Ten thousand greased piglets

20th March 2023

This may be quite the moment for the interplay of politics and process.

We have this week the former prime minister Boris Johnson facing detailed questions before the privileges committee.

We also have the deputy prime minister and lord chancellor Dominic Raab facing the outcome of an inquiry conducted by a senior barrister.

We have rumours that former president Donald Trump is about to be arrested.

And last week we even had an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin.

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These are not equally momentous, but they do have two things in common.

First, each of these are examples of politicians being held to account but not in any usual way: each is unusual.

The nearest to a normal political process is Johnson being examined by fellow members of parliament before a parliamentary committee: but he may have to evidence on oath, and the story of this inquiry is already packed with legal and media attacks and manoeuvring.

The inquiry into Raab is also not formally legalistic – but it is lawyer- and evidence-driven.

While Trump and Putin may face formal judicial proceedings.

Second, each of these processes features a mode of evidence-based questioning or inquiry that is structured so that the probing is difficult to evade or ignore.

And this is because politicians are adept at evading or ignoring questions.

In other words: politicians are good at not being accountable – that is, literally, at not giving an account of what they have done.

Normal political processes of accountability have in each of the examples failed – or in the case of Putin, never really existed.

And so resort is being made to forms of questioning and inquiry that are harder to evade or ignore.

Some may think that a law and policy blogger would applaud this: for at last there will be hard examinations that cannot easily be deflected.

But, no.

And this is because legal and political processes should be distinct and separate.

Instead of this being a triumph of the forensic method, it is a failure of the political method.

This is not a good thing.

Every lurch towards extreme parliamentary processes (Johnson), non-parliamentary processes (Raab), and judicial processes (Trump, Putin) is an implicit admission of the failure of political processes to check and balance those with political power.

Yes, some of these events may end up with striking political theatre.

And it may well be that such formal processes are the only way to deal with politicians who share the famous description of Johnson as a “greased piglet”.

But this shift is not a good thing on scale.

For soon we may go from a handful of greased piglets to hundreds if not thousands, with normal forms of accountability finally being accepted as redundant.

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“As far as I am aware, no Government business was discussed” – A close reading of Boris Johnson’s letter about the Lebedev meeting

26th July 2022

There are perhaps two stages to a close reading of a legal, formal or otherwise considered or negotiated document.

The first stage – sometimes overlooked – is to read what the document actually says (and not what you think or hope it says).

The questions to ask here are: What is the content? How is that content framed and conveyed? What propositions are put forward? How are paragraphs and sentences structured? What words are used?

And so on.

In essence: if thought has gone into compiling a text, thought should also go into reading that text.

The second stage is more difficult.

Here the reader needs to work out not what is said, but what is not said.

Why did the writer not say certain things which they otherwise would have said?

What were the words and phrases and sentences which could have been used, but were not?

Of course: this second stage can be prone to speculation or projection or other forms of (over-)elaborate analysis.

But it can be a useful exercise when one has a document where the wording seems, well, strained or odd.

In short: why does the text say this – and not something else?

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Now we come to a letter that was placed today into the public domain.

The letter is from the current (and departing) Prime Minister Boris Johnson and it is on his official headed paper.

You can read the letter here.

The portion of the letter with which this blogpost is concerned is that under Question 41.

The background to this is as follows: on or about 28 April 2018, Boris Johnson, then Foreign Secretary, attended a social event in Italy where one of the other guests was Alexander Lebedev, a former KGB agent.

He was asked about this when he appeared at the recent liaison committee of the House of Commons on 6 July 2022:

There was a follow-up question:

This was not a comfortable moment for the Prime Minister – and it was at the time he was being forced to announce his upcoming departure as Prime Minister.

You will see from the exchanges above that Johnson said he would write to the committee – but in any case the chair of the committee wrote to the Prime Minister on 8 July 2022 expressly asking for – among other things – the Prime Minister to write on the matter of:

“Whether you met with Alexander Lebedev on 28 April 2018 without officials, and whether officials were subsequently informed of the meeting”

The question being asked was plain – and precise.

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In his letter dated 21 July 2022 (and published by the committee today) devotes over a page of a four-page letter to responding to this question:

 

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You will see the response to the question asked comprises twelve paragraphs.

