The Empty City – and the nature of practical law and policy commentary

25th June 2023

Here is a painting of an empty city.

It is a perfect, bright, ideal(ised) empty Renaissance cityscape.

And here is another (almost) empty though less cheerful cityscape:

It is from the great twentieth-century artist De Chirico.

Scroll up and down and compare and contrast the two urban depictions.

Similar architecture, but the latter has flawed inconsistent perspectives and a more ominous (near-)emptiness.

(You may have noticed that both the pictures above have often been banners or avatars for my social media accounts.)

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Much of practical law and policy commentary offers a contrast between ideal systems, on one hand, and the incoherence and contradictions of reality, on another.

That is: between how things should work and how they do (and don’t) work – between the ideal Renaissance City and a latter day De Chirico city.

I have also spent most of my life in and around large cities, and so much of my writing carries urban perspectives – which, again like perspectives in a De Chirico painting, don’t always neatly join in the middle.

Anyway, this is just a way of saying I have changed the name of my Substack to Empty City.

I like the new name, and I hope you don’t mind it too.

And if you can subscribe at the Substack, that would be wonderful.

Apologies and publication schedule update

23rd June 2023

I hope all of you had a happy midsummer* – and now it will be another year before we get this much sunlight again.

My website had some unexpected problems, and it has been offline for a couple of days for repair and so on – and for this I apologise.

I have thereby taken some time to work on some long-delayed longer pieces for you.  These essays should be ready soon. I am sorry for the delay.  Researching and writing original detailed long-form content is not as easy as I sometimes fool myself into thinking it is.

I am also considering moving to a new publication schedule, of posting stuff here when there is something worth posting, rather than aiming to post once every weekday.

Sometimes this may mean a number of posts on a day, or a few weekdays between posts.

It also should mean fewer typos.

(Well. We can always hope.)

I am also thinking through the relationship between this site and the Substack.  At the moment I am usually publishing the same content on both.  But I am wondering if there should be divergence.

Let me know your response to any or all of the above by replying what you think in the comments below – I will read the comments though not necessarily publish them, and mark any comments which are “not for publication” accordingly.

I am especially anxious that those of you who are kind enough to support this site via Patreon and PayPal should feel that you are getting something in return.

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*For those of you in other hemispheres, please amend my text according to your taste.

How to approach the oral evidence at the Covid Inquiry

Midsummer Day, 2023

There are now big political names giving oral evidence at the Covid Inquiry for the first “module” covering the preparedness of the government for a pandemic.

This is just a brief post to point out that you should not over-emphasise the theatrics of certain exchanges between the witnesses and counsel, however dramatic or even gladiatorial those exchanges seem to be.

This is not a film or a play; it is not even a trial.

The best way to understand what each witness has to say, once the evidence has been given, is to click onto the “documents” part of the Covid Inquiry site.

And then you should find at least two documents.  The first is the witness statement of the relevant witness provided before the questioning, and the second is the transcript of the questioning.

For example, this is David Cameron’s witness statement – and this is the transcript of his session.

Sometimes the Inquiry will also publish other documentary evidence that has come up in the oral evidence sessions, for example this.

By comparing the witness statement with the oral evidence (and any additional documentary evidence) you will see exactly where the Inquiry is probing – and also where the Inquiry may not be satisfied by the content of a witness statement.

The nature of any inquiry does not lend itself to sudden courtroom fireworks; indeed, a line of questioning may seem very dull to onlookers until you realise what is said in the statement.

Remember, inquiries are often reliant on the evidence provided – a sort of GIGO principle.

And these oral sessions are intended to complement the written witness statements, and so the transcript should be read with the statement.

Those who only read media summaries, or catch snippets of the more notable exchanges, often end up surprised with what any inquiry produces.

Before you form Very Strong Opinions on what witnesses to the inquiry are supposed to have said, take a few moments to read the witness statement and then the transcript for yourself.

And you are lucky: because of the internet and an impressive Covid Inquiry website this – actually intellectually satisfying – exercise can be done with ease.

