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Recent Posts

  • A close reading of the “AI” fake cases judgment 9th May 2025
  • How the Trump administration’s “shock and awe” approach has resulted in its litigation being shockingly awful 22nd April 2025
  • How the United States constitutional crisis is intensifying 17th April 2025
  • A note about injunctions in the context of the Abrego Garcia case 14th April 2025
  • How Trump is misusing emergency powers in his tariffs policy 10th April 2025
  • How Trump’s tariffs can be a Force Majeure event for some contracts 7th April 2025
  • The significance of the Wisconsin court election result 2nd April 2025
  • “But what if…?” – constitutional commentary in an age of anxiety 31st March 2025
  • A significant defeat for the Trump government in the federal court of appeal 27th March 2025
  • Reckoning the legal and practical significance of the United States deportations case 25th March 2025
  • Making sense of the Trump-Roberts exchange about impeachment 19th March 2025
  • Understanding what went on in court yesterday in the US deportations case 18th March 2025
  • “Oopsie” – the word that means the United States has now tipped into a constitutional crisis 17th March 2025
  • Oh Canada 16th March 2025
  • Thinking about a revolution 5th March 2025
  • The fog of lawlessness: what we can see – and what we cannot see – in the current confusions in the United States 25th February 2025
  • The president who believes himself a king 23rd February 2025
  • Making sense of what is happening in the United States 18th February 2025
  • The paradox of the Billionaires saying that Court Orders have no value, for without Court Orders there could not be Billionaires 11th February 2025
  • Why Donald Trump is not really “transactional” but anti-transactional 4th February 2025
  • From constitutional drama to constitutional crisis? 1st February 2025
  • Solving the puzzle of why the case of Prince Harry and Lord Watson against News Group Newspapers came to its sudden end 25th January 2025
  • Looking critically at Trump’s flurry of Executive Orders: why we should watch what is done, and not to be distracted by what is said 21st January 2025
  • A third and final post about the ‘Lettuce before Action’ of Elizabeth Truss 18th January 2025
  • Why the Truss “lettuce before action” is worse than you thought – and it has a worrying implication for free speech 17th January 2025
  • Of Indictments and Impeachments, and of Donald Trump – two similar words for two distinct things 16th January 2025
  • Why did the DoJ prosecution of Trump run out of time? 14th January 2025
  • Spiteful governments and simple contract law, a weak threatening letter, and a warning of a regulatory battle ahead 13th January 2025
  • A close look at Truss’s legal threat to Starmer – a glorious but seemingly hopeless cease-and-desist letter 9th January 2025
  • How the lore of New Year defeated the law of New Year – how the English state gave up on insisting the new year started on 25 March 1st January 2025
  • Some of President Carter’s judges can still judge, 44 years later – and so we can see how long Trump’s new nominees will be on the bench 31st December 2024
  • “Twelfth Night Till Candlemas” – the story of a forty-year book-quest and of its remarkable ending 20th December 2024
  • An argument about Assisting Dying – matters of life and death need to be properly regulated by law, and not by official discretion 28th November 2024
  • The illiberalism yet to come: two things not to do, and one thing to do – suggestions on how to avoid mental and emotional exhaustion 18th November 2024
  • New stories for old – making sense of a political-constitutional rupture 14th November 2024
  • The shapes of things to come – some thoughts and speculations on the possibilities of what can happen next 8th November 2024
  • A postcard from the day after an election: capturing a further political-constitutional moment 6th November 2024
  • A postcard from the day of an election – capturing a political-constitutional moment 5th November 2024
  • “…as a matter of law, the house is haunted” – a quick Hallowe’en post about law and lore 31st October 2024
  • Prisons and prisons-of-the-mind – how the biggest barrier to prisons reform is public opinion 28th October 2024
  • A blow against the “alternative remedies” excuse: the UK Supreme Court makes it far harder for regulators to avoid performing their public law duties 22nd October 2024
  • What explains the timing and manner of the Chagos Islands sovereignty deal? 20th October 2024
  • Happy birthday, Supreme Court: the fifteenth anniversary of the United Kingdom’s highest court 1st October 2024
  • Words on the screen – the rise and (relative) fall of text-based social media: why journalists and lawyers on social media may not feel so special again 30th September 2024
  • Political accountability vs policy accountability: how our system of politics and government is geared to avoid or evade accountability for policy 24th September 2024
  • On writing – and not writing – about miscarriages of justice 23rd September 2024
  • Miscarriages of Justice: the Oliver Campbell case 21st September 2024
  • How Taylor Swift’s endorsement of Harris and Walz is a masterpiece of persuasive prose: a songwriter’s practical lesson in written advocacy 11th September 2024
  • Supporting Donald Trump is too much for Richard Cheney 7th September 2024
  • A miscarriage of justice is normally a systems failure, and not because of any conspiracy – the cock-up theory usually explains when things go wrong 30th August 2024
  • Update – what is coming up. 29th August 2024
  • Shamima Begum – and ‘de jure’ vs ‘de facto’ statelessness 21st August 2024
  • Lucy Letby and miscarriages of justice: some words of caution on why we should always be alert to the possibilities of miscarriages of justice 19th August 2024
  • This week’s skirmish between the European Commission and X 17th August 2024
