Category: Home Office

What does the Home Secretary mean by “taking legal advice into account”?

All Souls Day, 2022

What does it mean for a home secretary to “take legal advice into account”?

*

This question is prompted by statements by the home secretary to the House of Commons in respect of the escalating problems at the Manston asylum processing centre.

On Monday she told members of parliament:

“…I have never ignored legal advice.

“As a former Attorney General, I know the importance of taking legal advice into account.

“At every point, I have worked hard to find alternative accommodation to relieve the pressure at Manston.”

*

So whatever “taking legal advice into account” means, it does not – for her – mean “ignor[ing]” that advice.

The home secretary herself makes that distinction and juxtaposition.

*

The home secretary also said in her prepared statement:

“As Members will be aware, we need to meet our statutory duties around detention, and fulfil legal duties to provide accommodation for those who would otherwise be destitute.

“We also have a duty to the wider public to ensure that anyone who has entered our country illegally undergoes essential security checks and is not, with no fixed abode, immediately free to wander around local communities.”

Note that “also”.

*

Those quotations are from her prepared statement, but in response to an opposition question she then also stated:

“I have not ignored or dismissed any legal advice with which I have been provided.

“I cannot go into the details of that legal advice because of the Law Officers’ convention.

“That is part of the decision-making process that all Ministers go through.

“We have to take into account our legal duties not to leave people destitute; I have to take into account the fact that I do not want to prematurely release hundreds of migrants into the Kent community; I have to take into account value for money; I have to take into account fairness for the British taxpayer.”

*

Again the distinction is made with ignoring advice, but you will also see that taking into account legal advice is now set against other (competing?) things for her to take into account: “the fact that I do not want to prematurely release hundreds of migrants into the Kent community; I have to take into account value for money; I have to take into account fairness for the British taxpayer.”

These factors are presented as being alongside – and perhaps of at least equal importance to – “tak[ing] into account our legal duties not to leave people destitute”.

*

The home secretary in another reply said:

“I confirm that I have not ever ignored legal advice.

“The Law Officers’ convention, which I still take seriously, means that I will not comment on the contents of legal advice that I may have seen.

“What I will say is this: I am not prepared to release migrants prematurely into the local community in Kent to no fixed abode.

“That, to me, is an unacceptable option.”

The impression one gets from this further reply is that her not being “prepared to release migrants prematurely into the local community in Kent to no fixed abode” is not merely a factor to consider alongside any legal advice, but is actually the determining factor.

She seems to see that as the “unacceptable option” to which all other factors presumably, including legal advice, must yield.

If so, this accords with the “also” passage in her prepared statement.

*

On Sunday, the day before that commons statement, the well-connected political journalists at the Sunday Times reported:

“Suella Braverman has been accused of failing to act on legal advice that the government was illegally detaining thousands of asylum seekers. The move could cost taxpayers an expensive court action.

“The home secretary received advice at least three weeks ago warning that migrants were being detained for unlawfully long periods at the Manston asylum processing centre in Ramsgate, Kent. According to five sources, Braverman, 42, was also told that the legal breach needed to be resolved urgently by rehousing the asylum seekers in alternative accommodation.

“Two sources said she was also warned by officials that the Home Office had no chance of defending a legal challenge and the matter could also result in a public inquiry if exposed.

“A government source said: “The government is likely to be JR’d [judicially reviewed] and it’s likely that all of them would be granted asylum, so it’s going to achieve the exact opposite of what she wants. These people could also launch a class action against us and cost the taxpayer millions.””

*

On Hallowe’en, ITN reported this further information:

If this ITN report is correct – and it is certainly plausible – this would explain why so many home office “sources” are aware of this issue.

As this blog has mentioned before, it is a significant but not unknown step to go to the Treasury Devil – James Eadie, the government’s senior external legal adviser – for an opinion, especially before any actual litigation.

(You may recall that the Devil was invoked in another matter involving the current home secretary when she was attorney general.)

For the Devil to be invoked and for the advice just to come back as reinforcing the internal home office advice would have been rather the setback for the home secretary.

It would have meant that not only did she have advice before her which was unwanted from internal lawyers, but that the unwelcome advice had been upheld by the most senior external lawyer available to the government.

*

If so, what is a home secretary to do?

One thing a home secretary can do is to comply with legal advice,

That is what is expected by the ministerial code and, indeed, by the principle of the rule of law.

Of course, there will be situations – especially in respect of exercises of discretion in individual cases – where legal views may legitimately differ, and so a minister can take a view in respect of litigation risk.

But that latitude is not there in respect of compliance with general statutory duties.

The only option with a statutory duty for a government department is to comply with that duty.

*

Now we go back to what the home secretary said, and what she did not say.

The home secretary said that she did not “ignore” legal advice.

And the home secretary said that she took legal advice and legal obligations “into account”.

But the home secretary has not said – expressly – that she complied with the legal advice.

If the home secretary had complied with the legal advice she could simply say “I have complied with the legal advice”.

But she has chosen not to do so, and has used what seems to be evasive wording instead.

The most plausible explanation for this is that she has not complied with the legal advice.

Given the nature of statutory duties, it is not clear how this can be done.

They tend to be legally binary: you either comply or you do not comply.

They are not an item in a basket with other items.

*

In the house of commons today, an opposition politician said:

“The Prime Minister promised integrity, professionalism and accountability in Government. His Home Secretary has leaked information, is overseeing chaos in the Home Office and has broken the law. What will she actually have to do to get the sack?”

[An earlier version of this post wrongly attributed this quote to the leader of the opposition. This was not the case, and I have amended this post accordingly. I apologise for this error.]

