How the government is seeking to change the law on Rwanda so as to disregard the facts

30th January 2024

The decisions of judges, other than about case and court management, can be divided into two sorts.

First, there are rulings. These rulings can be about the substantive law, or they can be rulings on the admissibility of evidence, or they can be rulings on procedural technical points. In each instance, the judge will identify the rule, apply it to the situation before the court, and decide the outcome.

Add second, there are findings. These are determinations of fact which are required for the case before the court to be decided at a trial. These facts are, in turn, based on the evidence admitted before the court.

If there is no dispute, then a judge can make a finding of fact based on the undisputed evidence before the court; but if there is a dispute of fact then the judge has to weigh the conflicting evidence and make a finding.

The judge will then apply the rules to the facts found.

(In a criminal trial – and some civil trials – where there is a jury, it will usually be the jurors that will determine any disputes of fact and thereby any consequential legal liability.)

A reasoned judgment by a court deciding a case can include both types of decision; though in a straightforward case there is normally only a dispute of fact.

The key point for the purpose of this post is that rulings and findings are different.

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Now let us go to the Supreme Court judgment on the Rwanda policy.

The court set out the statutory criteria for determining whether Rwanda is a safe third country (emphasis added):

A country is a safe third country for a particular applicant, if:

“(i) the applicant’s life and liberty will not be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion in that country;

“(ii) the principle of non-refoulement will be respected in that country in accordance with the Refugee Convention;

“(iii) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected in that country; and

“(iv) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention in that country.”

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After a detailed examination of the evidence, ultimately the Supreme Court decided (again emphasis added):

“As matters stand, the evidence establishes substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that asylum claims will not be determined properly, and that asylum seekers will in consequence be at risk of being returned directly or indirectly to their country of origin. In that event, genuine refugees will face a real risk of ill-treatment in circumstances where they should not have been returned at all. The right of appeal to the High Court is completely untested, and there are grounds for concern as to its likely effectiveness. The detection of failures in the asylum system by means of monitoring, however effective it may be, will not prevent those failures from occurring in the first place. We accept the Secretary of State’s submission that the capacity of the Rwandan system (in the sense of its ability to produce accurate and fair decisions) can and will be built up. Nevertheless, asking ourselves whether there were substantial grounds for believing that a real risk of refoulement existed at the relevant time, we have concluded that there were. The structural changes and capacity-building needed to eliminate that risk may be delivered in the future, but they were not shown to be in place at the time when the lawfulness of the policy had to be considered in these proceedings.”

In other words the Supreme Court made a finding of fact based on the evidence placed before it. The evidence “established” a thing, and that thing in turn determined the case.

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Let us now look at the government’s Rwanda Bill currently before the House of Lords on its passage through parliament.

Here is clause 2 (note a Bill has “clauses” as it passes through parliament, which then become “sections” when it becomes an Act):

You can see what the government is seeking to do.

Instead of it being a matter for a court to decide whether Rwanda is a safe third country, the Bill removes that discretion absolutely – regardless of any evidence. Indeed such evidence may not even be relevant with this deeming provision.

A court will not be able to make its own findings, it “must conclusively” decide Rwanda is safe – whatever the actual facts.

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And now let us go to a speech in the House of Lords from the former Conservative Lord Chancellor Kenneth Clarke:

According to Hansard, Clarke said:

“[Ministers] have decided to bring an Act of Parliament to overturn a finding of fact made by the Supreme Court of this country.

“If we pass this Bill, we are asserting as a matter of law that Rwanda is a safe country for this purpose, that it will always be a safe country for this purpose until the law is changed, and that the courts may not even consider any evidence brought before them to try to demonstrate that it is not a safe country.

“That is a very dangerous constitutional provision. I hope it will be challenged properly in the courts, because we have an unwritten constitution, but it gets more and more important that we make sure that the powers in this country are controlled by some constitutional limits and are subject to the rule of law.

“Somebody has already said in this debate that Parliament, claiming the sovereignty of Parliament, could claim that the colour black is the same as the colour white, that all dogs are cats or, more seriously, that someone who has been acquitted of a criminal charge is guilty of that criminal charge and should be returned to the courts for sentence. Where are the limits?