  • What Elon Musk perhaps gets wrong about civil wars being ‘inevitable’ – It is in the nature of civil wars that they are not often predictable 7th August 2024
  • How the criminal justice system deals with a riot 5th August 2024
  • The Lucy Letby case: some thoughts and observations: what should happen when a defence does not put in their own expert evidence (for good reason or bad)? 26th July 2024
  • And out the other side? The possible return of serious people doing serious things in law and policy 10th July 2024
  • What if a parliamentary candidate did not exist? The latest odd constitutional law question which nobody has really thought of asking before 9th July 2024
  • The task before James Timpson: the significance of this welcome appointment – and two of the obstacles that he needs to overcome 8th July 2024
  • How the Met police may be erring in its political insider betting investigation – and why we should be wary of extending “misconduct of public office” to parliamentary matters, even in nod-along cases 28th June 2024
  • What you need to know about commercial regulation, in the sports sector and elsewhere – for there is compliance and there is “compliance” 25th June 2024
  • Seven changes for a better constitution? Some interesting proposals from some good people. 24th June 2024
  • The wrong gong 22nd June 2024
  • The public service of an “Enemy of the People” 22nd June 2024
  • Of majorities and “super-majorities” 21st June 2024
  • The strange omission in the Conservative manifesto: why is there no commitment to repeal the Human Rights Act? 12th June 2024
  • The predicted governing party implosion in historical and constitutional context 11th June 2024
  • Donald Trump is convicted – but it is now the judicial system that may need a good defence strategy 1st June 2024
  • The unwelcome weaponisation of police complaints as part of ordinary politics 31st May 2024
  • Thoughts on the calling of a general election – and on whether our constitutional excitements are coming to an end 29th May 2024
  • Another inquiry report, another massive public policy failure revealed 21st May 2024
  • On how regulating the media is hard – if not impossible – and on why reviving the Leveson Inquiry may not be the best basis for seeing what regulations are now needed 4th May 2024
  • Trump’s case – a view from an English legal perspective 24th April 2024
  • Law and lore, and state failure – the quiet collapse of the county court system in England and Wales 22nd April 2024
  • How the civil justice system forced Hugh Grant to settle – and why an alternative to that system is difficult to conceive 17th April 2024
  • Unpacking the remarkable witness statement of Johnny Mercer – a closer look at the extraordinary evidence put before the Afghan war crimes tribunal 25th March 2024
  • The curious incident of the Afghanistan war crimes statutory inquiry being set up 21st March 2024
  • A close look at the Donelan libel settlement: how did a minister make her department feel exposed to expensive legal liability? 8th March 2024
  • A close look at the law and policy of holding a Northern Ireland border poll – and how the law may shape what will be an essentially political decision 10th February 2024
  • How the government is seeking to change the law on Rwanda so as to disregard the facts 30th January 2024
  • How the next general election in the United Kingdom is now less than a year away 29th January 2024
  • Could the Post Office sue its own former directors and advisers regarding the Horizon scandal? 16th January 2024
  • How the legal system made it so easy for the Post Office to destroy the lives of the sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses – and how the legal system then made it so hard for them to obtain justice 12th January 2024
  • The coming year: how the parameters of the constitution will shape the politics of 2024 1st January 2024
  • The coming constitutional excitements in the United States 31st December 2023
  • What is often left unsaid in complaints about pesky human rights law and pesky human rights lawyers 15th December 2023
  • A role-reversal? – a footnote to yesterday’s post 1st December 2023
  • The three elements of the Rwanda judgment that show how the United Kingdom government is now boxed in 30th November 2023
  • On yesterday’s Supreme Court judgment on the Rwanda policy 16th November 2023
  • The courts have already deflated the Rwanda policy, regardless of the Supreme Court judgment next Wednesday 10th November 2023
  • The extraordinary newspaper column of the Home Secretary – and its implications 9th November 2023
  • Drafts of history – how the Covid Inquiry, like the Leveson Inquiry, is securing evidence for historians that would otherwise be lost 1st November 2023
  • Proportionality is an incomplete legal concept 25th October 2023
  • Commissioner Breton writes a letter: a post in praise of the one-page formal document 11th October 2023
  • “Computer says guilty” – an introduction to the evidential presumption that computers are operating correctly 30th September 2023
  • COMING UP 23rd September 2023
  • Whatever happened to ‘the best-governed city in the world’? – some footnotes to the article at Prospect on the Birmingham city insolvency 9th September 2023
  • One year on from one thing, sixteen months on from another thing… 8th September 2023
  • What is a section 114 Notice? 7th September 2023
  • Constitutionalism vs constitutionalism – how liberal constitutionalists sometimes misunderstand illiberal constitutionalism 24th August 2023
  • Performative justice and coercion: thinking about coercing convicted defendants to hear their sentences 21st August 2023
  • Of impeachments and indictments – how many of the criminal indictments against Trump are a function of the failure of the impeachment process 15th August 2023
  • A note of caution for those clapping and cheering at the latest indictment of Donald Trump 8th August 2023
  • Witch-hunt (noun) 2nd August 2023

