What the judge said and did not say at the Just Stop Oil hearing, and what the judge should and should not have said

22nd February 2023

The from-court sensation last week was not about something in the High Court, the Old Bailey or any of the other august courts of the English capital, but about what happened at a hearing at Wolverhampton Magistrates’ Court.

It was a legal case that involved no great issue of law, and indeed there seems no dispute about the applicable law or even its application.

The sensation was not the result of sensational news reporting from an intrepid news reporter, for there seems to have been no media present at the hearing.

And there does not seem to have been any miscarriage of justice, and the findings of guilt and acquittals seem not to have been wrong on the available facts.

But there was a sensation, all the same.

Tweets went viral, with one tweet on the hearing recording 1.4 million views.

The case was taken up by the national press, and pundits were emphatic in their support or opposition to what happened.

A former home secretary said this:

And, from the opposing perspective, a well-known Canadian campaigner said this:

And all this for case in a local magistrates’ court, with no great issue of law, no obvious miscarriages of justice, and it seems no news reporters present to record what happened.

Regardless of the substance of what happened, it is an example of what happens when the legal system and modern social media (and after a lag, mainstream media) meet.

So what did happen at that hearing at Wolverhampton Magistrates’ Court?

*

The straight answer is that we perhaps cannot be certain absolutely what happened, as accounts differ, and there seems to have been no recording of the hearing.

But what we can work out is as follows.

We are told there were nine defendants.

(There is a reason for the “We are told” choice-of-words, as will become apparent.)

We are also told the offence was aggravated trespass, which is an offence under section 68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994:

The Crown Prosecution Service guidance on the offence is as follows:

The prosecutions were in respect of this incident from April 2022, as reported by the local news Express & Star:

According to that news report:

“Around 30 protesters from the Just Stop Oil coalition, including two on the roof of a petrol tanker, blocked the exit and entrance to the Esso fuel terminal in Wood Lane, Tyburn, Birmingham.

“Members of the group called Just Stop Oil said it had blocked a number of “key oil” terminals, including the site in Tyburn, Birmingham.

“Police warned of delays as ExxonMobil UK, one of the country’s largest privately-owned underground oil pipeline distribution networks, confirmed demonstrations were under way at some of its sites. It said it had shut down three of its sites.”

The Birmingham Evening Mail reported:

“A protester was carried away by five police officers during a new blockade at a Birmingham fuel terminal.

“Activists from Just Stop Oil again blocked access to the Esso site in Tyburn today, Sunday, April 3, despite more than 100 arrests across the country this week. A police cordon was in place in Wood Lane, where officers had been stationed since 7.30am. West Midlands Fire Service was also in attendance.”

Two days before, the Birmingham Evening Mail reported:

“A Just Stop Oil protester glued his hands and bare feet to the road during a nine-hour protest in Birmingham. Others have glued themselves to each other.

“Up to 45 protesters have been disrupting oil tankers heading in and out of the Esso Fuel Terminal on Wood Lane, Tyburn, near Erdington, since 4am today, Friday, April 1.”

The “Just Stop Oil” group behind the protests published this release at the time:

“For the third day in a row, supporters of Just Stop Oil have disrupted oil supplies from 7 critical oil facilities near London and Birmingham in support of their demand to the UK government to end new oil and gas projects in the UK.

“Early this morning people climbed on and blocked oil tankers at 5 critical oil terminals. A few have entered the loading bay at Buncefield oil terminal in Hertfordshire and are standing on oil tankers holding banners.

“At Kingsbury, Midlands and Esso terminals in Birmingham oil tankers have been prevented from leaving by people sitting in the road.”

*

From the contemporaneous news reports and the contemporaneous Just Stop Oil press release there can be no doubt that (a) disruption was caused and (b) disruption was intended to be caused.

As such, anyone who caused the disruption and intended to cause the disruption could have no serious defence to a charge of causing and intending to cause the disruption.

*

And so from the protest last April, a prosecution was brought this month at Wolverhampton Magistrates’ Court.

We are told that that the hearing involved cross-examination, and that evidence was put in by the defendants.

This would mean that notwithstanding the openly expressed intention by Just Stop Oil to cause disruption, and the evidence of the disruption caused, the defendants pleaded not guilty.  This would also accord with two of the defendants being acquitted.

Seven of the defendants were however found guilty.

The judge – District Judge Wilkinson – said some things.

And this is when things become less certain.

*

A judge can say various things during a hearing – indeed, no one is usually in a position to tell them to shut up.

A judge making any significant decision will usually give reasons.

A judge imposing a sentence will give what are called “sentencing remarks” – which, in some national-profile cases are collected and published by the Judicial Office (previous examples are here).

But when a judge acquits they may also give reasons.

And sometimes what a judge says is set out in a prepared script, sometimes it is based on notes, and sometimes a judge may speak without notes.

*

After the hearing, the Just Stop Oil published a press release:

This was quite the headline, given that there were seven defendants found guilty.

The press release also contained what it called a “summation” – which is not a legal term for anything a judge says – and this “summation” is quoted as if it was verbatim:

“It’s abundantly clear that you are all good people. You are intelligent, articulate and a pleasure to deal with. It’s unarguable that man-made global warming is real and we are facing a climate emergency. Your aims are admirable and it is accepted by me and the Crown Prosecution Service that your views are reasonable and genuinely held. Your fears are ably and genuinely articulated and are supported by the science.

“When the United Nations Secretary General gives a speech saying that the activity of fossil fuel companies is incompatible with human survival, we should all be very aware of the need for change. Millions of people, and I do not dispute that it may be as many as 1 billion people, will be displaced as a result of climate change.

“No-one can criticise your motivations. You all gave evidence that was deeply moving. I certainly was moved. The tragedy is that good people have felt so much, without hope, that you feel you have to come into conflict with the criminal justice system.