And you will see that from the fifth paragraph onwards, the information provided is not the information requested.

Indeed, if you look at the final paragraph, the Prime Minister is providing information about who Labour politicians have met.

Only the first four paragraphs of the response relate to the request and should be read again:

You can read these paragraphs as well as anyone, and it is worth taking time to read what they say.

And what they do not say.

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For some reason, there is no mention of Alexander Lebedev by name – he is instead alluded to as “Evgeny Lebedev’s father”.

Johnson was asked both in the committee and in the chair’s subsequent letter whether officials were subsequently informed of the meeting.

Johnson’s letter places emphasis on a notification made about hospitality and that officials were “aware” in advance that he was attending.

You will see both the notification and the “aware” comment are about the social event generally – and not the meeting with Alexander Lebedev in particular.

Johnson cannot bring himself to say plainly that officials were not subsequently informed of the meeting with Alexander Lebedev.

The admission is instead buried in the following text:

In plain language: the Prime Minister did not subsequently notify officials of his meeting with Alexander Lebedev.

Johnson seeks to misdirect the reader with mentions of a notification about hospitality and officials being “aware” in advance of the social event generally, but the answer to the straight question is that he did not notify officials.

Indeed, there is no reason to believe from the content of this letter that officials were aware in advance that Alexander Lebedev would be in attendance.

Johnson further states the meeting with Alexander Lebedev was “not a formal meeting, nor something that was pre-arranged”.

This wording is odd.

That it was not “a formal meeting” is no more than a tautology that this was a social event – it is not a new point, but a dressing up of a point already made.

And that the meeting was not “pre-arranged” does not preclude the meeting as being expected.

Johnson does not say he was surprised to see Alexander Lebedev, which he could have said.

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The most remarkable phrase in the letter, however, is that “[a]s far as I am aware, no Government business was discussed”.

That formulation is strained in the extreme, as it would be within the Prime Minister’s knowledge what was discussed and what was not.

The “[a]s far as I am aware” proviso makes sense in a formal document when a person cannot have complete knowledge of a thing themselves.

But Johnson would presumably have complete knowledge of what he said.

Note also the Prime Minister does not simply say “[N]o Government business was discussed”.

If the Prime Minister could have said just that, he would have done so – and put the matter beyond any doubt.

But he did not say that, and that is presumably because he cannot say that.

He also does not use the more common “[a]s far as I can recollect” proviso.

The only reasonable explanation for the proviso “[a]s far as I am aware” in that statement is that the Prime Minister is aware of the possibility that government business was discussed, and so he does not want to be pinned down to a more committed answer that could mislead parliament.

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In summary, Boris Johnson did not notify officials that he had met Alexander Lebedev, and he cannot recall exactly what was discussed.

That is the only sensible interpretation and construction on the letter he has sent to the liaison committee, even though the letter goes out of its way not to mention Alexander Lebedev, and goes out of its way not to say expressly that officials were not subsequently notified, and goes out of its way to implicitly accept government business may have been discussed.

Instead of the twelve paragraphs of misdirection and waffle he could have said:

“I did not notify officials that I had met Alexander Lebedev, and I cannot recall exactly what was discussed.”

Instead, none of the information which the committee asked for directly is provided directly.

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There is something strange and worrying here.

If the meeting in Italy was straightforward and above board, then the response published today would also have been straightforward and open.

But the response was not – and that presumably is because the meeting was not.

Curious stuff.

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Russia’s flimsy constitution and the USA’s rigid constitution, and the notion that codified constitutions are necessarily a good thing

5th May 2022

From time to time this blog (and my commentary elsewhere) is accused of being against a codified constitution for the United Kingdom.

(A codified constitution is often also known – inexactly – as a ‘written’ constitution, but uncodified constitutions are usually written down, just not in one place.)

This accusation of being against a codified constitution for the United Kingdom is, in my view, unfair and incorrect.

A codified constitution for the United Kingdom may be a good and welcome thing.

Or it could be a horrible and unwelcome thing, entrenching domestic executive power yet further.

It all depends.

This is because codified constitutions can be good things or bad things.

The view of this blog (and my commentary elsewhere) is that a codified constitution of the United Kingdom is not necessarily a good thing.

And it rejects the casual plea ‘and this is why we need a written/codified constitution’ that often follows some political outrage.