“As time goes by in my career, I always fear echoes of the warnings that Quintin Hailsham used to give us all about the risks of moving towards an elected dictatorship in this country.

“The sovereignty of Parliament has its limits, which are the limits of the rule of law, the separation of powers and what ought to be the constitutional limits on any branch of government in a liberal democratic society such as ours.”

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Yes, Clarke had at best a mixed record as Lord Chancellor – especially in respect of the severe funding cuts to legal aid.

But he is absolutely right to set out, with first principles, the fundamental danger this bill presents.

The government should leave findings of fact to the courts – and if the court’s findings are unwelcome, then ministers should work to change the facts.

Using the law to deem a country safe which the Supreme Court found to be unsafe after a detailed examination of the evidence, is an unwelcome move by this government.

And even a former Conservative Lord Chancellor can spot this.

 

 

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“Computer says guilty” – an introduction to the evidential presumption that computers are operating correctly

A modest proposal for helping the Prime Minister “keep on top of government” and “to push priorities”

3rd July 2023

Over on Twitter, the estimable Dr Cath Haddon is live-tweeting a talk from a former cabinet minister to the Institute of Government:

Here is an idea for a Prime Minister to have something to help him or her keep on top of what is going on in government and to push priorities.

The Prime Minister should form a committee of, say, about twenty-two individuals, each responsible for a specific government department or public function.

Those on this committee should report directly to the Prime Minister.

And the Prime Minister should be able to appoint and replace members of this committee as he or she chooses.

This committee should meet at least a couple of times a week – and this meeting should be at Downing Street chaired by the Prime Minister.

There can also be sub-committees dealing with matters where more than one government department is concerned – and these sub-committees can also be chaired by the Prime Minister or their designate.

So as to ensure that priorities are pushed – and as politics should be the language of priorities as one politician once said – these appointees should be politicians not officials.

And appointing members of parliament to this committee would also mean that the Prime Minister would have a useful direct line to what is said about the departments in parliament.

Meetings of this committee should also be attended by the head of the civil service, so that he or she can be part of the discussions and to provide advice and practical insight.

The deliberations should be confidential so that discussions can be frank and not leaked.

And there should be collective responsibility for those on the committee, so that there is a single overall direction to the course of the government.

Those on this committee should also be paid a substantial amount in addition to their parliamentary salary so as to recognise the additional work and to attract the brightest and best.

Such a model would, at a stroke, keep a Prime Minister on top of what is going on in government and for priorities to be pushed across government.

And this is the important thing…

…if a Prime Minister cannot effectively use such a committee to keep on top of what is going on in government and to push priorities, then no “Prime Minister’s Department” is going to be of any greater help.

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The only thing left is what to call this committee.

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Pic source.

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The government is running out of time

26th June 2023

In the words of the eminent jurist Paul Simon:

“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me

“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me
While I looked around for my possibilities”

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One hard structural fact about the politics of the United Kingdom is that the government is running out of time.

By automatic operation of law the next general election has to take place by 28 January 2025.

That gives the current government about 580 days left, maximum, before a general election which many forecast that the governing Conservative party will lose.

About 580 days sounds a lot, but it really is not – at least in parliamentary terms.

That date presupposes that the general election is called at the last possible moment – 17 December 2024 – leaving the longest possible election campaign.

Current speculation is that the next general election will be in October 2024, which means the last parliamentary session will need to be over by September 2024, and given summer breaks, that basically means legislation will need to passed by June/July 2024.

So that is about 365 to 400 days.

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We are still – remarkably – within the same parliamentary session that commenced two prime ministers and one monarch ago in May 2022.

And as the Hansard Society averred in May, few of the Bills announced in that speech have become law:

It is expected that there will be a new King’s Speech this November.

This means that it is highly likely that there is just one more parliamentary session left before a general election – November 2023 to June/July 2024.

(There is the theoretical possibility of more than one remaining parliamentary term if the government has a sequence of truncated parliamentary sessions, with multiple openings of parliament.)

One implication of there being only one more parliamentary session before an election is that it is probable that there is not enough time to force any new legislation through the House of Lords under the Parliament Act, for that requires a Bill to be approved in successive sessions.

