The significance of the resignation of Dominic Raab

21st April 2023

The end, when it came, was not pretty.  But then again, endings rarely are.

The resignation letter was extraordinary:

The impression was that the letter was drafted in a rush – the sort of draft one would put together to get something out of one’s system, before composing something more measured.

The letter was accompanied by a 1,100 word piece in the Telegraph which was published eighty-or-so minutes later:

As a published article, it presumably would have been commissioned, edited and lawyered before publication – and so it may have been written before the letter.

But it said much the same.

One remarkable thing was that both the letter and the published article were in the public domain before the actual report – presumably to “frame the narrative” as a political pundit would put it.

And then the report was published:

And it became obvious why Raab was so anxious to “frame the narrative”– as parts of the report were, as a lawyer would put it, “adverse”.

This did not seem to be the usual, coordinated exchange of letters with a prime minister, which one would expect with such a senior resignation.

Instead, it looked a mess.

And one can only wonder about how this mess relates to the unexpected delay from yesterday, which was when the report was expected to be published and the prime minister was expected to make a decision.

What seems plain, however, is that Raab was pressed into a resignation.

If so, there is a certain irony, as it was the threatening of unpleasant outcomes to people who did not comply with his wishes/demands which was the subject matter of some of the complaints.

It therefore appears that Rishi Sunak was more skilful in this cost-benefit power-play than Raab.

In his resignation letter, Raab twice warns of the “dangerous” outcome if he did not get to continue on his way.

But in practice, Sunak by being silent and not “clearing” Raab yesterday placed Raab in an increasingly difficult situation, where it was becoming obvious even to Raab that unless he resigned he would be sacked.

Some may complain that Sunak “dithered” – but another analysis is that this former head boy and city banker patiently out-Raabed the school-cum-office bully.

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Beginnings, like endings, are also often not pretty.  And rarely are they ideal.

But, at last, the Ministry of Justice is free from perhaps the worst Lord Chancellor of modern times.

(Yes, worse even than Christopher Grayling or Elizabeth Truss.)

Over at his substack, Joshua Rozenberg has done an outstanding post on why – in substantial policy and administrative terms – Raab was just so bad.

And on Twitter, the fine former BBC correspondent Danny Shaw has also detailed the many failings in this thread:

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The Ministry of Justice is in an awful state.

The departing minister’s obsession with prioritising symbolic legislation such as the supposed “Bill of Rights” and a “Victims” Bill – which mainly comprises the shallow sort of stuff too often connected to the word “enshrining” – was demonstrative of the lack of proper direction for the ministry.

And it is significant that it was only during the interruption of the Truss premiership, with a new (if temporary) Lord Chancellor that the barristers’ strike was resolved.

Joshua Rozenberg sums up that telling situation perfectly:

“We saw an example of Raab’s indecisiveness in the way handled the strike by criminal defence barristers last summer. Increasing delays — caused initially by government-imposed limits on the number of days that judges could sit — were rapidly becoming much worse.

“Raab seemed like a rabbit frozen in the headlights, unable to decide which way to turn. The problem was solved by Brandon Lewis, who replaced Raab for seven weeks while Liz Truss was prime minister. He simply paid the barristers some more money.

“It was not so much that Raab was ideologically opposed to making a pay offer. On his return to office, he made no attempt to undermine the pay deal reached by Lewis. It’s just that he seemed unable to take a decision.”

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Now decisions can be made.

Gesture-ridden draft legislation can be abandoned.

And the grunt-work of actually administering our courts and prisons and probation service can take place.

That grunt-work will also not be pretty, and the incoming Lord Chancellor will not get easy claps and cheers that come with attacking “lefty” lawyers and “woke” judges.

But a new start can be made, and all people of good sense should wish the new Lord Chancellor well.

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The failure of Brexit to return real power to Westminster: a worked example

16th March 2023

Yesterday this blog averred that Brexit so far has been about giving power to Whitehall than giving power to Westminster.

Ministers since 2016 have been using the rhetoric of “taking back control” so as to make government less accountable to parliament.

