Section 007 – how the government authorises criminal activity by its agents, and a telling recent disclosure

16th December 2020

One theme in recent law and policy has been for the government of the United Kingdom to increasingly place itself and its agents above or beyond the law.

There is, of course, a certain hypocrisy in this given how loudly ministers shout about ‘Law and Order!’.

Sometimes this is done subtly, with limits on the scope judicial review, the law of human rights, and the entitlement to legal aid when one is challenging public bodies.

But sometimes it is done quite openly – indeed brazenly.

One example is the current attempt – which I explain in this video for the Financial Times – to make it effectively impossible to prosecute members of the armed forces for war crimes and torture.

 

Another attempt – though it has just been dropped – was to enable ministers to issue regulations that would break the Brexit withdrawal agreement.

And another attempt is the current Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill before parliament.

The long title of the Bill expressly states that it is to:

‘Make provision for, and in connection with, the authorisation of criminal conduct in the course of, or otherwise in connection with, the conduct of covert human intelligence sources.’

The Bill provides for ‘criminal conduct authorisations’ which are defined as ‘authorisation[s] for criminal conduct in the course of, or otherwise in connection with, the conduct of a covert human intelligence source.’

On the face of the Bill there are no exempt criminal offences – and so, in theory, they would include murder, war crimes and torture.

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At this point one can imagine senior security officials with kindly faces and reassuring manners telling us that, of course, no such offences would ever be committed.

But.

It is a matter of public record that the United Kingdom state was complicit in the murder of civil rights lawyer Patrick Finucane in 1989.

The United Kingdom state has also been complicit in the torture of civilians, in Northern Ireland, Kenya and Iraq.

The sheer volume of accumulated historical evidence is that, yes, we really should be worrying our little heads about what the United Kingdom state and its agents are capable of when they think it can get away with it.

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And there is now a more up-to-date reason to be concerned about the lack of effective controls and accountability.

Here the relevant provision is the wonderfully numbered section 007 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994.

(Ok, it is section 7 – but it amuses me.)

This provides for ministerial authorisations for people to break the law outside the British and Irish isles and then not have any criminal or civil liability for those acts in the United Kingdom.

It is a remarkable and little-known provision, and is worth a good look.

This is the so-called ‘licence to kill’.

And, of course, senior security officials with kindly faces and reassuring manners will tell us that the power would never be abused, and that those granting the authorisations will only do so on the basis of full information.

But as set out in yesterday’s Guardian, there has been a problem.

This was spotted by the fine organisation Reprieve, hidden away on page 59 of a dense 168 page report, in two paragraphs 9.39 and 9.40 (emphasis added):

‘9.39 We reviewed a section 7 submission relating to a high-risk SIS [Secret Intelligence Service] agent case overseas. SIS identified a risk that the agent may be involved in serious criminality overseas. SIS did not encourage, condone or approve any such criminality on the part of their agent. In their submission, SIS set out that they had secured the agent’s cooperation on terms of full transparency about the activities in which the agent was involved. It included some clear ‘red lines’, setting out conduct that was not authorised and would result in the termination of SIS’s relationship with the agent.

‘9.40 On renewal, six months after the original submission, SIS set out a number of indicators that the agent may have been involved in, or have contemplated, the serious criminality referenced above. We concluded that, on the basis of this new information, SIS’s ‘red lines’ had most likely been breached, but the renewal submission failed to make this clear. Whilst the submission referred to SIS’s ‘red lines’ provided information about criminality that may have occurred and noted an increased risk in the case, it did not make expressly clear that SIS’s ‘red lines’ had probably been crossed. We concluded that the renewal did not provide a comprehensive overview of available information which we believe would have provided the Secretary of State with a fuller and more balanced picture. SIS immediately responded to these concerns by updating the FCO.’

Or, as the Guardian rightly put it:

‘MI6 failed to make clear to the foreign secretary that a “high risk agent” operating overseas had probably engaged in “serious criminality” until it was pointed out by an independent regulator last year.’

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This means that there is very recent evidence that the United Kingdom security services do not provide appropriate information to those making authorisations in respect of criminal activity.

If this is happening with section 7 authorisations for foreign law-breaking, there is no reason to believe this will not also happen under the current bill providing for authorisations for domestic law-breaking.