A codified constitution is not a liberal panacea.

It is not even necessarily better than our current constitutional arrangements – so the alternative plea of ‘at least it would be a step in the right direction’ is also misconceived.

A codified constitution could be, from a liberal perspective, very much a step in the wrong direction.

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Codified constitutions are relevant to two of the current main international news stories – the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the likely overturning in the United States of Roe v Wade.

As this blog has previously set out, there are few constitutions which on paper are as liberal and wonderful as that of Russia.

And yet the Russian president had unlimited illiberal powers at home and no check on what he orders to be done (or attempted) abroad.

In the United States, the fundamental right of a woman of access to the means of aborting a pregnancy may no longer be a constitutional right, and thereby enforceable in all the states of the union.

This is because its status as a constitutional right rests only on mere case law, and not on the express provisions of the constitution itself.

And that, in turn, is because the constitution of the United States is difficult to amend generally, and it is practically impossible to amend on the issue of abortion – and so the constitutional right depended on litigation rather than on any formal enactment.

Other rights that seemed significant in the eighteenth century are set out in writing and cannot (easily) be removed.

Americans have the right to a well-regulated militia, but not a right to regulated and safe abortions.

But…. but….

…those are different, will come the defiant response of the constitution-mongers.

A codified constitution of the United Kingdom would be just right – not too flimsy, and not too rigid.

Perhaps this ideal codified constitution will be drafted by Goldilocks.

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Again, nothing on this blog should be taken to mean a codified constitution will necessarily be a bad thing.

But one should be critical, and one should not even presume that a codified constitution would tend to be a liberal panacea.

The government – backed by the considerable resources of the government legal service and the treasury panel of barristers – would seek to game any written constitution in the executive’s favour.

And against such a concert, mere wishful thinking will be no match

But…. but….

…this should be different, will come the response of the gamed constitution-mongers.

But.

Be careful what you clamour for.

A liberal constitutional order is not easy to achieve.

And that it may be the current arrangements without codification are more liberal than anything that the government would permit to be put in place as a codified constitution.

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Censorship vs the Babble – both work for authoritarians

7th April 2022

This post is just to set a quick thought (as I am recovering from illness).

It is to contrast and compare two things, which seem to be leading to a common end.

The first is Putin-style censorship – the sort which means Russians generally do not appear to have true information available about the invasion of Ukraine.

This suits the authoritarian nationalist populist Putin.

The second is the anything-goes babble of social media and 24-hour online news and comments, where few are actually censored.

The effect of this babble appears to be that liberal and progressive voices are drowned out, with hyper-partisan shouts of fake news and ‘balance’.

This suits the authoritarian nationalist populist politicians in many other countries.

So we have two modes of media which seem very different, but which have the same authoritarian effect of undermining and restricting critical voices.

Anyway, just a quick thought. What do you think?

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How you can be sued for libel for reporting things said in Parliament

10th March 2022

On 9 March 2022 the following was stated by Bob Seely MP in the House of Commons:

What Seely said is set out on the ‘They Work For You’ website:

And it has been published in Hansard:

What has struck many about what Seely said is that reporting parliamentary debates could be actionable under the law of defamation.

Surely, some thought, reporting what is said in parliament has absolute privilege – that is legal protection – from any law suit.

Well.

The legal position is not straightforward – though you may think it should be.

And the unsettling answer is that you can be sued for reporting things said in parliament.

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First there needs to be a distinction.

What MPs and peers themselves say in parliament does have absolute privilege.

This protection is provided by the Bill of Rights:

“`That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.”

From time to time, (ahem) spirited lawyers do threaten parliamentarians in respect of things said in parliament (here is a 2010 example) – but the lawyers should not do so, `and any legal claim would fail.

(The position is less clear-cut for witnesses at select committee hearings – but that is a topic for another time.)

This means there is nothing that a law firm can do with a legal threat to Seely or any other parliamentarian about what they say in parliamentary proceedings.

The MP or peer has absolute privilege – though there are rules in both houses of parliament about what can and cannot be said about certain matters – and those rules are not justiciable in court.

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But.

Those reporting – or indeed repeating – what is said in parliament do not have this same absolute protection.

The protection is instead ‘qualified’ – and so is subject to a condition.

This condition is (in general terms) that the report – or other repetition – is not malicious.

