Category: United Kingdom Law and Policy

This agreement is not the end of Brexit, it is a five year political truce

28th December 2020

More is now becoming apparent of the nature of the draft trade and cooperation agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom.

This post looks at two fundamental issues: structure and duration.

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In regard of structure, let us start with what is expressly stated as the ‘purpose’ of the agreement:

‘This Agreement establishes the basis for a broad relationship between the Parties […]’

The word ‘broad’ is significant, especially when one looks at the following provision.

This provision expressly provides that it is envisaged that there will be ‘other’ agreements that will both ‘supplement’ this agreement but will be subject to this agreement.

The key word here, at the end of the numbered paragraph, is that this agreement is a ‘framework’.

As such it is not, and is not intended to be, a once-and-for-all agreement, setting out all the terms of the post-Brexit relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom.

This will not surprise many (no doubt they are already scrolling down to type ‘why is this a surprise?’ in the comment box below) but it is significant – and consequential – and needs spelling out.

This is explicitly not an agreement which shows that the United Kingdom has, in one single bound, ‘taken back control’ and become free.

The agreement instead shows, even in its first two substantive provisions, that Brexit will be an ongoing negotiation, maybe one without end.

All this agreement does – expressly and openly – is provide a ‘broad…framework’.

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Once this is understood then other parts of the agreement make sense.

For example, there are numerous specialised trade committees set up for various sectors.

Loads of talking shops.

But some have rightly noted that some sectors do not have specialised trade committees.

The specialised trade committees which have been set up, however, oversee certain parts of the agreement.

So, if a sector is not the subject of other provisions in the agreement, then there will not be a specialised trade committee to oversee that sector.

(This is akin to, say, parliamentary select committees that are set up to mirror government departments.)

The reason, therefore, there is not a financial services specialised trade committee under this agreement is that there are no substantive provisions under this agreement on financial services (yet) for that committee to monitor.

If and when there is a ‘supplementary’ agreement on financial services, for example, there will be a corresponding new specialised trade committee.

That new committees can be formed is expressly provided for in the powers of the partnership council, that can ‘by decision, establish Trade Specialised Committees and Specialised Committees’.

The agreement, therefore, envisages both new supplementary agreements and new specialised committees.

(And these envisaged potential extensions are elsewhere in this agreement.)

In other words, this agreement is intended and designed to be a dynamic arrangement between the parties, where areas of trade and cooperation can change and indeed become closer (or less close) over time.

This means one consequence of Brexit is that the United Kingdom has swapped the dynamic treaties of the European Union which envisages things becoming closer (or sometimes less close) over time for a new ‘broad…framework’ dynamic agreement that also envisages things becoming closer (or sometimes less close) over time.

And this is part of the design, as the examples above show.

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There is more.

Not only is the agreement envisaged and designed to be dynamic over time, it will also be subject to five-yearly reviews.

So slow, incremental changes within five periods will be complemented by possible far more substantive shifts every five years.

This again is part of the design.

Buried on page 402 of the agreement:

“The Parties shall jointly review the implementation of this Agreement and supplementing agreements and any matters related thereto five years after the entry into force of this Agreement and every five years thereafter.”

And once you realise there is this five year cycle, you notice it elsewhere in the agreement.

There are numerous references to ‘2026’ and ‘five years’.

And as John Lichfield has pointed out in this significant and informative thread, 2026 is also a significant date on the fisheries question:

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Five year periods, of course, accord neatly with the five year cycles of the European Union.

The European Commission is appointed for a five year term, for example, and the European Parliament is elected every five years.

Each President of the European Council also tends to serve a five year term.

So this five year cycle of reviews is convenient for (and is no doubt designed to be convenient for) the European Union.

Each Commission, each European Parliament, and each President of the European Council, will have its turn to shape the relationship with the United Kingdom, before handing it onto the next.

The five year cycle also may suit the United Kingdom.

The Fixed-term Parliaments Act provides that each parliament should last five years – though, of course, this statute is set for repeal.

But, in any case, the politics of the United Kingdom generally tends to follow cycles of four to five years.

And if Fixed-term Parliaments Act stays in place, the next general election is in 2024, just in time for the run-up to the next review of the agreement.

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The trade and cooperation agreement is expressly and openly designed to have both small changes within five year cycles and potentially big changes every five years.

As such, this agreement is not the end of Brexit.