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The United Kingdom government has recently put forward legislative proposals for limiting torture and war crimes prosecutions, authorising criminal conduct for agents of the security forces, and even for powers to break the Brexit withdrawal agreement.

There has never been a government that has put so much legislative effort into making it possible to break laws rather than into making laws.

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Remembering David Cornwell – John le Carré – who would not be surprised at any of this.

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European Union law and the United Kingdom – an obituary

14th December 2020

Over at Prospect magazine my column for the Christmas/New Year special edition was an obituary – for European Union law in the United Kingdom.

Please go over there to have a read – and I just want to develop and add some points here.

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European Union law is radically different from the common law of England and Wales (I am not qualified to speak of the laws of Scotland and Northern Ireland, though similar points may be valid).

By ‘radical’ I mean (literally) that it went to the root of things.

The effect of European Union law was not only to benefit particular policy areas (for example, employment and the environment and so on) – though there is no doubt that whole ranges of policy are better off for the influence of European Union law.

The impact of European Union was also to how one thought about law – and about policy and politics.

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First, the law of the European Union is often ‘purposive’ – in which to understand any legal instrument (a directive or a regulation or a legally binding decision) one often has to go through pages of recitals, other materials, and even back to the ultimate bases of the the provision in the European Union treaties.

This, of course, can be an interesting – sometimes exciting – intellectual exercise but it really does not serve the purpose of legal certainty.

And often it was difficult to say with confidence what the ultimate tribunals of European Union law (the court of first instance and the court of justice) would say the law would be in any given situation.

And unlike courts in common law jurisdictions, the judgments of European Union law judges are often not reasoned but are instead declarative, even assertive.

As a general rule of thumb: a European Union legal instrument is as helpful and detailed as European Union court judgment is not.

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Second, the public law of the European Union has a conceptual unity that the public law of England and Wales does not – or at least did not before the United Kingdom’s membership of the union and its predecessor European communities.

(Public law is the term for the law that regulates public bodies and those exercising public functions and provides for what rights can be enforced against them.)

In England and Wales we, in many respects, did not even have anything one could even call ‘public law’ until the 1960s.

There was instead a mix of actions and proceedings one could take against the crown, against statutory corporations, against courts, and against those holding various public offices.

European Union public law instead provided for a general approach to emanations of the state – and of the rights one could enforce against them.

The European Union legal concept of ‘proportionality’ (that is that a public body should only interfere with the rights of others to the extent necessary to serve a legitimate purpose) was also a welcome change to the brutal and permissive approach of our administrative law – which can be fairly described as allowing public bodies to get away with what they can, unless it is irrational.

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Third, the European Union and its predecessor organisations are creatures of law as much as of policy and politics.

And although one should never underestimate the push and shove of policy and politics, when dealing with the European Union one always should have regard to law.

This was a recurring mistake for United Kingdom politicians.

For example, before the 2016 referendum there was an attempt by then prime minister David Cameron to force through a ‘deal’.

But as this blog has previously explained, the Cameron team wrongly thought it would just be a matter of bombast and confrontation – that the United Kingdom just needed to want something and to demand it loudly.

There were, however, real limits to what the European Union could agree to, at least without treaty changes.

And the same problem happened again and again during the exit negotiations and now the negotiations for the future relationship.

The European Union takes process and legal texts seriously, and the United Kingdom under Theresa May and Boris Johnson did not.

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You will note that this post – and the Prospect column – are not unmixed celebrations of European Union law.

Instead, I have attempted a critical appraisal (though one set out simply and I hope accessibly).

And this is partly because my own ultimate view on Brexit is ambivalent.

In the early 1990s I believed that it would have been better for the United Kingdom to have left the European Union at the time of Maastricht treaty.

It seemed to me then that the trajectory of the European Union towards wider competencies (foreign policy and justice and home affairs) and currency union would not end well in respect of the United Kingdom.

(And it did not.)

But by around 2000 I thought any extraction of the United Kingdom from the European Union would not be worth the time and effort to deal with decades of entwined law and policy.

(And it has not been.)

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The break of the law of the jurisdictions of the United Kingdom from the law of the European Union is going to be messy.

It is not going to be a neat clean break.

And the laws of the United Kingdom are not – thankfully – going to revert back to 1973.

The direct effect and application of European Union law in the United Kingdom may be over – and that is why an obituary is appropriate.

 Its influence, however, will continue for decades.