And then there are the recesses:

As one adds up the delays and holidays, and the speculation of an election by October 2024, the gross figure of 580 days becomes a lot less in practical legislative terms.

The grand hourglass of parliamentary time is running out for the current government.

We are not talking years, we are now talking months – and soon we will be talking weeks.

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And not only time is against them – there is the problem of legislative preparation.

Put simply: this government is not very good at preparing legislation.

As the Hansard Society politely put it:

Parliamentary time for bills should not be, say, “step one’‘ of a process but about “step four” – after policy formulation, consultation and development – all within or by departments.

And so if you factor in the time to actually put together new practical – that is, passable – legislation then not even the maximum 580 days are really enough.

Even if following the conference season this year there is a “whizz-bang” King’s Speech with lots of legislative proposals, that whizzery and bangery needs to being prepared now in departments, and there is not a lot of evidence of any whizzery and bangery taking place anywhere in Whitehall at present.

Not only does the government need enough time to get legislation through parliament and implement it before the next general election, ministers and departments need lead-in times to get the legislation to be in any state to pass.

The time left looks very tight.

Too tight.

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What we have is a government that not only is running out of time, but in some ways has already ran out of time to do anything radical and substantial in its one (likely) remaining parliamentary term.

And what makes this even more remarkable that this is a government elected in December 2019, on the back of Brexit, which had a substantial majority – only the second overall majority the Conservatives had had since 1992.

In legislative and policy terms, that majority has been largely wasted.

(Which may be a good or bad thing, depending on your politics.)

This is a government running out of possibilities.

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“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me

“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me
While I looked around for my possibilities”

 

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This has been cross-posted from my (newly renamed) Empty City substack.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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Telling the story of how the “serious disruption” public order statutory instrument was passed

14th June 2023

Here is a story about law-making told in different ways.

The law in question is a statutory instrument made under the Public Order Act 1986 – the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 – which comes into force tomorrow.

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By way of background

A statutory instrument is what is called “secondary legislation” and it has the same effect as primary legislation, as long as it is within the scope of the primary legislation under which it is made.

Statutory instruments are, in effect, executive-made legislation.  They still have to have parliamentary approval, but they are not open to amendment and rarely have debate or a vote.

Often the parliamentary approval of statutory instruments goes through on the nod, but sometimes they need to have a positive vote in favour.

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The government’s version

The first way of telling the story is from the government’s perspective.

The statutory instrument was put to a vote in the House of Commons on Monday with the Home Secretary herself leading the debate.

At the end of the debate there was a contested vote, which the government won:The (elected) House of Commons having shown its approval, the House of Lords did not pass a “fatal” motion against the statutory instrument.

Instead the House of Lords passed a motion (merely) regretting the Statutory Instrument:

The vote (against the government) was as follows:

The House of Lords also had a specific vote on a fatal motion, which was defeated:
And when the official opposition was criticised by for not supporting the fatal motion, a frontbencher was unapologetic:

And this is the first way of telling this story: there was a Commons vote; the Lords showed disdain but did not exercise any veto inn view of the Commons vote; and so the statutory instrument became law as the result of a democratic legislative process.

Told this way, the story is about how laws can and are made by such a democratic legislative process

Nothing to see here.

But.

But but but.

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The constitutionalist version

There is another way of telling this story.

This account starts with the Public Order Act 2023 when it was a bill before parliament.

At a very late stage of the passage of that bill the government sought to amend it so as to include provisions that were substantially similar to what ended up in the statutory instrument passed this week.

The government failed to get those amendments through the House of Lords. and so they were dropped from the bill before it became an Act.

As a House of Lords committee noted:

The Home Office could not answer these basic questions:For this committee to say that it believes “this raises possible constitutional issues that the House may wish to consider” is serious stuff.

What had happened is that the Home Office, having failed to bounce parliament into accepting these amendments into primary legislation by very late amendments, has come up with this alternative approach.

Told this alternative way, the story is not about how laws can and are made by a democratic legislative process.

Instead, the story is about how a democratic legislative process can be frustrated and circumvented by the executive.

