The tragedy of the Human Rights Act

27th March 2023

Here is a playfully mischievous tweet from the Guardian:

And how we can – and perhaps should – laugh at the irony of a newspaper that has attacked the Human Rights Act relying on that same Act when it is in its interests.

It is not even the first time – here is Associated Newspapers seeking to rely on the ECHR in respect of the Leveson Inquiry  and here is Associated Newspapers seeking to rely on the Human Rights Act in 2006.

And there is nothing – absolutely nothing – wrong with Associated Newspapers seeking to do this.

For that is what the law of fundamental rights is for: they can be relied by (or sought to be relied on) by anybody.

There are useful rights for the media generally and journalists in particular under the Act.

And in other jurisdiction – notably the United States – the media and journalists are conscious of the fundamental rights they can rely on and can point to provisions that protect those rights.

The tragedy of the Human Rights Act is that despite it providing rights on which the media and journalists can rely, it is also despised in many in the media and journalism.

There is a mismatch between the reputation of the Act and the substance of the Act.

In the United States it would be unthinkable – even now – for any media organisation to call for the repeal of the First Amendment.

If only media organisations in the United Kingdom were as protective of Article 10 of the ECHR.

But there is a disconnect.

The newspaper in-house lawyers know about these provisions, and they will not hesitate to rely on the ECHR and the Human Rights Act when they can.

But across the office floor, there is not attachment to Article 10.

And that is part of the tragedy of the Human Rights Act.

Over twenty years since it took effect, it is still seen by so many in politics and the media as a partisan ornament rather than a practical instrument.

So entrenched is the dislike for the legislation it is tempting to support repealing the Act and replacing it with a new statute with exactly the same provisions but with a far less contentious name.

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The submission of Boris Johnson is a document of wonder and delight, but it should not be taken seriously for its supposed primary purpose

 

Today the privileges committee of the House of Commons published the latest submission of Boris Johnson.

Nobody takes this submission seriously, at least not for its supposed primary purpose – that of being the solemn defence of Johnson against the charge of culpably misleading the House of Commons (and/or not correcting the record in a timely manner).

Nobody, including Johnson himself and the clever wordsmiths who crafted the arguments in the document.

The document, however, may have a number of secondary purposes.

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First, there is the political and personal strategic purpose of Johnson at the end of the process being able to claim that he has been “cleared” and “exonerated” regardless of whether he is actually cleared or exonerated.

Here Johnson may have already written off the committee report, and he realises some culpability will be found.

And so what Johnson is looking at is how this document can frame what is happening for what then follows, especially any vote of the House of Commons on sanction.

If he can, for example, say that the committee accepted he acted “in good faith” but that he should have corrected the record sooner then he can say he has been “cleared” and “exonerated” even though the committee finds him in breach because of his correction.

As such he is working backwards from the tale he wants to tell after the committee reports.

(If the submission works so that he is not found in breach, then all the better – but he knows the evidence against him is compelling.)

If he makes it as difficult as possible for the privileges committee to land a clean blow against Johnson on “good faith” at the time the House was misled, then he may escape any significant sanction.

Johnson then “wins”.

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Second, there is the tactical purpose of framing the ongoing narrative of this story on terms favourable to Johnson.

He is sending signals to his media and political supporters, some of whom are happily repeating his talking points and believe Johnson to be some sort of a victim.

This spin maximises his political space for manoeuvre: he retains political support and (somehow) the benefit of the doubt of some who should know better.

This submission helps Johnson in defining the charges against him on his own terms, rather than on the committee’s terms: Is the committee being unfair? Did he act in good faith?  Hasn’t he apologised for what was on his watch?  And so on.

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Third, a long submission like this may have the purpose of justifying the considerable amount of public money spent on Johnson’s defence.

If Johnson had one strong basis for defence, a few pages would be enough, perhaps even one page, perhaps even one paragraph.

But as a general rule: the longer the litigation letter, the weaker the case.

This is 52 pages.

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And fourth (and here I am being playfully ironic), this document is a wonderful example of public art.

The amount of public money spent on this document could have been wasted on some drab statue or earnest mural, but here we have instead a thing of beauty.