She would not have said “broken the law” lightly.

Perhaps she was referring to something else (and please let me know in the comments below if you think that was the case) but the impression I formed was that she was referring to the Manston situation.

The leader of the opposition then asked the prime minister:

“Did the Home Secretary receive legal advice that she should move people out—yes or no?”

When this question was not directly answered, he then said:

“I think the answer to the question of whether the Home Secretary received legal advice to move people out of Manston is yes.”

*

Presumably the legal advice to which the leader of the opposition was referring is the same legal advice which was provided by the Devil and internal legal advisers.

If so, then it seems that that the home secretary has placed a non-legal factor above compliance with the law.

She has decided that the non-legal factor prevails.

In doing so, the home secretary presumably thinks that this weighing exercise means that she has not “ignored” the legal obligation.

Instead, she has seemingly given less weight to that factor than to another factor.

If this interpretation is correct then it accords what she told the house of commons on Monday and it also accords with what the home office “sources” are saying to reporters.

I cannot think of any other interpretation that accords better with the available information.

(If you can, please do set it out below.)

The problem with this position would be that the relevant legal obligations are not just another item in a basket.

Instead, it is the breaking of those legal obligations that should be the “unacceptable option” to any home secretary, and indeed to any minister or official.

But this home secretary appears to think there is an option that trumps such compliance.

*

For the reasons set out above, it seems that the home secretary was advised to comply with the law and she has chosen not to do so, maintaining that “taking account” of the law in such a situation is somehow not to “ignore” the law.

That would be a remarkable position for the home secretary to adopt and, if so, one would expect the courts to take a different view if the matter is actually litigated.

***

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A close reading of Suella Braverman’s account of her unauthorised email

All Saints’ Day, 2022

On Wednesday 19 October 2022, at 4.55pm, the then (and now again) home secretary Suella Braverman tweeted her resignation:

*

The resignation letter contained the following passage:

“Earlier today [ie, the Wednesday], I sent an official document from my personal email to a trusted parliamentary colleague as part of policy engagement, and with the aim of garnering support for government policy on migration.

“This constitutes a technical infringement of the rules.

“As you know, the document was a draft Written Ministerial Statement about migration, due for publication imminently.

“Much of it had already been briefed to MPs.

“Nevertheless it is right for me to go.

“As soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported this on official channels, and informed the Cabinet Secretary.”

*

Those sentences largely speak for themselves and so do not need much of a gloss.

But do note that last sentence: “As soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported”.

Not just “as soon as I realised” but also “rapidly reported”.

Read that sentence carefully.

The image that the author of that letter wishes to convey here is striking: the author acted quickly, and by the author’s own initiative.

*

Now let us turn to another text by the same author.

This is the further letter sent by the author, this time to the Home Affairs Select Committee yesterday.

You can read this letter in HTML and in pdf.

This further letter is longer than the first letter, at six pages with a one page appendix.

Pleasingly it has numbered paragraphs, which rather makes it look like a court pleading or statement of case, but also makes it easier to navigate our way around – and so where relevant I will refer to the relevant paragraphs in brackets as [Para (x)].

Now let us have a close look.

*

We are not told the reason for this letter: it seems not to be a letter that has been requested by the Committee or required by any provision or resolution.

It appears thereby to be a volunteered and unsolicited account of the circumstances of the resignation – and this is reinforced in the letter:

“Given the level of speculation about the sequence of events that led to my resignation, including several inaccuracies, herewith is a detailed account about the circumstances of my resignation. I know how important the issues being raised are, and that is why I want to be fully transparent with Parliament and specifically with your Committee.” [Para 3]

As there was no request or requirement for creating and publishing this text, it is not clear what the motivation is for the creation and publishing of the text.

One possibility is that it is an attempt by the home secretary to frame and spin certain content of the letter that may come into the public domain by some other means.

*

Contained in this further letter is the following information about what was emailed.

The letter tells us about a written ministerial statement to be laid in parliament on the Thursday (the day after the email and then the resignation). [Para 4]

The letter also tells us that the statement was connected to the Office of Budget Responsibility forecast in respect of the then expected fiscal statement on 31 October 2022, and this indicates the possibility of the statement having some market sensitivity. [Para 4]

On the Tuesday (the day before the email and the resignation) the statement was a four-page document in near-final form. [Para 5]

The statement, we are told, “contained high level policy on illegal migration and legal migration proposals” and that it “consisted of high-level proposals for liberalising our migration rules under the Points Based System for workers, for example increasing the number of low-skilled foreign workers, as well as general plans for controlling illegal migration”. [Para 6 and 8]

(The hyphen comes and goes for “high level” and “high-level” for some reason.)

We are not told the statement’s security classification, though we are assured it was not “SECRET” or “TOP SECRET”. [Para 7]

We are also told that the statement did not contain “any information relating to national security, the intelligence agencies, cyber security or law enforcement. It did not contain details of any particular case work. It did not contain any market-sensitive data as all the data contained in the document was already in the public domain.” [Para 7]

That last sentence is curiously worded.

It is carefully limited to “data”.

If there was nothing in the statement which was market sensitive then the obvious thing to say would be to say there was no information which was market sensitive.

The author could have then just added “market sensitive” to the information listed in the preceding sentences.

But the author chose not to do this.

There are many kinds of market-sensitive information other than data – for example, how the data was to be used and what models or assumptions were to be employed.

But the denial is limited carefully to “data”.

We can only wonder why.

*

The draft statement was incomplete.