And today: a worked example:

You may have strong views about Brexit, and you may have strong views about the Windsor Framework.

(This blog has set out why, although the Windsor Framework is a Good Thing, the supposed ‘Stormont Brake’ is more likely to be an ornament than an instrument.)

Yet sensible people would want the Windsor Framework to be be properly considered and scrutinised by parliament.

For that is what sovereign parliaments should be able to do.

But, no.

The government is not giving parliament any adequate opportunity to examine the Windsor Framework.

This is more government by fiat, by ministerial decision.

You may think that is a Good Thing: that our government should be all-powerful between general elections with no or almost no accountability to parliament.

But, if so, do not pretend to others that Brexit was ever about giving power back to the Westminster parliament.

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Whitehall is the new Brussels – and Westminster is as weak as ever

15th March 2023

There are many things which were not true about Brexit.

Brexit was never going to be quick and easy: indeed, we were still this year re-negotiating the exit deal.

Brexit was never going to lead to a rush of new free trade deals.

Brexit was never going to make it easier for the United Kingdom to control its borders.And Brexit was not about reclaiming sovereignty: we had sovereignty all along, and that is how we were able to make the Article 50 notification.

But the untruth about Brexit which perhaps is the most irksome from a law and policy perspective is that it was about the Westminster parliament (re)gaining power from Brussels.

For what has happened instead is that Whitehall – that is ministers and civil servants – used Brexit as a pretext for its own power-grab.

There is a version of Brexit – unrealistic, of course – where parliament is given maximum powers over new trade deals and where parliament decides on a case-by-case basis which of the retained European Union laws it keeps or replaces.

A Brexit which was used to empower Westminster and our democracy.

In some ways – and this will annoy some of you – that would not have been a bad Brexit.

But the rhetoric of “taking back control” instead cloaked an increase in discretionary and unaccountable power by the government.

The Westminster parliament seems as powerless as ever against the executive.

Whitehall has become the new Brussels.

And we may have to “take back control” all over again.

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Legislation as an annual or biennial virility event

8th March 2023

In times past, communities used to come together every year or so to assert and celebrate rebirth and virility.

Nowadays, our politicians do something similar – although instead of costumes and spectacles they pass legislation.

Consider these two lists.

First, here are the Acts of Parliament since 2000 which have migration/immigration/borders/nationality in their short title:

This list, of course, excludes statutory instruments and other legislation that may have amended the law on migration and related aspects.

But it is about an Act every other year.

And here is a second list, of primary legislation since 2000 with terrorism or “investigatory powers” in the title:

Again, an Act of Parliament on average every couple of years or so.

Amusingly, our legislature cannot make its mind up whether the statutes should be title “terrorism” or “anti-“ or “counter-terrorism”.

(Perhaps one reason we have so many is because they keep cancelling each other out.)

Taking the two lists together, this means that the Home Office has had since 2000 about an Act every year on immigration or national security, or both.

An annual (biennial) legislative event which shows the Home Office is doing something.

We are told this year, like before, that the migration-related Bill is needed to solve the perceived borders issue.

We are told that those against this latest Bill are against the national interest:

One suspects similar sentiments could have been expressed (and indeed were) about those who may have had reservations about each of the previous Bills on borders and/or national security since 2000.

And like an addict, the Home Office will say in 2024 and 2025 that just some more Bills will be needed to show how serious we are about borders and/or national security.

Perhaps one day the Home Office will think it has enough legislation in place on borders and/or national security.

But until that happy day, Home Office ministers will pass a new Act every year or so to show that they are virile and that they are doing things.

Then they will hope we will forget the alarmism so that they can do it all over again in the next year or two.

The legislation will accumulate on the statute book, with different variations of the same few words in the titles.

Until perhaps they are all one day consolidated in a Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Borders, Migration, Immigration and Nationality Act.

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The Illegal Migration Bill is about political theatre, not serious law-making

 7th March 2023

Today we were supposed to see the government’s new Illegal Migration Bill.

According to today’s Order Paper, the Bill was to be presented to Parliament:

A minister told peers that the Bill was to be introduced today:

And there was even a Commons statement by the Home Secretary.