The agreement is not (and is not intended to be) a once-and-for-all settlement of the relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom.

It is instead – deliberately – a dynamic agreement, capable of enabling closer union (or less close union) over time.

The five year cycles accord exactly with the convenience of the terms of the European Union and also roughly match the political cycle of the United Kingdom.

This agreement does not bring Brexit to an end, it is instead a five year political truce.

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The United Kingdom-European Union trade agreement – the early emerging picture

27th December 2020

The draft trade agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom and related documents were published yesterday.

As this blog has previously averred, there is not sufficient time for this agreement and related documents to be properly analysed and scrutinised before the Brexit transition period ends automatically on 31st December 2020.

All one can really do in the time available is read through the documents, spot patterns and complications, and notice the more obvious deficiencies, discrepancies and omissions.

Proper analysis and scrutiny of such a large legal instrument is not and cannot be a linear, read-through exercise.

It is instead complex: comparing provisions within the agreement and related documents, then matching the provisions with external legal instruments, and – most importantly – practically stress-testing the proposed provisions against reality.

As this blog has previously said, legal codes are akin to computer coding – and so quick reviews before deployment will not spot the inevitable bugs.

All that said, there are already some emerging shapes and overall impressions.

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The best starting point is the European Union page, which has links to a number of relevant documents.

You will see there that there is not just one draft agreement, for trade – there are also a security of information agreement and a civil nuclear Agreement.

There is also a 26-page document of ‘declarations’.

Also worth looking at is this 2-page table of consequences of the United Kingdom’s departure and the benefits of the agreement.

The corresponding page of the United Kingdom government has fewer resources but there is this 34-page explainer which summarises at a high-level the ‘core’ provisions of the agreement.

(Though without the contents pages and judicious use of spacing, numbering and tabes, that explainer would have significantly fewer pages.)

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A number of commentators and experts have also shared their early views and impressions.

The excellent team at the Institute of Government have provided initial analyses of the provisions at their site – see the links on the left of that landing page for their looks at individual areas.

Professor Steve Peers – author of various leading texts on European Union law – spent Christmas Day and Boxing Day putting together an explanatory thread on Twitter.

The thread, like the rest of his social media output, is an astonishing work of immediate legal commentary and is a boon for the public understanding of law.

There was other outstanding commentary.

Trade expert Dr Anna Jerzewska: 

Services expert Nicole Sykes:

Former United Kingdom senior trade official David Henig did a post and a thread:

Another trade expert Sam Lowe observed that the trade side of the agreement was thin and – but for politics and choreography – could have been completed more quickly:

John Lichfield provided an informative thread on fisheries:

And extradition lawyer Edward Grange had a similarly informative ‘quick look’:

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In my own area of particular interest – institutions, governance and dispute resolution – my own very preliminary tweet got widely shared:

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1342749971142029312

And it was even picked up by the Daily Express, which – in an extraordinary and unexpected turn of events – described this blog as an ‘influential blog’.

Anton Spisak looked at this far more closely and he compiled this helpful diagram:

This elaborate scheme was correctly described by Professor Phil Syrpis as follows:

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All this is only ‘first glance’ stuff – a Boxing Day walk-through a long and complicated legal text.

But what is already plain is that what the United Kingdom government is boasting and spinning about the agreement may not be accurate.

Remember, however, that the old saying ‘the devil is in the detail’ is often the opposite of the truth.

Devils lurk and thrive in generalities, mismatched expectations, mutual misunderstandings, and grand sweeping statements.

It is these that bedevil us.

Details – that is precise language – flush out these devils.

And as we understand more about what has actually been agreed in this ‘deal’ – and what was not agreed – we will no doubt see many devils flush past.

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The EU-UK trade agreement – and the tale of two tables

Boxing Day, 2020

The post-Brexit agreement on trade and other matters is, it seems, in final draft form – although it has not yet been officially published.

What seems to be a copy of the final draft is here.

Proper analysis of the agreement will necessarily take time – though an initial glance showed about ten pages devoted to creating dozens and dozens of joint European Union and United Kingdom talking shops – committees, assemblies, talking shops, and so on.

This indicates that Brexit will in fact be a negotiation without end.

So while we digest this Christmas feast, let us look at a couple of Christmas cards.

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The first is a ‘scorecard’ made public on Christmas Eve.

This purports to show a sequence of heady United Kingdom ‘wins’.