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Category: Uncategorized

Understanding what went on in court yesterday in the US deportations case

18th March 2025

And how government lawyers found out one cannot play “Oopsie” with Equity.

*

On the face of it, the lawyers for the United States federal government in the deportations case had an uncomfortable time in court yesterday.

(Legal commentators following the hearing.)

*

Indeed, it seemed that the government lawyers were desperate for the hearing not go ahead. They applied for the hearing to be vacated, but that motion was denied. They even made an urgent appeal for the judge to be removed from the case, an hour so before the hearing, an appeal which was not met before the hearing.

And at the hearing itself, the government’s lawyers seemed ill-prepared and ill-informed.

In a way, and as someone pointed out on social media, this was odd.

The political-media build-up to the hearing suggested that there was going to be some grand confrontation between a robust government and the activist and/or obstructive courts: a clash of arms.

But what happened did not indicate the government lawyers had any confidence in their case: it was a whimper, and not a bang.

If so, what can explain this?

*

The starting point is to understand what the hearing and the case generally is about – and what is currently at stake.

The United States government wanted to deport foreign nationals to a third party state.

The (supposed) legal basis for this is this proclamation (no less) of 15th March 2025 from the President of the United States, which in turn cites the Alien Enemies Act of (no less) 1798.

This triggered immediate litigation on behalf of those who could be affected.

(The docket of available court documents is here.)

And so the same day of the proclamation, a federal court made this interim order (a “Temporary Restraining Order”):

MINUTE ORDER: The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs' Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Given the exigent circumstances that it has been made aware of this morning, it has determined that an immediate Order is warranted to maintain the status quo until a hearing can be set. As Plaintiffs have satisfied the four factors governing the issuance of preliminary relief, the Court accordingly ORDERS that: 1) Plaintiffs' 3 Motion for TRO is GRANTED; 2) Defendants shall not remove any of the individual Plaintiffs from the United States for 14 days absent further Order of the Court; and 3) The parties shall appear for a Zoom hearing on March 17, 2025, at 4:00 p.m. The hearing will proceed by videoconference for the parties and by telephone for members of the public. Toll free number: 833-990-9400. Meeting ID: 049550816. So ORDERED by Chief Judge James E. Boasberg on 3/15/2025. (lcjeb1) Modified to add public access line on 3/15/2025 (znbn). Order on Motion for TRO

The order was made by the chief judge Boasberg of the District of Columbia federal court.

You will see the written order includes the injunction that “Defendants shall not remove any of the individual Plaintiffs from the United States for 14 days absent further Order of the Court”.

This written injunction was supplemented by this oral command from the judge (copied from here, emphasis added):

“[T]hat you shall inform your clients of this immediately, and that any plane containing these folks that is going to take off or is in the air needs to be returned to the United States, but those people need to be returned to the United States. However that’s accomplished, whether turning around a plane or not embarking anyone on the plane or those people covered by this on the plane, I leave to you. But this is something that you need to make sure is complied with immediately.”

There is no doubt that this was an oral command from the judge, and it would also seem that is an express order of the court.

The plaintiffs in this case certainly believe it to be an order of the court:

“That oral Order of course carries no less weight than the Court’s written Order.”

But this is one of the many things contested by the federal government. They contend, among other things, that because it was not contained in the minuted Order quoted above, it did not bind the government.

As one person reported from yesterday’s hearing, the judge is somewhat unimpressed with this contention:

*

I am not an American lawyer, but it would seem to me from an English law perspective that it was at least necessarily implicit in the minuted Order that any planes should be turned round – and that the terms of of the minuted Order should be constructed and interpreted accordingly.

And this is distinct from the point as to whether an oral command from the bench itself constituted an Order of the court (which is a point of American law on which I am not able to offer a firm view).

(In England and Wales, the general position is that an order given by a judge in court has effect from the date it is made, regardless of when it is recorded and sealed: CPR 40.7(1).)

If what was orally commanded by the judge from the bench constitutes an Order, regardless of whether it was minuted (which is the express position of the plaintiffs and the apparent position of the judge), then on the face of it, the United States government breached that Order.

*

The crucial question is thereby binary: did the United States government breach a court Order?

There can only be a yes or no answer to that question.

This crucial question, of course, follows the prior question of whether there was, in fact, an Order.

*

But the crucial question is not whether the judge had the jurisdiction to make the Order.

In the United Kingdom the position across all three of our domestic jurisdictions is that an order of the court binds the government until and unless that order is set aside by the court (or, hypothetically, superseded by legislation).

This was unanimously affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom as recently as 2021 – I wrote about the case recently at Prospect, suspecting the issue was about to become topical.

In essence: governments cannot pick and choose with orders they can comply with.

I understand this is also the position in the United States, which is not surprising.

This means that if the United States government genuinely believed the court was in error in making an order the correct course would have been to either appeal the order or to seek to amend it.

It was not open to the federal government to disregard it because they believed it was made in error.

*

The position of the United States government can perhaps be summarised as follows:

– they complied with the minuted Order;

– they were not obliged to comply with the oral command from the bench, as that was not an Order; and

– in any case, the jurisdiction of the court ceased once the plane was in international airspace.

That third point seems to have been in the minds of those in government – including the Secretary of State – who clapped and giggled at the “Oopsie Too Late” tweet (discussed on this blog yesterday).

A thing cannot really be “Too late” if there was no applicable order to begin with.

The fundamental problem with this “Oopsie Too Late” stance – as it must have then dawned on the United States government – is that the reach of a court order is based on equity, which means in this case that it attaches itself to the defendant regardless of where they are.