“Thank you for opening my eyes to certain things. Most, I was acutely and depressingly aware of, but there were certain things.

“I say this and I mean this sadly, I have to convict you. You are good people and I will not issue a punitive sentence. Your arrests and loss of good character are sufficient. Good people doing the wrong thing cannot make the wrong thing right. I don’t say this, ever, but it has been a pleasure dealing with you.

“You should feel guilty for nothing. You should feel proud that you care, have concern for the future. I urge you not to break the law again. Good luck to all of you.”

*

It was the screenshot of this “summation” that went viral.

And, as you can see, it is the last of the paragraphs quoted which provided the headline to the press release.

The impression of that last paragraph (given the “you” in the prior I have to convict you…”) is that the judge’s remark that “You should feel guilty for nothing” is addressed to all the defendants.

But that final remark is no more striking than the rest of the quoted text.

Did a judge really say all these things to defendants in a criminal case?

*

When I saw the viral tweets I did nothing to promote or amplify them.

In fifteen years of legal commentary I have learned that when a judge is reported to have said something sensational – especially if it accords with your world-view – it is better to wait for it to be verified before congratulating or castigating the legal system.

But pretty soon these viral judicial remarks prompted an equal and opposite reaction.  The Daily Telegraph reported:

The news report continued:

“But on Friday afternoon, the Judicial Office, which represents judges, admonished the group for “misquoting” the judge. […]

“In a rare intervention, the body accused them of taking a phrase “out of context” and issued an almost entirely different account, saying it was “what the judge actually said”

“[…] the Judicial Office said: “It was said to one of the defendants who in his evidence had said (through tears) that he felt guilty for not doing enough to save the planet for his daughter.”

(The judge’s statement was also posted on the Crimeline site, though inadvertently incorrectly titled as “full” sentencing remarks.)

*

An “almost entirely different account”?

This was becoming fascinating.

So far in this post I have relied on the Just Stop Oil press release for the from-court facts – hence the “We are told” formulation above – but the facts stated above – charges, number of defendants, disposals – do not seem to be controversial, or indeed controverted.

But now we have an alternative version of what happened.

The Judicial Office had contacted the judge, who provided his own note of what was said.

The judge’s note was:

“As a judge my overriding duty is always to uphold the law without fear or favour.

“This is not a court of morals it is a court of law, if I allow my own moral compass or political beliefs to influence my decisions and ignore the law where it is convenient to me to do so then the court becomes one where the rule of law no longer applies.

“If judges across the criminal justice system did the same then there would be no consistency and no respect for the law, decisions based on the personal beliefs of members of the judiciary cannot be consistent with the rule of law and the ideal that each law will apply to all equally.

“Trust in the rule of law is an essential ingredient of society and it will erode swiftly if judges make politically or morally motivated decisions that do not accord with established legal principles. Indeed I would become the self appointed sheriff if I acted in such a way.

“It is abundantly clear that you are all good people, intelligent and articulate and you have been a pleasure throughout to deal with. It is unarguable that man made global warming is real and that we are facing a climate crisis. That is accepted and recognised by the scientific community and most governments (including our own).

“Your aims are to slow or even stop the advance of global warming and therefore to preserve the planet not just for generations to come but for existing generations. No one can therefore criticize your motivations and indeed each of you has spoken individually about your own personal experiences, motivations and actions.

“Many of your explanations for your actions were deeply emotive and I am sure all listening were moved by them, I know I was. In simple terms you are good people with admirable aims.

“However if good people with the right motivation do the wrong thing it can never make that wrong thing right, it can only ever act as substantial mitigation.”

*

The Judicial Office also told reporters by email on Friday last week:

“The judge in the case pointed out that Just Stop Oil have have misquoted him and put in words he never spoke. He has sent [us] the text of what he actually said below.

“They have also quoted the line, “You should feel guilty for nothing” out of context. It was said to one of the defendants who in his evidence had said (through tears) that he felt guilty for not doing enough to save the planet for his daughter. It was not in the context that the seven convicted should feel guilty for nothing which would make no sense at all in the context of the judge having convicted them.”

*

I asked the Judicial Office whether the judge’s note was read out verbatum in court – or it it was just the basis of what was said in court.  I also asked for confirmation that the note was not prepared after the hearing.

I was told the following:

“[these] were words that the judge had prepared before sentencing and were said verbatim.  He made some other comments as part of his sentencing but these were based on notes he made in advance but were not delivered verbatim.  As there is no recording or transcript made of proceedings in the magistrate court and in the absence of fully written sentencing remarks, this was the best [we] could provide at short notice in terms of what the judge had said in his own words.”

*

If you compare and contrast the two statements – what Just Stop Oil said and what the judge said through the Judicial Office – there are three main points of comparison and contrast.

*

The first part of the judge’s comments are not in the Just Stop Oil press release, and they are a statement of general principle.  As my fellow legal blogger Matthew Scott avers, “As an abstract statement of principle that could not have been put better.”

But as Scott also correctly observes, these remarks expressly introduce a tension between “politically or morally motivated decisions” and “established legal principles”.

As such, these prefatory remarks do not really help the judge against criticism – and they do not really change the framing of what then follows.

Yes, these general remarks provide a context – but they do not render what then follows as out of context.

*

If we now jump to the end of the comments, and to the Judicial Office email, the judge, however, has a good point.

The “you should feel guilty for nothing” remark appears not to have been directed at all the defendants, but to only one and in a specific situation.

Just Stop Oil accepted this, and they amended part of their press release accordingly – though this was too late for the viral tweets.

Just Stop Oil, however, have not amended the sensational title of their press release, which still gives the impression that the statement was said to all the defendants:

*

As for the middle part of the text, there is little substantial difference between the two accounts.