Almost every sentence of this submission – almost every sub-clause – is a delight to be cherished, demonstrating real craft.

Take for example:

“the Committee did not identify a single document which suggested that I was informed or warned by anyone that any event at No. 10 was contrary to the Rules or Guidance”

Just take a moment to think about that, just as you would take a moment to ponder a clever detail in a painting or a poem.

And then you have the happy realisation that this could be said by almost any person facing any sanction at any time.

I did not wrong, the accused person could say, because I was not informed or warned that what I was doing was wrong.

Of course, Johnson like the rest of us during the pandemic were expected to know the rules and guidance for themselves – and. if not, we could always listen to the then prime minister Boris Johnson at one of his press conferences telling us about the rules and guidance.

There are many, many more such sentences.

This masterwork of a submission, full of artificial beauty, should not just be a submission to some parliamentary committee.

It should also be submitted to the Turner Prize.

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Will this submission serve the interests of the greased piglet?

Will it help him in anyway?

Will he be, with one leap, be free from serious sanction – again?

This submission shows how such an escape can happen – as long as you do not take it seriously as an actual defence.

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Ten thousand greased piglets

20th March 2023

This may be quite the moment for the interplay of politics and process.

We have this week the former prime minister Boris Johnson facing detailed questions before the privileges committee.

We also have the deputy prime minister and lord chancellor Dominic Raab facing the outcome of an inquiry conducted by a senior barrister.

We have rumours that former president Donald Trump is about to be arrested.

And last week we even had an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin.

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These are not equally momentous, but they do have two things in common.

First, each of these are examples of politicians being held to account but not in any usual way: each is unusual.

The nearest to a normal political process is Johnson being examined by fellow members of parliament before a parliamentary committee: but he may have to evidence on oath, and the story of this inquiry is already packed with legal and media attacks and manoeuvring.

The inquiry into Raab is also not formally legalistic – but it is lawyer- and evidence-driven.

While Trump and Putin may face formal judicial proceedings.

Second, each of these processes features a mode of evidence-based questioning or inquiry that is structured so that the probing is difficult to evade or ignore.

And this is because politicians are adept at evading or ignoring questions.

In other words: politicians are good at not being accountable – that is, literally, at not giving an account of what they have done.

Normal political processes of accountability have in each of the examples failed – or in the case of Putin, never really existed.

And so resort is being made to forms of questioning and inquiry that are harder to evade or ignore.

Some may think that a law and policy blogger would applaud this: for at last there will be hard examinations that cannot easily be deflected.

But, no.

And this is because legal and political processes should be distinct and separate.

Instead of this being a triumph of the forensic method, it is a failure of the political method.

This is not a good thing.

Every lurch towards extreme parliamentary processes (Johnson), non-parliamentary processes (Raab), and judicial processes (Trump, Putin) is an implicit admission of the failure of political processes to check and balance those with political power.

Yes, some of these events may end up with striking political theatre.

And it may well be that such formal processes are the only way to deal with politicians who share the famous description of Johnson as a “greased piglet”.

But this shift is not a good thing on scale.

For soon we may go from a handful of greased piglets to hundreds if not thousands, with normal forms of accountability finally being accepted as redundant.

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Whitehall is the new Brussels – and Westminster is as weak as ever

15th March 2023

There are many things which were not true about Brexit.

Brexit was never going to be quick and easy: indeed, we were still this year re-negotiating the exit deal.

Brexit was never going to lead to a rush of new free trade deals.

Brexit was never going to make it easier for the United Kingdom to control its borders.And Brexit was not about reclaiming sovereignty: we had sovereignty all along, and that is how we were able to make the Article 50 notification.

But the untruth about Brexit which perhaps is the most irksome from a law and policy perspective is that it was about the Westminster parliament (re)gaining power from Brussels.

For what has happened instead is that Whitehall – that is ministers and civil servants – used Brexit as a pretext for its own power-grab.

There is a version of Brexit – unrealistic, of course – where parliament is given maximum powers over new trade deals and where parliament decides on a case-by-case basis which of the retained European Union laws it keeps or replaces.

