Words on the screen – the rise and (relative) fall of text-based social media: why journalists and lawyers on social media may not feel so special again

30th September 2024

In the beginning was the Word.

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Well, in the beginning there were words.

Lots of words, all over the place, at the beginning of the internet and then of the World Wide Web.

And this was because words were easy: text was one of the easiest of things to transmit.

Early social media was thereby text-dominated.

Yes, there were rudimentary ways of hosting and sending pictures and video and sound files.

But with text you could create more text – while pictures and videos and sound files were difficult to create and edit.

Early-ish blogging, I can recall with a shudder, required you to code with HTML. You had to physically type in hyperlinks with <a> tags and so on.

Even on Facebook you only had a limited text field into which you could type: “So-and-so is [ ]”.

Pretty soon, however, there were WYSIWYG social media and blogging.

Anybody, if the wanted, could compose, create and even edit words on the screen.

And so text-based social media took off, especially on Twitter.

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As Marie Le Conte set out in a thought-provoking and insightful post on her Substack, this had the effect of lots of text-based social media users – writers and journalists – believing that social media was about them:

As she elaborates:

“…journalists are people who write for a living. Twitter is and was a place where thoughts are expressed in writing.”

And what she says about journalists can also be said about lawyers: the stuff of lawyering, like the stuff of journalism, is words.

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As the eminent jurist Eliza Doolittle once averred:

“Words! Words! Words!
I’m so sick of words!
I get words all day through;
First from him, now from you!
Is that all you blighters can do?”

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It was all that us blighters – journalists, lawyers, and so on – could do, and it suited us.

Social media seemed a perfect medium.

But.

Text-based social media was only the start – an early stage just because text was easy, and other forms were less easy.

And now the other forms are catching up, and indeed they have caught up.

Just as HTML-based blogging eased into WYSIWYG social media typing, it is becoming just as easy for a social user to make and edit video and audio.

This, coupled with the wayward way Twitter has gone (and so has been quit by many), means that the great days of text-based social users thinking they were special are perhaps over.

There will still be a place for text-based social media, just like there are those who persist with CB Radio.

But it was just a phase we were going through.

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Political accountability vs policy accountability: how our system of politics and government is geared to avoid or evade accountability for policy

24 September 2024

Over at Bluesky, the German writer and historian Helene von Bismarck, an acute observer of British politics, posted this interesting question:

“One question I have been asking myself for many years about UK politics: Why does it – regardless of who is in government – appear to be this hard to solve problems & get things done? Schools, the NHS, defence procurement, etc. Lack of money, you (probably) say. But surely this isn’t all of it?”

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One answer, of course, is that there is a lack of accountability.

On the face of it, however, there is a great deal. of accountability in the politics of the United Kingdom.

There are general elections, where the government of the day can fail to obtain a majority – as in 1997, 2010, 2017 and 2024 – as well as by-elections and regional and local elections which often (are said to) give governments a ‘bloody nose’ (or something).

And between general elections, Prime Ministers can come and go – as in 1990, 2007, 2016, 2019, and 2022 (twice).

And then, at the levels below Prime Minister, ministers come and go, often with undue frequency.

We also have the theatres of Prime Ministers Questions and the various political shows on television and the radio (and increasingly with podcasts), and we have a well-connected and ambitious lobby of Westminster journalists.

And so, superficially at least, we have a near-constant buzz of accountability – almost all day, every day.

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But.

If the word “accountability” is taken to mean (as it should be) that the accountable person can be required to give an account of what they are doing, then things look rather different.

For in the United Kingdom we have a great deal of political accountability, we have far less policy accountability.

And by policy, it is meant the formulation, implementation and administration of things by government.

The theatres of political debate and discussion do not often go to the substance of policy – and often policy only seems relevant to the extent that it offers a ready “gotcha” against a hapless or hopeless minister.

The lobby system of journalism – and there are some outstanding lobby journalists – necessarily requires a focus on the politics of Westminster, rather than on what is happening in Whitehall – and still less on what is happening outside SW1.

The doctrine of individual ministerial accountability provides a mutually beneficial pact where a minister can (plausibly) say that they were not aware of something while officials escape routine accountability for what they do.