(This condition is the general effect of the august Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 and the Defamation Act 1996.)

This therefore means a person can be sued for defamation (and perhaps for other things) for reporting or repeating what is said in parliament when in doing so they acting maliciously.

The onus is on the claimant to show this malice.

So this means that a potential claimant can sue – and thereby threaten to sue – a person who is reporting or repeating what is said in parliament.

The potential claimant and their lawyers would have to meet a high threshold if there were to issue such a claim and demonstrate malice – and it may be that they will fail to do so.

But nothing at law stops them issuing the threats.

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How this all should work in an internet age where footage from parliament TV can be captured and circulated instantly is not clear.

For example I would not publish the footage of Seely above until and unless I saw it reported in Hansard, as I would want the protection of the 1840 Act.

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There is the eternal question of what constitutes ‘malice’.

 

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And there is also a question about whether lawyers for potential claimants can make over-stated libel threats when they have no evidence of malice.

As Professor Richard Moorhead explains there are general professional conduct rules about what can and cannot be in a threatening letter from a law firm:

The Solicitors Regulatory Authority states the following about solicitors’ professional duties in respect of disputes:

In essence – libel claimant lawyers cannot (and should not) threaten legal proceedings lightly – and if they do, there can be professional repercussions for those lawyers.

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Perhaps there should be further protections.

For example: in respect of infringements to registered intellectual property rights (eg trade marks and patents), the Intellectual Property (Unjustified Threats) Act 2017 prevents lawyers from making baseless threats.

Perhaps this should be extended to defamation threats.

And barristers and solicitors are under general professional obligations not to allege fraud without satisfactory evidence.

Presumably it would not be impossible for a similar rule to prevent baseless defamation threats, especially where there is no evidence of malice.

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None of the above suggests – or is intended to suggest – that any particular claimant firm is making such baseless threats.

Instead the above points to the protections that those receiving the threats have (or should have) so as to be confident that such threats are not baseless.

And it also points to the high hurdle that any claimant firm needs to meet so as to allege malice when making such a threat.

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We do have the gap in the law between absolute privilege for parliamentarians and only qualified privilege for those outside who report and repeat what those parliamentarians say.

It is a gap which in my view should be filled, and one which is not sensible (or sustainable) in the internet age.

But it is gap that has not yet been filled.

And so yes – as Seely said, it is possible for a law firm to threaten newspapers and others for what is said in parliament.

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For completeness, this is not a new problem either for parliamentarians or for those reporting on what they say.

Those with good memories will recall the Trafigura matter – which was not about defamation but confidentiality – where a member of parliament said something which seemed to be subject to (and thereby in breach of) a court injunction.

(And to demonstrate my own personal lack of malice – this is a link to how Trafigura’s lawyer saw what happened.)

So none of this is a new issue – and it is one that goes to the very essence of a separation of powers.

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Disclosure: I happen to be a qualified solicitor, and I still help clients facing libel and other claims, and so this post is informed by that experience.

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“Russian influence in the UK is the new normal” – Did you know the Russia Report had actually been published?

9th March 2022

Another brief post today – am not well and Twitter today has used up what spare mental energy I had – and so here is another link with an explanation.

This is to the ‘Russia Report’ – a document that many did not realise had actually been published.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1500098105936654340

And if you cannot read its fifty-five pages, you can read the four page summary here.

And, if those four pages are too many, just read the bullet-points – especially the first:

“Russian influence in the UK is the new normal.

“Successive Governments have welcomed the oligarchs and their money with open arms, providing them with a means of recycling illicit finance through the London ‘laundromat’, and connections at the highest levels with access to UK companies and political figures.”

You would think such a conclusion of a senior cross-party committee would have made the political news.

But – unless you have a particular interest – you would have never known it had been published at all.

A wise civil servant once observed that if you want to hide something, just publish it – for nobody will read it.

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A libel defeat for the Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation

8th March 2022

Today’s post will be just a short one, so as to link and draw attention to this judgment.

Paragraphs 38 and 39 are beautiful and quietly lethal.

By way of background, the corporate claimant – the Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation – sued in respect of the outstanding book Kleptopia.

(Buy it here – EDIT This is now an Amazon link, as the previous Bookseller link says they are out of stock.)