But.

There is no Bill – at least by mid-afternoon today.

This is odd.

That there is a delay was indicated by part of the Home Secretary’s statement:

“Mr. Speaker, I won’t address the bill’s full legal complexities today.  Some of the nation’s finest legal minds have been – and continue to be – involved in its development.”

And why would the “nation’s finest legal minds” still be “developing” something which was supposed to be published today?

The ministerial letter above provides a possible explanation:

Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides:

Nothing much of legal significance turns on section 19 statements either way – whether a minister views a Bill’s provisions as compatible or otherwise.

The lack of a compatibility statement will not make a statutory provision breach the ECHR, and the presence of a compatibility statement will not save a statutory provision from being found incompatible.

Section 19 is an ornament not an instrument.

Lord Hope in a 2001 House of Lords case said the following about one such statement of compatibility (emphasis added):

“It may be noted in passing that a statement of compatibility was attached to the Bill before second reading that its provisions were compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998. Statements to that effect are now required by section 19 of the Act, which was brought into force on 24 November 1998. But Mr Pannick QC for the Secretary of State did not seek to rely on this statement in the course of his argument. I consider that he was right not to do so. These statements may serve a useful purpose in Parliament. They may also be seen as part of the parliamentary history, indicating that it was not Parliament’s intention to cut across a Convention right […]  No doubt they are based on the best advice that is available. But they are no more than expressions of opinion by the minister.  They are not binding on the court, nor do they have any persuasive authority.

That was just after the Human Rights Act was passed – but it is pretty much the conventional wisdom of the courts and practitioners on such statements.

Of course, ministers will want to assure waverers in the Commons and the Lords that this is not yet another piece of legislation which will break international legal obligations.

More concerning will be the substance of the Bill, which may face heavy amendment in the Lords and litigation in the Courts.

But we cannot know what the Bill says, as it has not been published.

What we do know, in addition to the Home Secretary’s statement (and ignoring the media briefing) is this from the Order Paper:

And this on the Home Office website:

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The emphasis on media briefing for this Bill indicates that these proposals are more to do with political theatre, not law-making.

For the one thing which would do the most to stem any abuses of our asylum regime would be to have an adequately resourced and competent asylum system.

And until and unless we have an adequately resourced and competent asylum system, then everything else proposed by this government on asylum is hogwash.

The impression this Bill gives is that the government is not engaged in serious policy making and legal implementation, and it wishes to use its remaining months in office to play to various galleries and to evade any blame.

And this can be done by leaks, briefings, announcements and press releases – again, political theatre – with any actual legislation an afterthought.

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STOP PRESS

The Bill has now been published.

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Why the appointment of Sue Gray is both a mistake and not a mistake

6th March 2023

The senior civil servant Sue Gray has been appointed by the leader of the opposition as his chief of staff.

This, as you no doubt are aware, is the stuff of political controversy – not least because of Gray’s famous (infamous?) role in compiling the Partygate internal report.

From a policy perspective, however, is this controversial appointment a mistake?

Tactically and politically the appointment is an error.

It raises questions of propriety and timing for the leader of the opposition, and it opens up the  question of whether her role in the Partygate report was politically motivated.

It also distracts from any focus on the wrongdoing of Boris Johnson over Partygate.

But.

Strategically and governmentally the appointment is sensible.

If the leader of the opposition becomes prime minister then he needs aides who (genuinely) know the Whitehall machine, who are used the glare of the media, and who are unafraid of speaking truth to power, or at least to Prime Ministers.

As such Gray’s appointment can be compared to that of Margaret Thatcher’s aides, the recently deceased Bernard Ingham and Charles Powell, and Tony Blair’s appointment of Jonathan Powell.

Such appointments are a mark of taking government and policy seriously.

The timing of the appointment is dreadful, and it may be politically counterproductive in March 2023, but it may look less problematic if Labour win the next general election.

And in the run up to the next election, it means the party (currently) most likely to win that election will have guidance which enable it to better prepare for the realities of implementing manifesto promises and translating policy into practice.

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Is it, at last, time to say “good bye” to Thoburn and the idea of “constitutional statutes”?