A Brexit which was used to empower Westminster and our democracy.

In some ways – and this will annoy some of you – that would not have been a bad Brexit.

But the rhetoric of “taking back control” instead cloaked an increase in discretionary and unaccountable power by the government.

The Westminster parliament seems as powerless as ever against the executive.

Whitehall has become the new Brussels.

And we may have to “take back control” all over again.

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What the judge said and did not say at the Just Stop Oil hearing, and what the judge should and should not have said

22nd February 2023

The from-court sensation last week was not about something in the High Court, the Old Bailey or any of the other august courts of the English capital, but about what happened at a hearing at Wolverhampton Magistrates’ Court.

It was a legal case that involved no great issue of law, and indeed there seems no dispute about the applicable law or even its application.

The sensation was not the result of sensational news reporting from an intrepid news reporter, for there seems to have been no media present at the hearing.

And there does not seem to have been any miscarriage of justice, and the findings of guilt and acquittals seem not to have been wrong on the available facts.

But there was a sensation, all the same.

Tweets went viral, with one tweet on the hearing recording 1.4 million views.

The case was taken up by the national press, and pundits were emphatic in their support or opposition to what happened.

A former home secretary said this:

And, from the opposing perspective, a well-known Canadian campaigner said this:

And all this for case in a local magistrates’ court, with no great issue of law, no obvious miscarriages of justice, and it seems no news reporters present to record what happened.

Regardless of the substance of what happened, it is an example of what happens when the legal system and modern social media (and after a lag, mainstream media) meet.

So what did happen at that hearing at Wolverhampton Magistrates’ Court?

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The straight answer is that we perhaps cannot be certain absolutely what happened, as accounts differ, and there seems to have been no recording of the hearing.

But what we can work out is as follows.

We are told there were nine defendants.

(There is a reason for the “We are told” choice-of-words, as will become apparent.)

We are also told the offence was aggravated trespass, which is an offence under section 68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994:

The Crown Prosecution Service guidance on the offence is as follows:

The prosecutions were in respect of this incident from April 2022, as reported by the local news Express & Star:

According to that news report:

“Around 30 protesters from the Just Stop Oil coalition, including two on the roof of a petrol tanker, blocked the exit and entrance to the Esso fuel terminal in Wood Lane, Tyburn, Birmingham.

“Members of the group called Just Stop Oil said it had blocked a number of “key oil” terminals, including the site in Tyburn, Birmingham.

“Police warned of delays as ExxonMobil UK, one of the country’s largest privately-owned underground oil pipeline distribution networks, confirmed demonstrations were under way at some of its sites. It said it had shut down three of its sites.”

The Birmingham Evening Mail reported:

“A protester was carried away by five police officers during a new blockade at a Birmingham fuel terminal.

“Activists from Just Stop Oil again blocked access to the Esso site in Tyburn today, Sunday, April 3, despite more than 100 arrests across the country this week. A police cordon was in place in Wood Lane, where officers had been stationed since 7.30am. West Midlands Fire Service was also in attendance.”

Two days before, the Birmingham Evening Mail reported:

“A Just Stop Oil protester glued his hands and bare feet to the road during a nine-hour protest in Birmingham. Others have glued themselves to each other.

“Up to 45 protesters have been disrupting oil tankers heading in and out of the Esso Fuel Terminal on Wood Lane, Tyburn, near Erdington, since 4am today, Friday, April 1.”

The “Just Stop Oil” group behind the protests published this release at the time:

“For the third day in a row, supporters of Just Stop Oil have disrupted oil supplies from 7 critical oil facilities near London and Birmingham in support of their demand to the UK government to end new oil and gas projects in the UK.

“Early this morning people climbed on and blocked oil tankers at 5 critical oil terminals. A few have entered the loading bay at Buncefield oil terminal in Hertfordshire and are standing on oil tankers holding banners.

“At Kingsbury, Midlands and Esso terminals in Birmingham oil tankers have been prevented from leaving by people sitting in the road.”

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From the contemporaneous news reports and the contemporaneous Just Stop Oil press release there can be no doubt that (a) disruption was caused and (b) disruption was intended to be caused.

