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Why the Northern Irish Border Poll of 1973 was both unimportant and profoundly important

19th July 2023

(This post is a long excerpt from a fuller post at the Empty City substack for paying subscribers.)

*

This post is about the border poll that took place in Northern Ireland on 8 March 1973.

The choices in that poll were:

“Do you want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom?

“Do you want Northern Ireland to be joined with the Republic of Ireland outside the United Kingdom?”

(Pic source.)

*

By 591,820 votes to 6,423 votes, on a 56% turnout, the result of the poll was in favour of Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom.

This result was not a surprise, given the electorate of Northern Ireland at the time.

And the low turnout was, in part, caused by a boycott of the exercise by the nationalist community.

*

This 1973 poll – or plebiscite or referendum, for the terminology varied – is not that well-known. Many histories of the period do not mention it.

When it is mentioned the poll is often regarded as a pointless exercise which did nothing to satisfy the unionists, and which certainly had no legitimacy for the nationalists.

And even at the time the poll was regarded as being fairly unimportant, almost trivial.

The poll was imposed by the United Kingdom government during a political and security crisis; the Northern Irish unionists had not asked for any such poll to take place; the nationalists did not campaign or vote; and, in any case, the result was a conclusion foregone.

The poll also had little-to-no direct impact on events: it did not seem to change anything that otherwise would have happened either in 1973 or the years that followed.

Soon the poll was pretty much forgotten about.

And none of the subsequent periodic polls in Northern Ireland which were then envisaged by the United Kingdom government took place.

As such, the poll can be seen as a minor detail, almost a footnote, to the story of Northern Ireland during “the Troubles”.

The 1973 poll was unimportant, at least in any direct sense.

*

But.

But the poll can perhaps now be seen as profoundly important in its implications and consequences, for two reasons.

*

First, this poll was the first referendum under a dedicated Act of the parliament of the United Kingdom, and this meant that it was far easier for the other referendums that followed.

Before 1973, there had been local polls by local councils on local matters in the United Kingdom, held under general and permissive Acts of Parliament that enabled local councils to hold such local polls on local matters.

But this border poll was different – radically different.

It was the first time a matter which would normally be for the parliament in Westminster (or the then Northern Irish parliament at Stormont) was put to the people directly, despite heady notions of parliamentary supremacy or sovereignty, in any or all of the four constituent parts of the United Kingdom.

As my Substack has previously set out, senior British politicians since late Victorian times had sometimes called for referendums, usually to help them out of knotty problems.

But this was the first referendum to actually take place on a matter usually reserved for parliament.

As such, this was the first actual exception to the hitherto hard doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.

Other exceptions would soon follow.

Following this first dedicated referendum there was then the referendum in 1975 on the United Kingdom remaining part of the then European Communities, and then referendums in Scotland and Wales on devolution in 1979.

And those referendums, in turn, meant that by the late 1990s referendums were seen as a valid means for dealing with renewed calls for devolution.

In 1998 a referendum was seen as the obvious means for endorsing the Good Friday Agreement.

Also, from the early 1990s, referendums were frequently demanded in respect of the European Union, and one was finally granted in 2016.

There was even a referendum on electoral reform.

Referendums went from being a constitutional exception to being, at least for certain matters, a constitutional rule.

Yet without the Border Poll of 1973 the referendums of 1975 and 1979 and many of those thereafter may never have taken place.

Perhaps the vote on the Good Friday Agreement would have still occurred, but even then the precedent of 1973 was perhaps instrumental in it being recognised that it was for the people of Northern Ireland (and not their politicians) to make this key decision.

After 1973 the old doctrine of parliamentary supremacy became undermined in reality, if not in strict constitutional theory.

There were certain matters which it became parliament should refer to the people.

*

Second, not only was the border poll an exception to one fundamental principle, it was also an important practical assertion of what was to become another fundamental principle.

For the border poll of 1973 was the first application of what is now a fundamental principle which can be stated as follows: that it is for the people of Northern Ireland to decide whether Northern Ireland is to become part of a unified island of Ireland or to remain part of the United Kingdom.