It is too soon to tell whether this document accords with the actual draft agreement, but even on its own terms it is confused and unconvincing.

For example, if we look at public procurement, where the United Kingdom had no proposals, the outcome is dubbed a ‘mutual compromise’.

But on legal services, where the European Union in turn had no position, the outcome is dubbed a United Kingdom ‘win’.Some topics are artificially broken up, perhaps to claim more United Kingdom ‘wins’ (for example, Financial Services), and other ‘wins’ not substantiated by accompanying text (especially Law Enforcement).

Such inconsistencies and distortions mean that, even on the face of it, the ‘scorecard’ is not a reliable document to form a view on the draft agreement either for or against.

The table has been created by the United Kingdom government (or a supporter of government policy) as propaganda, not analysis.

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The United Kingdom government, however, is not alone in presenting a table as a spinning exercise.

Again, it is too soon to tell whether this table is accurate in comparison with the actual agreement, though there are no obvious internal inconsistencies in the document.

And maybe significantly, this second table is not framed as ‘wins’ but is instead about losses – the scope and areas of coverage.

What is outside the agreement, as opposed to what was included.

Looking down the ticks and crosses indicate what the United Kingdom might be losing as opposed to ‘winning’.

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Just as the number of talking shops to be created under the agreement show that Brexit will now become a negotiation without end, the existence of these two tables indicate that the merits of Brexit will also be an ongoing argument.

Brexit will be a contested subject for at least a generation.

This trade agreement may be bringing part of the Brexit story to a formal conclusion, but it certainly does not bring Brexit to an end.

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POSTSCRIPT

The United Kingdom government has now published the final draft agreement and a 34 page summary – see here.

And the European Union has published its suite of documents here.

 

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This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising topical law and policy matters – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

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If you value the free-to-read and independent legal and policy commentary both at this blog and at my Twitter account please do support through the Paypal box above.

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Scenes from Brexit past – so as to keep the impending Deal ‘triumph’ in perspective

Christmas  Eve, 2020

Today political and media supporters are hailing as a triumph a Brexit agreement few of whom have read and many will probably one day disown.

It is now a familiar ritual.

And as Christmas Eve is a time for ghost stories, here are some scenes from Brexit past.

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First let us go before even the referendum.

It is late 2015, and the then prime minister David Cameron and a team of negotiators are seeking a ‘deal’ – a supposed re-negotiation that would be the basis for victory in a referendum expected to take place in 2016.

But the re-negotiation was a failure – though that too hailed by some at the time – and was hardly mentioned in the referendum campaign.

And – as this blog has set out previously – the wrong lessons were drawn from that deal by Brexiters, who believed demanding more things loudly was a deft negotiation technique with the European Union.

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We now go to the days after the referendum result, in the summer of 2016.

The governing Conservative party were in the midst of a leadership election – and the winning candidate asserted that ‘Brexit means Brexit’.

The European Union were, around the same time, putting in place negotiation priorities and strategies that would mean that they were ready to start negotiating by the end of that year.

The United Kingdom, in contrast, had no plans or even articulated idea of what it wanted out of Brexit when that new prime minister made the departure notification in March 2017.

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We now move on to the middle of the following year, where Brexit secretary David Davis promised ‘the row of the summer’ over the sequencing of the Brexit negotiations.

The ‘row’ lasted only days, as a far better prepared European Union got its way completely on sequencing.

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And now we go to December 2017 where the European Union accepts that there has been ‘sufficient progress’ in the talks and enters into a ‘joint declaration’ with the United Kingdom.

This joint declaration contains delicate but significant wording on the issue of the border in Ireland – wording which many political and media supporters of the government do not appreciate at the time or do not take seriously.

That joint declaration is hailed by those supporters anyway.

Brexit is getting done.

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We finally move on to December last year, where the Conservative party win a general election on the basis of an ‘oven ready’ withdrawal deal negotiated by the current prime minister.

That deal was, of course, hailed by political and media supporters of the government.

But months later, the United Kingdom government resorts to proposing legislation that would empower ministers to break that same ‘oven ready’ deal.

That legislation was hailed by political and media supporters of the government.

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There are many more such scenes from Brexit – you may now be thinking of others.

Some of these ghostly memories may be forgotten by the cheerleaders of the government.

But they have certainly not been forgotten by the European Union.

