Category: Communications and Media & Law and Policy

Law is not magic – and lockdown regulations are not spells

19th December 2020

Of  course, law is not magic.

Magic is about old men in elaborate robes, in oddly furnished rooms, saying or setting down words in certain special orders that will then have real-world effects on those to whom those words are addressed.

Ahem.

In fact, law has a lot in common with magic – or, at least, magical thinking – and not only in the facetious characterisation above.

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If we move from the courtroom to government, and indeed to the public more generally, there is a common view that to make a law against something is to deal  with it.

A thing should be banned, and so just putting some words on a piece of paper – or on a computer screen – and then saying some magic words – either

‘Izzy–wizzy, let’s get busy!

or

‘Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows’

or some other similarly daft formula, the words will leap from the page – or the screen – and will change the world around us.

This is a habit of thought with which we are so familiar that is difficult to dislodge it from our minds.

But just setting out words, and chanting some special phrases, has little direct effect on anything – other than in respect of what meanings, concepts and values we in turn give to those words.

And with prohibitions, more is often needed for a thing to stop than for the words to have been typed ‘this thing is prohibited’.

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For some people, a prohibition may be enough: they will know that a thing has been banned and will act – or not act – accordingly.

For others, however, the banned thing can just continue – it is just that there is a risk that further instances of the banned thing may now be attended with certain legal consequences and, ultimately, coercive sanctions.

A person faced with such a risk may chose to eliminate the risk and not do the prohibited thing, or they may instead manage or even disregard the risk.

But unless one is in a totalitarian society, the mere threat of a coercive sanction is not enough – most modern societies rely on government by consent, and the state does not have sufficient resources to police everyone completely.

Put simply: laws and sanctions are usually not sufficient to effect behavioural change.

Instead many prohibitions work not because of words on a page, or because of enforcement, but because the purpose of the ban is aligned with social norms and is accepted (broadly) as legitimate – that the ban makes sense and is for a good purpose and so will be respected.

If a prohibition is not accepted as legitimate –  if it does not make sense or seems unfair or disproportionate – then no amount of legal magic or coercive force will give effect to the prohibition.

The prohibition then just breaks down.

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And now we come to the lockdown regulations.

The belief appears to be that just by making laws against social activity – either during Christmas or otherwise – is by itself sufficient.

That the government should lock down more firmly – and if the government does not do this, then it will be the government to blame if the pandemic spreads.

But typing banny words are not enough, with or without magic phrases, and there is certainly not enough police to enforce such banny words.

A lockdown will only be effective if people actually regulate their social behaviour in reality.

The government could issue regulations until it is blue in its face, but if there is a disconnect with social behaviour, then it is futile.

(And the sensible response to this is unlikely to be ‘more laws!” and ‘harsher penalties!’ – just as it is rarely a solution to bang one’s head harder against the wall.)

*

Law and laws are only one aspect of how those who govern us can influence and control our behaviour, to get us to change from what we would otherwise do.

People have to understand the purpose and point of prohibitions, rather than to just be expected to comply with them when they are imposed.

And for this a government needs to be transparent and credible: there needs to be trust more than law, and policy rather than policing.

There needs to be leadership.

Resources need to be in place for testing, tracing, and treatments.

Fair account needs to be taken of other possible priorities, even if those other priorities are less important.

Prohibitions and coercive sanctions still have a role – but they are not sufficient by themselves.

In essence, a government needs to govern, and not just make laws.

That is what govern – ments do.

There should be no magic to this.

*****

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The coded criticisms of the Attorney-General from both the Lord Chief Justice and the Court of Appeal

17th December 2020

The office of Attorney-General is at the very crossroads of law and politics.

As a lawyer, the Attorney-General is the government’s chief legal adviser and, by convention, is the head of the Bar of England and Wales.

They superintend the Crown Prosecution Service, and they can (and do) initiate contempt of court proceedings against the media.

A further role is that they can act in proceedings where they represent the public interest and/or the government.

They also can decide to refer cases to the court of appeal where it appears a criminal court has been ‘unduly lenient’ in sentencing.

These are all important – crucial -tasks and so it follows that these roles must be taken seriously.

The Attorney-General is, however, also a politician – usually a member of parliament but sometimes a peer – and one who attends the cabinet.

It is a job therefore where the holder has to wear two hats – or horsehair wigs.

And it is not an easy task even for senior politicians and experienced lawyers.

*

The current Attorney-General is neither a senior politician nor an experienced lawyer.

This, of course, is not their fault – although some in this position if they were offered the office would not take it.

The current holder of the office, however, is going out of their way to politicise and thereby to discredit the legal side of the office.

This blog has previously set out how the current Attorney-General should have resigned when they unapologetically tweeted in respect of a case of a political ally who was then subject to a live police investigation.

That really was not what the superintendent of the Crown Prosecution Service should be doing.

*

There is now a further example of how the current Attorney-General is undermining their office.

Here there are three texts that are of interest.

*

First, here is a Daily Express article from 7th November 2020: Attorney General to appear at Andrew Harper’s killers appeal hearing next week.