The judge is fully aware of this – and those reporting on the hearing yesterday all saw when the judge got out his equity light sabre:

There really can be no answer to this point.

One cannot play “Oopsie” with Equity.

The government lawyers no doubt know that they are likely to lose on this point.

If so, this would explain why the American lawyers are not playing the “Oopsie” game and are attempting to say that there was no applicable Order to begin with – or even that national security (ahem) trumps everything.

*

Yesterday’s hearing was, the judge said, about finding out information.

The plaintiffs listed the questions as follows:

This was information the government did not want to give.

The judge yesterday could have “thrown the book” at the defendant lawyers for refusing to provide this information – and issued sanctions there and then.

But he was wise not to do so – as sanctions imposed in haste often can be appealed with ease.

The judge instead has ordered that the answers be provided later today – or a reason given for the answers not to be given:

 

The judge is an experienced chief justice and he can sit in camera to hear sensitive information. If so, the national security excuse will not work for the government.

The judge also – sensibly – has insisted that the reasons be given as sworn statements.

Those who remember the Brexit litigation here in the United Kingdom will recall that Boris Johnson’s prorogation case fell apart when no minister or official would, on pain of perjury, set out in a sworn witness statement the true reasons for the prorogation.

Sworn statements are never to be given lightly: they concentrate the mind wonderfully.

*

Overall, there are two explanations for why the American government lawyers had a bad day in court yesterday.

The first is that what they did is all part of some grand knavish strategy: delay, obstruct, appeal, hinder the court, so that any final judgment or order or sanction is put back and back until it does not matter anymore.

This may well be true – and it is certainly a strategy that has worked on other cases for this President.

But there is also a second possible explanation.

That the legal side of things were not integrated into the initial decision-making for the deportations – and that the lawyers were then told to find some defence, any defence.

And the lawyers know there may be no defence to what has happened. If so, that would certainly explain their desperate attempts to avoid any hearing.

(And as reply guys will no doubt say, there could be a mixture of the two!)

But what does not explain what happened in court yesterday is any robust confrontational approach, a rousing call to arms against the judges.

Perhaps that will now come. Perhaps this case will now get politically weaponised.

But the impression so far is that the federal government has not really thought through their legal strategy – and that their lawyers do not know what to do.

*

“The truth is, these are not very bright guys, and things got out of hand.”

~ All the President’s Men

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

Posted on 18th March 202518th March 2025Categories Uncategorized14 Comments on Understanding what went on in court yesterday in the US deportations case

The wrong gong

22nd June 2024

In my post earlier today on Lord Etherton I confused the Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George for the Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire.

I got the gong wrong, and I apologise.

Posted on 22nd June 2024Categories Uncategorized2 Comments on The wrong gong

COMING UP

I have been working on two longer posts, which should be up in the next few days.

One is on the Post Office miscarriage of justice: in particular, the legal rule that computers are presumed to be operating correctly.

The other is on the case of Roberts v Hopwood, where it would seem the House of Lords held it was unlawful for a council to pay its workers equally.

Posted on 23rd September 2023Categories Uncategorized5 Comments on COMING UP

TOMORROW – a detailed explanation of the government’s judicial review of the Covid Inquiry – and why this judicial review is so significant

7th June 2023

I have finished a 4000-word monster post, you lucky people.

It will be posted tomorrow morning.

Posted on 7th June 2023Categories Uncategorized3 Comments on TOMORROW – a detailed explanation of the government’s judicial review of the Covid Inquiry – and why this judicial review is so significant

Understanding Boris Johnson’s difficulty with the Cabinet Office lawyers – and why it may have wider implications

29th May 2023

Boris Johnson is not happy with the Cabinet Office – and one suspects few will be sympathetic to the former Prime Minister.

But does he, for once, have a point?

Does he, in this particular instance, have any cause for complaint?

Johnson’s grievance is in respect to the referral by the Cabinet Office of certain matters to the police – that is, to the Metropolitan police in respect of what may have happened in Downing Street, and to the Thames Valley police in respect of what may have happened at Chequers, the country residence used by the Prime Minister.

And there is no doubt that Johnson is not happy.  According to a weekend news report:

“When Johnson found out what had happened he was in the United States, a visit that culminated in dinner with Donald Trump last Thursday.

“He and his team were first confused, then apoplectic, then called in new lawyers.

“‘Boris is absolutely furious,’ said one of those in touch with him last week. ‘He was completely flabbergasted and he suspects foul play. He has been spitting feathers. He feels his reputation has been unfairly trashed.'”.

“Apoplectic” is a strong word.

What was the cause of this apoplexy?

*

“Apoplexy (noun): A malady, very sudden in its attack, which arrests more or less completely the powers of sense and motion […]”

– Oxford English Dictionary

*

A good starting point is the nature of the Covid Inquiry itself.

It is a statutory public inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005, and this means the Inquiry has formidable legal powers, including to request documents.

Previous posts on this blog (here and here) have set out these powers and also the background to the current and potentially consequential stand-off between the Inquiry and the Cabinet Office.

What this means, in turn, is that the Cabinet Office has to do its own information-gathering exercise so that it is in a position to disclose documents and other material to the Inquiry (even if there is disagreement as to the scope of that disclosure).

*

Now let us move to the position of Johnson.