Other than the paragraph “When the United Nations Secretary General gives a speech saying that the activity of fossil fuel companies is incompatible with human survival, we should all be very aware of the need for change. Millions of people, and I do not dispute that it may be as many as 1 billion people, will be displaced as a result of climate change.” – which seems an unlikely frolic for a judge to have gone on in sentencing remarks – all the other comments attributed to him seem to have counterparts in the Just Stop Oil account.

In my view, the differences can be accounted for by brief notes being reconstructed after the event into prose.

Of course, Just Stop Oil should not have presented such reconstructed comments as being verbatim.  But it is a strain to say that their version of what was said is an “entirely different account”.

Indeed, had it matched the judge’s own notes exactly, it would look as if they had secretly recorded the judge.

I asked Just Stop Oil to explain how they put their version together. They said:

“We have notes from a defendant in court who cross checked them with others that were there and also notes from the defence lawyer […] who acted for one of the defendants.
“We corrected the press release when we became aware via Crimeline that one of the remarks was said to an individual defendant and we had taken it out of context.
“We have not received any communication from the judicial office and there appears to be nothing on the website so we’re slightly bemused by the framing in some of the media articles that suggests that we had some kind of official rebuke.
“We have not seen the information that was given to the press in its entirety but it is obvious that the Crimeline account stops short before the remarks around sentencing (since it contains no information about the sentences that were handed down).
“From looking at [lawyer’s] notes we can see that several of the remarks we have reported were made after sentences were pronounced.”
So it does appear the supposed verbatim press release was reconstructed – and that the statements were not said all at the same time.

*

Which leaves the final question: was it right for the judge to say such things – regardless of the reported sequencing?

Here, we should rely on the judge’s own account of what he said.

Judges’ comments when sentencing are not a bad thing.

Every court day, up and down the country, criminal judges will say things in what are immediate situations that exhort the defendant to do better in future or admonish the guilty.

At worst, such statements are harmless or futile, and at best, such statements may be beneficial to those being exhorted or admonished, and thereby to society.

Not all sentencing remarks can or should be as impeccable as the ones published on the national judicial website.

But.

Judges can and do say things they should not say.

Here a judge was addressing protesters in respect of a highly publicised incident organised by a highly publicised pressure group.

It was entirely foreseeable that what he said would be publicised.

And even it was not foreseeable, and it was an otherwise unexceptional courtroom on a cold and routine day in Wolverhampton Magistrates’ Court, it was inappropriate for a judge to express such general political sentiments, either in sentencing remarks or otherwise.

As it happens, as someone with politics broadly as green as my surname, the sentiments expressed by the judge would be ones I would like to see expressed more often by politicians.

But imagine a latter-day Judge Pickles or Judge Argyle type judge expressing sentiments in support of what illiberal right-wing protesters had done on some other demonstration.

That would be wrong, and would call the administration of justice into question, and so what the judge in Wolverhampton said was wrong too.

*

So, in (ahem) summation: Just Stop Oil erred in the title and content of their press release, and the judge erred more seriously in making the comments in the first place, even accepting his own version of his remarks.

And the real problem, as this blog averred recently, is with the refusal by the courts to provide or allow recordings of what judges say in open court.

There is no good reason for this prohibition, and scarcely even a bad reason – it is just unthinking conservatism.

Perhaps there should be a protest organised against it.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

Is it, at last, time to say “good bye” to Thoburn and the idea of “constitutional statutes”?

 9th February 2023

Oh dear old Thoburn, what shall be done with you?

Thoburn, the mainstay of thousands of constitutional law essays and hundreds of learned articles, does yesterday’s Supreme Court decision mean you are now no more?

*

Thoburn is the 2002 “metric martyrs” case which introduced into the then quiet, sedate world of constitutional law the exciting concept of “constitutional statutes”.

Until then all Acts of Parliament were regarded as being equal, none of them any more entrenched – enshrined – than any other.

But in Thoburn the judge said, in effect, that there was a class of super-duper statutes known as “constitutional statutes” and these statutes had super-duper qualities not available to more mundane everyday statutes.

Incredible, if true.

And so Thoburn became the recent constitutional law case any student or informed pundit had to have an opinion about.

But yesterday’s Supreme Court decision on the Northern Irish Protocol may mean the dictum in Thoburn are no longer to be taken seriously.

What will law students and pundits do?

*

To understand what happened with the Thoburn case we have to go back to the Victorian doctrine of the supremacy of parliament.

This doctrine holds that no statute passed by the Crown-in-Parliament can be gainsaid by any court.

But in two case in the early 1930s about the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 and the Housing Act 1925, the courts were presented with a situation where two statutes contradicted each other.

How should the courts deal with this situation?

The clever idea the courts came up with was “implied repeal” – and so the fiction adopted was that parliament in passing the later legislation knew about the earlier legislation, and so the (presumed) intent of parliament was to repeal the earlier legislation.

But as this repeal was not explicit in the later legislation, it would have to be an implicit repeal.

And this is how the interwar courts managed to disapply a piece of primary legislation, notwithstanding the heady doctrine of the supremacy of parliament.

(Of course, if no Act of parliament can actually be gainsaid by a court, then the courts should have just refused to choose between the two contradictory statutes and return the matter to Parliament to sort out – but the fig-leaf of the “intent” of parliament meant the courts could sort out the legislative mess parliament had created.)

And the legal rule from these case was that the later statute trumps – that is, implicitly repeals – the earlier statute when the two contradict.

*

But in 2002 the court was faced with another seemingly awkward situation.

It was submitted in that case that the Weights and Measures Act 1985 somehow implicitly repealed the earlier European Communities Act 1973.

On the merits of the case, the court found that this was not the position.

But in a dictum – which was not about the point on which the case turned – Lord Justice Laws (and please none of the usual jokes about nominative determinism) went on a judicial frolic and speculated about implied repeal.

