment in the reference made by the Scottish government about whether the Scottish Parliament could legislate for a non-binding referendum on Scottish independence.

This post is not about the specific issue of the Scottish independence referendum, which I have commented on at the Financial Times.

This post is instead about some fascinating passages in the judgment about referendums.

By way of background, the usual position is that there is a binary: on one hand there is parliament, and on the other hand there are extra-parliamentary exercises, such as referendums and consultation exercises.

These extra-parliamentary things are usually seen as advisory.

Sometimes there is an exception – the electoral reform referendum would have had a direct legal effect had a majority supported change.

But generally, referendums and such like are glorified opinion polls.

Any mandate is political, not legal.

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In today’s judgment, a unanimous Supreme Court seems to have put forward a different view (which I have broken up into sentences for flow and added bold for emphasis):

“78. The effect of the Bill, however, will not be confined to the holding of a referendum. Even if it is not self-executing, and can in that sense be described as advisory, a lawfully held referendum is not merely an exercise in public consultation or a survey of public opinion.

“It is a democratic process held in accordance with the law which results in an expression of the view of the electorate on a specific issue of public policy on a particular occasion. Its importance is reflected, in the first place, in its official and formal character.

“Statutory authority is needed (and would be provided by the Bill) to set the date and the question, to define the franchise, to establish the campaign period and the spending rules, to lay down the voting rules, to direct the performance of the counting officers and registration officers whose function it is to conduct the referendum, and to authorise the expenditure of the public resources required. Statutory authority, and adherence to the statutory procedure, confer legitimacy upon the result.

“79. That legislative framework is put in place because the result of a lawfully held referendum is a matter of importance in the political realm, even if it has no immediate legal consequences.

“That has been demonstrated in practice by the history of referendums in this country, and has also been recognised by this court.

“For example, in relation to the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence, Lord Hodge stated in Moohan v Lord Advocate […] with the agreement of the majority of the court, that “the referendum is a very important political decision for both Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom”.

“In relation to the 2016 referendum on leaving the European Union, the majority of the court stated in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union […] : “[T]he referendum of 2016 did not change the law in a way which would allow ministers to withdraw the United Kingdom from the European Union without legislation. But that in no way means that it is devoid of effect. It means that, unless and until acted on by Parliament, its force is political rather than legal. It has already shown itself to be of great political significance.”

[…]

“81. A lawful referendum on the question envisaged by the Bill would undoubtedly be an important political event, even if its outcome had no immediate legal consequences, and even if the United Kingdom Government had not given any political commitment to act upon it.

“A clear outcome, whichever way the question was answered, would possess the authority, in a constitution and political culture founded upon democracy, of a democratic expression of the view of the Scottish electorate.

“The clear expression of its wish either to remain within the United Kingdom or to pursue secession would strengthen or weaken the democratic legitimacy of the Union, depending on which view prevailed, and support or undermine the democratic credentials of the independence movement.

“It would consequently have important political consequences relating to the Union and the United Kingdom Parliament.”

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With regard to these “important political consequences”, the Supreme Court held that such a non-binding referendum would “in all the circumstances […] relate to” the reserved matters of the Union and the sovereignty of parliament, even if the referendum was not legally binding.

In particular, the Supreme Court emphasised that “statutory authority is needed (and would be provided by the Bill) to set the date and the question, to define the franchise, to establish the campaign period and the spending rules, to lay down the voting rules, to direct the performance of the counting officers and registration officers whose function it is to conduct the referendum, and to authorise the expenditure of the public resources required. Statutory authority, and adherence to the statutory procedure, confer legitimacy upon the result.”

A dedicated referendum, under a dedicated statute, is not to be taken lightly.

The key point in these passages is that “a lawfully held referendum is not merely an exercise in public consultation or a survey of public opinion”.

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The import of this judgment would seem to be that dedicated referendums set up by statute now occupy an intermediate position in the constitution of the United Kingdom.

They do not bind parliament (or presumably the courts), but they are not mere opinion polls either.

Such referendums and their results are, as a judge may say, “seen”.

The results of these referendums have a force which, even if not legally binding, is legally recognised and which may, in certain legal cases, make a legal difference.

Perhaps this may have implications in certain legal cases where there are “legitimate expectations” that a public body will act or not act in a certain way.

Perhaps it may have implications for what will follow a border poll in Northern Ireland, or in a further Scottish independence referendum.

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To an extent this is a judicial statement of the obvious political reality of referendums – but it is significant for it not only to be expressly acknowledged in a judgment but also (via “all the circumstances”) to have made a difference in this case.

Special referendums now appear to have a special constitutional status.

They matter and their results will be judicially recognised – even, as the Supreme Court expressly said here, if the United Kingdom government has not given any political commitment to act upon them.

If so, let us see what happens with the next one – that is, if there is a next one.

The consequential litigation may be fun.

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