That is why the deal is likely to have strict provisions on governance, as the United Kingdom has consistently spooked the European Union in the conduct of these negotiations.

So when the deal is finally unwrapped its contents may horrify the political and media supporters of the government who are currently hailing it more than any ghost story.

And that may be a scene of Brexit yet to come.

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This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising topical law and policy matters – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

Each post takes time, effort, and opportunity cost.

If you value the free-to-read and independent legal and policy commentary both at this blog and at my Twitter account please do support through the Paypal box above.

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Why a two thousand page EU-UK relationship agreement cannot be properly scrutinised between now and 31 December 2020

23rd December 2020

A week tomorrow, on 31st December 2020, the Brexit transition period comes to an end.

This transition period has artificially kept in place most of the substance of membership of the European Union for the United Kingdom (other than representation on various institutions) even though as a matter of law the United Kingdom departed the European Union on 31st January 2020.

There is still no agreement in place for the future relationship.

There is still, it seems, not even an agreed draft text in final form.

And there certainly has not been ratification by the European Parliament.

(In the United Kingdom, parliament does not need to ratify an international agreement though parliament may need to legislate so as to implement what has been agreed.)

According to one well-connected and reliable commentator the current version of the agreement is two thousand pages long.

This is not a surprise, given the scope of what needs to be addressed in the agreement – the new ongoing relationship of the United Kingdom and the European Union on trade and other matters.

There are also news reports that the negotiators have missed the deadline for any agreement to be voted on by the European Parliament before the end of the year.

But even if somehow the European Parliament can reconvene before end of the year, there is not enough time for anyone other than those directly connected with the negotiation (and so will be familiar with the text) to scrutinise the agreement.

Today is a Wednesday – Christmas Eve and Christmas Day block out tomorrow and Friday, and then it’s the the weekend, and then it is the Boxing Day holiday on Monday.

That leaves only three full days to do everything.

The situation is ludicrous.

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A legal instrument is a complex thing.

Legal texts are not linear documents – you do not start reading on page one and go through to the end, and then stop.

A legal text is more akin to a computer program – law codes and computer coding are remarkably similar things.

Each provision – indeed, each word – in a legal instrument has a purpose.

Each provision has to, in turn, cohere with all the other provisions elsewhere in the text – so Article 45, for example, needs to fit with Article 54, and so on.

In an international agreement such as this relationship treaty, each provision also has to cohere with hundreds – perhaps thousands – of other provisions in other legal instruments.

(This is especially true of an agreement entered into by the European Union, which is a creature of law.)

Each provision also has to be capable of working in practice – and so needs to be assessed from a practical as well as a legal(istic) perspective.

And – perhaps most importantly – any significant legal instrument needs to be examined and approved by political representatives.

This last requirement is particularly important when the agreement will have huge consequences for people and for businesses.

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And there is something else.

The United Kingdom government has now twice – in a rush – signed up to something so as to ‘get Brexit done’ and then regretted it.

The first was the ‘joint declaration’ in withdrawal agreement negotiations, and the second was the withdrawal agreement itself – which the United Kingdom government sought to legislate so that it could break the law.

This means that nobody can have any real confidence that government ministers have any proper understanding of what they are signing up to.

If any agreement needs proper scrutiny, this one does.

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Charles Dickens in A Christmas Carol makes it so that all three visitations are packed into a single evening.

But not even an imagination as vivid as that of Dickens could make it plausible that a two thousand page agreement of such immense importance could be properly examined as a matter of law and for practicality, and to receive proper political scrutiny, in the few days available before the end of the year.

Brace, brace.

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What if? What if? What if? – three counterfactuals about Brexit, and how they may have not turned out as Remainers would have liked

22nd December 2020

As the United Kingdom is now fewer than ten days away from the end of the Brexit transition period, and there is still no agreement in place, it is tempting to ask ‘what if things had been different?’ and to ponder whether if only [x] or [y] had happened everything would be ok.

So here are three counterfactuals, as thought experiments.

(Counterfactuals can be instructive, as long as you do not take them too seriously.)

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The first counterfactual is about the 2016 referendum.

What if there had not been a referendum, or if Remain had won the referendum?

Surely then the last few years would have been different?

Well.

As the then prime minister and the Conservatives had won the 2015 general election – that party’s first outright victory since 1992 – with the manifesto commitment to hold an ‘in/out’ referendum, not having a referendum would have had a political consequence.