As such, anyone who caused the disruption and intended to cause the disruption could have no serious defence to a charge of causing and intending to cause the disruption.

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And so from the protest last April, a prosecution was brought this month at Wolverhampton Magistrates’ Court.

We are told that that the hearing involved cross-examination, and that evidence was put in by the defendants.

This would mean that notwithstanding the openly expressed intention by Just Stop Oil to cause disruption, and the evidence of the disruption caused, the defendants pleaded not guilty.  This would also accord with two of the defendants being acquitted.

Seven of the defendants were however found guilty.

The judge – District Judge Wilkinson – said some things.

And this is when things become less certain.

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A judge can say various things during a hearing – indeed, no one is usually in a position to tell them to shut up.

A judge making any significant decision will usually give reasons.

A judge imposing a sentence will give what are called “sentencing remarks” – which, in some national-profile cases are collected and published by the Judicial Office (previous examples are here).

But when a judge acquits they may also give reasons.

And sometimes what a judge says is set out in a prepared script, sometimes it is based on notes, and sometimes a judge may speak without notes.

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After the hearing, the Just Stop Oil published a press release:

This was quite the headline, given that there were seven defendants found guilty.

The press release also contained what it called a “summation” – which is not a legal term for anything a judge says – and this “summation” is quoted as if it was verbatim:

“It’s abundantly clear that you are all good people. You are intelligent, articulate and a pleasure to deal with. It’s unarguable that man-made global warming is real and we are facing a climate emergency. Your aims are admirable and it is accepted by me and the Crown Prosecution Service that your views are reasonable and genuinely held. Your fears are ably and genuinely articulated and are supported by the science.

“When the United Nations Secretary General gives a speech saying that the activity of fossil fuel companies is incompatible with human survival, we should all be very aware of the need for change. Millions of people, and I do not dispute that it may be as many as 1 billion people, will be displaced as a result of climate change.

“No-one can criticise your motivations. You all gave evidence that was deeply moving. I certainly was moved. The tragedy is that good people have felt so much, without hope, that you feel you have to come into conflict with the criminal justice system.

“Thank you for opening my eyes to certain things. Most, I was acutely and depressingly aware of, but there were certain things.

“I say this and I mean this sadly, I have to convict you. You are good people and I will not issue a punitive sentence. Your arrests and loss of good character are sufficient. Good people doing the wrong thing cannot make the wrong thing right. I don’t say this, ever, but it has been a pleasure dealing with you.

“You should feel guilty for nothing. You should feel proud that you care, have concern for the future. I urge you not to break the law again. Good luck to all of you.”

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It was the screenshot of this “summation” that went viral.

And, as you can see, it is the last of the paragraphs quoted which provided the headline to the press release.

The impression of that last paragraph (given the “you” in the prior I have to convict you…”) is that the judge’s remark that “You should feel guilty for nothing” is addressed to all the defendants.

But that final remark is no more striking than the rest of the quoted text.

Did a judge really say all these things to defendants in a criminal case?

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When I saw the viral tweets I did nothing to promote or amplify them.

In fifteen years of legal commentary I have learned that when a judge is reported to have said something sensational – especially if it accords with your world-view – it is better to wait for it to be verified before congratulating or castigating the legal system.

But pretty soon these viral judicial remarks prompted an equal and opposite reaction.  The Daily Telegraph reported:

The news report continued:

“But on Friday afternoon, the Judicial Office, which represents judges, admonished the group for “misquoting” the judge. […]

“In a rare intervention, the body accused them of taking a phrase “out of context” and issued an almost entirely different account, saying it was “what the judge actually said”

“[…] the Judicial Office said: “It was said to one of the defendants who in his evidence had said (through tears) that he felt guilty for not doing enough to save the planet for his daughter.”

(The judge’s statement was also posted on the Crimeline site, though inadvertently incorrectly titled as “full” sentencing remarks.)

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An “almost entirely different account”?

This was becoming fascinating.

So far in this post I have relied on the Just Stop Oil press release for the from-court facts – hence the “We are told” formulation above – but the facts stated above – charges, number of defendants, disposals – do not seem to be controversial, or indeed controverted.