In the body of that article, under the byline of a political editor, was the following:

‘A friend of Ms Braverman’s told the Sunday Express:

‘“She was met with strong opposition from civil servants to pursue this case but she held firm and has done the right thing.

‘“She made it clear she wants to be there to underline how important this issue is to the ‘government and how seriously it takes this case.

“If the judges uphold the original sentences then she will have still done the right thing and it will be another example of wet, liberal judges being soft on criminals.”’

As is widely known, ‘friend’ is a code in political journalism for either the politician themselves or someone speaking on their behalf, such as a special adviser.

As far as I am aware, this quote has not been disavowed by the Attorney-General.

*

Second, here is a speech on sentencing by the Lord Chief Justice made on 9th December 2020.

Here are two paragraphs from this informative and accessible speech (asterisk and emphasis added):

‘Were the mythical alien to arrive on earth and, I grant you yet more improbably, take an interest in sentencing in England and Wales by reading the newspapers and dipping into the more noisy parts of on-line media, it would soon gain the impression that sentencing had got softer in recent years. It would read about “wet, liberal judges being soft on criminals” (*) and wonder why criminals convicted of serious offences were getting more lenient sentences than they used to. Then our alien visitor might seek some other sources of information, and if possessed of a brow it might become furrowed.

‘There is a difficulty with this narrative. It is a myth.’

The Lord Chief Justice then proceeds in his speech to demonstrate how sentencing has certainly not got softer.

But who was the judge quoting about “wet, liberal judges being soft on criminals” ?

The quotation is footnoted (where I have inserted the asterisk), and the footnote reads:

‘Sunday Express 8 November 2020, quoting a source.’

The Lord Chief Justice is here publicly dismissing – perhaps even deriding – the ‘friend’ of the Attorney-General who in turn is describing the Attorney-General’s motivation for intervening in a criminal sentencing case.

For the head of the judiciary to be doing this openly to the government’s chief legal adviser and holder of the ancient office of Attorney-General is an extraordinary public intervention.

*

And now we turn to the Court of Appeal judgment in respect of the sentencing of those who killed the police constable Andrew Harper.

The facts of the case are horrific.

Three were convicted of manslaughter, though a jury acquitted them of murder.

And so the three were sentences in accordance with the guidelines for manslaughter.

The Attorney-General, as the Daily Express article describes, exercised one of their powers and referred the sentences to the court of appeal on the basis of the sentences being ‘unduly lenient’.

The Attorney-General then – oddly for a barrister with no substantial criminal law background – appeared personally at the hearing.

There are three paragraphs of the judgment of interest in respect of the contribution and role of the Attorney-General.

Paragraph 57:

‘In her initial remarks, the Attorney General rehearsed some of the facts and said that the sentences have caused widespread public concern. She outlined four points, about which Mr Little QC then made submissions.’

Here the court are not even deigning to describe the Attorney-General’s contribution as submissions – a ‘submission’ is something one submits to the court for consideration – but merely as remarks.

(The Supreme Court adopted a similar remarks/submission distinction when a former Attorney-General appeared (out of his depth) at the first Miller case: ‘Following opening remarks made by HM Attorney General, Mr Eadie QC in his submissions on behalf of the Secretary of State, did not challenge much if any of the factual basis of these assertions…’ – paragraph 57 here.)

We now turn to the submission that were made, if not personally by the Attorney-General, but by another barrister on their behalf.

Paragraph 83 (emphasis added):

As to the length of the custodial terms, we note a striking feature of the submissions. When applications are made by the Attorney General for leave to refer to this court sentences which are said to be unduly lenient, it is frequently on the basis that the judge fell into error by failing to follow a relevant guideline. In this case, however, the argument advanced by the Attorney is that the sentence of Long, and therefore the sentences on Bowers and Cole, were unduly lenient because the judge erred in failing to depart from the relevant guideline.

Just as political journalists have their codes, so too do judges.

And to describe as position as ‘striking’ is to say that it is barking – and the rest of the paragraph explains why.

In essence: unduly lenient sentences are those which depart from the guidelines and not those made in accordance with them.

This is then followed by paragraph 84 (again emphasis added):

‘That is, to say the least, an unusual submission. It involves the proposition that in the circumstances of this case, a sentence within the guideline offence range was not within the range properly open to the judge, who was instead required to pass a sentence outside that range. We think it regrettable that, in advancing that submission, the structure and ambit of the guideline were not addressed. Nor was any sufficient explanation given why it is contended that the judge was not merely entitled to depart from the guideline but positively required to do so.’

Here ‘unusual’ means, in effect, beyond barking – and again the rest of the paragraph sets out why.

These are obvious points and would have been plain to government lawyers.

But as ‘friend’ of the Attorney General said, ‘[s]he was met with strong opposition from civil servants to pursue this case’.

And paragraphs 83 and 84 set out why.