A news report last December told us the following:The report went on to explain:

“The taxpayer will be funding legal fees for Boris Johnson and Matt Hancock when they appear at the official inquiry into the Covid pandemic next year […]

“Even though the two men are no longer prime minister and health secretary, the Government is covering the cost of legal representation for all former ministers who were involved in the official response to the pandemic, as well as people currently serving in those posts.”

One key point here is that the Cabinet Office is dealing with the disclosure to the Inquiry relating to Prime Ministers past and present, as well as to other Cabinet Office ministers.

This is because within the government of the United Kingdom there is not any formal “Prime Minister’s Department” other than the Cabinet Office.

*

It is important to note that this issue is distinct from the government paying the legal fees of Johnson in respect of his problems with the House of Commons privileges committee.

That the government is paying the legal fees of Johnson in respect of his problems with the House of Commons privileges committee is actually difficult to justify (as the issue there is in respect of his duties as a parliamentarian rather than directly as a minister).

The payment by the government for the work in respect of a public inquiry is, however, far less controversial – public inquiries into what was done by public bodies can require extensive disclosure exercises with the advice of specialist lawyers, and so it is normal for the government to pay for the work involved.

There is nothing untoward in the government paying the legal costs for all former and current ministers and officials caught up in the work of this Inquiry – and there is certainly a public interest in disclosure and evidence being managed by experienced and specialist lawyers.

*

But.

That the government will (and should) fund the legal work required for former and current ministers and officials that does not necessarily mean that the work should be done by government lawyers.

It should be open to former and current ministers and officials to appoint their own lawyers – especially if it felt there is a conflict of interest.

For example, at the Hutton Inquiry the journalist Susan Watts insisted on separate legal representation, as she believed that there was a conflict of interest with the BBC and this separate representation was reportedly paid for by the BBC.

The extent to which this separate legal representation at inquiries should be funded by the government (or an employer) is not easy to determine.  But there is a good argument that there should be funding for the work of disclosure and the provision of evidence, for that is the legal work required for the public good of the process of the inquiry.

*

Now, let us go back to December last year.

Johnson was presented with a situation where he could have insisted on getting his own legal representation (perhaps at public expense) or going along with the work being both funded and conducted by the Cabinet Office.

The crucial distinction is that if he had appointed his own lawyers they would have had a direct legal and professional obligation to act in his interests, consistent of course with his obligations to the inquiry (and to any court) and under the general law.

At this point, Johnson could – like Watts at the Hutton Inquiry – insisted on having his own lawyers.

But Johnson either made a decision to go with the Cabinet Office lawyers or (more plausibly) avoided making any decision so that the default was that the work would be done by the Cabinet Office lawyers.

And here we come to the crucial point: the Cabinet Office lawyers have no obligations to Johnson.

The “client” of government lawyers is, well, the government.

Government lawyers also have obligations to the inquiry (and to a court) and they have professional obligations as solicitors and barristers.

But they have no duty to former ministers and officials – nor even to current ministers and officials in respect of ministers’ and officials’ private personal capacities.

So when Johnson handed over the documents to the Cabinet Office he, in effect, loss control of those documents.

*

And now we come to another important point: those documents exist, and those documents cannot really be de-invented.

(If those documents had somehow been – ahem – “lost” then that is altogether another legal issue.)

But as the documents exist then the question of disclosure to the Inquiry would have come up at some point – whether it be for the Cabinet Office lawyers or for Johnson’s own lawyers.

The difficulty of what to do with those documents if – and it is an “if” – they contain evidence of wrongdoing would have come up at some point.

Johnson denies that the documents contain any evidence of wrongdoing – and as those documents are not in the public domain, this denial cannot be gainsaid.

Once those documents had been disclosed to the Inquiry even by Johnson’s own lawyers, then this means he and his lawyers would have lost control of the documents at some point.

And depending on what was made of those documents once they were seen by a third party then a referral to the police may have just been a matter of timing.

*

But.

Timing is not everything; there is also the question of fairness.

Did the Cabinet Office act unfairly in referring the documents to the police with no notice to Johnson, so that he could have made representations or sought independent legal advice?

*

According to the detailed Sunday Times news report, the sequence of events was as follows:

16th May – “lawyers for the government legal service, who were helping Johnson to put together his statement for the Covid inquiry, came across entries from his official Downing Street appointments diary, which suggested there had been gatherings in Chequers and No 10 that may have breached the Covid guidelines”

The senior official at the Cabinet Office is then notified.

We are told that the official feels “duty-bound to pass the material to the police” or run the risk of being accused of breaching his obligations under the civil service code of conduct.

18th May – the documents are sent to the police.  The Sunday Times quotes an official as saying:

“The only assessment we did was whether we should pass it to the police. It is a matter for the police to decide whether it constitutes grounds for an investigation. It would have been totally inappropriate to block it. It would also have been inappropriate to inform the former prime minister [Johnson] unless the police were happy for us to do so. On the Friday they said they were content to inform him as a courtesy.”

19th May – the head of propriety and ethics in the Cabinet Office, called Johnson’s office to inform him.

We can supplement the above timeline with this tweet from the government’s former senior legal official Jonathan Jones:

We who haven’t seen the latest Johnson papers (almost the entire world) can’t know if they show law-breaking. But what if they do, and civil service HADN’T referred them to the police?