And that consequence would likely to have been a continued rise in support for UKIP – in local elections and the European Parliament election –  resulting no doubt in a strong showing at the general election set for 2020 under the Fixed-term Parliament Act.

The matter of Brexit may not have gone away.

Similarly a narrow Remain victory – say, ahem, 52:48 – also would not have disposed of the issue, with Leavers then seeing that only one more heave was necessary for Brexit to happen.

By 2015-16, it is difficult to see that anything other than an emphatic Remain victory in a referendum ridding domestic politics of significant demands for Brexit.

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The second counterfactual is about the manner of departure.

The referendum result provided a mandate for the United Kingdom to depart the European Union.

But the referendum result, by itself, said nothing directly about the means and timing of the departure.

So it would have been open to a government to take its time, and to put in place a cross-party and thought-through plan, taking full and serious account of the immensity and complexity of Brexit.

Instead, however, we got Theresa May and then Boris Johnson wrongly treating Brexit as if it could be done easily and quickly, and driving it through on a highly partisan basis.

But – and here Leavers have a point – a Brexit delayed was likely to mean that Brexit would never happen.

And so unless Brexit was done briskly those opposed to Brexit would have attempted to subvert the exercise, regardless of the referendum mandate.

If a government had been rational and diligent in its planning for Brexit this, however, would have led to increasing backbench, Ukip and media pressure to ‘get Brexit done’.

And so unless Brexit was done on a cross-party basis – perhaps with a national government – it is difficult to see how long any prime minister who sought to avoid a botched Brexit would have lasted.

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The third counterfactual brings us to the current predicament.

What if there had been an extension to the transition period of one or two years?

This blog yesterday set out how that extension did not happen, and this is why the United Kingdom is now dealing with both a pandemic and the end of the transition period at the same time.

No sensible person would disagree that an extension should have been sought and secured, if only in view of the pandemic.

But.

Does anyone seriously think that an extra year or two years would have resulted in the United Kingdom government actually deciding what it wanted out of Brexit?

Would the next year or two be any different to the last four years?

If there had been extensions to the ends of 2021 and 2022, we would then be in the same confused state as we are now – the only possible grace would be there not being a concurrent pandemic.

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My own view is that the counterfactual with the most force is ‘what if’ any government of the United Kingdom – or the Conservative or Labour parties – had made a positive case for membership  from the 1980s onwards?

Instead we had opt-out after opt-out, with both those parties competing with each other to boast of how the United Kingdom was apart from the European Union.

And the print media in turn both encouraged and fed off this political antipathy.

So by 2015-16 it was difficult to see how the Brexit issue would go well for Remainers, even if certain decisions after 2015 had been taken differently.

Only a counterfactual which posits a different political context for the Brexit issue by 2015 seems to me to be plausible way of showing how Brexit could have been avoided.

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Another Brexit pundit once wrote about the various possible branches of history to do with Brexit.

That pundit, despite their wrongness on other issues, had a point.

There was no inevitability about any stage of the Brexit story.

Things could have turned out differently.

But there is also no reason to think they necessarily have turned out any better.

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How a government capable of ‘cancelling Christmas’ did not extend the Brexit transition period – or why populism keeps prevailing over prudence

Winter Solstice, 2020

How did it come to pass that a government capable of ‘cancelling Christmas’ did not extend the Brexit transition period,?

Why is the United Kingdom having to deal simultaneously with the effects of both a pandemic and the departure from the European Union?

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The Brexit withdrawal agreement provided for a transition period, where the United Kingdom remained part of the European Union in substance if not in legal from (though not part of the law and policy making institutions).

Article 126 of that exit agreement provided that this extension period would end on 31 December 2020.

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The exit agreement also provided that the transition period could be extended – either by one or even two years.

This was a prudent provision –  just in case something happened which meant the brisk ‘let’s get Brexit done’ timetable was not possible because of some significant development – well, like a worldwide pandemic.

Yet 1st July 2020 came and went with no extension to the transition period.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1278101059119075332

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This deadline for putting in place an extension was not a mere omission – the sort of thing a busy government may not have noticed in the rush of events.

The  failure to put in place the extension was a deliberate decision of the United Kingdom.

On 12 June 2020, the cabinet minister responsible for negotiations with the European Union announced proudly:

‘We have informed the EU today that we will not extend the Transition Period. The moment for extension has now passed.’