Instead of using primary legislation so as to make substantial (and illiberal) changes to the law, the government has used statutory instrument which cannot be amended or considered in detail, and has used its whipped House of Commons majority to face down Lords opposition.

Plenty to see here.

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The story may continue

Yet this is not how the story (told in either way) may end.

The thing about statutory instruments is that, unlike primary legislation, they can be challenged at the High Court.

This means that there can sometimes be a sort of constitutional see-saw: the convenience of using statutory instruments (as opposed to primary legislation) can be checked and balanced by an application for judicial review.

And that is what the group Liberty is doing, and its letter before claim is here.

In essence, the argument is that – notwithstanding the parliamentary approval – the statutory instrument is outside the scope of the relevant provisions of the Public Order Act 1986.

Liberty seems to have a good point, but any challenge to secondary legislation is legally difficult and it is rare that any such challenge ever succeeds.

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The moral of the story?

The moral of the story, however it is told, is perhaps about the general weakness of our constitutional arrangements in respect of limitations placed upon rights and liberties.

A government, using wide enabling legislation, can put legislation into place that it cannot achieve by passing primary legislation.

This cannot be the right way of doing things, even if Labour is correct about these illiberal measures having the support of the House of Commons.

There are some things our constitutional arrangements do well – and here we can wave at Boris Johnson and Elizabeth Truss having both been found repugnant and spat out by our body politic.

But there are things our constitutional arrangements do badly – and the increasing use (and abuse) by the government of secondary legislation to do things they cannot (or will not) get otherwise enacted in primary legislation worrying.

And a government casually and/or cynically using (and abusing) wide enabling powers is not a story that usually ends well.

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Two set-backs for animal welfare law – and a consolation

25th May 2023

While I prepare a detailed post on Boris Johnson and the Cabinet Office lawyers thingie, this is just a quick post to note a couple of setbacks to another interest of this blog: animal welfare law.

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First, you may recall this blog covering the “Frankenchicken” claim, which I thought was a well-made application for judicial review.

Unfortunately the High Court did not, though the judgment is rather difficult to follow – and I may unpack the judgment at a later date.

But plaudits must go to the Humane League (and, yes, we all know the puns for the 80s pop band) for putting together such an impressively crafted case.

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Second, late today on a quiet parliamentary sitting, the government announced it was reneging on the Animal Welfare (Kept Animals) Bill – even though it was at an advanced parliamentary stage.

There are news reports on this here and here.

You may recall that the Conservative manifesto for 2019 devoted an entire page to animal welfare, making (specific) commitments:

And you may also recall two senior cabinet ministers recently insisting that the House of Lords had to accept that the (generalised) content of the Conservative manifesto as the “will of the people”:

But it would seem the government picks-and-chooses which of its manifesto commitments are serious enough to threaten the House of Lords with, and which the government cannot even be bothered with so that it can progress its own bill.

The reason for this pulling of a bill appears to be that the government does not feel confident that it can resist amendments that would further protect animal welfare beyond the protections promised in the manifesto.

It is a depressing moment for animal welfare law.

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On the bright side, however, there is consolation: the great Chris Packham – who does sterling work not only on animal welfare but also neurodiversity – won his libel case, and the judgment is well worth reading.

(The pic above shows him supporting the “Frankenchicken” claim which was coincidently heard at the High Court at same time as his libel claim.)

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Can anything actually be done to improve parliamentary scrutiny?

18th May 2023

Over at The House Magazine – in effect, parliament’s in-flight magazine – there is a thoughtful and informative article by Dr Alice Lilly entitled The Slow Death of Parliamentary Scrutiny.

One merit of her piece is that is looks at other long-term and structural reasons for the difficulties parliament have in scrutinising draft legislation – that is, other than the obvious one that any government does not want to be scrutinised.

And although ministers and their media supporters often play-act about the undemocratic House of Lords, it is plain that the government is increasingly relying on the upper house to save the government from itself in the legislative process.

Peers are now doing the tidying up of bills that really should be done before legislation is even presented to parliament.

And, in turn, departments, are seeking to shove more through by means of unscrutinised secondary legislation.

In essence: the House of Commons is becoming an ornament – though not a pretty one – rather than an instrument of the state.

But.