But now we have an alternative version of what happened.

The Judicial Office had contacted the judge, who provided his own note of what was said.

The judge’s note was:

“As a judge my overriding duty is always to uphold the law without fear or favour.

“This is not a court of morals it is a court of law, if I allow my own moral compass or political beliefs to influence my decisions and ignore the law where it is convenient to me to do so then the court becomes one where the rule of law no longer applies.

“If judges across the criminal justice system did the same then there would be no consistency and no respect for the law, decisions based on the personal beliefs of members of the judiciary cannot be consistent with the rule of law and the ideal that each law will apply to all equally.

“Trust in the rule of law is an essential ingredient of society and it will erode swiftly if judges make politically or morally motivated decisions that do not accord with established legal principles. Indeed I would become the self appointed sheriff if I acted in such a way.

“It is abundantly clear that you are all good people, intelligent and articulate and you have been a pleasure throughout to deal with. It is unarguable that man made global warming is real and that we are facing a climate crisis. That is accepted and recognised by the scientific community and most governments (including our own).

“Your aims are to slow or even stop the advance of global warming and therefore to preserve the planet not just for generations to come but for existing generations. No one can therefore criticize your motivations and indeed each of you has spoken individually about your own personal experiences, motivations and actions.

“Many of your explanations for your actions were deeply emotive and I am sure all listening were moved by them, I know I was. In simple terms you are good people with admirable aims.

“However if good people with the right motivation do the wrong thing it can never make that wrong thing right, it can only ever act as substantial mitigation.”

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The Judicial Office also told reporters by email on Friday last week:

“The judge in the case pointed out that Just Stop Oil have have misquoted him and put in words he never spoke. He has sent [us] the text of what he actually said below.

“They have also quoted the line, “You should feel guilty for nothing” out of context. It was said to one of the defendants who in his evidence had said (through tears) that he felt guilty for not doing enough to save the planet for his daughter. It was not in the context that the seven convicted should feel guilty for nothing which would make no sense at all in the context of the judge having convicted them.”

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I asked the Judicial Office whether the judge’s note was read out verbatum in court – or it it was just the basis of what was said in court.  I also asked for confirmation that the note was not prepared after the hearing.

I was told the following:

“[these] were words that the judge had prepared before sentencing and were said verbatim.  He made some other comments as part of his sentencing but these were based on notes he made in advance but were not delivered verbatim.  As there is no recording or transcript made of proceedings in the magistrate court and in the absence of fully written sentencing remarks, this was the best [we] could provide at short notice in terms of what the judge had said in his own words.”

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If you compare and contrast the two statements – what Just Stop Oil said and what the judge said through the Judicial Office – there are three main points of comparison and contrast.

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The first part of the judge’s comments are not in the Just Stop Oil press release, and they are a statement of general principle.  As my fellow legal blogger Matthew Scott avers, “As an abstract statement of principle that could not have been put better.”

But as Scott also correctly observes, these remarks expressly introduce a tension between “politically or morally motivated decisions” and “established legal principles”.

As such, these prefatory remarks do not really help the judge against criticism – and they do not really change the framing of what then follows.

Yes, these general remarks provide a context – but they do not render what then follows as out of context.

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If we now jump to the end of the comments, and to the Judicial Office email, the judge, however, has a good point.

The “you should feel guilty for nothing” remark appears not to have been directed at all the defendants, but to only one and in a specific situation.

Just Stop Oil accepted this, and they amended part of their press release accordingly – though this was too late for the viral tweets.

Just Stop Oil, however, have not amended the sensational title of their press release, which still gives the impression that the statement was said to all the defendants:

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As for the middle part of the text, there is little substantial difference between the two accounts.

Other than the paragraph “When the United Nations Secretary General gives a speech saying that the activity of fossil fuel companies is incompatible with human survival, we should all be very aware of the need for change. Millions of people, and I do not dispute that it may be as many as 1 billion people, will be displaced as a result of climate change.” – which seems an unlikely frolic for a judge to have gone on in sentencing remarks – all the other comments attributed to him seem to have counterparts in the Just Stop Oil account.