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Life after Brexit – and “exceptionalism”

20th June 2023

There is a useful general rule of writing: if more than one person, in good faith, mistakes the point you are making then it is the fault not of the reader, but the fault of the writer.

This is a general rule, not a universal law, and so it has exceptions; but it is true far more often than not.

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And so, when on Friday, in response to my quick post on life after Brexit a number of usually sensible respondents (here and elsewhere) thought I was guilty of the very “exceptionalism” of which I was accusing others, it was moment to think and reflect.

Was I unclear?  Or was I being inconsistent, even hypocritical?

I hope it is not the latter, and so I am going to take advantage of this being my own blog to have another go at setting out my view on what the United Kingdom should do now it is outside the European Union.

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First, the situation is – well – exceptional.  No sovereign state has ever before become an “ex-member” of the European Union.

The nearest analogue is Greenland – not a sovereign state – which left the (predecessor) European Communities – not the European Union.

And so whatever relationship the United Kingdom now has with the European Union necessarily will be distinct and unusual, regardless of the attitudes of those in both the United Kingdom and the European Union.

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Second, in saying that there should be joint institutions – “I would prefer the United Kingdom to formally remain outside the European Union while, over time, and in substance, evolving joint institutions, policies and rules in partnership with the European Union” – I am only referring to things which are already in place.

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement provides, for example:

And in the withdrawal agreement, for example:

To say that a suggestion that the United Kingdom and European Union should evolve joint institutions is “exceptionalism” is simply to say you have not read or understood the agreements already in place.

The institutions are already there.

My view is that as the agreed institutional framework is already in place – though in embryonic form – they should in a trial-and-error manner become a ever-firmer basis of the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union.

This would make the ongoing relationship practicable and sustainable, rather than some whizz-bang big-bang set of new institutions.

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Third, any institutional relationship should be at the pace of both the United Kingdom and European Union – a collaborative approach that is, I aver, distinct from “exceptionalism”.

It is just as important that it works for and suits the European Union as it works for and suits the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom should not get (and certainly will not get) special, selfless treatment from the European Union.

But there are possible association relationships that would suit the ruthless self-interest of the European Union as well as the interests of the United Kingdom.

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The foreseeable future is unlikely to be either the United Kingdom following a trajectory towards an illusory goal of splendid isolation or the United Kingdom being accepted back as a full member state of the European Union.

The United Kingdom instead has to prepare for life on the outside of the European Union, seeking to build the most practical and sustainable relationship consistent with the political totem of the 2016 referendum result.

You may hate the 2016 referendum result – and you are welcome to keep re-fighting the 2016 referendum – but given that neither the governing nor main opposition party are seeking to reverse Brexit (or even offer a further referendum) then the result of that referendum has to stand.

And our policy for the next five to ten years at least has to accept this.

The United Kingdom and the European Union have two detailed agreements with joint institutions.

I would submit that it is not “exceptionalism” to see how such a structured relationship now goes, and to also see what the United Kingdom and the European Union can jointly make of it.

I would submit that “exceptionalism” is pretending that that this is not the mundane reality and that – perhaps by magic – something else can and should happen instead.

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There is another rule about writing that one should never answer critics.

Well.

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The remarkable fall of Boris Johnson – and what it tells us, if anything, about our constitutional arrangements?

19th June 2023

In December 2019, Boris Johnson had the greatest prize that our constitutional arrangements could bestow.

He had led his party to a substantial majority at a general election; his party had the mandate for its proposals in its manifesto; he had the command of his cabinet and his party; and he had even stripped out of his parliamentary party many more moderate Tories.

The opposition was in disarray, and the official opposition had had one of its worst election results in its history.

Few, if any, prime ministers have even been in such a strong position.

He had the prospect of at least one parliamentary term, perhaps more.

Yet now, less than one parliamentary term later, Johnson is not only out of government, he is out of parliament.

There is no comparable downfall in our parliamentary and political history.