There were “some sentences which had not been fully agreed by all departments” and there was to be a meeting at 1pm that Wednesday of the relevant sub-committee that was to agree a final version. [Paras 6 and 9]

Given the mention of the Office for Budget Responsibility, one of the departments would presumably have been the Treasury.

*

At 7.25am the author used her personal email address to email the draft incomplete statement to the government backbench member of parliament John Hayes. [Para 12]

The covering message was:

“Dear John, What do you think? I’ll need to take a view this morning by 10am.” [Para 12]

What did he think of what?

Presumably the request was for his thoughts on the proposed amendments in the text from other departments, as he would know from previous briefings the position of the author.

This would accord with the 10am deadline, which would allow the author time to consider Hayes’ views in advance of the 1pm cabinet committee meeting.

We are then told about how the email was sent with an unintended recipient:

“I addressed it to Sir John’s parliamentary email and intended to copy his secretary’s parliamentary email address. However, I entered the incorrect email address for his secretary unintentionally and unknowingly.” [Para 12]

*

Hayes did not reply by 10am, but somebody else did.

This unexpected reply was at 8:34am:

“‘This has been sent to me in error.’ I did not recognise the person who had sent this message, but noted that it was from a parliamentary email address with a similar name to Sir John’s secretary.” [Para 14]

The author then tells us that at “before or around 10am” she saw this 8:34am message from the unintended recipient.

The “before” here is vague.

Nonetheless, “[t]his was the moment that I realised that I had made a mistake by sending it to an unintended recipient.”

When was that moment?

The “before” could mean any time between 8:34 and 10am.

And what did the author decide to do?

Two things.

*

First, the author sent an email at 10:02 to this stranger:

“Please can you delete the message and ignore. Thanks”.

Note that at this point the author says she does not know the recipient – just that it is someone with a similar name to the intended recipient.

Note also the author does not ask the recipient to confirm deletion, and just leaves it with it with a mere “Thanks”.

Perhaps she thought that was which was needed, and that is all that would come of it.

*

The second thing we are told the author decides to do is “that I would inform my officials as soon as practicable”.

This term “as soon as practicable” is also vague.

But whatever it means it does not mean promptly or immediately, or indeed “rapidly”.

As it happens, the author does not seem to inform her officials for quite some time.

This is even though she is, on her own account, located at the Home Office. [Para 17-18]

*

At 11:31am, the Chief Whip sends a WhatsApp message to the author asking her to speak to Andrew Percy, the member of parliament to whose assistant the email had been unintentionally sent.

The author tells us she did not see this message at the time.

*

At 11:33am Percy emailed the author as follows:

“Suella

“I am really not sure that government documents should be being shared with members of your former campaign team via gmail.

“Can you tell me what the Ministerial Code says on this and what the processes are in the Home Office for the sharing of sensitive government documents via gmail.

“Simply asking my team to delete this email and ignore it is not an acceptable response to what appears, on the face of it, to be a potentially serious breach of security.

“I am considering a point of order on this issue and have raised it with the Chief Whip.

“I hope an explanation will be forthcoming. You are nominally in charge of the security of this nation, we have received many warnings even as lowly backbenchers about cyber security.

“Andrew Percy.”

The author claims not to have seen this Percy email at the time, and the Percy email is only quoted later in the letter which gives an impression that it was a later development.

Indeed, both the Chief Whip’s message and the Percy email are deftly inserted in this further letter outside of the strict chronology of the day’s events, and so it is not obvious on first reading how early in the day’s events they had been sent.

*

By 11.50am there is no indication that the author has informed her officials when she encounters the Chief Whip and Percy. [Para 19]

We are then told of a coincidence.

“At 11.50 in Members’ Lobby, and by coincidence, I saw the Chief Whip and Andrew Percy MP. The Chief Whip asked me to speak to Mr Percy MP. He told me that my email had been received by a member of his parliamentary staff. He was concerned about my having sent the email to Sir John and to his staff member.” [Para 19]

She then gives an apology (to which we will return), but there is still no indication that she had informed her officials.

This is now nearly two hours after her “Thanks” email and three-and-a-half hours after the 8.35am email alerting her to the mistake.

On her own account, it is only at this point she knows who the email was sent to – for at 10:02 she had not known who the recipient was and assumed that whoever they were they would just delete it as requested (without confirmation).

*

It is now noon:

“At midday I decided that I would not attend PMQs as planned, so that I could take action regarding my mistake. I returned to my parliamentary office. This was the first opportunity I had had to communicate in full what had happened.” [Para 21]

*

The “in full” here is doing a lot of lifting.

The author had been at the Home Office by her own admission between 10am and 11.20am.

Some communication with her officials would have been possible after the 8.34am email or the 10.02 email.

And who does she “communicate in full” to?

Her Private Secretary?

No.

Her Permanent Secretary?

No.

The Cabinet Secretary?

No.

It is to her Special Adviser (a political appointee), and not her Private Secretary or her department’s Permanent Secretary, or the Cabinet Secretary.

We are then told:

“There, I explained the above chronology to my Special Adviser and asked him to phone my Private Secretary immediately.” [Para 23]

She does not herself tell the Private Secretary directly, for some reason.

“I asked [my Special Adviser] to inform my Private Secretary of the chain of events set out above and make clear that I wanted to fully report the breach and follow official processes. I wanted official advice on what I needed to do next. This included any reviews that were deemed appropriate by senior civil servants.” [Para 23]

She does not herself tell the Private Secretary of the chain of events, for some reason.