 9th February 2023

Oh dear old Thoburn, what shall be done with you?

Thoburn, the mainstay of thousands of constitutional law essays and hundreds of learned articles, does yesterday’s Supreme Court decision mean you are now no more?

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Thoburn is the 2002 “metric martyrs” case which introduced into the then quiet, sedate world of constitutional law the exciting concept of “constitutional statutes”.

Until then all Acts of Parliament were regarded as being equal, none of them any more entrenched – enshrined – than any other.

But in Thoburn the judge said, in effect, that there was a class of super-duper statutes known as “constitutional statutes” and these statutes had super-duper qualities not available to more mundane everyday statutes.

Incredible, if true.

And so Thoburn became the recent constitutional law case any student or informed pundit had to have an opinion about.

But yesterday’s Supreme Court decision on the Northern Irish Protocol may mean the dictum in Thoburn are no longer to be taken seriously.

What will law students and pundits do?

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To understand what happened with the Thoburn case we have to go back to the Victorian doctrine of the supremacy of parliament.

This doctrine holds that no statute passed by the Crown-in-Parliament can be gainsaid by any court.

But in two case in the early 1930s about the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 and the Housing Act 1925, the courts were presented with a situation where two statutes contradicted each other.

How should the courts deal with this situation?

The clever idea the courts came up with was “implied repeal” – and so the fiction adopted was that parliament in passing the later legislation knew about the earlier legislation, and so the (presumed) intent of parliament was to repeal the earlier legislation.

But as this repeal was not explicit in the later legislation, it would have to be an implicit repeal.

And this is how the interwar courts managed to disapply a piece of primary legislation, notwithstanding the heady doctrine of the supremacy of parliament.

(Of course, if no Act of parliament can actually be gainsaid by a court, then the courts should have just refused to choose between the two contradictory statutes and return the matter to Parliament to sort out – but the fig-leaf of the “intent” of parliament meant the courts could sort out the legislative mess parliament had created.)

And the legal rule from these case was that the later statute trumps – that is, implicitly repeals – the earlier statute when the two contradict.

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But in 2002 the court was faced with another seemingly awkward situation.

It was submitted in that case that the Weights and Measures Act 1985 somehow implicitly repealed the earlier European Communities Act 1973.

On the merits of the case, the court found that this was not the position.

But in a dictum – which was not about the point on which the case turned – Lord Justice Laws (and please none of the usual jokes about nominative determinism) went on a judicial frolic and speculated about implied repeal.

Could a later Act of Parliament really implicitly repeal the European Communities Act 1973, which – in turn – was the (then) basis for the laws of the European Union having effect in the United Kingdom?

On the basis of the 1930s cases then this would have to be the position, as the later statute trumps the earlier statute.

But.

As we now know, repeal of the European Communities Act 1973 would be a very complicated and far-reaching thing.

And so Lord Justice Laws posited a new category of statutes which would be immune from any implied repeal.

If there were any contradictions with an earlier “constitutional statute” then it would be the later statute that would be repealed, not the earlier one.

His dictum was as follows (which I have broke out into one-sentence paragraphs):

We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament: as it were “ordinary” statutes and “constitutional” statutes.

The two categories must be distinguished on a principled basis. In my opinion a constitutional statute is one which (a) conditions the legal relationship between citizen and State in some general, overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental constitutional rights.

(a) and (b) are of necessity closely related: it is difficult to think of an instance of (a) that is not also an instance of (b).

The special status of constitutional statutes follows the special status of constitutional rights.

Examples are the [sic] Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of Union, the Reform Acts which distributed and enlarged the franchise, the HRA, the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998.

The ECA clearly belongs in this family. It incorporated the whole corpus of substantive Community rights and obligations, and gave overriding domestic effect to the judicial and administrative machinery of Community law.

It may be there has never been a statute having such profound effects on so many dimensions of our daily lives.

The ECA is, by force of the common law, a constitutional statute.

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This was exhilarating, provocative stuff.

And it was utter flapdoodle.

There was no basis for positing such “constitutional statutes” – either then or now.