*

Taking these three texts together we can see that the judiciary are alert to the motivations of the Attorney-General and are resistant to the attempts to politicise the office, and that the judiciary will be unafraid to reject ‘striking’ and ‘unusual’ submissions made on behalf of the Attorney-General.

The judges are not stupid or unworldly – they know exactly the import of coded criticisms in public speeches and judgments.

The Attorney-General may be sending signals, but so are the judges.

*

But this Attorney-General will not care.

The political job is done – and one can imagine the claps and cheers of the ‘friend’ quoted in the Daily Express article. 

She took on the ‘wet, liberal judges being soft on criminals’.

But this political job has been done at a cost.

Although a politician, the Attorney-General is entrusted with highly important decisions in respect of not only referring ‘unduly lenient’ sentences, but also in respect of many other legal matters, from contempt of court to the operation of the crown prosecution service.

But the conduct of the current Attorney-General is such that their credibility as a decision-maker capable of making such decisions on the appropriate basis is open to doubt.

This quick win for a political ambitious Attorney General is at the cost of the standing of their office.

The Attorney-General is weaponising her legal responsibilities for political purposes.

This is a remarkable, striking and unusual predicament.

And given that the Attorney-General is not only doing this recklessly but with apparent enthusiasm means that there is no reason for anyone watching it happen in real time to be unduly lenient.

*****

This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising a topical law and policy matter – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

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The shoddy legal direction of Gavin Williamson to Greenwich Council

15th December 2020

Amidst the flurry of government regulations closing down various things during the current pandemic comes this very different legal instrument from Gavin Williamson, the Secretary of State for Education.

Instead of ordering a thing to close, the Secretary of State is ordering things to stay open.

It is an extraordinary letter, and it is worth examining carefully.

(As a preliminary point, however, please note I am not an education law specialist and so there may be sector-specific legal aspects of this of which I am unaware – the examination in this post is on general legal principles and based on my experience as a former government lawyer and as a public lawyer generally.)

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First, let us look at the power on which the Secretary of State relies upon.

It would seem there is no general legal power for the Secretary of State to order that any school remain open (or close), and so the letter relies on a specific provision in the Coronavirus Act 2020.

(If there were such a general legal power to issue such a direction, then presumably the Secretary of State would rely upon that power instead of the Coronavirus Act 2020.)

The relevant section of the Act is section 38.

The relevant part of that section is section 38(1)(a) which provides for a power to enable the Secretary of State to give directions requiring the ‘provision, or continuing provision, of education, training and childcare’.

That provision in turn refers to a paragraph in a schedule to the Act.

(This is not a ‘paragraph’ as such – it is a wordy provision which goes on for three pages, like something from a W. G. Sebald book.)

The paragraph sets out in detail the requirements for a ‘temporary continuity direction’ under section 38 – like a checklist.

For example, the Secretary of State must have regard to medical advice (paragraph 1(3)(a) and the direction must be necessary and proportionate (paragraph 1(3)(b).

The direction can require the recipient to take ‘reasonable steps in general terms’ (paragraph 1(4)(a)) and require a relevant institution to stay open or to re-open (paragraph 1(4)(b).

There is also a catch-all power that the Secretary of State may make any other connected provisions which he or she ‘considers appropriate’ (paragraph 1(4)(i)).

*

What is the duty of the recipient of such a direction?

The Act provides that it is ‘the duty of a responsible body or relevant institution to which a temporary continuity direction…to comply with the direction’.

How is this duty to be enforced?

If the recipient does not comply with a direction, the government can make an application to the courts for an injunction.

(Both the above are in paragraph 1(6) of the schedule.)

This would, of course, be an unusual injunction – most injunctions prohibit a person from doing a thing, while this will be a rarer ‘mandatory’ injunction requiring a person to do a thing.

A failure to comply with an injunction is, at law, a serious matter and can be a contempt of court, with (presumably) sanctions such as imprisonment and unlimited fines.

A breach of a mandatory injunction may also result in a court directing that the required act be completed by another person at the expense of the disobedient party (CPR 70.2A).

*

This looks like a wide and arbitrary power for the Secretary of State to give directions, with serious sanctions for a breach of a direction.

But if you look carefully there are explicit statutory requirements for the Secretary of State to be reasonable and to use this power only where necessary and proportionate.

These requirements are also imposed by the general law.

These will be quite high hurdles for the Secretary of State to jump.

*

Going back to the letter, you will see that in paragraph 2 of the letter the Secretary of State asserts that he ‘considers [the direction] to be reasonable’ – but there is almost no reasoning other than a general reference to a general interest (‘of securing that schools…allow pupils to attend school full time’ ) and a general reference to the Secretary of State’s guidance (but with no specific guidance quoted).

There is also no local data.

Any court would expect to see far more reasoning than this before enforcing such a direction with a mandatory order.

For example, can the education of the pupils not be done remotely?

Has proper regard been made to local conditions?

Is it proportionate and necessary to mandate a school to remain open with only days left in the school term?

Is it fair and equitable (a test of most injunctions) to insist a state school remain open when many private schools remain closed?