Although the problem can be stated, it is less clear what – if anything – could be the solution.

Scrutinising legislation is dull, thankless work – and so, unless it is made a well-resourced priority for active members of the the House of Commons, then the natural tendency will be for politicians to do other things.

And one can take for granted that ministers (of any party) and officials will seek to avoid scrutiny if they can.

Abolishing – or restricting – the House of Lords would cause more problems, unless such a change was part of a broader package of fundamental parliamentary reform.

The current situation is far from ideal – and it may be unsustainable: for there is only so much one can expect from members of the House of Lords.

Yet unless Members of Parliament make scrutiny of legislation a priority – and insist to ministers and departments that enough time is provided for scrutiny, and also insist on there being proper resources in place for that scrutiny – then it may be we have a worsening problem without any likely solution.

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Why [x] should be regulated.

17th May 2023

Concerns about the implications of [x] have led to calls for it to be regulated.

In a “nightmare scenario” one leading politician has said that “[x] could get out of control” with “unimaginable consequences”.

The politician added that they had read reports about [x] and that “something really should be done”.

“Why is the government not doing something about [x]?  Doesn’t the government care?”

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“Doesn’t the government care?”

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An official spokesman rejected the allegation that the government does not care about [x] and commented that “all options remain open, including regulation and even prohibition”.

Surveys show that members of the public when asked if “x should be regulated?” generally say that it should be regulated, unless those members of the public are asked if “[x] should be banned?”, and then they say it should be banned instead.

“Whatever [x] is,” said one person in a vox pop, “it shouldn’t be allowed.  And what about the children?”

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What about the children?”

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Independent observers said that [x] is not capable of being defined, let alone regulated or prohibited, and dismissed concerns as “being responses to loaded questions” but they also admitted fearing that their observations would be relegated to a long paragraph towards the end of this article which few would actually read.

Supporters of [x] yesterday refused to be interviewed for this article, commenting instead by email that whatever they said would be relegated to the end of this article, coming after and before what they said would be “scaremongering”.

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“Scaremongering”

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The final word must go to the politician who called for regulation of [x] who also said “[x] should now be allowed,” when asked with a differently framed question, adding “there is too much red tape”.

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“Frankenchickens” and the law

3rd May 2023

Scrolling though Instagram while trying to think of a legal angle on the coronation worth writing about I came across this:

As it happens I have a lot of time for the broadcasting of Chris Packham and Megan McCubbin, and for my fellow Brummie Benjamin Zephaniah, and so I thought this may be an interesting case to write about for a blogpost.

What is being described as a “Frankenchicken”?

According to Zephaniah: “Decades of selective breeding have turned [chickens] into monstrous frankenchickens who can barely carry their own weight, and who lie in crowded barns, being burned by their waste.  We should not be treating animals like this.”

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The applicant – The Humane League – was kind enough to share their legal arguments with me.

At the heart of this legal case is a paragraph.

It is paragraph 29 in a schedule, in a schedule to some regulations, which are in turn regulations made under an Act of Parliament.

And this paragraph 29 provides:

“29.  Animals may only be kept for farming purposes if it can reasonably be expected, on the basis of their genotype or phenotype, that they can be kept without any detrimental effect on their health or welfare.”

(My emphasis added, for a reason which will become obvious.)

The schedule containing this paragraph has effect by reason of regulation 4 of the relevant regulations, and this provides:And these regulations were made under section 12 of the Animal Welfare Act:

It is in this elaborate way that many things are regulated: provisions within provisions within provisions – a legislative pass-the-parcel.

The applicant in this case is contending the government misunderstands paragraph 29.

The applicant says paragraph 29 prohibits the keeping of animals for farming purposes unless it can reasonably be expected that, on the basis of their genotype or phenotype, that they can be kept without any detriment effect on their health or welfare.

The applicant says the government is in turn contending that paragraph 29 does not establish any such prohibition “and, moreover, [the government] disputes that the word “kept” refers to keeping at all”.

(I do not have access to the government’s legal argument.)

The applicant then contends that because the government misunderstands paragraph 29 the government thereby makes two further legal errors.