They were invented just to get the courts out of the potentially tricky situation which the judges’ contrived solution to the problems in the 1930s had got themselves into.

The notion of “implied repeal” was now a reversible switch – and it was to be the judges who decided (and not parliament) whether it would be the earlier or the later legislation that would be “implicitly repealed” by the simple expedient of the judge perhaps dubbing one or the other of the Acts of Parliament a “constitutional statute”.

It was all rather daft, but you will see why it was like catnip to those with an interest in constitutional law.

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Anyway, the Laws dictum was relied on by the applicants in the recent Allister litigation on the legality of the Northern Irish Protocol, which eventually reached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court decision in that case is fascinating and it warrants a post by itself, especially on respect of the developing jurisprudence of the court on devolution.

But the Supreme Court was unimpressed by the Thoburn point.

The court described the submission (again broken up into one-sentence paragraphs):

On the hearing of this appeal, the appellants submitted that the Acts of Union were constitutional statutes so that the rights in the trade limb of article VI of His Majesty’s subjects of Northern Ireland being on the same footing in respect of trade as His Majesty’s subjects of Great Britain, could not be subject to repeal or to subjugation, modification, or suspension absent express or specific words in a later statute.

In support of that submission, the appellants relied on a line of authorities starting with Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin)[2003] QB 151 for the proposition that whilst ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed constitutional statutes may not.

At para 63 of Thoburn, Laws LJ suggested that the repeal of a constitutional statute or the abrogation of a fundamental right could only be effected by a later statute by:

“express words in the later statute, or by words so specific that the inference of an actual determination to effect the result contended for was irresistible.”

The appellants submitted that the Acts of Union are constitutional Acts and that the rights to equal footing as to trade were fundamental rights so that there was no scope for implied repeal and by analogy there was no scope for implied subjugation, modification, or suspension.

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You will see that the Thoburn point has now been expanded beyond implied repeal and that “constitutional statutes” have various other super-duper legal protections.

The court held (again broken up into one-sentence paragraphs, and with my two comments interposed):

The debate as to whether article VI created fundamental rights in relation to trade, whether the Acts of Union are statutes of a constitutional character, whether the 2018 and 2020 Acts are also statutes of a constitutional character, and as to the correct interpretative approach when considering such statutes or any fundamental rights, is academic.

“Academic.”

Even if it is engaged in this case, the interpretative presumption that Parliament does not intend to violate fundamental rights cannot override the clearly expressed will of Parliament.

“Even if”

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Allister is not about implied repeal, so strictly speaking the Laws dictum in Thoburn may be said to not be applicable.

But the notion of “constitutional statutes” is plainly not taken seriously by this unanimous Supreme Court in an important devolution case engaging what Laws would have called many “constitutional statutes” , with a panel consisting of justices from Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, as well as the court’s leading public law justice, Lord Sales.

For the Supreme Court, the content of the Acts of Union have no special entrenched legal status, and they can be amended, and so on, just as any other Act of Parliament.

The question of what would happen with a direct contradiction, as in the early 1930s has been sidestepped.

But the expedient of “constitutional statutes” as suggested by Laws in Thoburn seems to have been put back in its judicial box.

Or has it?

No doubt there will now be thousands more constitutional law essays, and hundreds more learned articles, to tell us whether the dictum in Thoburn is no more.

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The importance of giving important legislation very dull names

25th January 2023

In his informative post today on Dominic Raab and his “Bill of Rights”, Joshua Rozenberg quotes today’s important report by a parliamentary committee:

“What’s more, says the all-party committee, it’s not a bill of rights at all. If the government decides to press on with it, the bill’s title should be changed to something more meaningful — such as the European Convention on Human Rights (Domestic Application) Bill.”

And indeed the committee even states this as a conclusion:

The committee make a good point – and this is a missed trick by the justice secretary Dominic Raab.

Had Raab gone for a bill with such a boring title it may even now been an Act.

But he went for perhaps the most portentous title for legislation he could think of – other than Magna Carta II – and so looks like he will have no legislation passed at all.