These are not ‘gotcha’ questions, but points which one knows a court will ask before granting an injunction – and so should be anticipated and covered in a letter threatening an injunction.

But there is nothing in this letter to meet these obvious and foreseeable questions that would need to be answered in court.

*

This direction then, even if it is the right thing for the Secretary of State to order, is not a well-drafted piece of legal work.

If i were still a government lawyer I would have been embarrassed to have prepared this for a minister.

It is not enough to assert that a thing is reasonable, necessary or proportionate – these statutory requirements for a direction also need to be shown.

*

The recipient of this letter – Greenwich Council – has already published an initial response.

Their initial response is as detailed as the Secretary of State’s letter is not.

“Yesterday we asked all schools in the Royal Borough of Greenwich to move to online learning for most pupils, but keep premises open for the children of key workers, vulnerable children and those with special educational needs. 

‘Other boroughs have asked schools to take similar measures, and the Mayor of London has also called for all secondary schools to close, with an extra week off in January to enable testing.  

‘Our request was based on information from Public Health England and supported by the Council’s Public Health team. In the Royal Borough of Greenwich, we currently have the highest rates of COVID-19 since March, with numbers doubling every four days. Our seven-day infection rate for the borough is now 59% higher than at the same point last week. 

‘Infection rates are particularly high amongst young people, with 817 children of school age testing positive for COVID-19. 4,262 children and 362 staff are self-isolating – that’s an increase of 640 people since Friday. In many cases, other members of the child’s household have also tested positive, impacting entire families. 

‘Schools across the borough have now organised online learning from tomorrow, whilst others are opening their premises to all pupils. This evening we received a legal direction from the Government to withdraw our request to schools. We are in the process of seeking legal advice and will respond to the Government in the morning.  

‘We have alerted schools, and will speak to them tomorrow. But given we received this notification just before 5pm, it was impossible to ask schools to change any of the arrangements they have in place for Tuesday.’

The person(s) who drafted that response have done a good job: they are showing how the closure is reasonable, necessary and proportionate.

The response is based on local data and shows that reasonable alternative arrangements have been made.

The response also shows the council is in a better position to asses the situation than the Secretary of State.

*

On the basis of information in the Greenwich Council response, the government would be hard-pressed to obtain an injunction in support of their direction.

None of the above is to say that the government’s ultimate position is weak – a better prepared direction, based on local data, and with proper and detailed reasoning, may have been – or still be – possible.

But such a direction letter was not sent, and this shoddy one was sent instead.

The Secretary of State may issue a better direction – or government lawyers may turn up to court with a better application for an injunction.

The government is even threatening to go to court ‘without notice’ so that the council may be subjected to an injunction without any say in court, which would be inappropriate given the council have set out already that it believes it is acting reasonably.

*

Ministerial directions are powerful legal instruments, but they should always be used with care.

When I was young I often had reports sent from school averring that I could do better.

But here we have what purports to be a formal government direction sent to keep schools open where one could say of the Secretary of State that they could do better.

*

POSTSCRIPT

Sadly – at least for the legal commentary (at least) the council has decided not to contest the direction in court.

The council, of course, is entitled to take such a decision.

But its decision to comply with the direction does not take away anything from the critique above.

*****

This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising a topical law and policy matter – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

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Donald Trump’s subversion of constitutional legitimacy, and its consequences

12th December 2020

The latest attempt by Donald Trump to litigate the 2020 presidential election has ended in failure.

The Supreme Court of the United States has dismissed the attempt by Texas to somehow nullify the votes of other states.

This is – or should be – Trump’s Wile E. Coyote moment.

The post-election litigation has had the quality of him running in mid-air, and now he must – or should – submit to constitutional gravity.

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But.

This defiance – which is shared by many Republicans in congress and nationally – may have dangerous lingering effects.

The defiance is subversive: it is an attempt to contaminate the legitimacy of the election of Joseph Biden.

To poison the wells, so to speak.

And in a way, this is apt and not surprising.

For just as Trump’s campaign to become president started with him denying the constitutional legitimacy of one Democratic president – with the ‘birther’ conspiracy – his presidency has ended with an assault on the legitimacy of another.

This is what Trump is ‘good’ at – identifying and exploiting weaknesses.

Sometimes this is on a personal and immediate level,  so as to obtain leverage in any given situation, or to intimidate someone with a nickname.

But in terms of an entire political system, it is to maintain and increase influence by identifying an issue which undermines constitutional legitimacy itself.

This is bullying on the grandest political scale.

*

This bullying will probably be not without consequence.

Along with populating the federal judiciary with conservatives, this rejection of political legitimacy will no doubt be a legacy of the Trump presidency.

And a lack of a shared sense of what is legitimate in any political system rarely ends well, and sometimes even ends with violence.

If a substantial proportion of people do not believe that the mechanisms of political change are valid and fair then they will tend to look to other ways for effecting changes.

Just think of Ireland, along with many other examples.

But it also has less lethal effects.

Normal issues of political debate cannot be approached on their own terms.