Could a later Act of Parliament really implicitly repeal the European Communities Act 1973, which – in turn – was the (then) basis for the laws of the European Union having effect in the United Kingdom?

On the basis of the 1930s cases then this would have to be the position, as the later statute trumps the earlier statute.

But.

As we now know, repeal of the European Communities Act 1973 would be a very complicated and far-reaching thing.

And so Lord Justice Laws posited a new category of statutes which would be immune from any implied repeal.

If there were any contradictions with an earlier “constitutional statute” then it would be the later statute that would be repealed, not the earlier one.

His dictum was as follows (which I have broke out into one-sentence paragraphs):

We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament: as it were “ordinary” statutes and “constitutional” statutes.

The two categories must be distinguished on a principled basis. In my opinion a constitutional statute is one which (a) conditions the legal relationship between citizen and State in some general, overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental constitutional rights.

(a) and (b) are of necessity closely related: it is difficult to think of an instance of (a) that is not also an instance of (b).

The special status of constitutional statutes follows the special status of constitutional rights.

Examples are the [sic] Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of Union, the Reform Acts which distributed and enlarged the franchise, the HRA, the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998.

The ECA clearly belongs in this family. It incorporated the whole corpus of substantive Community rights and obligations, and gave overriding domestic effect to the judicial and administrative machinery of Community law.

It may be there has never been a statute having such profound effects on so many dimensions of our daily lives.

The ECA is, by force of the common law, a constitutional statute.

*

This was exhilarating, provocative stuff.

And it was utter flapdoodle.

There was no basis for positing such “constitutional statutes” – either then or now.

They were invented just to get the courts out of the potentially tricky situation which the judges’ contrived solution to the problems in the 1930s had got themselves into.

The notion of “implied repeal” was now a reversible switch – and it was to be the judges who decided (and not parliament) whether it would be the earlier or the later legislation that would be “implicitly repealed” by the simple expedient of the judge perhaps dubbing one or the other of the Acts of Parliament a “constitutional statute”.

It was all rather daft, but you will see why it was like catnip to those with an interest in constitutional law.

*

Anyway, the Laws dictum was relied on by the applicants in the recent Allister litigation on the legality of the Northern Irish Protocol, which eventually reached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court decision in that case is fascinating and it warrants a post by itself, especially on respect of the developing jurisprudence of the court on devolution.

But the Supreme Court was unimpressed by the Thoburn point.

The court described the submission (again broken up into one-sentence paragraphs):

On the hearing of this appeal, the appellants submitted that the Acts of Union were constitutional statutes so that the rights in the trade limb of article VI of His Majesty’s subjects of Northern Ireland being on the same footing in respect of trade as His Majesty’s subjects of Great Britain, could not be subject to repeal or to subjugation, modification, or suspension absent express or specific words in a later statute.

In support of that submission, the appellants relied on a line of authorities starting with Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin)[2003] QB 151 for the proposition that whilst ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed constitutional statutes may not.

At para 63 of Thoburn, Laws LJ suggested that the repeal of a constitutional statute or the abrogation of a fundamental right could only be effected by a later statute by:

“express words in the later statute, or by words so specific that the inference of an actual determination to effect the result contended for was irresistible.”

The appellants submitted that the Acts of Union are constitutional Acts and that the rights to equal footing as to trade were fundamental rights so that there was no scope for implied repeal and by analogy there was no scope for implied subjugation, modification, or suspension.

*

You will see that the Thoburn point has now been expanded beyond implied repeal and that “constitutional statutes” have various other super-duper legal protections.

The court held (again broken up into one-sentence paragraphs, and with my two comments interposed):

The debate as to whether article VI created fundamental rights in relation to trade, whether the Acts of Union are statutes of a constitutional character, whether the 2018 and 2020 Acts are also statutes of a constitutional character, and as to the correct interpretative approach when considering such statutes or any fundamental rights, is academic.

“Academic.”

Even if it is engaged in this case, the interpretative presumption that Parliament does not intend to violate fundamental rights cannot override the clearly expressed will of Parliament.

“Even if”

*

Allister is not about implied repeal, so strictly speaking the Laws dictum in Thoburn may be said to not be applicable.

But the notion of “constitutional statutes” is plainly not taken seriously by this unanimous Supreme Court in an important devolution case engaging what Laws would have called many “constitutional statutes” , with a panel consisting of justices from Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, as well as the court’s leading public law justice, Lord Sales.

For the Supreme Court, the content of the Acts of Union have no special entrenched legal status, and they can be amended, and so on, just as any other Act of Parliament.

The question of what would happen with a direct contradiction, as in the early 1930s has been sidestepped.

But the expedient of “constitutional statutes” as suggested by Laws in Thoburn seems to have been put back in its judicial box.

Or has it?

No doubt there will now be thousands more constitutional law essays, and hundreds more learned articles, to tell us whether the dictum in Thoburn is no more.

****

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

Another weekend, another threat to leave the European Convention of Human Rights

6th February 2023

Here we go, again.

This was a news report in yesterday’s Sunday Times:

The content of the report itself does not quite amount to the “pledge” of the headline – but the content of the report is not without interest:

“The PM has been clear he wants to introduce legislation that meets our international obligations,” a source familiar with Sunak’s thinking said. “This bill will go as far as possible within international law. We are pushing the boundaries of what is legally possible, while staying within the ECHR. And we are confident that when it is tested in the courts, we will win.

“But if this legislation gets onto the statute book and is found to be lawful by our domestic courts, but it is still being held up in Strasbourg, then we know the problem is not our legislation or our courts.

“If that’s the case, then of course he will be willing to reconsider whether being part of the ECHR is in the UK’s long-term interests.”

Senior figures say the prime minister is prepared to deploy the nuclear option before the general election if the European court strikes down his plans. But that would put the government on a collision course with MPs and particularly the House of Lords, and it is highly unlikely it would happen before the election due in 2024.