Raab wanted to evoke and allude to the Bill of Rights of 1688-89 when all he was doing was fiddling around at the margins of how the European Convention on Human Rights was given effect in English law.

Had he been content with a more drab descriptive title, he may now have a legislative achievement to chalk up against his name.

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There is nothing wrong with dull titles for legislation.

For example, one of the most important statutes in property and contract law has the sterling, stirring title of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.

What matters is the substance of a statute, not what can be said in a press release with its title.

A less pompously named statute tidying up some of the acknowledged problems with the Human Rights Act may have actually been welcome.

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But.

The problem is not just with Raab.

The Human Rights Act itself has a needlessly provocative title.

Had it been called the European Convention on Human Rights (Domestic Application and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1998, then there would probably be far less political and media opposition, even if the substance was the same.

Part of the reason why the 1998 Act is still contested in some political and media quarters is because of its name.

So let us worry less about the the titles of legislation and more about the substance.

And perhaps “political” titles for legislations should be banned.

The prohibition could even be contained in a Banning Daft Legislation Titles Act.

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We have a coalition government, and we have had for some time

12th January 2023

Another day, another news report about the government not being able to get support from its own backbenchers for its legislative programme:

This is becoming a regular event.

The stuff of the politics of the governing party at the moment is pretty much U-turns and rebellions.

This is a governing party that was elected with a majority of 80.

Indeed, the governing party forced through Brexit in 2019-20 so as to to gain this party majority.

And this governing party has done almost nothing substantial with this nominal majority.

For despite the majority on paper, this is a government in constant negotiation with its own backbenchers.

If we drop the formalities, this is a coalition government, between the warring factions of the governing party.

And this has been the case since it was elected.

If we then look back before 2019 we also can see coalition governments: the 2010-15 formal coalition and the 2017-19 informal deal between the governing party and the Democratic Unionist Party.

Indeed, other than between 2015-17, an argument can be made that we have had, either formally or in effect, coalition government almost continuously since 2010.

Of course, this may seem counter-intuitive.

Coalitions are often seen as nice cuddly things, allowing centrists and environmental and regional parties to have disproportionate influence.

And one of the stock arguments for proportional representation is that we would have the benefit of more coalitions.

But we have had coalitions anyway.

We have just had, from a small-l liberal perspective, the wrong sort of coalitions.

But when a government cannot carry its own business without continual compromises and retreats caused by competing factions then there is perhaps no other good word for what we have.

For what we do not have is a party-based government able to implement a manifesto programme.

Indeed, other than in 2015-17, it is difficult to remember when we last had one.

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From ornament to instrument – how current politics are forcing constitutions to work in the UK and USA

6th January 2022

This is just a short post, prompted by the ongoing inability of the Republicans in the United States House of Representatives to elect a speaker.

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There is usually no problem in a speaker being elected: the first day of the new House of Representatives is usually a ceremony, attended by the smiling families of new congressmen and congress women.

But now we are on the third day of voting, because a group of hardline Republicans are contesting what would normally be a coronation.

Two years ago today (as I set out in last week’s Substack essay), the counting and certification of electoral college votes was also converted from being a mere ceremony to something far more politically vital.

Indeed, a plan was in place to use what was normally (again) a coronation into an opportunity for the defeated president Donald Trump to somehow retain office.

And over here, during the last days before the United Kingdom left the European Union, there was an attempt to use a prorogation of parliament so as to force through a no-deal exit.

That (purported) use of the prorogation was contested and then quashed by the Supreme Court.

But usually prorogations are dull and straightforward affairs, of little interest even to political obsessives.

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Our current volatile politics keeps converting dull and ceremonial elements of our constitutions into things that matter.

Our constitutional arrangements are being forced to work, where they previously only had to decorate.

To an extent this is a good thing: like all the functioning parts of a car occasionally being tested for a MoT test.

But it also may be a bad thing, as too much stress may mean that element of the constitution buckles and breaks.

Either way, it is certainly exciting.

But, as we know, constitutional law should not be exciting, it should be dull.

Day-to-day politics should take place within the parameters of a constitution, not constantly pressing on the edges, straining them as far as they will go.

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