Parliamentary questions are easily evaded either in written or oral form, with no sanction for tardiness or non-compliance.

And as for Freedom of Information, the departmental section 17 letters refusing disclosure are perhaps the most dismal and insincere – if not outright dishonest – official documents in the history of our domestic bureaucracy.

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One illustration of how weak policy accountability is in the United Kingdom are the now (all too frequent) public inquiries.

These inquiries – sometimes long after the events being investigated – often do little more than what could have been done at the time, if the organs of the state had had the necessary powers and the requisite will.

To take one glaring example: the Covid inquiry is forcing politicians and officials to give an account – ie provide accountability – about everyday decision- and policy-making during the pandemic.

This should have been done in and by parliament at the time.

Many revelations that come out of that and other inquiries is an indication of the weakness of our traditional forms of accountability.

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Why is all this so?

Part of the reason is legal(istic) – inquiries have formal legal powers which are not generally available to (say) parliamentary committees and still less available to journalists.

But the main reason is there is no real incentive for government and parliament and officials and the media to have it any other way: no careers will be benefited, there is no electoral advantage, there are no extra viewers or listeners, and there no more newspapers sold (or fewer copies left unsold).

And the primary reason for this lack of incentive is, well, us.

If voters (and viewers and readers) wanted more real-time policy accountability then there would be career, commercial and/or electoral advantages in there being more policy accountability.

But that would mean us taking policy seriously, which is dull and complicated.

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There are, however, grounds for some optimism.

Parliamentary select committees – especially in their online manifestations – are becoming increasingly impressive in what evidence is made publicly available in their ongoing inquiries.

The House of Commons library also make their outstanding briefings available to the public as well as to parliamentarians.

The decline in specialist journalists is – though only to a limited extent – being offset by specialist commentators – on Substack or elsewhere.

But, even taking all these positive points at their highest, there is generally little or no incentive for there to be real accountability, as opposed to superficial (and theatrical) accountability.

And so the massive policy problems identified by von Bismarck in her post do not have ready solutions – though, no doubt, there will one day be a scathing public inquiry about each of them.

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On writing – and not writing – about miscarriages of justice

23rd September 2024

(“…Punish the Wrongdoer” – at the Old Bailey, London – which presumably means implicitly not punishing the innocent: source.)

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I was going to do an article over at Prospect about the Lucy Letby case, with an accompanying more detailed post here. But I have now put it on hold.

There are four reasons for this.

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First, the online context for the article and post was (and is still) too heated and partisan.

The article and post are about what it would mean for such a case to be a miscarriage of justice or not: in effect, a guide to how to think about that and other cases where it is contended there is an unsafe conviction.

As such the article and post would not take a “side” – but it seems there is currently little appetite for anything other than which maintains Letby is either innocent or guilty.

And like Pavlov’s puppies, there are individuals who just need the slightest pretext to describe something as a “conspiracy theory” – even when no conspiracy is posited, and still less is there any theory.

(For an Anglo-Saxon empiricist and pragmatist to be called a “theorist” is perhaps as objectionable as being called a “conspiracist”.)

(And for more on whether miscarriages of justice require a “conspiracy theory” see here.)

On the other “side” there will be those just as irked at a legal blog setting out that the various scientific and statistical points being made by critics of the convictions, even taken at their highest, can only go so far in this particular case

So I am waiting for the online context to calm down.

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Second, there is the beginning of the Thirwall inquiry.

Any half-decent article and post on the Letby case would now need to take account of the additional information that will be available from the inquiry, in addition to the information from the court litigation.

And so I am now also waiting for that inquiry to get to an appropriate stage.

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Third, there is the risk of what can be called the “one sample” fallacy.

And so I wanted to look at other actual and contended miscarriages of justice, so to see the problems that have come up before and how, if at all, those problems were addressed.

I also wanted to see if the folk memory of past notorious miscarriages of justice accorded with the actuality of what was decided by the court.

When I re-looked at the Roy Meadow case reports, for example, they did not quite say what I recollected those cases saying.