In my view, the differences can be accounted for by brief notes being reconstructed after the event into prose.

Of course, Just Stop Oil should not have presented such reconstructed comments as being verbatim.  But it is a strain to say that their version of what was said is an “entirely different account”.

Indeed, had it matched the judge’s own notes exactly, it would look as if they had secretly recorded the judge.

I asked Just Stop Oil to explain how they put their version together. They said:

“We have notes from a defendant in court who cross checked them with others that were there and also notes from the defence lawyer […] who acted for one of the defendants.
“We corrected the press release when we became aware via Crimeline that one of the remarks was said to an individual defendant and we had taken it out of context.
“We have not received any communication from the judicial office and there appears to be nothing on the website so we’re slightly bemused by the framing in some of the media articles that suggests that we had some kind of official rebuke.
“We have not seen the information that was given to the press in its entirety but it is obvious that the Crimeline account stops short before the remarks around sentencing (since it contains no information about the sentences that were handed down).
“From looking at [lawyer’s] notes we can see that several of the remarks we have reported were made after sentences were pronounced.”
So it does appear the supposed verbatim press release was reconstructed – and that the statements were not said all at the same time.

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Which leaves the final question: was it right for the judge to say such things – regardless of the reported sequencing?

Here, we should rely on the judge’s own account of what he said.

Judges’ comments when sentencing are not a bad thing.

Every court day, up and down the country, criminal judges will say things in what are immediate situations that exhort the defendant to do better in future or admonish the guilty.

At worst, such statements are harmless or futile, and at best, such statements may be beneficial to those being exhorted or admonished, and thereby to society.

Not all sentencing remarks can or should be as impeccable as the ones published on the national judicial website.

But.

Judges can and do say things they should not say.

Here a judge was addressing protesters in respect of a highly publicised incident organised by a highly publicised pressure group.

It was entirely foreseeable that what he said would be publicised.

And even it was not foreseeable, and it was an otherwise unexceptional courtroom on a cold and routine day in Wolverhampton Magistrates’ Court, it was inappropriate for a judge to express such general political sentiments, either in sentencing remarks or otherwise.

As it happens, as someone with politics broadly as green as my surname, the sentiments expressed by the judge would be ones I would like to see expressed more often by politicians.

But imagine a latter-day Judge Pickles or Judge Argyle type judge expressing sentiments in support of what illiberal right-wing protesters had done on some other demonstration.

That would be wrong, and would call the administration of justice into question, and so what the judge in Wolverhampton said was wrong too.

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So, in (ahem) summation: Just Stop Oil erred in the title and content of their press release, and the judge erred more seriously in making the comments in the first place, even accepting his own version of his remarks.

And the real problem, as this blog averred recently, is with the refusal by the courts to provide or allow recordings of what judges say in open court.

There is no good reason for this prohibition, and scarcely even a bad reason – it is just unthinking conservatism.

Perhaps there should be a protest organised against it.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

Due process and ministerial matters

1st February 2023

The working title of this post was something like “Boris Johnson, Nadhim Zahawi, and the creeping judicialisation of ministerial matters” – but that was perhaps too provocative and over-stated, even though it does have an element of truth to it.

One starting point here is that ministers of the crown are appointed, at least in constitutional theory, by the monarch, on the advice of the prime minister.

Another starting point is that parliament is the master of its own procedures, and what happens in parliament cannot be gainsaid by any court.

Both of these things – the hiring and firing of ministers and the affairs of parliament – are firmly in the realm of politics, rather than part of the province of law.

And those commentators and politicians who are hard against things like “judicial activism” and “unelected judges” are usually the most vigilant about judicial intrusions into the realm of politics.

There is a “political constitution” we are told, and it is not the business of judges and lawyers to get involved in what are matters of politics.

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But.

In the recent political matters of, first, Boris Johnson and the privileges committee and then second, the sacking of Nadhim Zahawi we are hearing phrases such as “natural justice” and “due process”.

The contention is that neither parliament nor the prime minister should have unfettered discretion.

There are things parliament and the prime minister cannot do, it is averred, because of the procedural rights of the politician involved.