We are then told it is only after she has asked her Special Adviser to tell the Private Secretary that she reads the Percy email of 11:33am. [Para 23]

And then we are told that it only after seeing the Percy email that she saw the Chief Whip’s message of 11:31am. [Para 24]

*

Back to the Special Adviser being asked to inform the Private Secretary:

“Immediately after being told, my Private Secretary discussed the issue with the Permanent Secretary, and with his agreement then flagged the issue on my behalf to the Prime Minister’s Private Office and the Cabinet Secretary’s Private Office. This was the first time the Prime Minister’s Private Office or the Cabinet Secretary’s Office had been informed. As a result of my actions, the Cabinet Secretary was told for the first time. Separately, and unbeknownst to me at the time, the Chief Whip had also notified the Prime Minister of this issue. This was not known to me until after these events.”

There are two very interesting turns of phrase here.

The “Immediately” implies promptness.

And the “As a result of my actions” suggests that she was directly responsible for the Prime Minister’s private office and Cabinet Secretary’s office being informed, when in fact it had gone as follows: Author > Special Adviser > Private Secretary > Permanent Secretary > Cabinet Secretary.

*

It is now almost 1pm on the Wednesday.

The original email had been sent at 7.25am; the email from the unintended recipient was at 8.34am; the thanks-and-please-delete email had been sent by her to a stranger at 10:02am; the Chief Whip’s message had been at 11:31am; Percy’s email had been at 11:33am; and the meeting with the Chief Whip and Percy had been at 11:50am.

But on the author’s own account, she still has not spoken or otherwise communicated directly with any Home Office officials (as opposed to her own Special Adviser) about the matter.

And then:

“At 12.56 and 12.57, I emailed all of the relevant emails to my Private Secretary as part of my referral to officials.” [Para 27]

There is no reason given why this did not happen before.

*

Ministers are busy people, and they can be swamped with information and communications.

And so nothing in the above should be taken to mean that the author is not being accurate as to when she actually saw messages.

Indeed, this post is set out on the basis of the author being accurate in what she says in the further letter.

*

But.

If we go back to the author’s resignation letter, we see the following:

“As soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported this on official channels, and informed the Cabinet Secretary.”

This statement is not consistent with what the author said in the further letter.

If we accept that the 8.33am email was not seen at the time, the mistake was realised “before or about” 10am.

Her Special Adviser was not asked until after noon to contact officials , and there was no direct contact with officials until almost 1pm.

If her further letter is correct, then “[a]s soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported this on official channels” cannot also be correct.

The author also did not inform the Cabinet Secretary.

On her own account, it was: Author > Special Adviser > Private Secretary > Permanent Secretary > Cabinet Secretary.

Yet the normal and natural meaning of “[a]s soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported this on official channels, and informed the Cabinet Secretary” is that the author herself directly informed the Cabinet Secretary.

This was not the case, if her account in the further letter is correct.

*

For completeness, the further letter also states:

“Following my referral and subsequent resignation, the Home Office conducted a review of my use of personal email and verified the above sequence of events. The review also identified that within the period between 6 September and 19 October, I had sent official documents from my government email to my personal email address on six occasions.”

Note: six.

Note also that it is not said that she only sent official documents to her personal email six times, but only that six occasions have been “identified”.

It would have been easier just to say that author only did this six times, but this other form of words was chosen instead.

Those six occasions would have been in addition to the incident described above.

We are also not told how many times those official documents had been forwarded.

And note the dates: there may have been, on the face of this wording, other occasions in her other government roles, outside of those specified dates.

*

At the meeting with the Chief Whip and Percy, the author says she said:

“I apologised and said that this was the first time that I had used my personal email to send an official Home Office document to someone outside government, that there was no risk to security due to the content, and that I would ensure that this would never happen again.” [Para 19]

Note: “first time”.

The appendix to the letter lists six times the author had forwarded emails from her official email to her personal email:

The 19 October incident above is not one of these, because the relevant draft statement was forwarded to her from her Special Adviser.

If what the author says what she assured the Chief Whip and Percy is correct, then the position would be that not one of these six documents was then forwarded.

We must also assume that none of the times official documents were forwarded to her by her Special Adviser (such as above) that they were not also sent outside of government.

*

The letter of 31 October 2022 from the home secretary to the chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee is carefully drafted and, as with any carefully drafted document, rewards careful attention.

There are turns of phrase and framing of information in that letter that could give an impression different to that which would be gained from a close reading.

But a close reading shows that the portion of the resignation letter that says “[a]s soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported this on official channels, and informed the Cabinet Secretary” cannot be correct.

The further letter raises more questions than provides answers.

Either her resignation letter is correct or this further letter is correct.

But not both.

***

Thank you for reading – and this blog needs your support to carry doing these close readings.

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The Home Secretary, the Home Office, and “statutory duties”

Hallowe’en, 2022

The uses made of certain law-related phrases in political discourse can be fascinating.

Take the current political row about the treatment of asylum seekers in Manston.

It appears from news reports that the current home secretary Suella Braverman and/or the previous home secretary Priti Patel failed to ensure there was sufficient accommodation for asylum seekers.

This failure was, in turn, a breach of the law – and, it is alleged, that this breach of the law was knowingly made.

In essence, the accusation is that the home secretary was told what the law was and the home secretary chose not to comply with that law.

*

I do not know – and I suspect you do not know – the truth of the matter (at least not yet).

But the language in which the accusations are framed is interesting.

This is not, it seems, about human rights gone mad or “woke” or both.

It is not about a minister “taking a view” on the risk of there being a successful challenge, either by an application for judicial review or otherwise.