The United Kingdom may have ‘taken back control’ of its laws – but Brexit will certainly not free domestic law from the impact of the law of the European Union.

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Sovereignty and ‘Sovereignty!’

11th December 2020

One feature of contemporary politics in both the United Kingdom and United States is the way descriptive words and phrases have become slogans with a very different meaning.

This blog has already described the unhappy juxtaposition between ‘Law and Order!’ and law and order – and we now have a populist president in the United States using his power to pardon so as to place people above and beyond the law, while the populist government of the United Kingdom sought recently to expressly legislate that it could break the law.

And a similar distinction can be made about sovereignty and ‘Sovereignty!’.

In the United Kingdom it would seem that one explanation of the ongoing failure for a trade agreement to be finalised with the European Union is because of this ‘s’ word.

Here, as examples, are some recent tweets from the United Kingdom’s head negotiator.

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So what does this ‘s’ word mean?

From a legal perspective, sovereignty is really about two things.

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First, sovereignty is about the ultimate source of political power in any given polity.

In the United Kingdom, as its name suggests, the ultimate source of political power is the crown.

Some would say is not correct to even speak of the ‘sovereignty of parliament’ – the power of parliament to make or unmake any law always depends on a bill receiving royal assent.

Only with the crown’s approval does a law then have super-duper magical power.

Resolutions and motions of either or both houses of parliament may bind parliament but they do not have the same effect outside as legislation.

That is why I and others tend to write of ‘supremacy’ of parliament, not sovereignty.

The crown also is the source of political power elsewhere in the United Kingdom constitution.

It is the source of power – somewhat obviously – in respect of the so-called ‘royal prerogative’ – where the executive gets to do things which have legal effect without any legislative basis.

It is the source of power with ‘royal charters’, instruments which can have legal effects similar to legislation.

And the crown is the ultimate source of power for the judiciary, at least for the high court of England and Wales.

(This means that in constitutional terms, the two Miller cases on prime ministerial power can be characterised as being about the crown in the courts adjudicating on the powers of the crown as exercised by ministers so as to circumvent the crown in parliament.)

This form of sovereignty is quite unaffected by anything Boris Johnson and David Frost may or may not agree to with the European Union.

Just as parliament was always able to repeal the European Communities Act 1972, parliament will be able to make or unmake any law which flows from the post-Brexit relationship agreement, and that will be respected by the courts.

So this cannot be the meaning of sovereignty that Johnson and Frost have in mind.

Nothing in any post-Brexit trade agreement is relevant to this meaning of sovereignty at all.

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The second legal meaning of sovereignty is not so much about the source of power but about legal capacity.

A sovereign thing can do and not do as it wishes.

And one thing a sovereign thing can do is to enter agreements with other sovereign things.

This is where Johnson and Frost appear to misunderstand the ‘s’ word.

For them, ‘Sovereignty!’ means that the United Kingdom cannot and should not enter into and be bound by any international agreements.

But one test of sovereignty is that a thing is capable of entering into international agreements – the cart is not before the horse.

In general terms, being able to accept obligations is the very point of sovereignty: that a nation state can enter into a treaty means that it is a sovereign state.

(For more on the fascinating history of sovereignty and treaties, see here.)

This is why, for example, Canada, Australia and New Zealand insisted on being separate signatories to the surrender instrument of Japan, and to not allow the United Kingdom to sign on behalf of the then empire.

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Sovereignty thereby does not mean that the United Kingdom cannot and should not enter into international agreements.

Sovereignty means that the United Kingdom can do so.

And any international agreement means accepting obligations that restrict autonomy, for that is the nature of an obligation.

Under the North Atlantic treaty, for example, the United Kingdom has an obligation to go to war even if it not attacked itself

Article 5 of that treaty provides:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Some would say that Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty is a greater interference with the ‘s’ word of the United Kingdom than anything which has come from the European Union.

And it is difficult to reconcile many statements of government-supporting politicians on sovereignty in respect of the European Union with their continued support for the United Kingdom being part of NATO.

Similar points can also be made for the United Kingdom’s obligations under the United Nations charter and indeed under any other international treaties.

Trade-offs on autonomy are a feature and not a bug of being a sovereign state.

An analogy is with being able to marry: when a person reaches their majority they can enter into a marriage contract should they so wish, but being in their majority does not compel them to either marry or not marry, and if they marry they can always divorce.