A policy promoted by an ‘illegitimate’ executive will be unacceptable, regardless of any merits.

This hyper-partisanship – that goes far beyond the usual knockabout politics of a party system – is devastating to any functioning democracy.

But in an age where a political base can be mobilised directly – bypassing traditional party and media structures – many politicians will be tempted not to show self-restraint.

The sensible convention that one does not go too far politically, not least because one does not want opponents to go too far, is disregarded.

Trump may well have lost his legal battle to retain the presidency, but this Trumpism may well be with us for much longer.

And that, more than desperate legal suits, will be the test Trump leaves for the law and politics of the United States

**

This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising a topical law and policy matter – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

***

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Sovereignty and ‘Sovereignty!’

11th December 2020

One feature of contemporary politics in both the United Kingdom and United States is the way descriptive words and phrases have become slogans with a very different meaning.

This blog has already described the unhappy juxtaposition between ‘Law and Order!’ and law and order – and we now have a populist president in the United States using his power to pardon so as to place people above and beyond the law, while the populist government of the United Kingdom sought recently to expressly legislate that it could break the law.

And a similar distinction can be made about sovereignty and ‘Sovereignty!’.

In the United Kingdom it would seem that one explanation of the ongoing failure for a trade agreement to be finalised with the European Union is because of this ‘s’ word.

Here, as examples, are some recent tweets from the United Kingdom’s head negotiator.

*

So what does this ‘s’ word mean?

From a legal perspective, sovereignty is really about two things.

*

First, sovereignty is about the ultimate source of political power in any given polity.

In the United Kingdom, as its name suggests, the ultimate source of political power is the crown.

Some would say is not correct to even speak of the ‘sovereignty of parliament’ – the power of parliament to make or unmake any law always depends on a bill receiving royal assent.

Only with the crown’s approval does a law then have super-duper magical power.

Resolutions and motions of either or both houses of parliament may bind parliament but they do not have the same effect outside as legislation.

That is why I and others tend to write of ‘supremacy’ of parliament, not sovereignty.

The crown also is the source of political power elsewhere in the United Kingdom constitution.

It is the source of power – somewhat obviously – in respect of the so-called ‘royal prerogative’ – where the executive gets to do things which have legal effect without any legislative basis.

It is the source of power with ‘royal charters’, instruments which can have legal effects similar to legislation.

And the crown is the ultimate source of power for the judiciary, at least for the high court of England and Wales.

(This means that in constitutional terms, the two Miller cases on prime ministerial power can be characterised as being about the crown in the courts adjudicating on the powers of the crown as exercised by ministers so as to circumvent the crown in parliament.)

This form of sovereignty is quite unaffected by anything Boris Johnson and David Frost may or may not agree to with the European Union.

Just as parliament was always able to repeal the European Communities Act 1972, parliament will be able to make or unmake any law which flows from the post-Brexit relationship agreement, and that will be respected by the courts.

So this cannot be the meaning of sovereignty that Johnson and Frost have in mind.

Nothing in any post-Brexit trade agreement is relevant to this meaning of sovereignty at all.

*

The second legal meaning of sovereignty is not so much about the source of power but about legal capacity.

A sovereign thing can do and not do as it wishes.

And one thing a sovereign thing can do is to enter agreements with other sovereign things.

This is where Johnson and Frost appear to misunderstand the ‘s’ word.

For them, ‘Sovereignty!’ means that the United Kingdom cannot and should not enter into and be bound by any international agreements.

But one test of sovereignty is that a thing is capable of entering into international agreements – the cart is not before the horse.

In general terms, being able to accept obligations is the very point of sovereignty: that a nation state can enter into a treaty means that it is a sovereign state.

(For more on the fascinating history of sovereignty and treaties, see here.)

This is why, for example, Canada, Australia and New Zealand insisted on being separate signatories to the surrender instrument of Japan, and to not allow the United Kingdom to sign on behalf of the then empire.

*

Sovereignty thereby does not mean that the United Kingdom cannot and should not enter into international agreements.

Sovereignty means that the United Kingdom can do so.

And any international agreement means accepting obligations that restrict autonomy, for that is the nature of an obligation.

Under the North Atlantic treaty, for example, the United Kingdom has an obligation to go to war even if it not attacked itself. 

Article 5 of that treaty provides:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Some would say that Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty is a greater interference with the ‘s’ word of the United Kingdom than anything which has come from the European Union.

And it is difficult to reconcile many statements of government-supporting politicians on sovereignty in respect of the European Union with their continued support for the United Kingdom being part of NATO.

Similar points can also be made for the United Kingdom’s obligations under the United Nations charter and indeed under any other international treaties.

Trade-offs on autonomy are a feature and not a bug of being a sovereign state.

An analogy is with being able to marry: when a person reaches their majority they can enter into a marriage contract should they so wish, but being in their majority does not compel them to either marry or not marry, and if they marry they can always divorce.

The Johnson-Frost approach to the ‘s’ word is confused.

They seem to think sovereignty means that the United Kingdom cannot and should not enter into international agreements, whereas sovereignty actually means that the United Kingdom can do so should it want to do so.