Had he perhaps not realised there was a pandemic on at the time?

Remarkably, the following sentence of the minister’s statement expressly stated that the decision not to extend was in view of the pandemic:

‘At the end of this year we will control our own laws and borders which is why we are able to take the sovereign decision to introduce arrangements in a way that gives businesses impacted by coronavirus time to adjust.’

The United Kingdom government promoted the decision not to extend as a news story.

The deadline was even the topic of direct discussion between the prime minister and the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission on 15 June 2020:

‘The Parties noted the UK’s decision not to request any extension to the transition period. The transition period will therefore end on 31 December 2020, in line with the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement.’

The United Kingdom government knew the extension deadline was about to pass, and the government decided deliberately to not have an extension with full awareness (and explicit mention) of the ongoing pandemic.

‘Getting Brexit done’ was more important.

Populism prevailed over prudence.

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This option to extend the transition period was the only way to do so that was written into the exit agreement.

This means that, on the face of it, there is no way there can be an agreement now to extend the transition period.

The opportunity to extend the agreement would appear to have come and gone.

That said, there may be other ways of an extension – as set out by Georgina Wright and others in this report by the estimable Institute for Government.

And few legal feats are beyond the wits of clever European Union and United Kingdom government lawyers in a crisis.

But such an alternative approach to extension would not be easy nor  can it be instant – it would be an elaborate patch and workaround.

For such an extension to put in place now – ten days before the end of the transition period, with the Christmas holidays and a weekend in the middle – would require extraordinary political goodwill and legal ingenuity.

And all to have the same effect as the opportunity squandered by the government in June 2020.

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The decision to ‘cancel Christmas’ was, as this blog set out yesterday, not one any government would have wanted to make.

The fundamental mistake of this government was not to prepare people for the possibility – indeed probability – of this decision.

Days before the decision was made, the prime minister was loudly deriding the leader of the opposition on this very point.

Just click  below and watch and listen.

(Alongside this banality, the Secretary  of State for Education was also threatening a London council with a high court mandatory injunction so as to keep schools open.)

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Had the prime minister and others been acting responsibly, and in the public interest, and given it appears that the government had known about the new coronavirus variant for some time, there should not have been derision of the opposition for the possibility of ‘cancelling Christmas’.

A prime minister and government acting responsibly, and in the public interest, would have been explaining that the public and businesses had to brace themselves for the possibility – indeed probability – of such restrictions and to prepare accordingly.

But the prime minister went for easy claps and cheers instead.

Again, populism prevailed over prudence.

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Yesterday, this story was published by the government-supporting media.

The ugly truth, however, is that every single significant error in Brexit and with coronavirus has been because of the UK government ‘playing to its domestic audience’.

Every single one.

*****

This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising topical law and policy matters – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

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‘Cancelling Christmas’ days after deriding the possibility shows how the prime minister is caught in the trap of populism

20th December 2020

Just days ago, at the last Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs), this exchange took place.

Click and watch it.

At this point, the prime minister knew that there was a real risk that, to use the phrase, ‘Christmas would have to be cancelled’ – at least for London and the south east.

A responsible prime minister would have used the moment of PMQs – where there is a platform both before elected representatives and before the media and public – to prepare people for this sad possibility.

(Indeed, it may be that on Wednesday he knew that it was far more than a possibility.)

But what did this prime minister do instead?

He derided the leader of the opposition and he dismissed the risk.

We once had a prime minister – who was not without other faults – who candidly warned the public of sweat and tears.

We now have a prime minister who goes for claps and cheers.

Indeed, ‘populism’ can be illustrated, if not defined, by this prime minister sneering that others want to ‘cancel Christmas’ for claps and cheers – days before then having to cancel Christmas.

The constant putting-off of difficult decisions, and the promotion of easy answers.

(On this, this column by Rafael Behr is magnificent.)

Now some government-supporting politicians are spinning that this is a prime minister unafraid of difficult decisions.

This is untrue.

The difficult decision was not the one forced yesterday – there was by then no real choice – but at PMQs, where there was a choice to be made.

Does the prime minister tell members of parliament and the watching media and and public to brace themselves that something bad may happen – and to thereby give everyone time to plan accordingly – or does he go for the glib jibe?

Watch the footage again, and see what he decides to do.

It is difficult – genuinely – to imagine a more incompetent prime minister.