Perhaps this story can be understood in purely personal terms: that Johnson was the author of his own downfall.

But.

Just as every politician gains power in a particular constitutional context, every politician who loses power also does so in a particular context.

Had some things been different, had certain events and processes take another course, Johnson could well still be prime minister.

Johnson may well have willed himself into power, but he certainly did not intend to lose power.

A sequence of events meant that it became outside of his control as to whether he could continue to be prime minister, and a further sequence of events meant that it became outside of his control as to whether he would “beat” the privileges committee.

The constitution of the United Kingdom regurgitated Johnson from our body politic and spat him out.

(And the the constitution of the United Kingdom then also regurgitated Elizabeth Truss from our body politic and spat that prime minister out too, though not as far.)

Had our constitutional arrangements been more rigid – more fixed, perhaps codified – it may well be that it could have been harder to get rid of Boris Johnson from government and then from parliament.

For, to repeat, after the last general election, Boris Johnson had the very greatest prize that our constitutional arrangements could bestow, and it is difficult to see how that prize could have ever been formally wrestled away from him by any codified procedure.

Our constitutional arrangements certainly could be a lot better in so many ways – but on the specific question of the ejection of Johnson: could our constitutional arrangements actually have been better?

And if that question seems to you to have a complacent premise, there is then the far more worrying, far less complacent question: what does it say about our constitutional arrangements that such a figure was ever able to get the greatest prize our constitutional arrangements could bestow in the first place? 

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Why the United Kingdom should not “re-join” the European Union – the United Kingdom should start any application from scratch

16th June 2023

The flaws and the errors of the case for Brexit are many and obvious, but those who oppose and want to reverse Brexit also have a problematic case.

In particular, and as this blog averred a couple of years ago, the notion that the United Kingdom can “re-join” the European Union is misconceived.

The United Kingdom is unlikely to “re-join” the European Union – if that is taken to mean that the United Kingdom will simply be able to step back and resume its role and position, almost as if nothing had happened.

Instead, those who support the United Kingdom being a member of the European Union will have to do is to make the case afresh.

And that will be difficult, as it will require a settled majority support for membership in our polity – and currently neither even the governing party nor official opposition support membership.

The occasion for this post is a fine article over at Byline by the academic Professor Jacob Öberg, which should be read by all who are interested in the topic.

He also has done a Twitter thread:

 

His article is optimistic – the United Kingdom ever being a member state is not impossible:

But: it is optimism coupled with hard realism.

And he emphasises rightly that it is for the European Union to be satisfied that we are ready to be a member.

(Indeed, the idea that the European Union should let us back just because we ask them too is a form, of course, of British exceptionalism.)

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My view, as you may know, is different – and it is one which is not shared with many, if anyone.

I would prefer the United Kingdom to formally remain outside the European Union while, over time, and in substance, evolving joint institutions, policies and rules in partnership with the European Union.

I think only such a close relationship over time, with the United Kingdom not technically being a member state, is sustainable and practical given the state of British politics.

As I type this, I can anticipate 101 responses to this position, and I am sure some will be set out below, but it is in my mind the only view that marries the need for closeness with paying tribute to the Brexit totem.

A totem which will be there, even if you despise it.

Pro-Europeans had over forty years to “win” the argument on European integration, and they failed when it mattered in 2016.  And now with the enduring fact of the Brexit referendum, the overall argument is even less likely to be won – or at least be seen to be won.

Some may say that practicalities do not matter that much, and the case for outright European Union membership should be made, and that we should accept nothing less.

My worry is that is the counsel of perfection, and that it will miss the opportunity of actual closer relationships in the meantime.

Let Brexiters have their technical sovereignty, and let us also have a substantial and practical close association with the European Union, while nominally being outside.