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And fourth, I wanted to set out some preliminary points – like the role of juries and how it is for them to weigh evidence (once that evidence is admissible) – in a separate post or posts.

(In first go at the Letby article, I was 2,000 words in and I still was explaining in general terms the role of juries in weighing evidence.)

Sometimes an article and a post can (try to) do too much, and I got a sense that this was the situation here.

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As I have said before, I have no ultimate view on the guilt or innocence of Letby – and that is for a jury or a court of competent jurisdiction to decide, and not a blogger or someone who reads a blog.

But it is a case which may provide a useful basis for helping lay people understand how the justice system works (or may not work) and what a court can and cannot do.

And for the Letby case in particular, what else the legal system could have possibly done when Letby and her lawyers elected (for good reason or bad) not to put expert evidence before the jury themselves.

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Miscarriages of justice do happen – especially when there is reliance on expert and circumstantial evidence; but that does not mean that every case where there is reliance on expert and circumstantial evidence is (or is likely to be) a miscarriage of justice.

That misconception can perhaps be called the prosecution critic’s fallacy.

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And so in the meantime before I publish something more substantial on Letby, let us look at other cases where the has been an actual or alleged miscarriage of justice.

Let us look at the case of Oliver Campbell, which I wrote about here and here.

***

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Miscarriages of Justice: the Oliver Campbell case

21st September 2024

How Taylor Swift’s endorsement of Harris and Walz is a masterpiece of persuasive prose: a songwriter’s practical lesson in written advocacy

11th September 2024

Taylor Swift has endorsed the Democratic nominees Kamala Harris and Tim Walz.

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Politically and culturally the endorsement is significant, but this is not really a political or cultural blog.

This is, however, a blog that sometimes provides close readings of key documents, and there are things about the endorsement that are perhaps worth noticing and remarking upon.

In essence: this endorsement is a masterpiece of practical written advocacy, and many law schools would do well to put it before their students.

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Look carefully at the first three paragraphs – especially the use of the first person “I” and “me/my” and the second person “you” (emphasis added):

“Like many of you, I watched the debate tonight. If you haven’t already, now is a great time to do your research on the issues at hand and the stances these candidates take on the topics that matter to you the most. As a voter, I make sure to watch and read everything I can about their proposed policies and plans for this country.

“Recently I was made aware that AI of ‘me’ falsely endorsing Donald Trump’s presidential run was posted to his site. It really conjured up my fears around AI, and the dangers of spreading misinformation. It brought me to the conclusion that I need to be very transparent about my actual plans for this election as a voter. The simplest way to combat misinformation is with the truth.

“I will be casting my vote for Kamala Harris and Tim Walz in the 2024 Presidential Election. I’m voting for @kamalaharris because she fights for the rights and causes I believe need a warrior to champion them. I think she is a steady-handed, gifted leader and I believe we can accomplish so much more in this country if we are led by calm and not chaos. I was so heartened and impressed by her selection of running mate @timwalz, who has been standing up for LGBTQ+ rights, IVF, and a woman’s right to her own body for decades.”

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In the first paragraph, she ensures that she identifies with you the reader – “Like many of you [comma]” and “As a voter [comma]”.

There are four “yous” in that first paragraph: you, you, you, you.

You are already half-nodding along. You and Swift have common ground.

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In the second paragraph, she then describes things of personal concern – but here she avoids putting “I” at the start of any sentence. This makes it look that she is describing the situation objectively.

She deftly – and convincingly – justifies making a political endorsement. The sentences “It brought me to the conclusion that I need to be very transparent about my actual plans for this election as a voter. The simplest way to combat misinformation is with the truth.” are perfectly reasonable.

Two premises leading to a “conclusion”, and in just one paragraph.

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You will see that so far she has avoided starting any sentence with “I”.

And then, with the third paragraph, wham.

The first sentence beginning with “I” is the actual endorsement.

And then every sentence in the third paragraph begins with “I”: bam bam bam.

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Also, like any good advocate, Swift is careful to make the listener or reader feel that it is their own decision to make, and again this is skilfully done:

“I’ve done my research, and I’ve made my choice. Your research is all yours to do, and the choice is yours to make.”