“Cover up. Bias. Breach of constitutional duty to uphold the law. Failure to follow guidance” https://t.co/bEkGDeYCWE

— Jonathan Jones (@SirJJKC) May 27, 2023

Jones makes a good point: what were the government lawyers to do?

Remember that (a) the documents could not have been de-invented and (b) the documents would have had to have passed to the Inquiry at some point, even if not via the Cabinet Office.  It is therefore only a question of timing until the documents came to public light.

And if – if – the documents contain problematic content then there would be questions about why the documents had not been previously referred to the police.

Jones also helpfully links to the Civil Service guidance:

So maybe that outdated Directory of Civil Service Guidance that everyone had forgotten about (until someone spotted the stuff about contact with the Opposition) turns out to be relevant to the reporting of possible crimes too … pic.twitter.com/k1n5FZ6jPB

— Jonathan Jones (@SirJJKC) May 23, 2023

The guidance he links to is here (though the pdf seems borked for scrolling).

The booklet “Giving Evidence on Information about Suspected Crimes: A Guide for Crown Servants” does not appear to be on the internet.

But the essence of the guidance is simple: if there is evidence of criminality then the matter should be escalated to the most senior official and it is for them to make a decision.

According to the weekend news reports, this is exactly what happened, and the decision was made by the most senior official at the Cabinet Office.

*

What is not clear, however, is why an official said “It would also have been inappropriate to inform the former prime minister [Johnson] unless the police were happy for us to do so”.

On the face of it, this is not a matter, like say suspected money laundering, where there was a real risk of “tipping off”.

No doubt it would have been a difficult, if not excruciating, conversation – but would it actually have been “inappropriate” to not inform a former Prime Minister that a referral may have to be made and for him (or her) to make representations and to now seek separate legal advice?

Somebody cooperating with the government on submissions to a Public Inquiry was suddenly to be dropped in to possible legal jeopardy.

Of course, there is no legal or professional obligation on the civil service to have contacted Johnson in advance – as set out above, the government owes no duties to former ministers or officials.

But the lack of a firm obligation does not, by itself, make it – to use their word – “inappropriate”.

This may not be a word to just nod-along with.

*

As this blog has previously averred (here), Johnson’s legal defence to the previous Covid police inquiry was skilfully done.

By framing his roles as “showing leadership” in a work context he deftly side-stepped all but one of the incidents that were referred to the police.

It was an impressive legal strategy, which corresponded neatly with the evidence which had to be explained.

Yet the strategy, having served one purpose well, had a couple of gaps.

First, it did not explain his overall state of knowledge of the Downing Street parties, even if his own role at the gatherings was defensible – and this is what the House of Commons privileges committee is looking at.

Second, it only covers the work gatherings where other employees were present – and so not gatherings either in the Downing Street flat or at Chequers.

Perhaps there are also solid legal justifications for those gatherings.

Here the Sunday Times tells us:

“Johnson called in a separate legal team working for Lord Pannick KC, who has been working for him on the privileges inquiry. By 9pm they had determined that every one of the gatherings in the diary entries was defensible.”

(Note here the delightful small detail of the lawyers’ time-keeping.)

Faced with what may well be a new police investigation, it may well be that Johnson and his lawyers can point to the applicable law and guidance of the time to show that the gatherings were within the legal rules.

Perhaps.

But it may also have been open to the Cabinet Office to have gone back to Johnson for (ahem) clarification as to why the gatherings evidence by the diary entries were within the guidance at the time rather than reporting the matter to the police.

The Cabinet Office was, no doubt, acting within its rights to refer the matter to the police without notice to Johnson and asking for his further input.

But (at least to me) there is a nagging feeling that this matter could have been dealt with better by the Cabinet Office.

Not least because this referral may now cause a moral hazard for other former ministers and officials who otherwise would work with the Cabinet Office in respect of the Inquiry.

Any sensible former minister and official should now consider insisting on separate legal representation, rather than assuming that the Cabinet Office would not do the same to them.

*

Of course, Johnson should have (in my view) appointed his own lawyers (at either his or the government’s expense, or a mixture of both).

Had he done so, then the lawyers would have explained the risks to Johnson on disclosing the documents, especially if they contained unwelcome details.

The documents would still have had to have been disclosed, but Johnson would have been appraised of the risks, and he would be advised on what to do next and how and when to make representations.

(And if Johnson were prudent he should also now apply like a shot to be “a core participant” in the inquiry, so as to avoid various further avoidable surprises.)

Of course: if Johnson chose to go with the Cabinet Office on the sole ground of potential additional legal costs then one would need a heart of stone not laugh like a drain.

But putting such mirth aside, one can understand the shock, if not quite apoplexy, of discovering a government department handling your submissions and disclosures to an Inquiry had – without notice – referred you instead to the police.

One can understand why Johnson has now appointed his own lawyers.

He should have done so before.

*

One can also understand that the Cabinet Office had to take the matter seriously.

The Cabinet Office would certainly have also faced criticism had they pretended there was not problem if it does turn out that the documents are (literally) incriminating.  Jonathan Jones’ point above is well-made.

It was entirely right that the matter was escalated to the most senior government official – and that official will have to account for the decision they made and how they made it.

And given the lack of any direct obligation to Johnson, the Cabinet Office were within its rights to make a referral to the police.