This blog covered, you may remember, the “legal” advice commissioned by Johnson and his criminal lawyers to the effect that parliament was acting with conspicuous unfairness in its dealings with Johnson, even though it would never be a matter for any court.

This advice, we were told at the time, was “absolutely devastating” but, in fact, it absolutely missed the point.

This weekend just gone saw a similar complaint from supporters of Zahawi:

One response to these protestations is simply to scoff, especially as both Johnson and Zahawi are the sort of politicians who otherwise would criticise lawyers for “getting people off on technicalities”.

(And many such “technicalities” are procedural points, as opposed to substantive points on the merits.)

Like the proverbial “foxhole atheists”, it can be remarked that politicians who otherwise would disdain, if not despise, clever lawyerly tricks seem to have a change of heart about procedural fairness when their own rights are at issue.

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But scoffing alone would be wrong: for it is actually heartening to see due process and procedural fairness being given emphasis in political matters.

Of course, taking due process and procedural fairness seriously does not (necessarily) mean political matters being dragged into the courts.

The prerogatives and privileges of both the crown and of parliament mean that such matters are not justiciable.

And there is the danger of due process being misused.

In particular, there is the problem of prime ministers using inquiries and investigations as the means of not taking decisions which they are supposed to make themselves under our constitutional arrangements.

And there is the problem that, like with the (infamous) wait for the Sue Gray report, inquiries and investigations can be used as an excuse to avoid and evade proper parliamentary scrutiny and political accountability.

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Taking due process and procedural fairness (more) seriously is a welcome development, given the alternative of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.

Yet taking such things seriously means it should not matter whether doing so is politically convenient or not.

Fairness should always a basic value, and not a means to an end.

And so the best way politicians could show us that they do take due process and procedural fairness seriously is not when it is in their own cause, but in the cause of those far less powerful in society whose rights are undermined or disregarded.

For if politicians cared as much about the procedural rights of the less powerful as they do about their own due process rights, then that would show their protests were not just cynical, self-serving expediencies.

No doubt, however, such politicians would shrug off such uneven-handed inconsistency as, well, just a technicality.

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One-and-a-half cheers for the sacking of Nadhim Zahawi – and the calm, lethal prose of Sir Laurie Magnus

30th January 2023

In a summary, three-step form there seems nothing amiss about the sacking of Nadhim Zahawi from the cabinet: (1) he did some things wrong; (2) the things he did wrong were a breach of the Ministerial Code; and (3) he was sacked by the Prime Minister.

Those three steps are what is supposed to happen in these circumstances – and there are recent examples of one or both of the first two of these steps not actually being followed by the third.

But.

This government could not even get this quite right.

In particular: the things which were done wrong were known to the Prime Minister before the publication of the report from the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests which set out the details of the wrongs and how they breached the Ministerial Code.

That said, there is a certain satisfaction from reading the report, with its methodical approach, accumulation of detail, and particularisations of breach.

(Well, apart from the “The General Principles of the Ministerial Code are very clear” – and longer-term followers will know why.)

The report by Sir Laurie Magnus is a fine piece of work, and one can only wonder what other recent ministerial transgressions would look like in such calm, lethal prose.

But it really should not be the job of an adviser, however independent or distinguished, to work out whether a Prime Minister should sack a minister.

There was nothing substantial in the report which the Prime Minister did not already know, or could have known with a due application of diligence.

This out-sourcing of ministerial discretion – which is reminiscent of the Sue Gray report – is a bad thing for accountability of ministers to parliament.

And when done by a Prime Minister is a very bad thing indeed.

So, a single-and-a-half cheer for this report and the sacking.

But not the three cheers that would have followed the Prime Minister doing his job and doing this all for himself.

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The Church of England seems more accountable on the floor of the House of Commons than most government ministers

26th January 2023

Now here is a curious thing.

The Church of England seems more accountable on the floor of the House of Commons than most government ministers.

This week there was an urgent question about the position of the Church of England on same-sex marriages.