*

An indication of the United Kingdom government’s incorrect understanding of sovereignty was set out in a white paper earlier in the Brexit process:

“The sovereignty of Parliament is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution. Whilst Parliament has remained sovereign throughout our membership of the EU, it has not always felt like that.”

This is about “feelings” – not law or policy.

Brexit as therapy – so as to make the United Kingdom “feel” it is a sovereign state.

And this is the fundamental misconception of those who assert ‘Sovereignty!’ just to make themselves feel better.

Sovereignty exists anyway.

Sovereignty does not care about your feelings.

**

This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising a topical law and policy matter – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

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If you value the free-to-read and independent legal and policy commentary both at this blog and at my Twitter account please do support through the Paypal box above.

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The fundamental problem of Brexit is that a complex and slow task has been treated as easy and to be done at speed

10th December 2020

Three photographs summarise perfectly the course of the Brexit negotiations.

Few people will claim that the negotiations for the terms of the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union and then for the terms of the future relationship have gone perfectly, or even well.

Is there a single cause for this?

Some would say that Brexit in and of itself could never have gone well – that for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union was a project that would always have ended badly.

That Brexit was misconceived to begin with.

Perhaps.

But a Brexit done slowly and gradually, over several years, with full acknowledgment of how complicated an exercise would have been possible (even if not desirable).

Also possible would have been a Brexit where the United Kingdom had properly worked out what it wanted from departure before starting the exit process.

But these things did not happen.

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For me, the most fundamental problem with Brexit is not so much the principle of departure but the constant underestimation by the United Kingdom government of what would be involved in a member state unravelling over 45 years of entwined law and policy.

The task was always going to be complex, and it was not one which could be done at speed.

But those in charge of United Kingdom policy have treated the task as if it were simple – David Davis winging it, Theresa May believing it would all be as easy as when she opted in and out of European Union policy areas as home secretary, and the slogans and bravado of Boris Johnson.

Taking back control, Brexit means Brexit, get Brexit done.

Of course, the terms of Article 50 itself did not help in this respect – with its envisaged brisk two year period – but this period was capable of extension, and indeed it was extended.

There was also the somewhat artificial distinction between the exit agreement and the agreement for the future relationship, and it would have been much better if there had been one overall negotiation and agreement.

Yet even taking those process points into account, the Brexit exercise would still have been botched because the United Kingdom government had not properly prepared and thought-through its Brexit policy before embarking on departure.

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Perhaps Brexiters thought – not without good reason – that any delay would mean a Brexit denied.

And so, unless Brexit was done at speed, it would not be done at all.

Perhaps.

But a Brexit delayed and maybe not done at all would have been preferable to this botched Brexit.

The complexity of Brexit will not go away because it is ignored and the process done at undue speed – the problems will just manifest themselves differently.

Brexit will never ‘be done’ – at least not for the rest of the 2020s.

Brace, brace.

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This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising a topical law and policy matter – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

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The fork in the road to Brexit – Boris Johnson has to choose between being irresponsible or being unprincipled

9th December 2020

The United Kingdom prime minister Boris Johnson has come to a fork in the road on his Brexit journey.

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One direction is for those who are irresponsible.

To take this route he has to go for ‘no deal’ – that is for the United Kingdom to not have a relationship in place with the European Union once the Brexit transition period ends on 31st December 2020.

This will mean no agreement on tariffs, or on the trade in services, or on security and information sharing, or on numerous policy areas not to do with fishing as well as fishing, or on regulatory equivalence and how any divergence is managed.

This would be an extraordinary disruptive change in our relationship with the European Union in just a few days from now.

But the irresponsible route has been taken before in the Brexit journey: a referendum without any preparation for a Leave vote; an Article 50 notification without planning or thought; and a refusal to extend the transition period when there was an opportunity to do so.

The ‘irresponsible’ route has been taken before: it has ‘form’.

One can imagine that route being chosen.

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The other direction is for the unprincipled.

To take this route Johnson has to renege on many things he has said he would not do.

He needs to accept the European Union’s unbending position on regulatory equivalence and on governance of the agreement.

And this will conflict with the things he has said to his political supporters and others on ‘sovereignty’ and limiting the reach of Brussels.

To now go against these commitments would be hypocritical

But this route also has been taken before in his Brexit journey: he wrote two columns, for and against, and made promises to the then prime minister before supporting leave; he voted against and then for the next prime minister’s deal; he accepted the withdrawal agreement on terms he had previously opposed; and he told the electorate he had an ‘oven ready deal’ before then legislating so as to break that same deal.

The unprincipled route too has been taken before and has ‘form’.

One can imagine that route being taken instead.

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Clever wags will, of course, respond to the title of this post with ‘both’.

But he cannot do both, not on this occasion.

While there are elements of irresponsibility and lack of principle in many actions he – and most other politicians – will take, there is a real and stark decision here.

A binary situation: either/or.

Johnson either accepts the terms on offer from the European Union, or he does not.