It is not thereby about an area of law with “grey areas” or “fuzzy edges” or whatever evasive language one can get away with.

No.

This row is about good-old, old-fashioned, domestic law “statutory duties”.

That is the sort of binary law in respect of which you either comply or do not comply.

It is not the sort of law in respect of which, for example, you take a view on whether you have acted “proportionately” or not in a particular case, and in respect of which you guess (ahem, forecast) how a court will deal with a challenge.

Where the law provides binary “statutory duties”, a government department (and indeed anyone else, including you) should not “take a view”.

You comply.

Simple as that.

The Act of Parliament says you should do [x], and so you do [x] – else you are in breach of your duty to do [x].

It is therefore not open to Braverman or any other partisan to ignore the law on the basis that it is about woke human rights and assert that the courts will strike the wrong balance for proportionality.

And this is why, in part, I think this row has reached the public domain.

*

This is not about exercises of discretion in individual cases, where the home secretary or relevant official can take one view or another on a case-by-case basis.

This is wholesale non-compliance.

That is why I think officials are more jumpy than they otherwise would be.

This is not a decision to interfere with right in individual cases, but an apparent decision to disregard entire legal rules.

Perhaps the relevant home secretary did not realise or care for the distinction.

Perhaps the disdain for “individual case” human rights law has tripped over to disdain for the general rules of legal compliance with statutory duties.

Who knows.

But we have got to a point where even Home Office officials – Home Office officials! – are sufficiently alarmed by a home secretary’s proposals to disregard the law that they are contacting and briefing journalists.

*

First it was individual human rights, and now it is general statutory duties.

Once you start making exceptions to the rule of law, those exceptions become wider and more troubling.

Brace, brace.

 

***

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Along with Fake News and Fake Law, we have Fake Policy

20th April 2022

A ‘policy’ can be understood as a means to an end.

In a political context, a policy is the means by which various elements of the state can be used to achieve an outcome that would not be achieved, but for that policy.

Those elements can be ‘hard’ – for example, the use of legal prohibitions or coercive sanctions.

And other elements can be ‘soft’ – such as budget allocation and funding, administrative priority, the issuing of guidance, or the exercise of leadership.

But whatever combination of elements, the usual notion is that a policy is there to do something in practical terms – to have an ‘in real life’ (IRL) effect.

And then…

…and then we have the ‘policies’ of our current home secretary.

Of course, the home secretary is not the only minister to make announcements of policies which were not really intended to ever have effect, so as to ‘play well’ with the media or voters.

But it is difficult to think of a politician so adept at promoting such fake policies.

Take the Rwanda proposal (which has already featured on this blog).

A moment’s thought will indicate to any sensible person that the policy makes no sense IRL.

For example: that the proposal is for only some but not all of the asylum seekers to be transported onto Rwanda does not and cannot ‘break’ any ‘business model’.

The traffickers will instead just adjust their model so as to focus on those who are less likely to be moved on.

This is a point so bleedingly obvious that even the former home secretary and prime minister Theresa May – who promoted the vile ‘hostile environment’ policy – can see that it will not work.

Even Theresa May.

But.

The Rwanda proposal is not being promoted because it will work – or is capable of working.

The home secretary even admitted in formal correspondence published on the government’s own website that there is no evidence that the policy will work to deter anyone.

The proposal is there as a thing in itself – to rally illiberal supporters and ‘to own the libs’.

In the event this policy ever gets implemented, this fake quality will still be true as to its essence.

It is not a policy in any practical or meaningful sense – it is a signal.

And signals something positive or negative, depending on one’s values.

The publicity, like the cruelty, is the point.

**

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What the Home Secretary’s Ministerial Direction on Rwanda signifies – and what it does not signify

18th April 2022

The home secretary has issued ‘a ministerial direction’ for her proposal for a ‘migration and economic development partnership’ with Rwanda for the processing of asylum claims.

Such a direction is significant – but it is also important to realise what it does not signify.

The direction by itself does not mean that the proposal is wrong, or will not work, or is unlawful.

What it does mean is that there is sufficient concern within the home office that the most senior official wants Priti Patel to own the decision to go ahead with it.

And this is worth exploring.

*

The partnership proposal was published last (Maundy) Thursday – which is odd, given that parliament was not sitting and we are around the time of the start of the central government ‘purdah’ for the local election campaigns.

Also published was a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Rwanda.

In general terms, an MoU is a document that is supposed to impress you as as being effective and formal, but is not actually effective nor formal.

A political (and legal) sleight of hand (SoH).

And followers of this blog will enjoy the wording of paragraph 2.2 of the MoU:

“2.2 For the avoidance of doubt, the commitments set out in this Memorandum are made by the United Kingdom to Rwanda and vice versa and do not create or confer any right on any individual, nor shall compliance with this Arrangement be justiciable in any court of law by third-parties or individuals.”

*

So that was (Maundy) Thursday.

On (Easter) Saturday, in the late afternoon, two letters were published by the government.

These letters were dated 13 April 2022, that is the Wednesday before the proposal and the MoU were published on the Thursday.

The first letter was from the most senior civil servant at the home office.

He was insisting on a ministerial direction.

Why?

*

To answer that question we need to understand government policy on ‘managing public money’.

This policy is not the sort of partisan policy which politicians announce or publish in a manifesto.

It is instead the sort of policy which any government has, regardless of which part is in power.

And within each department the most senior official – in this case the permanent secretary – is the ‘accounting officer’ responsible for ensuring the policy is complied with.

When I was a government lawyer fifteen years ago, it was known as ‘VFM’ – value for money.