The Johnson-Frost approach to the ‘s’ word is confused.

They seem to think sovereignty means that the United Kingdom cannot and should not enter into international agreements, whereas sovereignty actually means that the United Kingdom can do so should it want to do so.

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An indication of the United Kingdom government’s incorrect understanding of sovereignty was set out in a white paper earlier in the Brexit process:

“The sovereignty of Parliament is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution. Whilst Parliament has remained sovereign throughout our membership of the EU, it has not always felt like that.”

This is about “feelings” – not law or policy.

Brexit as therapy – so as to make the United Kingdom “feel” it is a sovereign state.

And this is the fundamental misconception of those who assert ‘Sovereignty!’ just to make themselves feel better.

Sovereignty exists anyway.

Sovereignty does not care about your feelings.

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The fundamental problem of Brexit is that a complex and slow task has been treated as easy and to be done at speed

10th December 2020

Three photographs summarise perfectly the course of the Brexit negotiations.

Few people will claim that the negotiations for the terms of the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union and then for the terms of the future relationship have gone perfectly, or even well.

Is there a single cause for this?

Some would say that Brexit in and of itself could never have gone well – that for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union was a project that would always have ended badly.

That Brexit was misconceived to begin with.

Perhaps.

But a Brexit done slowly and gradually, over several years, with full acknowledgment of how complicated an exercise would have been possible (even if not desirable).

Also possible would have been a Brexit where the United Kingdom had properly worked out what it wanted from departure before starting the exit process.

But these things did not happen.

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For me, the most fundamental problem with Brexit is not so much the principle of departure but the constant underestimation by the United Kingdom government of what would be involved in a member state unravelling over 45 years of entwined law and policy.

The task was always going to be complex, and it was not one which could be done at speed.

But those in charge of United Kingdom policy have treated the task as if it were simple – David Davis winging it, Theresa May believing it would all be as easy as when she opted in and out of European Union policy areas as home secretary, and the slogans and bravado of Boris Johnson.

Taking back control, Brexit means Brexit, get Brexit done.

Of course, the terms of Article 50 itself did not help in this respect – with its envisaged brisk two year period – but this period was capable of extension, and indeed it was extended.

There was also the somewhat artificial distinction between the exit agreement and the agreement for the future relationship, and it would have been much better if there had been one overall negotiation and agreement.

Yet even taking those process points into account, the Brexit exercise would still have been botched because the United Kingdom government had not properly prepared and thought-through its Brexit policy before embarking on departure.

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Perhaps Brexiters thought – not without good reason – that any delay would mean a Brexit denied.

And so, unless Brexit was done at speed, it would not be done at all.

Perhaps.

But a Brexit delayed and maybe not done at all would have been preferable to this botched Brexit.

The complexity of Brexit will not go away because it is ignored and the process done at undue speed – the problems will just manifest themselves differently.

Brexit will never ‘be done’ – at least not for the rest of the 2020s.

Brace, brace.

**

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The fork in the road to Brexit – Boris Johnson has to choose between being irresponsible or being unprincipled

9th December 2020

The United Kingdom prime minister Boris Johnson has come to a fork in the road on his Brexit journey.

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One direction is for those who are irresponsible.

To take this route he has to go for ‘no deal’ – that is for the United Kingdom to not have a relationship in place with the European Union once the Brexit transition period ends on 31st December 2020.

This will mean no agreement on tariffs, or on the trade in services, or on security and information sharing, or on numerous policy areas not to do with fishing as well as fishing, or on regulatory equivalence and how any divergence is managed.

This would be an extraordinary disruptive change in our relationship with the European Union in just a few days from now.

But the irresponsible route has been taken before in the Brexit journey: a referendum without any preparation for a Leave vote; an Article 50 notification without planning or thought; and a refusal to extend the transition period when there was an opportunity to do so.

The ‘irresponsible’ route has been taken before: it has ‘form’.

One can imagine that route being chosen.

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The other direction is for the unprincipled.

To take this route Johnson has to renege on many things he has said he would not do.

He needs to accept the European Union’s unbending position on regulatory equivalence and on governance of the agreement.

And this will conflict with the things he has said to his political supporters and others on ‘sovereignty’ and limiting the reach of Brussels.