There may be other apparent routes: he could affect that the European Union has given in on something, or there could perhaps be (yet another) extension of the Brexit process.

But these deflections hide or delay the ultimate decision: no deal or a deal on the terms of the European Union.

The decision that is taken may perhaps one day seem to historians as inevitable all along.

But looking at it from the outside in early December 2020, it is genuinely difficult to work out which route this prime minister will take.

Both directions have the force of narrative behind them.

Both seem plausible next chapters in the book of Brexit.

So the question for our prime minister is: are you more irresponsible than unprincipled, or vice versa?

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This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising a topical law and policy matter – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

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Brexit will be with either no deal or a deal on the terms of the European Union – and it is difficult to see how any Brexit could have ended differently

8th December 2020

We are now at the latest Brexit endgame.

Another endgame in that succession of contests between the United Kingdom and the European Union that we call Brexit.

This latest contest is about whether there will be an agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom for the relationship following the end of the transition period on 31st December 2020.

And the United Kingdom has a difficult choice.

The choice is between the United Kingdom agreeing to the terms on offer or refusing those terms.

Take these terms or leave them.

This outcome, like previous outcomes in this process, will be determined by whether the United Kingdom refuses to agree a thing or agrees that thing on the terms of the European Union.

And this is how ‘taking back control’ has worked out in practice.

The European Union’s way, or the highway.

And, as before, it is more likely than not that the United Kingdom will agree a thing on the terms of the European Union.

This latest agreement was to be called the ‘treaty of London’ as a patriotic gesture.

But instead, it is Boris Johnson who has been summoned this week to Brussels.

Perhaps the European Union will not be so insensitive as to provide a disused Eurostar railway carriage as the venue for any reeluctant signature of instruments of the trade agreement.

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Is ‘no deal’ still possible?

There is a real prospect that Johnson going to Brussels will not mean he agrees to the presented trade agreement.

Even with the United Kingdom government jettisoning the makeweight issues of fisheries and the Internal Market Bill clauses, there are two serious issues of contention.

The outstanding issues are the governance of the agreement (that is, how is to be enforced if things go wrong) and the ‘level playing field’ of regulatory equivalence (that is, how is any divergence from the current common commercial standards be managed).

A moment’s thought should make any sensible person realise that these two issues go to the very centre of any future relationship agreement.

For these issues to still be open just days before the end of the Brexit transition period is not a good sign.

There is no indication or reason to believe that the European Union will compromise on either issue.

Not least because the European Union will be fully aware of how any compromise in this agreement will affect its credibility in other trade agreements, and European Union negotiators are not fools.

So it will either be the European Union’s way, or the highway.

And the United Kingdom is perfectly capable of choosing the daft way.

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Could things have been different?

What if, for example, the United Kingdom had exercised its (now lost) power to request an extension of a further year to the transition period?

That certainly would have been prudent from a practical perspective: it would have enabled the European Union and the United Kingdom to deal with other pressing issues, not least the coronavirus pandemic.

Yet.

Does anyone seriously think the United Kingdom government would have used this further year working out what it wanted from Brexit?

It has had since 2016 to work out its position, and there is no reason to think that another year would have made any difference.

Had there been a year’s extension to the transition period, the United Kingdom’s (lack of) position would have been the same in December 2021 as it is now in December 2020.

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So, if this is the current predicament – who is to blame?

There are currently pundits putting forward the view that the lack of a ‘soft’ Brexit, with the United Kingdom staying in either the single market and/or the customs union is somehow the fault of those who were not in government since 2016.

Remainers are certainly culpable for losing the referendum – after 43 years of membership, the referendum was theirs to lose.

And, in my view, Remain lost the 2016 referendum far more than Leave won it.

But once Theresa May made ‘Brexit means Brexit’ the basis of her bid to become prime minister and Conservative party leadership, there is no plausible chain of events that would have led to any Brexit being a ‘soft’ Brexit rather than a hard one.

(Brexit may have been avoided by a general election or a further referendum, or there may have been endless delays in sending the Article 50 notification – but if Brexit was to happen it was never going to be a happy one.)

‘Brexit means Brexit’ quickly became the red lines, and the red lines in turn necessarily meant the United Kingdom  leaving the customs union and the single market.

Remainers can be blamed for losing the referendum, but not for government policy on Brexit thereafter.

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Now we are a few days before the end of the transition period, without either an agreement or much clue.

Both a trade agreement on the terms of the European Union and no deal seem possible.

This is perhaps the worst possible position for the United Kingdom to be in at this time.

But since May told us ‘Brexit means Brexit’ it is difficult to see how any departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union could have ended up any better.

Brace, brace.

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This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising a topical law and policy matter – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

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Brexit, deal, no deal, and the politics of easy answers

6th December 2020

Today is a Sunday, one of the last Sundays of the year, and we still do not know if there will be a deal in place from 1st January 2021 for the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union.

One hand, there are three big pointers to a deal being possible: both parties want a deal, it is in the best interests that there is a deal, and both sides are still talking.