Part of the ‘managing public money’ policy provides:

The fine folk at the Institute of Government have provided this excellent explainer on ministerial directions which you should now read.

And this is the government’s own page for such directions.

*

Now we go back to the permanent secretary’s letter.

You will see the first three paragraphs set out his understanding of the policy and what it is seeking to achieve – and this is set out in positive terms to which the home secretary herself cannot object.

The fourth paragraph then sets out his role as the accounting officer, and the fifth paragraph sets out the extent to which he sees there is no problem with the Rwanda proposal (emphasis added):

“The Accounting Officer advice that I have received comprises a rigorous assessment of the regularity, propriety, feasibility and value for money of this policy, drawing on legal, policy and operational expertise.  I have satisfied myself that it is regular, proper and feasible for this policy to proceed. We have incorporated learning from Windrush in developing this policy and the plans for its implementation.”

So, according to the official it is generally “regular, proper and feasible” for the proposal to proceed.

But.

There is something about which he as accounting officer is not satisfied, and this is set out out in the next paragraphs (which I have separated out for flow):

“However, this advice highlights the uncertainty surrounding the value for money of the proposal.

“I recognise that, despite the high cost of this policy, there are potentially significant savings to be realised from deterring people entering the UK illegally.

“Value for money of the policy is dependent on it being effective as a deterrent.

“Evidence of a deterrent effect is highly uncertain and cannot be quantified with sufficient certainty to provide me with the necessary level of assurance over value for money.

I do not believe sufficient evidence can be obtained to demonstrate that the policy will have a deterrent effect significant enough to make the policy value for money.

“This does not mean that the MEDP cannot have the appropriate deterrent effect; just that it there is not sufficient evidence for me to conclude that it will.”

*

The proposal has a “high cost” – but there is no sufficient evidence that the high cost will be offset by savings from it having any deterrent effect.

The evidence for such an effect is not only uncertain but “highly uncertain”.

He therefore cannot sign off on the policy as accounting officer.

He instead needs to escalate it to the minister to sign off personally.

And so (again broken up for flow):

“Therefore, I will require your written instruction to proceed.

“I consider it is entirely appropriate for you to make a judgement to proceed in the light of the illegal migration challenge the country is facing.

“I will of course follow this direction and ensure the Department continues to support the implementation of the policy to the very best of our abilities.

“Should you issue a direction, I am required to copy all relevant papers to the Comptroller and Auditor General (who will inform the Public Accounts Committee) and the Treasury Officer of Accounts.

“I anticipate publishing our exchange of direction letters as early as practicable.”

*

So this is not any usurpation of ministerial responsibility and democratic control, but a reinforcement of the priority of minister over officials.

The minister will get their way – but they have to take the decision themselves.

And so the home secretary replied, giving the direction.

Her letter is also worth looking at – though this time for what it does not say.

Her letter does not engage with the value for money points but sidesteps them (again broken for flow):

“While we understand it is not possible for HMG to accurately model the deterrent effect from day one, together with Rwanda, we are confident this policy is our best chance at producing that effect.

“It is only by introducing new incentives and effective deterrents into the system, as our international partners like Denmark, Greece, and Australia have succeeded in doing, that we can take on the criminal gangs facilitating illegal entry and break their lethal business model.

“I recognise your assessment on the immediate value for money aspect of this proposal.

“However, I note that without action, costs will continue to rise, lives will continue to be lost, and that together we have introduced safeguards into our agreement to protect taxpayer funding.

“And while accepting the constraints of the accounting officer framework set out by HM Treasury, I also think there are credible invest-to-save arguments in the long term.

[…]

…I also believe there is an imperative to act now to mitigate the impact on staff wellbeing as well as departmental operational and financial pressures in the longer term.

“It would therefore be imprudent in my view, as Home Secretary, to allow the absence of quantifiable and dynamic modelling – which is inevitable when developing a response to global crises influenced by so many geopolitical factors such as climate change, war and conflict –– to delay delivery of a policy that we believe will reduce illegal migration, save lives, and ultimately break the business model of the smuggling gangs.

“I am therefore formally directing you as Accounting Officer to take forward this scheme with immediate effect, managing the identified risks as best you can.”

*

For the home secretary, the lack of sufficient evidence of any deterrent effect does not matter.

She believes the Rwanda proposal will work, and so it shall be taken forward.

She is confident that in the longer-term there will be value for money, and – in any case – modelling is not easy for this sort of things.

Her decision; her call.

*

Of course, one should be wary of taking documents such as these two exchanged letters seriously at face value.

Such exchanges can be choreographed and it sometimes (though not here one suspects, given the disjoined nature of the reply) the same official will draft both letters – ‘sign here minister’.

It could be that the request for a direction here is a manifestation of deeper unease within the home office at this proposal – and that such a request, framed in VFM terms, was the only way of signalling publicly this unease.

The bureaucratic equivalent of the blinking hostage.

On the other hand, the home office is certainly capable of nasty and expensive policies.

And the permanent secretary in his fifth paragraph goes out of his way to say it is “regular, proper and feasible for this policy to proceed”.

Who knows?

Perhaps the permanent secretary knew the value for money objection could not be gainsaid and that it would not look like he was criticising the merits of the proposal.

Perhaps, perhaps, perhaps.

We do not know the realities behind the scenes.

The request for a direction is significant – but what it signifies generally is not clear.

But what we do know from this exchange of letters is that on the very eve of the publication of the proposal, the most senior official in the home office said that there was not sufficient evidence that the proposal would have any deterrent effect, and in response to this the home secretary could not provide any such evidence but wanted to go ahead with the policy anyway.