To now go against these commitments would be hypocritical

But this route also has been taken before in his Brexit journey: he wrote two columns, for and against, and made promises to the then prime minister before supporting leave; he voted against and then for the next prime minister’s deal; he accepted the withdrawal agreement on terms he had previously opposed; and he told the electorate he had an ‘oven ready deal’ before then legislating so as to break that same deal.

The unprincipled route too has been taken before and has ‘form’.

One can imagine that route being taken instead.

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Clever wags will, of course, respond to the title of this post with ‘both’.

But he cannot do both, not on this occasion.

While there are elements of irresponsibility and lack of principle in many actions he – and most other politicians – will take, there is a real and stark decision here.

A binary situation: either/or.

Johnson either accepts the terms on offer from the European Union, or he does not.

There may be other apparent routes: he could affect that the European Union has given in on something, or there could perhaps be (yet another) extension of the Brexit process.

But these deflections hide or delay the ultimate decision: no deal or a deal on the terms of the European Union.

The decision that is taken may perhaps one day seem to historians as inevitable all along.

But looking at it from the outside in early December 2020, it is genuinely difficult to work out which route this prime minister will take.

Both directions have the force of narrative behind them.

Both seem plausible next chapters in the book of Brexit.

So the question for our prime minister is: are you more irresponsible than unprincipled, or vice versa?

**

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Brexit will be with either no deal or a deal on the terms of the European Union – and it is difficult to see how any Brexit could have ended differently

8th December 2020

We are now at the latest Brexit endgame.

Another endgame in that succession of contests between the United Kingdom and the European Union that we call Brexit.

This latest contest is about whether there will be an agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom for the relationship following the end of the transition period on 31st December 2020.

And the United Kingdom has a difficult choice.

The choice is between the United Kingdom agreeing to the terms on offer or refusing those terms.

Take these terms or leave them.

This outcome, like previous outcomes in this process, will be determined by whether the United Kingdom refuses to agree a thing or agrees that thing on the terms of the European Union.

And this is how ‘taking back control’ has worked out in practice.

The European Union’s way, or the highway.

And, as before, it is more likely than not that the United Kingdom will agree a thing on the terms of the European Union.

This latest agreement was to be called the ‘treaty of London’ as a patriotic gesture.

But instead, it is Boris Johnson who has been summoned this week to Brussels.

Perhaps the European Union will not be so insensitive as to provide a disused Eurostar railway carriage as the venue for any reeluctant signature of instruments of the trade agreement.

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Is ‘no deal’ still possible?

There is a real prospect that Johnson going to Brussels will not mean he agrees to the presented trade agreement.

Even with the United Kingdom government jettisoning the makeweight issues of fisheries and the Internal Market Bill clauses, there are two serious issues of contention.

The outstanding issues are the governance of the agreement (that is, how is to be enforced if things go wrong) and the ‘level playing field’ of regulatory equivalence (that is, how is any divergence from the current common commercial standards be managed).

A moment’s thought should make any sensible person realise that these two issues go to the very centre of any future relationship agreement.

For these issues to still be open just days before the end of the Brexit transition period is not a good sign.

There is no indication or reason to believe that the European Union will compromise on either issue.

Not least because the European Union will be fully aware of how any compromise in this agreement will affect its credibility in other trade agreements, and European Union negotiators are not fools.

So it will either be the European Union’s way, or the highway.

And the United Kingdom is perfectly capable of choosing the daft way.

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Could things have been different?

What if, for example, the United Kingdom had exercised its (now lost) power to request an extension of a further year to the transition period?

That certainly would have been prudent from a practical perspective: it would have enabled the European Union and the United Kingdom to deal with other pressing issues, not least the coronavirus pandemic.

Yet.

Does anyone seriously think the United Kingdom government would have used this further year working out what it wanted from Brexit?

It has had since 2016 to work out its position, and there is no reason to think that another year would have made any difference.

Had there been a year’s extension to the transition period, the United Kingdom’s (lack of) position would have been the same in December 2021 as it is now in December 2020.

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So, if this is the current predicament – who is to blame?

There are currently pundits putting forward the view that the lack of a ‘soft’ Brexit, with the United Kingdom staying in either the single market and/or the customs union is somehow the fault of those who were not in government since 2016.

Remainers are certainly culpable for losing the referendum – after 43 years of membership, the referendum was theirs to lose.

And, in my view, Remain lost the 2016 referendum far more than Leave won it.