The Tories would then put withdrawal from the ECHR at the heart of their manifesto, drawing a sharp dividing line between the Conservatives and Labour. The plan is proof, allies say, that Sunak shares the hardline instincts of the Tory right on immigration.

*

What can we make of this?

Perhaps this is just a weekend frolic: a political source contriving something so as to get the weekend press coverage they want at the end of another difficult week.

If so, this would not be first weekend this has happened, and it probably will not be the last.

And in any case, the last part of the news report quoted is probably political bravado: the sound of an anonymous source getting increasingly excited by what they are imparting.

But the first part looks to me as if it may be tied to the circulation of internal government legal advice.

So with my former government lawyer hat on, let us look what could be the situation:

1. The government has a plan to deal with the boats and this plan requires legislation.

2. The government has obtained legal advice on that plan and perhaps even on the wording of the draft legislation.  This advice may be internal advice from the government legal service, and/or it could have been obtained from external specialist counsel.

3. That legal advice is that both the plan and the draft legislation may be compliant with the Human Rights Act 1998 which gives effect to the ECHR in domestic law and, if so, they will be upheld in the domestic courts.

4. However, that legal advice may also include the proviso that the ultimate  arbiter of the ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg may take a different view – either on a final or on an interim basis.

5. A minister – perhaps the Prime Minister – has decided to proceed with the plan and the legislation on the basis of this legal advice.

If the above analysis is (roughly) correct then the politics of the situation may unfold as follows.

First, if the domestic courts and/or the Strasbourg court hold that the plan and/or the legislation is/are not compliant with the ECHR then it is not the government’s fault but that of the judges and the lawyers.

Second, if the the plan and the legislation is/held to be compliant then the government had won its showdown with the judges and the lawyers – by threatening to leave the ECHR the government has got the courts to cower.

In either scenario, the government will be beyond blame.

The politics of the situation would be, if the above is correct, a win-win for the government.

*

But.

If the government does lose, and the courts hold that the plan and/or the legislation is/are held not to be compliant with the ECHR, what about the threat to leave the ECHR?

This is the bit which is not really thought-through.

As this blog has set out previously, the Good Friday Agreement requires the ECHR to be enforceable directly in the courts of Northern Ireland.

(The Human Rights Act 1998 currently does this for Northern Ireland, as well as for the rest of the United Kingdom – but it does not matter what legislation does it, as long as it is done.)

There is no obvious way that the ECHR can be enforceable directly in the courts of Northern Ireland if the United Kingdom is not a party to the ECHR.

Even attempts to carve out the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom – creating yet another legal(istic) border down the Irish Sea – are unlikely to work.

This is because Article 1 of the ECHR requires its signatories to secure to everyone within their jurisdictions the rights and freedoms set out in the ECHR – and so the United Kingdom cannot be a signatory for some parts of the United Kingdom and not others (emphasis added).

And unless the United Kingdom is the signatory, the ECHR cannot have legal effect so as to be directly enforceable in the courts of Northern Ireland.

The alternative possibility that Ireland still being a signatory to the ECHR could be used as the legal basis for giving direct effect to the ECHR in the courts of Northern Ireland would presumably be a non-starter with the unionist community.

In essence: if the United Kingdom leaves the ECHR then it would seem the United Kingdom will be in breach of express provisions in the Good Friday Agreement.

And all this would be in addition to the reaction of the United States of America to a breach of the Good Friday Agreement – especially as long as Joseph Biden is President.

It is impossible to see how withdrawal could be done without upset.

*

Of course, some would say it is a pity that it is only the Good Friday Agreement that would prevent the United Kingdom government leaving the ECHR.

Surely there are better arguments against leaving than that?

But even if there are better normative points to make on behalf of the ECHR, the Good Friday Agreement would be a formidable structural obstacle to withdrawal.

And changing the Good Friday Agreement would probably need the consent of at least the Northern Irish in a referendum, if not that of the voters of Ireland too.

*

And it appears that current Conservative backbenchers are underwhelmed by this threat, with one correctly using the technical legal term “willy waving”.

As Politico reports:

Enough of the willy waving: Playbook has seen texts exchanged in the “Home Group” of Tory MPs in response to the story over the weekend. Replying to a message from Jonathan Gullis, who had shared it approvingly, Doyle-Price said that “willy waving about leaving the ECHR will do zilch” and declared: “I have been a member of the Conservative Party for 36 years. This group leaves me cold. Upholding the law should never be a matter for debate for a Conservative. Our Home Office is crap. If the government wants to have a phone[y] war over the ECHR instead of sorting itself out it can do it without me.”

Everyone’s a critic: There was more backlash in the group from David Simmonds, who said that “the ECHR is not the issue here. By pretending it is, we are setting ourselves up for a fall as a UK court will take the same line,” and called for reform of the asylum system. Alicia Kearns agreed that “it’s exactly as David sets it out. We cannot tackle asylum claims when we haven’t given ourselves the legal grounding on coming here illegally.” Anna Firth said that while she was happy to be proven wrong, she thought Doyle-Price was “bang on the money” about the ECHR “rabbit hole.”

[…]

On the record: Bob Neill told the Financial Times that it would be “unbelievable” for the U.K. to put itself “in the same company as Russia and Belarus” by leaving the ECHR, while former justice sec Robert Buckland calls it “an undesirable state of affairs.”

 

*

What seems to have happened is that that a political castle was improvised this weekend on the mound of what probably is some fairly unexceptional legal advice about whether the government’s latest plan and draft legislation would survive legal challenge at home and in Strasbourg.

On the basis of that legal advice, politicians and their advisers appear to have rapidly gamed certain political tactics, free from any thought about the structural legal problems, as well as without realising the lack of backbench support.