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Process and evidence will cause severe setbacks for populists like Johnson and Trump, but process and evidence are not enough to defeat them

15th June 2023
*
Words! Words! Words! I’m so sick of words!
I get words all day through;
First from him, now from you!
Is that all you blighters can do?
– Eliza Doolittle
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Words, words, words.
So many words – strong words, vivid words, striking words.
Words like “…a kangaroo court…skewed…sole political objective of finding me guilty…prejudicial…not be tolerated in a normal legal process…incredulous…time-wasting procedural stunt…puzzling…This is rubbish…It is a lie…this deranged conclusion…patently absurd…transparently wrong…Complete tripe…a load of complete tripe…ludicrous…a rehash of their previous non-points…nothing new of substance to say…preposterous…totally ignored…How on earth do these clairvoyants know exactly what was going on at 21.58…It is a measure of the Committee’s desperation that they are trying incompetently and absurdly to tie me to an illicit event…utterly incredible…artifice…Charade…This report is a charade…I was wrong to believe in the Committee or its good faith…The terrible truth is that it is not I who has twisted the truth to suit my purposes…This is a dreadful day for MPs and for democracy…vendetta…trumped up charges”.
All these words, words, words are from this morning’s statement from Boris Johnson.
But sometimes words – even colourful and extreme words – can make no difference.
For against such any sophistical rhetorician, inebriated with the exuberance of their own verbosity, are the twin deadly enemies of the populist and charlatan: process and evidence.
And in this way, today’s Privileges Committee Report has wings that are like a shield of steel.
Words, words, words, will all bounce off.
Each of the findings of the committee is based on stated evidence, and each of the conclusion rests on the findings.
And at key stages the committee has been at pains to ensure Johnson (and his lawyers) had an opportunity to respond to any potentially adverse findings and conclusions.
Try as he may, with ever-stronger words, there is nothing Johnson can do to dislodge the evidence and the findings and the conclusions.
They shall squat there, over him, and they do not care about Johnson’s fierce words.
As such, the privileges committee report complements the federal indictment of Trump.
There, similarly, a calm reasoned, evidenced and through document will be hard for Donald Trump to derail or discredit.
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Alas, however, the soft and malleable politics of the populists will not be defeated only by process and evidence.
It is only at extremes that process and evidence can be invoked to tame the unruly and untruthful.
The challenge is to defeat populists like Johnson and Trump not with exceptional proceedings where they cannot lie their way through, but in the day-to-day bustle of practical politics.
Unfortunately it is not possible to make every politician sign a statement of truth, under a plausible pain of perjury, for everything they say.
Yes, there will be times where the likes of Johnson and Trump will hit the limits of what they can get away with.
But what those opposed to the likes of Johnson and Trump need to do is find ways of defeating them without resort to processes and evidence.
Process and evidence have their valuable place within any polity, but they are not enough.
The likes of Johnson and Trump need to be defeated politically too.

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Telling the story of how the “serious disruption” public order statutory instrument was passed

14th June 2023

Here is a story about law-making told in different ways.

The law in question is a statutory instrument made under the Public Order Act 1986 – the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 – which comes into force tomorrow.

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By way of background

A statutory instrument is what is called “secondary legislation” and it has the same effect as primary legislation, as long as it is within the scope of the primary legislation under which it is made.

Statutory instruments are, in effect, executive-made legislation.  They still have to have parliamentary approval, but they are not open to amendment and rarely have debate or a vote.

Often the parliamentary approval of statutory instruments goes through on the nod, but sometimes they need to have a positive vote in favour.

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The government’s version

The first way of telling the story is from the government’s perspective.

The statutory instrument was put to a vote in the House of Commons on Monday with the Home Secretary herself leading the debate.

At the end of the debate there was a contested vote, which the government won:The (elected) House of Commons having shown its approval, the House of Lords did not pass a “fatal” motion against the statutory instrument.

Instead the House of Lords passed a motion (merely) regretting the Statutory Instrument:

The vote (against the government) was as follows:

The House of Lords also had a specific vote on a fatal motion, which was defeated:
And when the official opposition was criticised by for not supporting the fatal motion, a frontbencher was unapologetic:

And this is the first way of telling this story: there was a Commons vote; the Lords showed disdain but did not exercise any veto inn view of the Commons vote; and so the statutory instrument became law as the result of a democratic legislative process.