The judge held that the book did not hold the defamatory meanings pleaded:

“In short, the Book does not bear the defamatory meaning contended for by the Claimant because, read in their proper context, the allegations complained of by the Claimant do not refer to any ENRC corporation” (paragraph 36).

But.

The judge goes on and says, in effect: hang on, this book does make serious allegations about the claimant, so why is the claimant not suing on those serious allegations?

Why, asked the judge in effect, is the Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation not suing for being called “[a] corporate front – “a charade” [ ] used [ ] for criminal activities including corruption, money laundering, theft and embezzlement. “

Well, why indeed.

This, of course, is not an express admission by the Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation that it is such a front.

But one suspects these judicial comments in a legally privileged, public judgment were not those sought by the claimant in bringing this case.

Less SLAPP – and more of a slap-down.

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Disclosure and disclaimer: the journalist defendant also works for the Financial Times, where I am a freelance ‘contributing editor’ but nothing in this post refers (or is intended to refer) to any case brought by Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation against any other FT entities and/or individuals; and I also long ago happened to work for the claimant’s law firm.

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The United Kingdom government is rushing through anti-oligarch legislation without proper scrutiny

7th March 2022

Imagine a serious piece of proposed legislation, for serious times.

Imagine that legislation is substantial – a Bill of 64 pages.

Imagine that legislation is complex – 55 clauses and 5 schedules (the latter comprising 11 parts).

Imagine that legislation is coercive – creating at least 12 new criminal offences.

Imagine that legislation confers wide executive powers – with 20 “may by regulations” provisions for Secretary of State to legislate by fiat, including in respect of individual rights.

And now…

…imagine that proposed legislation being forced through all its stages in the House of Commons in a single day.

What could possibly go wrong?

Well.

We will now find out, for this is what is happening today with the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Bill.

This significant legislation is being rushed through with almost no opportunity for adequate scrutiny by Members of Parliament – just so the government can be seen be doing something about Oligarchs.

This is not how fundamental legislation should be put in place.

 

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Oligarchs in London – what lawyers are to blame for and what they are not

1st March 2022

There is a negotiation tactic when a party wants to be robust or unreasonable but wants to appear to be nice and approachable.

The tactic is to blame the lawyers: “I would agree, you see, but I have been told by my lawyers that I cannot”.

And nobody minds – the party gets to save their face, and the lawyers shrug off the misplaced blame and charge their fees.

There is a similar move in politics and media.

The politician or pundit gets to blame the lawyers – and to get easy nods and cheers.

“It is the lawyers to blame.”

In turn the less alert of those listening will roar and demand that the lawyers be named and shamed.

And nobody minds – the politician and pundit gets to save their face, and the lawyers shrug off the misplaced blame and charge their fees.

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This political and media dance routine obscures what lawyers cannot be blamed for – and what they can be.

Individual lawyers at any one time can only work with the law as it stands.

If the law does not permit or enable a thing, then a lawyer cannot make a difference.

If you want to stop a person from having or exercising certain rights then legislative change can often make the difference wanted.

Take for example, sanctions on oligarchs.

Oligarchs will have rights and can exercise their rights.

That lawyers advise and assist so as to make those rights effective is not – ultimately – the fault of the lawyer.

If the government really wants to sanction an individual then there is little that lawyers can do to prevent it.

There are certain limited exceptions – obviously in respect of life and liberty – but almost anything else is possible if the government is determined and goes about it in the right way.

Take, for another example, defaming oligarchs.

Again, oligarchs have a right to defend their reputations.

And lawyers will be there to advise and assist so as to make that right effective.

But such lawyers can only work with the law of defamation as it stands – and it is entirely open to the government to seek to reform the law of defamation.

There are reforms that could be made – for example to make SLAPP legal cases far more difficult to threaten or to make.

Determined efforts and reforms, however, would take time and effort by the government – and so it is easier to blame the lawyers instead.

There will always be those who will clap and cheer.

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But.

The defence above does not absolve lawyers in England and Wales from personal responsibility.

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That said, barristers – those lawyers who tend to do advocacy in court – are (supposedly) bound by a cab-rank rule which means they are (supposed) to take case in their area, regardless of who are instructing them.

As such barristers can be instructed in a matter contrary to their own views.