And note the reference here to “the people” – and thereby the decision is not for the politicians of Northern Ireland or any representative body, such as a Northern Ireland parliament.

This is significant.

The principle – which was first canvassed by the United Kingdom government in the late 1960s – informed and shaped what has happened in Northern Ireland since 1973, via the Good Friday Agreement, to the present day.

And it is this fundamental principle that explains why it is probable there will be a further border poll in Northern Ireland in the next few years.

*

The 1973 Border Poll, however, came about almost by accident, as one of many novel improvisations in a difficult political situation.

Here we need to go back to the United Kingdom’s Ireland Act of 1949 that provided that in no event would Northern Ireland cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the parliament of Northern Ireland.

It was a matter for the parliament of Northern Ireland, and not the Northern Irish people directly.

See section 1(2):

*

But by 1973 there was no parliament of Northern Ireland.

The parliament of Northern Ireland had been suspended.

And so when the government of the United Kingdom, facing the escalation of the Troubles, decided that there should be some affirmation of Northern Ireland’s position in the United Kingdom a decision was made that there should be a direct poll instead.

What had been, under the 1949 Act, a matter for the elected parliament of Northern Ireland was, at a stroke, made a matter for the people of Northern Ireland directly.

The 1949 Act had not said the consent of the people was needed or even should ever be sought on the place of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. It was not an issue for any popular vote.

But in 1973 it was made a matter for the people of Northern Ireland directly, and it has been ever since.

See section 1 of this 1973 Act, which followed the border poll:

And then section 1 of the 1998 Act that gave effect to the Good Friday Agreement:

Never again would an Act of Parliament say the place of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom was a decision to be taken on behalf of the people of Northern Ireland.

*

So in terms of the immediate politics of 1973 the border poll may not have been important, but the use of a referendum for such a question was profound in its implications and consequences.

And as we approach a probable new border poll in Northern Ireland, it is a story that is perhaps worth knowing.

Over at my Empty City Substack I have posted a fuller account of the 1973 border poll for paying subscribers.

**

The fuller article has also been posted at my Patreon.

Any PayPal subscribers wanting access to the fuller article should leave a message below marked private with their email address.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

Posted on 19th July 2023Author David Allen GreenCategories Constitutional and Legal History, Constitutional Law, Democracy, Elections and Voting, Island of Ireland

11 thoughts on “Why the Northern Irish Border Poll of 1973 was both unimportant and profoundly important”

  1. Simon Daukes says:
    19th July 2023 at 15:49

    Very interesting. On a related matter I’d be keen to hear you opine on the 2016 advisory referendum.
    Prior to the unofficial poll Alex Salmond asked a question in parliament wishing to know why since what was being considered was major constitutional change there was no requirement for a “Super majority” normally in the region of 60-66% if a change to the status quo is to be considered. The answer given in parliament by David Liddament (at the time David Cameron’s deputy. Indeed I believe it was at PMQs where Liddament was standing in.) was that no such requirement was necessary since it was only an advisory referendum. Fast forward to the following years and numerous calls for a further referendum which were refused on the grounds that a legitimate decision had been democratically made. But it hadn’t. Why did this not get used by the parliamentary campaigners such as Dominic Grieve?

    Reply
    1. Tim Roll-Pickering says:
      22nd October 2023 at 22:51

      There was a lot of mythology about this moment in Parliament. It actually occurred when Salmond tabled an amendment to do two things, one of which got all of the attention but the other was what Liddington was explicitly referring to.

      Salmond’s amendment would have a) empowered the Returning Officer to declare that the referendum had passed and b) denied them doing so unless it achieved a majority in each of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. In Liddington’s response he rejected b) on the grounds that the United Kingdom is one member state and the people would be voting as one. His comments about “advisory” and “unnecessary” were in relation to a). This was because the declaration in itself was not going to trigger anything legally, nor was the Returning Officer going to leave the declaration and go and post notification of Article 50.