First, the misunderstanding means that the government has adopted and maintains policies and practices, including a Code of Practice and a system of monitoring and enforcement, founded on legal error – including a policy of non-enforcement.

And second, as the policies and practices do not discriminate against those who in breach of the paragraph, there is a consequential lack of equal treatment between producers.

The applicant’s press release sent to me states:

“The Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the defendant in the case, argues that it has no policy which condones or permits the use of Frankenchickens, despite fast-growing breeds being standard in the chicken industry.

“The case also challenges the ‘trigger system,’ Defra’s monitoring system aimed at detecting welfare issues associated with conventional chicken breeds, of which the overwhelming majority will be fast-growing.

“The trigger system requires slaughterhouse vets to report problems, but only if they occur above a given threshold – which The Humane League argues is far too high.

“A final ground of the case argues that the system in place is creating unequal treatment between chicken producers that comply with the law and those who do not.”

This, of course, is not an animal welfare blog – but from a law and policy perspective what is fascinating – and clever – about this case is that the applicant is seeking declaratory relief.

This means the court is being invited to declare the meaning of a legal instrument, in this case paragraph 29.

And this is a perfectly proper thing for a court to be asked to do.

The court is not being asked to directly quash any policy, but to say what a legal provision means.

And a paragraph deep in a schedule to regulations made under a statute is as much a statutory provision as section 1 of any Act of Parliament you can think of.

It also seems that there are differing views on what paragraph 29 means – and the view contended for by the applicant in this case has survived a permission hearing and so can be taken as at least arguable.

This is therefore not a simple try-on, but something the high court thinks is a serious legal question to be heard.

The framing of the case, however, means that if the applicant prevails then it will also pull away the basis of various policies and practices based on that paragraph.

That is an ambitious case to make, but again it is a legitimate and arguable one.

If the government has based policies and practices on a misunderstanding of the law then those policies and practices can fall too.

According to ITV, Defra argues that fast-growing chicken breeds are not inherently condemned to suffer health problems and that there is no scientific consensus saying so.

A spokesperson is quoted as saying:

“We are proud to have some of the highest animal welfare standards in the world.  All farm animals are protected by robust animal health and welfare legislation. This sets out detailed requirements on how farmed livestock, including meat chickens, must be kept.

The hearing is today and tomorrow.

I have no idea which side will win – though I am on the side of the chickens – but this is an example of litigation done well by a pressure group – and it is thereby an example of how such public interest litigation should be brought.

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You can read more on the Humane League’s campaign here.

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Why Raab’s frontal attack on the Human Rights Act failed, and why the Home Office attack on human rights law is succeeding

25th April 2023

One big error by the former Lord Chancellor Dominic Raab was how he went about dealing with human rights law.

Raab insisted on outright repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998, and nothing else.

As this blog has previously averred, the Act was the Moby Dick to his Captain Ahab.

The Act had to go.

And this approach failed, even from an illiberal perspective.

For the Human Rights Act 1998 is still there, and Raab is not.

A more effective approach from an illiberal perspective is not the full repeal of the Act, but to slowly bit-by-bit reduce its effect and restrict its scope.

Take this simple clause 1(5) from the Illegal Migration Bill:

That is all that needs to be done.

For the Human Rights Act 1998 is only a statute, and what one statute provides another can take away.

The Act does not, from an illiberal perspective, need to be repealed: it can instead be subjected to dozens of similar “notwithstanding” clauses, in new legislation and amending old legislation.

There is no point in saying: don’t tell the government this!

Those in the government already know – that is why the Home Office lawyers have put that clause in the Bill.

They do not need Raab’s cavalry charge of full repeal: they can be more effective operating on the flanks, picking off targets as they choose.

Of course, if the government goes too far there may, perhaps, be an adverse adjudication by the European Court of Human Rights on such legislation.

But that would be a cost of government business, sometime down the road, and not something to prevent putting in such clauses now.

And the pushback against such clauses will be harder than defending an entire Act from repeal.

The government can and will be more savvy in its illiberalism.

And this is far more concerning, from a liberal perspective, than Raab’s futile whale-hunt.

The Human Rights Act 1998 may now be safe from repeal, but the reach of human rights law in primary legislation is certainly not safe from attack.

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Comments Policy

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