But once Theresa May made ‘Brexit means Brexit’ the basis of her bid to become prime minister and Conservative party leadership, there is no plausible chain of events that would have led to any Brexit being a ‘soft’ Brexit rather than a hard one.

(Brexit may have been avoided by a general election or a further referendum, or there may have been endless delays in sending the Article 50 notification – but if Brexit was to happen it was never going to be a happy one.)

‘Brexit means Brexit’ quickly became the red lines, and the red lines in turn necessarily meant the United Kingdom  leaving the customs union and the single market.

Remainers can be blamed for losing the referendum, but not for government policy on Brexit thereafter.

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Now we are a few days before the end of the transition period, without either an agreement or much clue.

Both a trade agreement on the terms of the European Union and no deal seem possible.

This is perhaps the worst possible position for the United Kingdom to be in at this time.

But since May told us ‘Brexit means Brexit’ it is difficult to see how any departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union could have ended up any better.

Brace, brace.

**

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Brexit, deal, no deal, and the politics of easy answers

6th December 2020

Today is a Sunday, one of the last Sundays of the year, and we still do not know if there will be a deal in place from 1st January 2021 for the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union.

One hand, there are three big pointers to a deal being possible: both parties want a deal, it is in the best interests that there is a deal, and both sides are still talking.

And it is still only the first week of December and, even taking the impending public holidays into account, there is still time for a deal to be finalised and even ratified if minds are focused and there is goodwill among all those involved.

But.

On the other hand, no amount of goodwill and focus will lead to a deal if the parties cannot agree on substantial issues.

There appears to be three issues of unresolved contention: fisheries, the ‘level playing field’ (that is, common and enforceable commercial and trade standards), and governance (that is, the ongoing enforceability) of the agreement.

Of these, it is difficult to believe that fisheries is really that significant – it is a relatively small commercial sector, and the parties have mutual interests in one side catching the fish and and selling the fish to the other.

A cynical person may think that the fisheries issue is only still prominent so as to provide domestic cover to the United Kingdom government against domestic political concern about the other two issues, which do go to  post-Brexit sovereignty and control.

Fisheries policy as a red herring.

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The trade agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union was supposed to be so easy.

The then-international trade secretary said in 2017:

“The free trade agreement that we will have to do with the European Union should be one of the easiest in human history.”

His reasoning?

“We are already beginning with zero tariffs, and we are already beginning at the point of maximal regulatory equivalence, as it is called. In other words, our rules and our laws are exactly the same.”

What he missed, of course, is that one main purpose of an agreement would be about what happens after day one: how is equivalence maintained and any divergence managed?

Points so obvious it is painful to realise that an international trade secretary did not realise this.

A Brexit secretary once boasted it would be easy to put in place a free trade area ten times bigger than the European Union.

Leaving aside the fact that such an area would be larger than the world’s economy, and so presumably would include the Clangers and other extraterrestrials, the United Kingdom has actually ended up with a free trade area smaller than the United Kingdom – with a trade barrier down the Irish sea.

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It all seemed so easy, and it has it not turned out to be easy at all.

And this comes to the most basic problem with the United Kingdom’s approach to Brexit.

A complex problem has been treated as if it was a simple problem.

Any difficulty was to be met with chants of ‘Taking Back Control’ and ‘Get Brexit Done’.

The huge political and economic challenges of extracting the United Kingdom from forty-seven years of entangled and entwined law and policy was for the likes of Boris Johnson and Michael Gove no more difficult than writing a punchy 1100-word column against a slightly flexible deadline.

This is what often happens with populism – which (as this blog has said before) can be described as the promotion of easy answers in exchange for electoral support.

And so we have ended up with a month to go, with no idea what will be the agreed substantial and enforceable terms of trade between the European Union and the United Kingdom, and a real possibility that there will be no agreed terms of trade.

Brace, brace.

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Brexit makes no legal difference to the United Kingdom being able to authorise the new coronavirus vaccine

3rd December 2020

For the launch of any vaccine, credibility is essential.

And so senior government ministers and other politicians should not be lying about the regulatory aspects of the new vaccine so to score points for Brexit.

This is the Leader of the House of Commons, the cabinet minister responsible for the government’s legislative programme.

https://twitter.com/Jacob_Rees_Mogg/status/1334068994345754625

This is a health minister.

And this is a government-supporting backbencher.