      Unfortunately in the 2016-2020 period a myth took effect that referendums in the UK have qualified majority requirements and selective quoting of this moment added to the mistaken belief.

      There is of course a great irony in an SNP politician demanding a qualified majority given that it was the experience of the 1979 Scottish devolution referendum’s requirement for a minimum of 40% of the total Scottish electorate to vote Yes that rather soured many against such thresholds and the SNP especially opposed it both at the time and afterwards.

      Reply
  2. Philip Bovey says:
    19th July 2023 at 16:29

    Just after the 1975 European referendum I was at a session where the then Attorney-General (at a time when the Law Officers perhaps commanded more respect than now) say that once was an exception, the second was precedented and the third would be routine.

    Reply
  3. Edward says:
    19th July 2023 at 19:32

    Very interesting.

    I doubt very much if there will be a ‘border poll’ in the next few years . A Catholic majority, as there is now, does not translate into a call for a referendum. Taken together, the SDLP ( nationalists) , Sinn Fein ( republicans) , and the various independent republicans, constitute about 42% of the elected representatives. The Good Friday Agreement is noticeably vague about the circumstances in which the Secretary of State (NI) would determine that a vote in favour of leaving the UK was likely to be carried, and thus introduce the procedures for a referendum. But 42% is a long way from the 50% plus 1 formulation for a change of jurisdiction. It cannot be achieved without the support of the middle group which is essentially the Alliance Party. There is no indication that this is forthcoming.

    I cannot see why ( assuming a Labour victory at the next general election) a Secretary of State would be in a hurry to enthuse about a referendum. Apart from the dire precedent of the Brexit referendum, it would stimulate demand for another Indyref in Scotland. That’s the last thing the Labour Party wants just now – or ever?

    But the crucial element is the numbers. And they don’t add up.

    Reply
  4. David says:
    19th July 2023 at 21:34

    Presumably there would also need to be a referendum in the Republic to allow N.I. to join with them – which they may well reject.

    And wouldn’t the E.U. stick their nose in as the province is currently subsidised by Westminster and will themselves need E.U. subsidies. Plus by joining the Republic it would remove the E.U.’s leverage of the U.K. via the Windsor Protocol.

    But, since the advent of the E.U. there is now a third option: an independent Northern Ireland within the E.U. to consider.

    Reply
    1. Jyri Sulin says:
      20th July 2023 at 05:56

      Firstly, it was not us, the EU, who held a referendum to change the ante-2016 status quo, the UK did, ii) it was not our red-lines breaching the GFA, but yours, that made the whole NI protocol a necessity in the first place, iii) we (our politicians) did not meet with loyalist thugs to incite violence, yours did iv) we did not threaten to withhold food supplies to the UK to force the issue, the UK did (with Ireland), v) very importantly, we, the EU, did not promise impossible things to the people of Great Britain, yours did.

      The list above could be endless, but I digress.

      The EU would love nothing else more than to see the UK “removed” from Irish affairs, but the idea that the EU would “lose” its leverage over the UK, if NI rejoins the rest of the island is quite fanciful.

      Our leverage over you/UK is our size, and the fact that your economic well-being depends on maintaining access to our markets — not the other way. There is absolutely nothing the EU needs from the UK in order for us to function. This simple fact is the root of our (EU’s) leverage — and it won’t go away during our life times.

      So, when you lament the EU having leverage over the UK on matters where there is an international treaty agreement in force, please direct your ire towards your own representatives, instead of dreaming up some EU schemes that are just sad and tired “they are after us” myths that Brexiters have been peddling for seven long years, while reality has been bearing down on the promised Brexit fantasies.

      Thank you very much.

      Reply
    2. Jyri Sulin says:
      21st July 2023 at 07:24

      To add.

      An independent Norther Ireland would need to apply to join the EU via TEU Art. 49, just like everybody else.