This is not to say that the current governing party is not capable of putting departure from the ECHR in its manifesto and, if they are again returned, seeking to put that commitment into effect.

(Withdrawal from the ECHR is unlikely before the next general election, as it was not in the 2019 Conservative manifesto, and there would be not enough time to force it through the House of Lords.)

In this age of Brexit and Trump, no such political move can be discounted.

But it would not be easy.

And it would require considerably more thought and planning than the current anonymous briefings indicate has taken place.

****

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

 

The importance of giving important legislation very dull names

25th January 2023

In his informative post today on Dominic Raab and his “Bill of Rights”, Joshua Rozenberg quotes today’s important report by a parliamentary committee:

“What’s more, says the all-party committee, it’s not a bill of rights at all. If the government decides to press on with it, the bill’s title should be changed to something more meaningful — such as the European Convention on Human Rights (Domestic Application) Bill.”

And indeed the committee even states this as a conclusion:

The committee make a good point – and this is a missed trick by the justice secretary Dominic Raab.

Had Raab gone for a bill with such a boring title it may even now been an Act.

But he went for perhaps the most portentous title for legislation he could think of – other than Magna Carta II – and so looks like he will have no legislation passed at all.

Raab wanted to evoke and allude to the Bill of Rights of 1688-89 when all he was doing was fiddling around at the margins of how the European Convention on Human Rights was given effect in English law.

Had he been content with a more drab descriptive title, he may now have a legislative achievement to chalk up against his name.

*

There is nothing wrong with dull titles for legislation.

For example, one of the most important statutes in property and contract law has the sterling, stirring title of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.

What matters is the substance of a statute, not what can be said in a press release with its title.

A less pompously named statute tidying up some of the acknowledged problems with the Human Rights Act may have actually been welcome.

*

But.

The problem is not just with Raab.

The Human Rights Act itself has a needlessly provocative title.

Had it been called the European Convention on Human Rights (Domestic Application and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1998, then there would probably be far less political and media opposition, even if the substance was the same.

Part of the reason why the 1998 Act is still contested in some political and media quarters is because of its name.

So let us worry less about the the titles of legislation and more about the substance.

And perhaps “political” titles for legislations should be banned.

The prohibition could even be contained in a Banning Daft Legislation Titles Act.

****

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

New Essay at Substack: Perhaps the most significant UK constitutional case of the last fifty years

6th January 2023

Over at my new law and lore Substack, I have published an essay for paying subscribers on how the Malone case of 1979-1985 exposed the lie of our supposedly liberal constitution and changed the way we were governed.

The essay starts as follows:

Consider this simple, attractive proposition: in the United Kingdom, you are free to do as you will, unless there is a law against it.

What could be wrong with such a nice proposition: it is almost a perfect articulation of principled liberalism.

But.

This proposition can have a hidden and ugly implication.

For it also can mean that the State can do as it wishes, to you and other people, unless there is a law against it.

And the case which exposed this unpleasant truth – and helped put an end to it, so that the State was required to have a legal basis for interfering with our lives – is the 1979-85 case of Malone.

This is the story of that case, and of its effects.

You can read the rest of the essay with a paid subscription here.

*

This essay is also being posted on Patreon for those who subscribe to this blog using that medium.

For those who subscribe and donate through either Patreon or PayPal, please leave a “PRIVATE” comment below confirming you want me to add your email address to the Substack system so you can have a one-year complementary subscription to the law and lore Substack.

It is important that nobody pays “twice” for my content.

How the government won but also lost the court case on Rwanda removal policy

19th December 2022

Today the High Court handed down its judgment in respect of the many legal claims brought against the Rwanda removal policy.

On the face of it, the government of the United Kingdom appear to have won – and that is certainly how the judgment has been reported:

*

But.

In two ways the government has not won, and indeed this may not be a welcome judgment for the government.

Let me explain.

*

The wide legal challenge was to the policy.

In effect the policy is as follows: the Home Secretary can decide that asylum claims made in the United Kingdom should not be determined here, and that instead the persons who have made those claims should be removed to Rwanda to have their asylum claims determined there.

A legal challenge to any policy is always difficult – almost impossible.

This is partly because courts do not like intervening in matters of policy, as opposed to reviewing particular rules and individual decisions.

It is also partly because to say that a policy is unlawful means, in effect, that every possible rule made under that policy and every possible decision made under that policy will be unlawful.

And it is partly because policies can be adapted and modified so that the possibility of the policy itself always being unlawful can be avoided.

A policy is always the hardest target to hit in the administrative law courts.

It was therefore no great surprise that the High Court in this case – with a bench comprised of the two most experiences judges in administrative law matters – rejected the challenge to the policy as a whole.

And so, the government “won”.

*

The government, however, also lost.

In the eight individual cases under review, the High Court decided that the removal decisions be quashed and the Home Secretary take the decisions again with proper regard to individual circumstances.

Look at the final paragraph carefully:

That paragraph indicates that the government lost on nineteen particular decisions in this case.

Nineteen.

Each of those nineteen decisions was legally flawed: every single one.

The policy may well be lawful – but in not one case was the policy lawfully applied.

And so the the government lost all the individual cases.

*

Now we come to the real defeat for the government.

The import of the High Court decision is that in respect of each removal to Rwanda under the policy, the Home Office has to apply the policy in a robust and reasoned manner to the individual circumstances of each case in each of the decisions to be made.

Otherwise the removal will be successfully appealed or reviewed.

But for page after page of this judgment there is a catalogue of Home Office errors in respect of each of the cases.

The impression one forms reading the judgment as a whole is that, with the resources and administrative competence available, the Home Office simply is not capable of making all the individual decisions so that many removals to Rwanda are likely.

For the legal issue with decisions which need to be made on individual circumstances is that each decision can be appealed or otherwise legally challenged according to those circumstances.