Note the rhythm: I, I, you, you, you.

The most effective persuasion is often to lead the listener or reader to making their own decision – and to make them feel they are making their own decision.

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Finally, the pay-off: the thing that will linger.

The reader is already half-aware of what is coming, because of the photograph.

A good pay-off is often a call-back – and here, cleverly, the call-back is to the visual clue the reader would have registered before even reading.

“With love and hope,

Taylor Swift
Childless Cat Lady”

This is, of course, a swipe and a blow against J. D. Vance, the Republican vice presidential nominee.

And so Swift mocks the Lilliputian.

***

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Supporting Donald Trump is too much for Richard Cheney

7th September 2024

A miscarriage of justice is normally a systems failure, and not because of any conspiracy – the cock-up theory usually explains when things go wrong

30th August 2024
One accusation that is often made of anyone with an interest in possible miscarriages of justice is that they are “conspiracy theorists”.

In reality, however, you do not have to posit a conspiracy to explain when things go wrong with the legal system.

In particular, what happens in the justice system is that the safeguards and checks which exist to prevent or minimise miscarriages of justice sometimes do not work properly.

Just as a conspiracy can perhaps explain a car accident, the explanation is more likely to be brakes failure, or driver error, or so on. One or two things go wrong, and then the whole thing crashes.

As some Medieval chap put it, explanatory factors should not be multiplied beyond necessary.

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Indeed, a number of not directly connected people acting in concert to achieve a common goal is what is required for the justice system to work consistently properly.

And we all know unlikely that is.

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Update – what is coming up.

Shamima Begum – and ‘de jure’ vs ‘de facto’ statelessness

21st August 2024
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One striking – and troubling – aspect of the legal case of Shamima Begum is the artificiality of the United Kingdom state maintaining that she ever had the real prospect of going to Bangladesh.

The removal of her British citizenship was predicated on her being able to take the citizenship of Bangladesh, a country which she had never visited and to which she had no meaningful connection.

By way of background, this is from paragraph 1 of the relevant Court of Appeal decision:

“On 19 February 2019 Shamima Begum, then aged 19, was deprived of her British citizenship by a decision under s 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 (“BNA 1981”), made personally by the then Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Rt Hon. Sajid Javid MP. Her appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”) was dismissed on 22 February 2023.”

Adding:

“Ms Begum was born in the United Kingdom on 25 August 1999. She was brought up in Bethnal Green in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. Her parents are of Bangladeshi origin and, through them, Ms Begum had Bangladeshi citizenship until her 21st birthday.”

The Court of Appeal then noted:

“SIAC observed that Ms Begum’s case under this ground was straightforward: even if the deprivation decision did not render her technically stateless, it had that practical effect. One way or another, she could not go to Bangladesh, and that meant there was nowhere for her to go […].”

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We are told by the Court of Appeal that material before the Home Secretary included a reference to this effective statelessness:

“On 18 February 2019 a ministerial submission with accompanying documents was received by the Secretary of State. The submission recommended that the appellant be deprived of her British citizenship on the basis that it would be conducive to the public good due to the threat that she was assessed to pose to UK national security. […]

“One of the annexes to the submission, dealing with the potential risks to Ms Begum of mistreatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR, expressed the view that although there was a risk that individuals in Bangladesh could be subject to conditions which would not comply with the ECHR, the Secretary of State may consider that there was no real risk of her returning to Bangladesh. Neither the submission nor the annexes to it expressly considered the issue which forms the basis of Ms Begum’s third ground of appeal before this court, that if deprived of British citizenship she would be “de facto stateless”.

“The Secretary of State agreed with the recommendations in the submission on 19 February 2019.”

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This was an eye-catching push-pull you point: on one hand, the Home Secretary was legally safe in taking away her British citizenship as Begum would in theory be able to go to Bangladesh but, on the other hand, he was also legally safe because in practice she could not do so.

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One of the grounds of appeal of Begum before the Court of Appeal was:

“De facto statelessness: The deprivation decision was unlawful on account of a failure by the Secretary of State to have regard to whether the decision to deprive would render Ms Begum de facto stateless on account of her de jure Bangladeshi citizenship being of no practical value to her. SIAC correctly concluded that this was a mandatory relevant consideration to which the Secretary of State was required to have regard. However, SIAC erred in finding that the matter had been properly considered.”