Yes, other government-supporting politicians – from the home secretary to the leader of the house of commons – would be just as dreadful.

But they would only be as bad in different ways.

For as, scientists tell us, one cannot go below absolute zero, one cannot go beneath a level of absolute incompetence.

No prime minister would have relished facing up to ‘cancelling Christmas’ for millions of people.

But our prime minister is caught in the trap of populism.

And politicians that can only play to the crowd invariably end up letting the crowd down.

*****

This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising topical law and policy matters – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

Each post takes time, effort, and opportunity cost.

If you value the free-to-read and independent legal and policy commentary both at this blog and at my Twitter account please do support through the Paypal box above.

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Law is not magic – and lockdown regulations are not spells

19th December 2020

Of  course, law is not magic.

Magic is about old men in elaborate robes, in oddly furnished rooms, saying or setting down words in certain special orders that will then have real-world effects on those to whom those words are addressed.

Ahem.

In fact, law has a lot in common with magic – or, at least, magical thinking – and not only in the facetious characterisation above.

*

If we move from the courtroom to government, and indeed to the public more generally, there is a common view that to make a law against something is to deal  with it.

A thing should be banned, and so just putting some words on a piece of paper – or on a computer screen – and then saying some magic words – either

‘Izzy–wizzy, let’s get busy!

or

‘Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows’

or some other similarly daft formula, the words will leap from the page – or the screen – and will change the world around us.

This is a habit of thought with which we are so familiar that is difficult to dislodge it from our minds.

But just setting out words, and chanting some special phrases, has little direct effect on anything – other than in respect of what meanings, concepts and values we in turn give to those words.

And with prohibitions, more is often needed for a thing to stop than for the words to have been typed ‘this thing is prohibited’.

*

For some people, a prohibition may be enough: they will know that a thing has been banned and will act – or not act – accordingly.

For others, however, the banned thing can just continue – it is just that there is a risk that further instances of the banned thing may now be attended with certain legal consequences and, ultimately, coercive sanctions.

A person faced with such a risk may chose to eliminate the risk and not do the prohibited thing, or they may instead manage or even disregard the risk.

But unless one is in a totalitarian society, the mere threat of a coercive sanction is not enough – most modern societies rely on government by consent, and the state does not have sufficient resources to police everyone completely.

Put simply: laws and sanctions are usually not sufficient to effect behavioural change.

Instead many prohibitions work not because of words on a page, or because of enforcement, but because the purpose of the ban is aligned with social norms and is accepted (broadly) as legitimate – that the ban makes sense and is for a good purpose and so will be respected.

If a prohibition is not accepted as legitimate –  if it does not make sense or seems unfair or disproportionate – then no amount of legal magic or coercive force will give effect to the prohibition.

The prohibition then just breaks down.

*

And now we come to the lockdown regulations.

The belief appears to be that just by making laws against social activity – either during Christmas or otherwise – is by itself sufficient.

That the government should lock down more firmly – and if the government does not do this, then it will be the government to blame if the pandemic spreads.

But typing banny words are not enough, with or without magic phrases, and there is certainly not enough police to enforce such banny words.

A lockdown will only be effective if people actually regulate their social behaviour in reality.

The government could issue regulations until it is blue in its face, but if there is a disconnect with social behaviour, then it is futile.

(And the sensible response to this is unlikely to be ‘more laws!” and ‘harsher penalties!’ – just as it is rarely a solution to bang one’s head harder against the wall.)

*

Law and laws are only one aspect of how those who govern us can influence and control our behaviour, to get us to change from what we would otherwise do.

People have to understand the purpose and point of prohibitions, rather than to just be expected to comply with them when they are imposed.

And for this a government needs to be transparent and credible: there needs to be trust more than law, and policy rather than policing.

There needs to be leadership.

Resources need to be in place for testing, tracing, and treatments.

Fair account needs to be taken of other possible priorities, even if those other priorities are less important.

Prohibitions and coercive sanctions still have a role – but they are not sufficient by themselves.

In essence, a government needs to govern, and not just make laws.

That is what govern – ments do.

There should be no magic to this.

*****

This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising topical law and policy matters – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

Each post takes time, effort, and opportunity cost.

If you value the free-to-read and independent legal and policy commentary both at this blog and at my Twitter account please do support through the Paypal box above.

Or become a Patreon subscriber.