Told this way, the story is about how laws can and are made by such a democratic legislative process

Nothing to see here.

But.

But but but.

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The constitutionalist version

There is another way of telling this story.

This account starts with the Public Order Act 2023 when it was a bill before parliament.

At a very late stage of the passage of that bill the government sought to amend it so as to include provisions that were substantially similar to what ended up in the statutory instrument passed this week.

The government failed to get those amendments through the House of Lords. and so they were dropped from the bill before it became an Act.

As a House of Lords committee noted:

The Home Office could not answer these basic questions:For this committee to say that it believes “this raises possible constitutional issues that the House may wish to consider” is serious stuff.

What had happened is that the Home Office, having failed to bounce parliament into accepting these amendments into primary legislation by very late amendments, has come up with this alternative approach.

Told this alternative way, the story is not about how laws can and are made by a democratic legislative process.

Instead, the story is about how a democratic legislative process can be frustrated and circumvented by the executive.

Instead of using primary legislation so as to make substantial (and illiberal) changes to the law, the government has used statutory instrument which cannot be amended or considered in detail, and has used its whipped House of Commons majority to face down Lords opposition.

Plenty to see here.

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The story may continue

Yet this is not how the story (told in either way) may end.

The thing about statutory instruments is that, unlike primary legislation, they can be challenged at the High Court.

This means that there can sometimes be a sort of constitutional see-saw: the convenience of using statutory instruments (as opposed to primary legislation) can be checked and balanced by an application for judicial review.

And that is what the group Liberty is doing, and its letter before claim is here.

In essence, the argument is that – notwithstanding the parliamentary approval – the statutory instrument is outside the scope of the relevant provisions of the Public Order Act 1986.

Liberty seems to have a good point, but any challenge to secondary legislation is legally difficult and it is rare that any such challenge ever succeeds.

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The moral of the story?

The moral of the story, however it is told, is perhaps about the general weakness of our constitutional arrangements in respect of limitations placed upon rights and liberties.

A government, using wide enabling legislation, can put legislation into place that it cannot achieve by passing primary legislation.

This cannot be the right way of doing things, even if Labour is correct about these illiberal measures having the support of the House of Commons.

There are some things our constitutional arrangements do well – and here we can wave at Boris Johnson and Elizabeth Truss having both been found repugnant and spat out by our body politic.

But there are things our constitutional arrangements do badly – and the increasing use (and abuse) by the government of secondary legislation to do things they cannot (or will not) get otherwise enacted in primary legislation worrying.

And a government casually and/or cynically using (and abusing) wide enabling powers is not a story that usually ends well.

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Why the Covid Inquiry publishing reports as it goes along is brilliant news – and a welcome change

13th June 2023

The Covid Inquiry started taking oral evidence from witnesses today, and there is one snippet of news which you may have missed – and that may make all the difference.

Here it is on the Guardian live blog:

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Of the recent(ish) inquiries with which I am most familiar – the Hutton Inquiry, the Chilcot Inquiry, the Leveson Inquiry, and the Daniel Morgan Inquiry – there has been (if I recall correctly) a common problem.

Yes, there was great apprehension and even excitement on the eve of publication – often after years of suspense.

And then: the report drops.

Volumes and volumes of text, often with schedules of evidence, are all plonked into the public domain.

Time-poor reporters (and their attention-poor readers) scramble to get a sense of the report – often relying on executive summaries.

There are word-searches and there is scan-reading, and there is a hurried hunt for juicy quotes and any smoky gun.

If we are lucky, we may also get a meaningful ministerial statement.

And then: it is all over in a day, leaving the report to specialists and eccentrics.

In a few days, the report will pass into history, and it can be quickly forgotten.

The report may have taken considerable time and resources to put together, but the all-or-nothing manner of its publication can in turn mean that there will not be any similar effort into the media and the public engaging with the report when it is published.