Or to put it another way: the government has legally saved its Rwandan removal policy at the expense of making the lawful implementation of that policy extraordinarily resource-intensive and financially expensive.

*

Of course, this judgment may be appealed by the claimants – though it seems at first read a strong judgment by two highly regarded judges in this field, and I do not think an appeal would be likely to succeed.

And so perhaps the policy under challenge may actually be implemented – though it seems there are no current plans to send any asylum seekers to Rwanda.

But.

Even if this policy is one day lawfully implemented – if – it will be always be an administrative and financial drain of the highest order on the Home Office and thereby the taxpayer.

Many will say that the policy is immoral and should be dropped on that basis alone.

Being immoral, however, does not make a policy unlawful.

But a policy being lawful also does not make it practicable.

The government and its supporters may raise a cheer that the policy is itself has been held to be not unlawful.

But today’s judgment means that – like the chartered flights to Rwanda last summer – the lawful implementation of the policy may never really get off the ground.

 

***

Thank you for reading: posts like this take time and opportunity cost, and so for more law and policy posts like this – both for the benefit of you and for the benefit of others – please support through the Paypal box (above), or become a Patreon subscriber.

***

These law and policy posts are also crossposted on my new “law and lore” Substack.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome.

Why we should cheer Owen Paterson taking his case to the European Court of Human Rights

29th November 2022

The former member of parliament Owen Paterson is taking a case to the European Court of Human Rights.

There is nothing wrong with this.

Indeed, there is everything right about him doing so.

Paterson is a European human aggrieved about his fundamental rights, and he has the protection of the convention that guarantees his human rights.

It is for such aggrieved persons that the convention exists.

Indeed, the convention protects the rights of all humans subject to the jurisdictions of signatory states, and some of the convention rights even extend to legal persons such as companies.

Paterson has as much right as any other person in a convention state to petition the Strasbourg court.

*

But.

Paterson as a politician sought to remove the protection of the European Convention on Human Rights from other people.

In 2014, Paterson argued not only for the United Kingdom to take a restricted view of its obligations under the convention, but for the whole lot to go:

“Much of the problematical immigration into this country stems not just from the EU but from the European Court of Human Rights.

“This is exacerbated by the rulings of judges in the court at Strasbourg and by our own UK courts implementing the Human Rights Act.

“Repeal of the HRA and adoption of a new Bill of Rights, breaking free from the ECHR, would also relieve us of migrant pressure, include such absurdities as not being able to deport illegal immigrants who come to Calais, because – according to our judges – France is not a ‘safe’ country for asylum seekers.”

*

Now Paterson – through his lawyers – says he is going to Strasbourg.

Presumably this means he now believes that we should not be “breaking free” from the convention just yet, and that he would rather like a non “exacerbating” judgment from the judges at Strasbourg.

To the credit of his lawyers, they appreciate (and anticipate) the sheer absurdity of their client’s position:

“The irony that Mr Paterson, a vocal opponent of European institutions, should be seeking the help of the ECHR is not lost.”

Well.

You could say that.

And the sentence that then follows in the lawyers’ press release is just beautiful:

“But he has no other choice, as the Government has yet to meet its promise of repatriating human rights law to Britain, hence the application to Strasbourg.”

*

He has no other choice.

And that is the very point of human rights law, and of international human rights conventions and international human rights courts.

They are all there as a last resort, for those with no other choice.

When you have a grievance that local forms of law have failed you, and when you believe fundamental rights should mean that your legal position is different from how you have been treated, then this is when you should be able to rely on your human rights in accordance with international law instruments, and seek a remedy at an international court.

And it should not matter if the right you are relying on is about fair trials, or torture, or free expression, or privacy.

Those migrants about whom Paterson complained in 2014 also “had no other choice”.

Various people have “had no other choice”.

*

Paterson’s petition to the Strasbourg court may not succeed.

His complaint about parliamentary rules and procedures may not gain the favour of the Strasbourg judges.

The complaint is somewhat ambitious:

“The applicant complains that his Article 8 rights were infringed, as the public finding that he had breached the Code of Conduct damaged his good reputation, and that the process by which the allegations against him were investigated and considered was not fair in many basic respects.

“Communicated under Article 8.”

(Yes, Article 8 – and it is not clear why the complaint is not (also) under Article 6.)

*

Paterson deserves a fair hearing of his petition.

Paterson is right to ask the Strasbourg court to apply international human rights standards to the parliament of the United Kingdom to see if our parliament is found wanting.

He is right not to be swayed by notions of “parliamentary supremacy” and “national sovereignty”.

Other politicians have only managed to get the parliament of the United Kingdom to pass legislation giving effect to the European Convention on Human Rights.

Paterson wants to go a grand step further and subject parliament itself to the convention.

He wishes, to adopt some jargon, for our “political constitution” to be judicialised according to European legal standards.

If he succeeds, Parliament will be obliged to change its own processes by a European institution.

Of course: it is a pity that Paterson sought to prevent others from protecting their rights at Strasbourg.

However, if he succeeds in this claim, he may do more to subject our polity as a whole to the European Convention of Human Rights than any politician since the Human Rights Act 1998 was passed.

This blog wishes him luck.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome.

Here we go again: Raab returns to the Ministry of Justice

25th October 2022

When Dominic Raab left the Ministry of Justice when Elizabeth Truss became Prime Minister, the blog teased that the Human Rights Act was still there and Raab was not.

Well.

Raab has today returned to the Ministry of Justice as Secretary of State and Lord Chancellor (and Deputy Prime Minister).

And this means things do not look good for the Human Rights Act.

As this blog has previously averred, the Human Rights Act is Moby Dick to Raab’s Captain Ahab:

And so when Raab went, it seemed the Act was safe.

The new Truss administration dropped the “Bill of Rights”, a dreadful mess of a Bill.