You will see these statements are not about Brexit allowing the United Kingdom to authorise the new vaccine more quickly as a matter of policy.

Each statement directly and expressly attributes the speed of the authorisation to a change in the law made possible by Brexit.

This, however, is false.

The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency confirmed yesterday it was acting under EU law when it it made the authorisation.

Even the Prime Minister did not endorse the claim that Brexit made any legal difference.

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The fact is that Brexit made no legal difference to the authorisation of the new vaccine.

Such an authorisation was (and is) possible under European Union law.

The relevant provision is Article 5(2) of the Directive 2001/83/EC.

Here is the proof in back and white.

European Union Directives do not necessarily need to be implemented to have legal effect, but for completeness the implementing domestic legislation for Article 5(2) is Regulation 174 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012.

Until 31 December 2020 under the Brexit transition arrangements, Article 5(2) has legal effect in the United Kingdom – and even after 1 January 2020 Regulation 174 would still be part of domestic law.

Brexit therefore made no legal difference.

So what is the recent amendment mentioned by the politicians?

That appears to be a reference to the The Human Medicines (Coronavirus and Influenza) (Amendment) Regulations 2020.

But those regulations do not amend or directly affect Regulation 174 – you will see they skip straight over it and add supplementary provisions.

The recent amendment is thereby irrelevant to the legal ability of the United Kingdom to authorise the vaccine.

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The cabinet minister responsible for the government’s legislative programme and health ministers would know that Brexit made no legal difference to the United Kingdom’s ability to authorise the new vaccine.

They would know the correct legal basis for authorisation of the new vaccine: that is their job and they would have been briefed.

But they chose to knowingly promote a falsehood instead, just to score a point for Brexit.

This was dangerously irresponsible, given that any false statements about the new vaccine may be exploited by anti-vaxxers.

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How Brexit may lead to Scottish independence and Irish unification

1st December 2020

So familiar is the three-word phrase ‘the United Kingdom’ that it can be forgotten that it does not name any particular country.

It is instead a description of dry and abstract political arrangement – the kingdoms that are (somehow) united could be anywhere on the globe.

Of course, the term is short for ‘the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ – but the shorter form is more common.

It is worth pausing and thinking about the phrase, as it reminds us that the United Kingdom is itself a political union, as much as the European Union or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

And political unions come and go: there is no inherent reason why any political union is permanent.

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This post is prompted by a tweet yesterday from the Conservative leader in Scotland.

The sentiment of the second sentence of the tweet can, however, be applied to another example of ‘independence’.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1333459489383649282

And this will be a recurring problem for British Conservative politicians in opposing Scottish independence: the arguments they deployed in respect of Brexit and against the European Union can be re-fashioned in turn by those in favour of dissolving the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

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For what it is worth (and it is not worth much as someone writing from England), I happen to support both Scottish independence and an Ireland united by consent.

This is not because I am anti-English and a rootless cosmopolitan, but a recognition that, in the end, all political unions will tend to come and go.

And although I dislike all forms of nationalism (which often tend to be illiberal), self-determination is very much a liberal value.

The people of Scotland and of Northern Ireland (and of Wales) should decide on their own political arrangements.

The United Kingdom is not necessarily a permanent arrangement.

Indeed, but for events before the Norman conquest, England itself could have carried on for many centuries being a geographic expression with a collection of smaller kingships (Wessex, Mercia, Northumbria), just as Spain did until the early modern period, and Italy and Germany did until the nineteenth century.

‘Great Britain’ itself – a combination of the union of the English and Scottish crowns and then of parliaments 1603 to 1707 – has no greater claim for political permanence than, say, the combined role of the British monarch being also the Elector of Hannover (which lasted from 1714 to 1837).

(On ‘Great Britain’ being a construct, it is worth reading – or at least knowing about – Linda Colley’s Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837.)

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But liberal arguments may work both ways.

The liberal principles of internationalism and self-determination can often be used both for and against any particular attempt at political union – for example, an independent Scotland (having exercised self-determination) will seek to be part of the European Union.

The European Union itself has no claim either to permanence, and it may one day join a list of historical attempts at unifying Europe.

Brexit and the recent political events in Poland and Hungary are an existentialist challenge to the European Union, which it may or may not survive.

The point is that no political structure is necessarily eternal.

Many once thought the sun would never ever set on the British Empire, before its fairly rapid dismantlement after the Second World War.