(The various legal threats reported this week by Johnson against the Cabinet Office, from defamation to data protection, are not convincing.)

But.

Even if we can understand the respective positions of Johnson and the Cabinet Office, this situation does seem a mess

And it is a mess with implications for others – and so thought must go into how these things should be dealt with.

Given the vagueness and ever-changing complexity of the Covid regulations few would feel certain that the documents they provide to the Cabinet Office (and/or the Inquiry) would not also evidence potential breaches of the criminal law.

This is thereby not going to be a one-off problem.

The overwhelming public interest is that the Inquiry gets the evidence it needs.

And risks of referrals to the police for possible prosecutions – for Johnson or for anyone else – may inhibit that overwhelming public interest.

***

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Posted on 29th May 202329th May 2023Categories Uncategorized28 Comments on Understanding Boris Johnson’s difficulty with the Cabinet Office lawyers – and why it may have wider implications

Tick tock, tick tock Cabinet Office – the Covid Inquiry stand-off this weekend

26th May 2023

My post on former Prime Minister Boris Johnson and the Cabinet Office lawyers should be ready to be posted on Monday, so in the meantime this post is about the stand-off this weekend between the Cabinet Office and the Covid Inquiry.

To recap: the Covid Inquiry has immense legal powers, and it has exercised one of those powers in serving a formal section 21 notice on the Cabinet Office.

This means that unless it has a legal reason not to do so, the Cabinet Office now has to comply with that request on pain of criminal sanction.

For inquiries under the Inquiries Act are powerful legal creatures, and their formal requests are not to be taken lightly.

See my previous post on this here.

The section 21 notice was dated 28 April 2023.

And you will see in the appendices the requests for information in respect of Johnson.

The deadline for the Cabinet Office to comply with the notice has now been set by the Inquiry chair to be 4pm on 30th May 2023 – that is this coming Tuesday

Remember Monday is a bank holiday.

And today is Friday.

The initial response of the Cabinet Office was to instruct the government’s senior external lawyer – at presumably great public expense – to make a legal(istic) objection to the notice.

The Inquiry chair deftly put that Cabinet Office legal application back in its box by a ruling this week.

*

There now seems to be four possible outcomes of what is now a stand-off.

1. The Inquiry may extend the deadline again, but there is no evidence this has happened.

2. The Cabinet Office may comply with the request and provide the all information requested by Tuesday.

3. The Cabinet Office may not comply with the request, and it will provide either none of the information requested or not all the information requested – in effect daring the Inquiry chair to commence criminal proceedings which will then presumably be defended or otherwise challenged.

4. The Cabinet Office may make an urgent application to the High Court to either injunct the inquiry or quash the notice (or some other remedy) before the deadline of Tuesday.

If the choice is (4) then there really is not a lot of time.

I understand the Cabinet Office is considering its next step on the question of disclosure of what it unilaterally deems “unambiguously irrelevant” material.

We can bet it is.

But the stakes are now high – and there is not a lot of time to leisurely consider the position.

Unless there is an extension, the Cabinet Office has to decide before Tuesday whether to comply, to challenge, or to risk criminal sanctions.

Presumably the final decision is now with someone sufficiently senior who will then have to account for their decision.

But if the decision is to bring a legal challenge, there is almost no time left.

And if the Cabinet Office does not bring a legal challenge, then the commissioning of that expensive legal application from the so-called Treasury Devil looks a waste of public money.

If that application was sincere then the government’s position is that the Covid Inquiry chair is acting outside of her legal powers.

But if the Cabinet Office do not now go through with a legal challenge then it looks as if that application was made for tactical reasons, simply because the government does not want to disclose the documents.

*

Which side will blink?

And if the government does not disclose the information requested, will the Covid Inquiry chair commence criminal proceedings against the government?

The impression given by her ruling this week is that she means business.

But how the Covid Inquiry chair responds to anything less than full disclosure by the Cabinet Office on Tuesday will indicate whether that business-like impression is correct.

***

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Posted on 26th May 2023Categories Coronavirus - COVID-19, Courts and Politics, Covid Inquiry, Litigation, Uncategorized, United Kingdom Law and Policy12 Comments on Tick tock, tick tock Cabinet Office – the Covid Inquiry stand-off this weekend

Blogging shall resume on Monday

Thank you for your patience while I had a break over Easter from blogging: even law and policy commentators sometimes need rest and recuperation.

I will be back seeking to make sense of what appears to be senseless, from Monday.

Posted on 14th April 202314th April 2023Categories Uncategorized4 Comments on Blogging shall resume on Monday

An Arrest Warrant for Vladimir Putin

17th March 2023

Today an arrest warrant was issued for the arrest of Vladimir Putin.

This warrant was issued by the International Criminal Court.

On the face of it, the jurisdiction of that court in this matter is not obvious.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine are signatories to the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court and provides for the jurisdiction of the court.

(And nor are, for example, the United States and Israel.)

But it seems that not being a signatory is not a barrier.

According to the court’s site, “Ukraine is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, but it has twice exercised its prerogatives to accept the Court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes under the Rome Statute occurring on its territory, pursuant to article 12(3) of the Statute”.

It would appear that a mere declaration – as distinct from signing, let alone ratifying, the Rome Statute – is enough to confer jurisdiction.