**

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How the Government both won and lost the Priti Patel High Court bullying case

6th December 2021

Today judgment was handed down in the case brought by the civil service union the FDA in respect of the Prime Minister’s determination that the bullying of the Home Secretary had not broken the Ministerial Code.

On the face of it, the government won the case.

And so this is what the press reported (and that is what time-poor news desks have published on their news sites):

But.

There are different ways that a government can win a case like this – and a closer look at the judgment shows that in substance this is not a welcome decision for the government at all.

*

First, we need to know what the case was – and was not – about.

The case was not about deciding whether the Home Secretary is a bully or not – that was not what the court was being asked to determine, and the detailed evidence about bullying was not put before the court:

And, as that was not the question before the court, then the hot takes that the court has ‘cleared the Home Secretary of bullying’ are not and cannot be true.

The primary question before the court was whether it was open to the Prime Minister, given the information before him, to determine that there had not been a breach of the Ministerial Code.

The court found that, on this occasion, the determination that there had not been a breach of the Ministerial Code was one of the determinations open to the Prime Minister on the information before him.

But in reaching that conclusion the court made a number of points that were against the government – and these points may be significant in future cases.

*

First, the court held that the Prime Minister’s determinations of the ministerial code were, in principle, amenable to judicial review by the courts.

The government made a spirited attempt to argue that the Prime Minister’s determinations of the ministerial code were not ‘justiciable’ – that the very subject matter was a no-go area for the High Court.

The court deal with justiciability in paragraphs 25 to 43 of a 61 paragraph judgment – about a third of the decision.

The court accepted that not every determination of the Code may be judicially reviewed.

And, of course, those judicial reviews which are heard by the court may not succeed (as with this case).

But there is nothing stopping a similar case on different facts succeeding just because of the subject matter.

That the court held that, in principle, prime ministerial determinations of the Ministerial Code are amenable to judicial review is a boon for transparency and accountability.

*

Once the court had dismissed the government’s attack on justiciability, it turned to whether the Prime Minister had misdirected himself in applying the Code.

Here the key paragraph of the Code is:

“1.2 Ministers should be professional in all their dealings and treat all those with whom they come into contact with consideration and respect. Working relationships, including with civil servants, ministerial and parliamentary colleagues and parliamentary staff should be proper and appropriate. Harassing, bullying or other inappropriate or discriminating behaviour wherever it takes place is not consistent with the Ministerial Code and will not be tolerated.”

The information before the Prime Minister was an advice from Sir Alex Allan, the independent adviser on the Code.

His advice included the following:

“My advice is that the Home Secretary has not consistently met the high standards required by the Ministerial Code of treating her civil servants with consideration and respect.

“Her approach on occasions has amounted to behaviour that can be described as bullying in terms of the impact felt by individuals.

“To that extent her behaviour has been in breach of the Ministerial Code, even if unintentionally. This conclusion needs to be seen in context. There is no evidence that she was aware of the impact of her behaviour, and no feedback was given to her at the time.”

Having considered this advice, the Prime Minister’s conclusion was:

“Sir Alex’s advice found that the Home Secretary had become – justifiably in many instances – frustrated by the Home Office leadership’s lack of responsiveness and the lack of support she felt in DfID three years ago.

“He also found, however, that the Home Secretary had not always treated her civil servants with the consideration and respect that would be expected, and her approach on occasion has amounted to behaviour that can be described as bullying in terms of the impact felt by individuals.

“He went on to advise, therefore, that the Home Secretary had not consistently met the high standards expected of her under the Ministerial Code. 

“The Prime Minister notes Sir Alex’s advice that many of the concerns now raised were not raised at the time and that the Home Secretary was unaware of the impact that she had.

“He is reassured that the Home Secretary is sorry for inadvertently upsetting those with whom she was working. He is also reassured that relationships, practices and culture in the Home Office are much improved.

“As the arbiter of the code, having considered Sir Alex’s advice and weighing up all the factors, the Prime Minister’s judgement is that the Ministerial code was not breached.”

*

The FDA’s claim was that, given Allan’s advice, this was not a conclusion that the Prime Minister could have legally made.

Here paragraph 58 of the judgment is important about the Prime Minister’s conclusions:

In other words: because the Prime Minister did not say Patel was not a bully, it must be that he either accepted Allan’s advice or did not form his own view.

Had the Prime Minister explicitly rejected Allan’s advice that it was bullying then it would have been a different legal situation.

The judgment then goes on in paragraph 59 to the other factors considered by the Prime Minister – it is not a paragraph easy to follow in one go, and may require re-reading:

The essence of the paragraph is in the sentences:

“In that context, the statement that the Prime Minister’s judgement was that the Ministerial Code was not breached is not therefore a finding that the conduct could not be described as bullying.

“Rather, it is either a statement that the Prime Minister does not consider, looking at all the factors involved, that it would be right to record that the Ministerial Code had been breached, or alternatively, that the conduct did not in all the circumstances warrant a sanction such as dismissal as it did not cause the Prime Minister to lose confidence in the minister.”

*

The Prime Minister can consider himself very lucky to have won this case.

Once can quite imagine a differently constituted court (or the Court of Appeal) taking a harder view against the Prime Minister

The FDA, in turn, are right to aver the following:

“The High Court has decided:

 – That the prohibition on bullying, discrimination and harassment in the Ministerial Code is justiciable in the Courts.

– That the Prime Minister must correctly apply those concepts when determining complaints against ministers.

– That it is not an excuse for bullying under the Code that a minister does not intend or is not aware of the upset and distress caused by their actions.