And as in England, we have an established church there is a member of parliament charged with answering questions on behalf of the Church of England – from the backbenches:

In contrast to this exercise in parliamentary accountability, we have this week had the Prime Minister refer the Zadawi tax matter to the ethics adviser and the BBC mount an internal investigation into the relationship of its chair with a former Prime Minister.

This is in addition to the King’s Counsel looking at allegations against the Lord Chancellor.

There are various other inquiries and investigations, some now almost-forgotten.

And the thing is about these inquiries and investigations is that they are often exercises in political deflection and delay – deft manoeuvres so that there is no actual practical accountability of ministers, at least not immediately.

The consequence is that we are now in the extraordinary situation where the bishops of the Church of England are generally more accountable to members of parliament than the ministers of the crown.

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This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

Nadhim Zahawi, his lawyers, and a blogger

18th January 2023

There is a certain intellectual satisfaction to be had from watching an investigation done well – especially if you have watched it unfold in real time.

The work of tax lawyer and blogger Dan Neidle (who I know) on the remarkable matter of the tax affairs of Nadhim Zahawi is to be savoured.

Click on this link and read the chronology of how Neidle went step-by-step from the moment he thought something here just was not right.

(I remember in prehistoric times, when I had the same moment in the Nightjack and the Saudi prisons contract stories.)

I am not a tax lawyer, but I do know a bit about media law, and from that perspective I would like to add a couple of points about this story.

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There is nothing wrong, in principle, with any person asserting their legal rights – in defamation or anything else – if their legal rights are being infringed.

And so, until and unless the law of defamation is abolished, Zahawi and anybody else – including you – can seek to defend their – your – rights.

The problem here is not that there were libel letters, but that Zahawi’s legal strategy was flawed to begin with.

And so, faced with someone who knew what they were doing, the legal strategy first had to keep changing, before falling apart.

Moreover, lawyers’ letters can often be more revealing in what they do not say, rather than what they do say – and, if read carefully, even the most robust-seeming lawyers’ letter can expose the weakness of the position of a hapless client.

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We do not know the extent to which Zahawi’s lawyers were acting under instruction – and although lawyers can advise, it is always the client who decides.

(That said, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority was absolutely right to remind the lawyers involved that legal correspondence should not be abused.)

And the wise litigation lawyer will already know that heading a letter “Not For Publication” can be often a triumph of hope over experience, especially when dealing with bloggers.

The aggressive legal strategy would have to have been approved by Zadawi.

And so the fault for Zahawi’s botched legal strategy must ultimately be with Zahawi.

He no doubt went to his lawyers instructing them to get the problem to go away, but by doing so, he made his own position far worse.

The gaps in the aggressive legal letters were telling, and they would have been better unsent.

The legal strategy adopted by Zahawi is as much a misjudgment as anything else in this matter.

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The fate of Zahawi is now in the realm of politics, not law.

He may survive, and the political circus may move on.

But whatever happens, the elegant and thorough blogging of Neidle will stand as an outstanding example of what can be done, over time, when an investigation is done well.

Bravo.

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This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

New Essay at Substack: Perhaps the most significant UK constitutional case of the last fifty years

6th January 2023

Over at my new law and lore Substack, I have published an essay for paying subscribers on how the Malone case of 1979-1985 exposed the lie of our supposedly liberal constitution and changed the way we were governed.

The essay starts as follows:

Consider this simple, attractive proposition: in the United Kingdom, you are free to do as you will, unless there is a law against it.

What could be wrong with such a nice proposition: it is almost a perfect articulation of principled liberalism.

But.

This proposition can have a hidden and ugly implication.

For it also can mean that the State can do as it wishes, to you and other people, unless there is a law against it.

And the case which exposed this unpleasant truth – and helped put an end to it, so that the State was required to have a legal basis for interfering with our lives – is the 1979-85 case of Malone.

This is the story of that case, and of its effects.

You can read the rest of the essay with a paid subscription here.

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This essay is also being posted on Patreon for those who subscribe to this blog using that medium.

For those who subscribe and donate through either Patreon or PayPal, please leave a “PRIVATE” comment below confirming you want me to add your email address to the Substack system so you can have a one-year complementary subscription to the law and lore Substack.

It is important that nobody pays “twice” for my content.