Article 12 of the Rome Statute provides:

One can see how this joins the legal dots so that there is jurisdiction for a warrant to be issued.

Somewhere there is, no doubt, a paper copy of Article 12(3) with a big tick next to it.

But this, of course, will not be enough for the Russians to cooperate.

There is currently zero chance of Putin being arrested.

This should not surprise us.

For, unlike equity, international law often acts in vain.

In large part, that is the point of international law – to provide international standards even if those standards are not met

And the politics in Russia can change.

*

By coincidence, the last week also saw the 103rd birthday of the last surviving Nuremberg prosecutor, Ben Ferencz.

Ben Ferencz (@BenFerencz), the last surviving prosecutor from the Nuremberg trials, is 103 today: https://t.co/5o06m4tges

— Mr Memory (@AmIRightSir) March 11, 2023

One of the convictions secured by Ferencz was for an SS officer responsible for mass murders in Ukraine.

That mass murderer was hanged.

All Putin would face is imprisonment.

*

The basis for the warrant for Putin is the forced deportation of Ukraine children.

This is a serious matter – but it is, of course, not the only war crime for which Putin is responsible.

It is, however, one of the easiest to evidence – and, indeed, it would appear the facts of the deportations are not disputed.

As such it has a flavour of Al Capone and tax evasion – a prosecution that is evidence-led and thereby more likely to reach a more advanced stage procedurally.

Presumably an arrest warrant needs a sound evidential base, and the forced deportation of Ukraine children provides the requisite evidence.

This certainly not to underplay the importance of the child deportation issue – it is more of an illustration that any practical prosecution will always be a balance between law and evidence.

Perhaps further grounds can be added in due course.

But if this prosecution has any chance of success, then at this early stage doing-it-by-the-evidence as well as doing-it-by-the book is prudent and admirable.

This prosecution may not get any further – but, if it does, it will be in part because the prosecution was properly thought-through at its early stages.

***

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Posted on 17th March 202318th March 2023Categories International law, Uncategorized4 Comments on An Arrest Warrant for Vladimir Putin

Libraries and books

10th March 2023

I recently spent a few days in some wonderful, world-famous academic libraries, and I noticed two things different from when I was an undergraduate a few decades ago.

The first was that the library was full of working students and researchers – packed – with either almost no or no desks available.

This, on the face of it, is a good sign.

In the early 1990s I remember the same libraries being fairly empty, and you could have a whole row – sometimes a whole room – to yourself, and not just a desk.

Libraries are (ultimately) instruments and not ornaments, and so they ought to be busy and not empty.

But.

If you looked carefully, you also noticed that almost none of those working in the libraries were using any of the books from the shelves or from the stack.

Indeed, almost every student and researcher was working on a laptop (or at least staring at one).

A librarian explained to me that while they are delighted that libraries are being used more than before, they are sad that it rarely for any of the library stock.

It was more about ambiance, it seems: the librarian mentioned that students say they work better when surrounded by books, even if they are not using any.

The reason I was there was to look at some volumes from the shelves or brought up from the stacks – books which one could not get anywhere else.

And so I waited with my pile of books for a desk to become free.

And waited.

Standing there, with nothing more advanced than a pad of A4 paper and a pencil case, feeling like a dinosaur or time traveller; wondering about the paradox of book-lined libraries being more used than before, but with the books themselves as ornaments, even if the library was itself being used as an instrument.

And then I realised I was just as “culpable” – for in the olden days, one would have written a letter to a newspaper or made a private journal article about such an observation – and I am posting an electronic blogpost instead.

***

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Posted on 10th March 2023Categories Uncategorized19 Comments on Libraries and books

The Tate Modern viewing platform case – why did they not mention Denning?

2nd February 2023

In summertime the public viewing platform at Tate Modern is the delight of everyone.

Nearly every person can enjoy panoramic views of London, including into the rooms of neighbouring apartments, for which well-off people have paid – and they do not want other people to watch.

The platform will probably now be turned to some other use.

The whole of London will be much the poorer.

And all this because of those who have bought flats there next to the Tate Modern.

*

Yes, this brief post is about the Supreme Court judgment in the “nuisance” case about whether local residents have a claim in respect of Tate Modern’s use of the top floor of its Blavatnik Building as a viewing platform.

A detailed look at this fascinating case is a subject for another post.

But, in the meantime, it is remarkable that one person who was not named in the judgment, the former Master of the Rolls Lord Denning.

I am not a fan of Lord Denning as an appeals judge, but nobody can deny his skill as a wordsmith.

And one of his most famous judgments was in the minority in the 1977 case of Miller v Jackson.

It is a case known to every student of English law.

This was a case about a village cricket pitch which, the plaintiffs contended, constituted a nuisance to the adjacent properties.

The case of Miller v Jackson is mentioned a few times in the Supreme Court judgment, but Denning’s famous minority speech is not alluded to – and he is not named whatsoever.

This can only be a deliberate omission, given the sheer fame of that Denning speech.

We should be impressed by the self-restraint of the Supreme Court judges not to mimic or even refer to the famous speech by Denning.

A temptation that cannot be resisted, however, by far lesser legal minds.

****

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

Posted on 2nd February 20232nd February 2023Categories Litigation, Uncategorized, United Kingdom Law and Policy41 Comments on The Tate Modern viewing platform case – why did they not mention Denning?

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