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In one paragraph, the Court of Appeal rejected this ground of appeal:

“It is not necessary to decide what might be difficult questions about whether the concept of “de facto statelessness” is established in international law. The point in layperson’s language is that Ms Begum had nowhere else to go. Until her 21st birthday in 2021 she had Bangladeshi citizenship by descent but there was no realistic possibility of her being able or permitted to enter that country. The appendix to the ministerial submission made this clear, though in the context of whether she was at risk of treatment contrary to ECHR Article 2 or Article 3. As SIAC found at [302]-[305], this was sufficient to bring the issue to the attention of the Secretary of State, if he did not know it already. Despite knowing that she had nowhere else to go, in all practicality, the Secretary of State nonetheless decided that to deprive her of her British citizenship on grounds that to do so was conducive to the public good and in the interests of national security. He took that matter into account. The decision cannot be impugned on the basis that he did not do so. On the basis of the open arguments applied to the evidence that we have seen in open and closed, Ground 3 fails.”

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In essence: it did not legally matter that the deprivation of her citizenship in fact (de facto) rendered her stateless, as long as (a) in legal theory (de jure) she was not stateless and (b) the minister considered this fact, and made the deprivation order anyway.

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Begum then applied to the Supreme Court.

Some thought this would be a good case for the Supreme Court to engage with this extraordinary power of the UK state to take away a person’s citizenship – in some ways a person’s most basic legal right – in circumstances where in reality they would be rendered stateless, but as a legal fiction they would not be.

It could have been a Supreme Court case for the ages.

But, no.

In their short published reasons, they decided not to hear the appeal on his and her other grounds. On de facto statelessness, they provided these three paragraphs (emphasis added):

“The fourth ground of appeal concerns the fact that the deprivation decision resulted in the Appellant’s becoming de facto stateless, as there was no reasonable prospect of her being admitted into Bangladesh, of which she was a citizen. In this regard, it is argued that the Secretary of State failed to have regard to all material considerations.

“Both courts below found on the evidence that the Secretary of State had taken into account the fact that the deprivation decision would render the Appellant de facto stateless. There is nothing to indicate that that conclusion is vitiated by any error of law. The Appellant’s submission that the Court of Appeal failed to distinguish between the fact of de facto statelessness and the significance of that fact (the latter, rather than the former, being argued to be the mandatory relevant consideration) does not appear to the panel to raise an arguable point of law.

“The panel notes that the Appellant does not challenge the existing law that the prohibition, under section 40(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981, on making a deprivation decision which would render a person stateless, refers to de jure rather than de facto statelessness. Nor is it argued that the Secretary of State’s decision to make the deprivation decision, notwithstanding that its effect would be to render the Appellant de facto stateless, was unlawful because it was perverse.”

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Begum may apply now to the European Court of Human Rights – a possibility which the Supreme Court alludes to elsewhere in its decision: “Whether the Convention law should be developed as the Appellant argues is a matter which can only appropriately be decided by the European court, as the authoritative interpreter of the ECHR. It is not the role of this court to develop the law under the Convention well beyond the principles established by the European court.”

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But overall, this does not seem a satisfactory position.

There are many people in the United Kingdom who either through their parents or otherwise could, in theory, become a citizen of another country – even though they have no real connection with such a country.

The power used in the Begum case cried out for judicial consideration at the very highest level in our judicial system, but the Supreme Court appears to have shrugged – and, at best, passed the matter to Strasbourg.

Of course, we do not have all the facts about Begum – there may be evidence not in the public domain which justifies her exclusion; we do not know.

But the general principle about removing British citizenship requires anxious scrutiny by our highest court.

In 2020-21 the Supreme Court decided various technical points about Begum’s case.

It is a shame that the Supreme Court has now decided not to hear the substantive issue in her case.

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Lucy Letby and miscarriages of justice: some words of caution on why we should always be alert to the possibilities of miscarriages of justice

19th August 2024

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