And it is still only the first week of December and, even taking the impending public holidays into account, there is still time for a deal to be finalised and even ratified if minds are focused and there is goodwill among all those involved.

But.

On the other hand, no amount of goodwill and focus will lead to a deal if the parties cannot agree on substantial issues.

There appears to be three issues of unresolved contention: fisheries, the ‘level playing field’ (that is, common and enforceable commercial and trade standards), and governance (that is, the ongoing enforceability) of the agreement.

Of these, it is difficult to believe that fisheries is really that significant – it is a relatively small commercial sector, and the parties have mutual interests in one side catching the fish and and selling the fish to the other.

A cynical person may think that the fisheries issue is only still prominent so as to provide domestic cover to the United Kingdom government against domestic political concern about the other two issues, which do go to  post-Brexit sovereignty and control.

Fisheries policy as a red herring.

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The trade agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union was supposed to be so easy.

The then-international trade secretary said in 2017:

“The free trade agreement that we will have to do with the European Union should be one of the easiest in human history.”

His reasoning?

“We are already beginning with zero tariffs, and we are already beginning at the point of maximal regulatory equivalence, as it is called. In other words, our rules and our laws are exactly the same.”

What he missed, of course, is that one main purpose of an agreement would be about what happens after day one: how is equivalence maintained and any divergence managed?

Points so obvious it is painful to realise that an international trade secretary did not realise this.

A Brexit secretary once boasted it would be easy to put in place a free trade area ten times bigger than the European Union.

Leaving aside the fact that such an area would be larger than the world’s economy, and so presumably would include the Clangers and other extraterrestrials, the United Kingdom has actually ended up with a free trade area smaller than the United Kingdom – with a trade barrier down the Irish sea.

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It all seemed so easy, and it has it not turned out to be easy at all.

And this comes to the most basic problem with the United Kingdom’s approach to Brexit.

A complex problem has been treated as if it was a simple problem.

Any difficulty was to be met with chants of ‘Taking Back Control’ and ‘Get Brexit Done’.

The huge political and economic challenges of extracting the United Kingdom from forty-seven years of entangled and entwined law and policy was for the likes of Boris Johnson and Michael Gove no more difficult than writing a punchy 1100-word column against a slightly flexible deadline.

This is what often happens with populism – which (as this blog has said before) can be described as the promotion of easy answers in exchange for electoral support.

And so we have ended up with a month to go, with no idea what will be the agreed substantial and enforceable terms of trade between the European Union and the United Kingdom, and a real possibility that there will be no agreed terms of trade.

Brace, brace.

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This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising a topical law and policy matter – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

If you value this free-to-read and independent legal and policy commentary at this blog and at my Twitter account please do support through the Paypal box above.

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Brexit makes no legal difference to the United Kingdom being able to authorise the new coronavirus vaccine

3rd December 2020

For the launch of any vaccine, credibility is essential.

And so senior government ministers and other politicians should not be lying about the regulatory aspects of the new vaccine so to score points for Brexit.

This is the Leader of the House of Commons, the cabinet minister responsible for the government’s legislative programme.

https://twitter.com/Jacob_Rees_Mogg/status/1334068994345754625

This is a health minister.

And this is a government-supporting backbencher.

You will see these statements are not about Brexit allowing the United Kingdom to authorise the new vaccine more quickly as a matter of policy.

Each statement directly and expressly attributes the speed of the authorisation to a change in the law made possible by Brexit.

This, however, is false.

The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency confirmed yesterday it was acting under EU law when it it made the authorisation.

Even the Prime Minister did not endorse the claim that Brexit made any legal difference.

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The fact is that Brexit made no legal difference to the authorisation of the new vaccine.

Such an authorisation was (and is) possible under European Union law.

The relevant provision is Article 5(2) of the Directive 2001/83/EC.

Here is the proof in back and white.

European Union Directives do not necessarily need to be implemented to have legal effect, but for completeness the implementing domestic legislation for Article 5(2) is Regulation 174 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012.

Until 31 December 2020 under the Brexit transition arrangements, Article 5(2) has legal effect in the United Kingdom – and even after 1 January 2020 Regulation 174 would still be part of domestic law.

Brexit therefore made no legal difference.

So what is the recent amendment mentioned by the politicians?

That appears to be a reference to the The Human Medicines (Coronavirus and Influenza) (Amendment) Regulations 2020.

But those regulations do not amend or directly affect Regulation 174 – you will see they skip straight over it and add supplementary provisions.

The recent amendment is thereby irrelevant to the legal ability of the United Kingdom to authorise the vaccine.

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The cabinet minister responsible for the government’s legislative programme and health ministers would know that Brexit made no legal difference to the United Kingdom’s ability to authorise the new vaccine.

They would know the correct legal basis for authorisation of the new vaccine: that is their job and they would have been briefed.

But they chose to knowingly promote a falsehood instead, just to score a point for Brexit.

This was dangerously irresponsible, given that any false statements about the new vaccine may be exploited by anti-vaxxers.

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