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There is also a plausible argument that it was only membership of the European Union of both the United Kingdom and Ireland that enabled the peace process in Northern Ireland to work and the Good Friday Agreement to be put in place.

Take away the European Union and that handy practical solution becomes unstuck.

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So one particular irony that may come from Brexit is that the so-called Conservative and Unionist Party – by its absolute insistence on forcing through departure from the European Union – may be instrumental in breaking up the union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

An independence referendum in Scotland and a border poll in Norther Ireland are both now more likely than not in the next few years – and both may well go against being part of a United Kingdom.

And that would be an exercise in ‘taking back control’ – just not the ‘taking back control’ that Brexiters perhaps had in mind.

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In one month the stabilisers are set to be removed from the Brexit bicycle

30th November 2020

Today is the last day of November and in one month’s time, on the last day of December 2020, the Brexit transition period is set to end – by automatic operation of law.

The stabilisers will be coming off the Brexit bicycle.

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The United Kingdom formally departed the European Union on 31 January 2020.

It has not now been a Member State for ten months.

But the effect of ceasing to be a member was artificially delayed by a transition period that was to last until at least 31 December 2020.

This transition period meant that, with some minor exceptions, the substance of European Union law and policy would continue to apply in respect of the United Kingdom even though it was no longer actually a member.

There was the possibility of extending this transition period until the end of next year – which would have been sensible not least because of the ongoing impact of the coronavirus pandemic – but the United Kingdom chose not to seek such an extension, and the formal deadline for that extension is now passed.

There is still, perhaps, a possibility of a formal extension even now – it would not be legally or procedurally easy, and it would need the urgent goodwill of all the European Union Member States – but this is increasingly unlikely.

And so, unless something exceptional happens, the United Kingdom will leave the transition arrangements at the end of next month.

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The next issue is whether there will be an agreement (or agreements) in place between the United Kingdom and the European Union in respect of trade and other matters.

There is already an exit deal in place between the European Union and United Kingdom, which is (supposedly) binding on the parties – and it is this agreement which was freely and knowingly entered into a year ago that the United Kingdom government is now seeking to breach with its proposed internal market legislation.

But that exit deal was primarily for certain tidying-up matters in respect of the departure, rather than the general ongoing relationship (though some provisions regarding Ireland were intended to have lasting effect).

With one month to go – and with no time for proper scrutiny and possibly no time even for ratification – there is still no agreement in place on the ongoing relationship.

It appears one issue is fish and fisheries policy – but it would seem there is still not agreement on far more fundamental issues such as governance of the agreement (that is, what happens when things go wrong or a party breaks its word) and the ‘level playing field’ (that is, will both sides have enforceable and equal standards against the other for commercial activity).

Governance and the ‘level playing field’ are not minor issues, but go to the very heart of any future relationship.

The various antics of United Kingdom government – not just limited to the internal market legislation – have made the European Union nervous about governance – and as has been said, trust is good but law is far better.

The United Kingdom should have spent these last few months showing the European Union – and other potential partners for trade agreements around the world – that it could be trusted to abide with international agreements.

But instead the United Kingdom has, at this most critical of times, shown the opposite – and so has created a needless but major moral hazard.

What serious potential international trading partner would now trust the United Kingdom to keep its word?

And in respect of the ‘level playing field’, the European Union is also – and again understandably – nervous about United Kingdom ministers unilaterally reneging on agreed and enforceable commercial standards in the name of ‘sovereignty’.

Because of all this, there is a non-trivial risk of there not being any formal commercial relationship in place for 1 January 2021.

And there is certainly no reason to expect the European Union to sign up to a deal out of charity or pity or otherwise against their interests – especially as current and future trading partners of the European Union are all looking on too.

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There are still, nonetheless, many favourable conditions for a deal – the parties are still speaking, there is agreement on the majority of the legal text, the parties both have an interest in a deal, and both parties would benefit from a deal.

But all these conditions are not enough if there is not actual agreement on fundamental issues.

So we come to the final month of the transition period, where the end-of-year holidays mean even less working time available to finalise a deal, during a pandemic and amidst forecast of a severe economic downturn.

There is no deal in place.

And even if there will be a deal in place by the end of next month, the general situation and outlook is not good.

This is perhaps the worst time for the stabilisers to come off the bicycle.

Brace, brace.

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