That reversal was, it seems, the price exacted by Robert Buckland, the former Lord Chancellor, for serving as Welsh Secretary in Truss’s cabinet.

But earlier today, Buckland announced he was leaving the cabinet under the new Prime Minister Rushi Sunak:

Buckland’s letter refers to a meeting, and one wonders if he again asked for an assurance about the Human Rights Act – and, if so, what the answer was.

*

While Raab was away, his replacement Brandon Lewis had the confidence and sense to negotiate a resolution to the strike by criminal barristers.

It is unlikely that resolution would have happened had Raab stayed on, and it should not be taken for granted that action by criminal lawyers has come to an end.

*

As this blog has previous stated, those who sneer at Raab for not understanding human rights law are wrong.

It is that he does understand it – he just does not care for it.

And this makes him a more formidable opponent to liberals and progressives than someone who is merely ignorant of the applicable law.

We do not know yet whether Raab will now seek to revive the “Bill of Rights” many of us had assumed would pass into oblivion.

There are at least two years left of this parliament and so there is perhaps enough time for him to have a go at forcing the Bill through if he can, regardless of any backbench worries.

He may have difficulty in the House of Lords, however, as the 2019 Conservative Manifesto stopped short of promising to repeal the Human Rights Act.

But for Raab this is unfinished business, and so such an attempt is more than likely.

And for those who have a liberal or progressive interest in the law, we are again that fabled bowl of petunias:

Curiously enough, the only thing that went through the mind of the bowl of petunias as it fell was Oh no, not again.”

Oh no, not again.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome.

The comments policy is here.

The dropping of “The Bill of Rights” – and why it is both good and bad news

7th September 2022

The Human Rights Act 1998 is still in place.

And Dominic Raab is not.

Raab was three times a minister at the Ministry of Justice, and his personal and political priority was the repeal of the Act.

The legislation was the Moby Dick to his Captain Ahab.

But the whale has swum away again.

*

Raab’s latest attempt to repeal the Act was the so-called “Bill of Rights”.

When this was published my reaction was that it was a dud and a misdirection.

In essence, the rights under the European Convention on Human Rights would still be enforceable in domestic law, but there would be lots of provisions to make such enforcement more difficult in practical situations.

The United Kingdom cannot leave the ECHR without breaching the Good Friday Agreement – and so the “Bill of Rights” was a cynical attempt to make it look like something fundamental was happening when it was not.

Given the MoJ is facing chaos and crises in the prison and criminal justice systems, it seemed an odd priority for scarce ministerial and civil servant resources, as well as a waste of parliamentary time.

And this was especially the case when repealing the Act was not even in the 2019 Conservative manifesto, and so such a move was likely to be blocked or delayed by the House of Lords.

It was difficult to conceive of a greater exercise in pointlessness.

But, for Raab, the Act had to be repealed.

*

“All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assailable in Moby Dick.”

*

And now today, on the first full day of the new Prime Minister’s time in office, we read that the “Bill of Rights” is no more:

This revelation has the ring of truth.

The “Bill of Rights” is dead.

And so…

…Hurrah.

*

But.

The cheers cannot last for too long.

For this further news is also important:

The quoted statement may look like verbiage – but it signals something important.

The “Bill of Rights” was always going to be a clumsy vehicle for all the illiberal provisions the government would like to have so as to make it more practically difficult to enforce convention rights.

And so instead of putting many of these illiberal provisions in one big bill that was likely to fail, the same illiberal ends will now be achieved in other ways.

These moves will be driven mainly by the Home Office, and not the MoJ.

This is a canny move by the government – even if it is an unwelcome one from a liberal perspective.

The claps and congratulations about the “Bill of Rights” being dropped should therefore not last too long.

The government is just going to seek the limit the benefits and protections of the Act in other, less blatant ways.

Dominic Raab and his “Bill of Rights” may have gone.

But the need to be vigilant about what the government wants to do with our Convention rights has not gone at all.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome.

The comments policy is here.

Is this an abuse of the law of contempt of court?

5th August 2022

I came across a case on BAILLI which I read with increasing concern, indeed dismay.

I had somehow missed the relevant litigation being reported in the news, and so I did not know anything of the case, so I came to the case report fresh.

And I could not believe what I was reading.

I am sharing it with followers of this blog now, for I am thinking about writing about the case in detail.

The case is about contempt of court – and, in particular, what a court can be asked to do by a party with an injunction against those who (supposedly) breach that injunction.

The courts of England and Wales take contempt of court seriously – very seriously – especially in respect of parties breaching the orders of the court.

Indeed, it often seems that courts take contempt of court more seriously in respect of parties breaching the orders of the court than the court will do if a party breaches a legal obligation to any other party.

But this case seems to show how contempt of court this can be abused by the injuncting party

The impression I gained on reading this case was that the injuncting party were, in effect, weaponising and misusing contempt of court for private, commercial advantage – to the effect one could discern any motivation behind what they were doing at all.

The application seemed either spiteful or irrational – for a bad reason or for no reason.

And certainly not for any good reason.

The judge was not having any of it, and these two paragraphs give a flavour of the judgment:

Before I devote the time and energy (and opportunity cost) to writing about the case, I should be grateful for the views of those following this blog.

Is this a case worth a close reading?

Is this an (attempted) abuse of power which should be be brought to a wider audience?

Or is this a storm in a lawyer’s tea cup?

Does the fact that a judge sorted it out in the end mean that nothing really untoward here happened which could not be cured?

I am currently considering writing a detailed step-by-step critique of what the injunction party sought to do here – as it seems to me to be, on the facts, vindictive and a gross misuse of the court.

I also think, in general, there must be a change so that injunctions against “persons unknown”, after this case, always require the leave of the court.

There is a Law Gazette news report here.

And Adam Wagner has done a Twitter thread here:

Let me know what you think.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome.

The comments policy is here.