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Solicitors, on the other hand, are not bound by a cab-rank rule.

And it is solicitors who will be sending the letters on behalf of oligarchs in respect of sanctions and defamation.

Solicitors do get to choose who they act for.

Indeed, the business models of certain solicitor practices are based on there being numerous foreign corporations and high net-worth individuals wanting to enforce rights in London.

(And for what it is worth, I choose not to act for oligarchs or foreign states, and do not act against newspapers, even though I am a media and commercial lawyer.)

But.

If one a solicitor does not want to act for such clients in such cases, then there will be other solicitors who will.

Solicitors may be able to choose who they act for, but they cannot choose to change the law.

And so here – even without denying the personal responsibility of lawyers who choose to act for such clients – we again have the ultimate problem being the law, rather than lawyers.

The hard truth is that, although it is satisfying to blame – and name and shame – lawyers, it is the law that is at fault.

What lawyers do is a function of that law.

But that would require difficult questions of how the law came to be in the state that it is.

And that is why law-makers and their political and media supporters choose to blame lawyers instead.

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The Chelsea FC statement that is not what it seems

27th February 2022

Last night – at 6.45pm on Saturday – Chelsea Football Club unexpectedly published this statement:

In terms of media coverage, the statement could not have been timed better.

It was early enough to be just about picked by the Sunday newspapers, but late enough to avoid lengthy scrutiny.

And it was at that time on a Saturday that those on Twitter are expecting ‘breaking’ stories.

Accordingly, the statement was quickly taken (and shared) by many in news and sports media as being significant.

This apparent significance also seemed warranted by the content of the statement, which I publish below (with sentences split out):

“Statement from Club Owner Roman Abramovich

“During my nearly 20-year ownership of Chelsea FC, I have always viewed my role as a custodian of the Club, whose job it is ensuring that we are as successful as we can be today, as well as build for the future, while also playing a positive role in our communities.

“I have always taken decisions with the Club’s best interest at heart.

“I remain committed to these values.

“That is why I am today giving trustees of Chelsea’s charitable Foundation the stewardship and care of Chelsea FC.

“I believe that currently they are in the best position to look after the interests of the Club, players, staff, and fans.”

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Let us look at what this actually says.

One phrase which stands out is “stewardship and care” – which Abramovich is “giving” to the “trustees of Chelsea’s charitable Foundation”.

Two sentences before that phrase – deftly – this is framed as a “decision”.

This looks solemn and legally meaningful.

But.

The statement has no legal meaning at all.

Indeed, it would seem that the statement was crafted deliberately so as to give the impression that something legally significant was happening – a “decision” to transfer a thing to “trustees” – when nothing legally significant was happening at all.

This is PR – and this is what you get when you can afford expensive and wily PRs.

And it had the desired effect:

And there were many excited tweets from those in news media who should have known better suggesting the statement said something important.

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The phrase “stewardship and care” looks like it should be a legal phrase.

It is similar to, say, “duty of care” (which is a legal term of art) – and “stewardship” has a nice legal-ish comforting ring to it.

But it is flapdoodle.

What one transfers to trustees is not “stewardship and care” but ownership of property.

The trustees then – literally – hold that property on trust on behalf of beneficiaries.

But if you look at the Chelsea FC statement there is no property been passed to trustees.

The word “trustees” is, in effect, a misdirection.

They may as well be assistant referees or physiotherapists, for their title is – strictly speaking – irrelevant to what is being described

It is very skilfully put-together statement for journalists and others in a hurry.

And only those with a background in commercial and trusts law would realise immediately that the statement did not actually say what it seemed to say.

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This does not mean that the fact of such a statement is not without its own significance.

There would be a purpose to such a statement at such a time: statements like this are not randomly put out at 6.45pm on a Saturday when Russia is invading Ukraine.

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Of course: there is nothing wrong about retaining ownership of Chelsea FC – even from my perspective as an Aston Villa supporter.

It is certainly not defamatory to say that Abramovich remains as much the owner of Chelsea FC after this statement as he was before.

(And we would especially like to welcome all the representatives of London’s defamation law enforcement community who have chosen to join us here on the law and policy blog at this time.)

Nothing on this blog should be taken to mean that one should think any worse of anyone involved – indeed, this post registers admiration at a such a perfectly deft exercise in PR.

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