      It would be an economic basket-case, who could not qualify for an EU membership in a hundred years, and if the EU would made an exception and we’d let them join: an enormous political risk for the EU, as long as loyalist would have any say in the affairs of the new entity.

      A Trojan horse inside the EU destined to wreak havoc on behalf of an ex-member isn’t a really enticing proposition for us in the EU — even on a good day. Since Brexit there hasn’t been many between the EU and and the yours. So that would be a hard “non, nyet (for the Johnsonites amongst you), nein, nee, no”.

      I’d rather have NI unify with Ireland, thus the loyalists would be in such a small minority inside the Irish electorate, that they could do no harm to anyone.

      I guess my point is that an independent NI would be a nightmare for everyone, but would hurt mostly the people of NI, while a reunification with Ireland would offer them much, much better future prospects.

      The present status quo might be economically the most promising option, but it is politically unstable to the point that it renders the economical side moot.

      The trouble with crazy (people) is that it doesn’t care, or know better.

      Reply
  5. Edward says:
    20th July 2023 at 08:15

    There is a commitment to hold a referendum in the Republic of Ireland in order to complement a pro- unity result in a Northern Ireland referendum.

    These events would be major international events. Pro- unity results would have profound consequences for the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, the EU and NATO. They would also generate enormous interest ( to say the least) amongst the global Irish diaspora, especially in the USA. It is likely that most opinion across the EU would support Irish unity.

    In these circumstances no Irish political party could do otherwise than support a pro unity position. With a few eccentric exceptions perhaps, Irish society would follow suit.

    If Unionists are driven to believe that a yes vote in Northern Ireland would be rejected by the Republic there is clearly little left in Unionism. A radical alternative would be to persuade the Catholic/nationalist majority in Northern Ireland that it is welcome as an equally cherished partner in the UK. History, plus recent unionist comment, does not indicate a willingness to consider this option.

    Reply
  6. Ivan says:
    20th July 2023 at 12:14

    We might have expected a plebiscite or plebiscites on these issues to be carried out much sooner, in particular by the Irish Boundary Commission of 1924-5. That’s because its aim, according to the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 that provided for it, was to:

    “…determine in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland.”

    In practice under the ambiguous terms of reference the commission chairman was able to rule out any plebiscites, and restricted its consideration only to a narrow strip along the border.

    This was probably not what many in the Irish Free State imagined the treaty provided for, given that large areas along the border, deep into Northern Ireland, had an extensive catholic predominance.

    The British government achieved the IFS’s agreement to the Commission’s recommendations, of a small net transfer of land (204 sq miles) to the IFS, by bundling it with a resolution of financial disagreements.

    Reply
  7. Jim2 says:
    21st July 2023 at 06:28

    Very curious, I can’t see the UK govt in 1973 having the slightest intention of letting go of NI. So why hold a referendum? I can’t imagine there was a long-term strategy to institute referendums as a tool of government. The result only locked the UK into making a bad situation worse.

    Perhaps there was a small faction in the UK who felt there was some hope of unloading NI somehow – but that never looked likely. So the UK govt got deeper and deeper into the NI tar pit. Such is the way with referendums.

    Reply
    1. Kevin Hall says:
      24th July 2023 at 17:30

      The UK was already locked into the NI troubles. I vaguely remember there being a plebecite, as it was referred to at the time, but not what it was for let alone what motivated it. It didn’t have any impact on the rest of the UK so it was largely ignored in the news at the time. This blog (and the fact that I’ve recently been in Belfast) made me look up the details.

      I suspect there was a hope that having a public vote about remaining in the UK would settle the matter and that Nationalist feeling would fade away as a result. The government knew that the Unionist majority would guarantee a “remain” result so there was no risk of losing NI. The Nationalists knew this too so chose to boycott the election in protest.

      I hadn’t realised that this poll was what opened the door to future referenda. But we seem to be coming full circle. The idea of a referendum to settle a divisive constitutional issue has been poisoned by the outcome of the EU referendum in 2016 which only created deeper division.

      Reply

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