“These findings vindicate the claim brought by the FDA and represent a clear rejection of the idea that there are different standards for ministers than for civil servants. The FDA is applying for its full costs of the claim to be paid by the government.

“In an unexpected development, the Court also found that the Prime Minister had not acquitted the Home Secretary of bullying in his decision in November 2020. The Court has held that the Prime Minister must have accepted the advice of Sir Alex Allan that the Home Secretary had engaged in bullying (or at least that he did not reach any concluded view on the matter).”

*

Whichever government lawyer drafted the conclusions of the Prime Minister ultimately won this case for the government.

A more clumsily worded statement would have meant that even this court would have decided in favour of the FDA.

The government won – just about.

But now there is a High Court decision holding that determinations of the Ministerial Code are justiciable and that the Prime Minister must act properly in applying the Code to particular cases.

The case was also decided on the bases that the Home Secretary was not exonerated of the allegations and that the lack of intention did not mean it was not bullying.

The FDA must be tempted to have one more heave – and to take this to the Court of Appeal (though there would be a risk that it could lose the gains it has made).

The government is in the harder appeal position – for it can hardly appeal a case which it has ‘won’ and so it is stuck (for now, unless the FDA appeals) with the finding of justiciability and other points made by the court.

So this is a good example of a case which both sides can be seen to have lost – but one in which both sides can also be seen as having won.

And the more significant victory, for transparency and accountability, is that of the FDA.

******

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The Supreme Court judgment in Majera – court orders have to be obeyed, even by the Home Secretary

21st October 2021

Yesterday, while lawyers and commentators were discussing the recent speech by the Attorney General, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom handed down a judgment that may be more significant than anything the Attorney General said and what others will say about that speech.

The case is that of Majera – and it is about immigration and deportation, but it is about a lot more than that.

Majera was born in Rwanda and came to the United Kingdom as a child, but in 2006 he was convicted of serious offences, and when in prison he was issued with a deportation order.

He was then released on licence in 2015, but was again detained, and so he applied to the relevant tribunal for bail, which was granted in a court order.

So far, so complicated – though not an unusual set of facts in the ever-expanding caselaw about deporting foreign-born convicts.

But Majera then did something that prompted even more litigation and led ultimately to yesterday’s significant Supreme Court judgment.

Majera volunteered to work in a charity shop.

*

You would think that it would be a good thing for a convict facing deportation to contribute to society by doing unpaid work for the public good.

But: no.

This was intolerable for the Home Office.

The problem, however, was that the tribunal order granting bail did not preclude Majera from working on a voluntary basis, but from paid employment or from any business or profession.

(The other bail conditions were strict: Majera could only do voluntary work as approved by his supervising officer – so not any voluntary work but only that which a state agent endorsed, and he was subject to a curfew.)

The Home Office, disregarding the judge’s order, formally notified Majera that he could not do voluntary work – and when objections were made, the Home Office came up with various excuses which they abandoned on legal challenge.

And so Majera challenged the Home Office decisions, as he was entitled to do so.

The Home Office, in response, came up with the argument that the judge’s order on bail was invalid, and thereby void, as it contradicted another statutory provision.

Accordingly, the Home Office contended, it was perfectly open to the Home Office to disregard the judge’s order and impose conditions of their own.

*

Majera won his challenge.

But.

The Home Office appealed.

It would seem the prospect of Majera working in a charity shop was so unacceptable that public funds were justified in taking this to the Court of Appeal, and so the Home Office did, instructing a QC to do so.

*

The Court of Appeal decided in favour of the Home Office.

Their reasoning was that if a decision is void then, well, it is void.

If the judge did not actually have the power to make the order that was made, then the order disappeared in a puff of legal magic, and it should be treated as if it never happened.

The order would have no effect, by the automatic operation of a lack of law.

Here the appeal judges relied on cases where subordinate legislation and administrative decisions were held to have no legal effect because they were ‘ultra vires’.

Majera appealed, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear his appeal.

*

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision led by Lord Reed the president of the court, granted Majera’s appeal.

The decision is a wide-ranging survey of the law of ‘ultra vires’ and a detailed critique of vague notions such as ‘void’ and ‘null’ when applied to things that otherwise would have legal effect.

It is a judgment that will repay careful reading.

In essence: the supreme court held that orders of the court were special, and so should not have been lumped together with ‘ultra vires’ subordinate legislation and administrative decisions by the Court of Appeal.

A court order must be obeyed until and unless it is set aside by the court (or possibly overtaken by legislation).

It was not open to the home secretary – or anyone else – to pick and choose which orders were valid or invalid.

*

This is a judgment that is significant on its own terms – but (on first glance) it also may be one with wider implications.

For example: one of the government’s current legislative proposals for judicial review is about giving courts the power to make ‘suspended’ quashing orders that would limit the legal effects of a finding of ‘ultra vires’.

Another government proposal is about limiting the scope of judicial review in the tribunal system – and this case shows that it is not only the individuals but the state itself that can take bad public law points in claims and defences.

This may not be a judgment that was intended to contribute to the discussion about judicial activism and the reform of judicial review, but it may be an important contribution nonetheless.

*

But it is certainly an important case about the separation of powers.

For just as in a recent judgment in favour of the home secretary, Lord Reed said that is certain cases, the courts should accord ‘respect’ to the home secretary, this case in turn is about the respect the executive – and everyone else – should accord to the orders of the court.

Even the home secretary.

For just as the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General are warning judges to keep off the executive’s lawn, this is the Supreme Court, in effect, telling the government to keep off the lawn of the courts.

****

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