This is why it is sensible – and welcome and refreshing – that the Covid inquiry are not saving everything to one big report at the end of the process.

As well as public, streamed sessions, and an admirable website hosting useful documents, the Inquiry can encourage ongoing engagement by issuing these interim reports.

And, if this is done well, then we may end up up with that rare thing: an Inquiry where the findings and recommendations last longer than a news cycle.

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What if acceptance of Boris Johnson’s resignation from the House of Commons had been delayed – or even refused?

12th June 2023

For a brief, wonderful moment today it seemed that yet more constitutional drama could be squeezed out of the ongoing antics of former prime minister Boris Johnson.

On Friday Johnson announced his resignation from the House of Commons:

“So I have today written to my Association in Uxbridge and South Ruislip to say that I am stepping down forthwith and triggering an immediate by-election.”

Some (including me) took his deftly worded statement to mean that he was resigning as a Member of Parliament with immediate effect.

But look where “immediate” is actually inserted in his statement.  Clever.

In fact, Johnson did not resign from the House of Commons on Friday.

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Of course – strictly speaking – a Member of Parliament cannot “resign” – though there is no point in making this distinction in general commentary.

What a voluntarily departing Member of Parliament has to do is to place themselves in disqualification from sitting in the House of Commons.

And in practice, this means applying for and being appointed to one of two ancient offices for profit.

This is section 4 of the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1974:

In practice what this means is that a Member of Parliament has to make an application to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for appointment to one of these offices – and when the Chancellor of the Exchequer endorses the warrant of appointment, the parliamentary seat becomes vacant.

This, in turn, means – thought this is a distinct step – a writ for a by-election can then be moved in the House of Commons.

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This is what Erskine May, the parliamentary rulebook says:

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Usually, there is no problem with any of this pantomime – for usually such a resignations are one-offs and occasional.

And so normally the appointments gently alternate between the two ancient offices.

If more than two Members of Parliament resign at once – as when the Northern Irish unionist Members of Parliament did in 1985 – the appointments have to be staggered so that each office is nominally filled in turn.

These are the lists from Wikipedia of the most recent appointments to both offices, and the reasons for the Member of Parliament leaving the House of Commons:

And although the system does not really make much sense, and is based ultimately on a constitutional fiction (there is no pay – or profit – for holding the office), it works.

There may be no way of resigning as a Member of Parliament in a technical sense, but there is a means of doing so by employing some quaint, archaic mumbo-jumbo.

It is another example of how our constitutional arrangements miss the direct point, and so we have to have a charming work-around instead.

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But.

Earlier today there was the prospect of Johnson bringing excitement to another odd little constitutional corner – though here unwillingly on his part.

(And remember constitutional matters should not be exciting, they should be dull.)

What if…

…the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not appoint Johnson to one of these two offices?

What if, in effect, Johnson’s resignation from the House of Commons was delayed or even refused?

According to the fine experts at the House of Commons Library, it is possible for the appointment to be refused by the Chancellor of the Exchequer – thereby preventing the resignation from taking effect- though this has not happened since Victorian times:

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There is an argument that a Member of Parliament facing an imminent report into their conduct should not be able to resign and avoid any sanction.

And if, in such circumstances, the Chancellor of the Exchequer refused to make the appointment until after the Commons voted on the report and any sanction, it is difficult to see what Johnson could have done about it.

(Though it would have been fascinating and fun to see whether this exercise of discretion by a government minister was amenable to judicial review by the High Court.)

Johnson would have been forced to stay as a Member of Parliament while the privileges committee report was debated and any sanction voted on.

And it is hard to see how he could have avoided it.

*

But alas, we shall not have this constitutional amusement.

For this afternoon Johnson resigned.

Johnson was appointed to the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, and Wikipedia was updated accordingly.

So we will have to wait a bit longer for our next constitutional excitement.

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For more on this procedure, please read the excellent House of Commons Library briefing.

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