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The coded criticisms of the Attorney-General from both the Lord Chief Justice and the Court of Appeal

17th December 2020

The office of Attorney-General is at the very crossroads of law and politics.

As a lawyer, the Attorney-General is the government’s chief legal adviser and, by convention, is the head of the Bar of England and Wales.

They superintend the Crown Prosecution Service, and they can (and do) initiate contempt of court proceedings against the media.

A further role is that they can act in proceedings where they represent the public interest and/or the government.

They also can decide to refer cases to the court of appeal where it appears a criminal court has been ‘unduly lenient’ in sentencing.

These are all important – crucial -tasks and so it follows that these roles must be taken seriously.

The Attorney-General is, however, also a politician – usually a member of parliament but sometimes a peer – and one who attends the cabinet.

It is a job therefore where the holder has to wear two hats – or horsehair wigs.

And it is not an easy task even for senior politicians and experienced lawyers.

*

The current Attorney-General is neither a senior politician nor an experienced lawyer.

This, of course, is not their fault – although some in this position if they were offered the office would not take it.

The current holder of the office, however, is going out of their way to politicise and thereby to discredit the legal side of the office.

This blog has previously set out how the current Attorney-General should have resigned when they unapologetically tweeted in respect of a case of a political ally who was then subject to a live police investigation.

That really was not what the superintendent of the Crown Prosecution Service should be doing.

*

There is now a further example of how the current Attorney-General is undermining their office.

Here there are three texts that are of interest.

*

First, here is a Daily Express article from 7th November 2020: Attorney General to appear at Andrew Harper’s killers appeal hearing next week.

In the body of that article, under the byline of a political editor, was the following:

‘A friend of Ms Braverman’s told the Sunday Express:

‘“She was met with strong opposition from civil servants to pursue this case but she held firm and has done the right thing.

‘“She made it clear she wants to be there to underline how important this issue is to the ‘government and how seriously it takes this case.

“If the judges uphold the original sentences then she will have still done the right thing and it will be another example of wet, liberal judges being soft on criminals.”’

As is widely known, ‘friend’ is a code in political journalism for either the politician themselves or someone speaking on their behalf, such as a special adviser.

As far as I am aware, this quote has not been disavowed by the Attorney-General.

*

Second, here is a speech on sentencing by the Lord Chief Justice made on 9th December 2020.

Here are two paragraphs from this informative and accessible speech (asterisk and emphasis added):

‘Were the mythical alien to arrive on earth and, I grant you yet more improbably, take an interest in sentencing in England and Wales by reading the newspapers and dipping into the more noisy parts of on-line media, it would soon gain the impression that sentencing had got softer in recent years. It would read about “wet, liberal judges being soft on criminals” (*) and wonder why criminals convicted of serious offences were getting more lenient sentences than they used to. Then our alien visitor might seek some other sources of information, and if possessed of a brow it might become furrowed.

‘There is a difficulty with this narrative. It is a myth.’

The Lord Chief Justice then proceeds in his speech to demonstrate how sentencing has certainly not got softer.

But who was the judge quoting about “wet, liberal judges being soft on criminals” ?

The quotation is footnoted (where I have inserted the asterisk), and the footnote reads:

‘Sunday Express 8 November 2020, quoting a source.’

The Lord Chief Justice is here publicly dismissing – perhaps even deriding – the ‘friend’ of the Attorney-General who in turn is describing the Attorney-General’s motivation for intervening in a criminal sentencing case.

For the head of the judiciary to be doing this openly to the government’s chief legal adviser and holder of the ancient office of Attorney-General is an extraordinary public intervention.

*

And now we turn to the Court of Appeal judgment in respect of the sentencing of those who killed the police constable Andrew Harper.

The facts of the case are horrific.

Three were convicted of manslaughter, though a jury acquitted them of murder.

And so the three were sentences in accordance with the guidelines for manslaughter.

The Attorney-General, as the Daily Express article describes, exercised one of their powers and referred the sentences to the court of appeal on the basis of the sentences being ‘unduly lenient’.

The Attorney-General then – oddly for a barrister with no substantial criminal law background – appeared personally at the hearing.

There are three paragraphs of the judgment of interest in respect of the contribution and role of the Attorney-General.

Paragraph 57:

‘In her initial remarks, the Attorney General rehearsed some of the facts and said that the sentences have caused widespread public concern. She outlined four points, about which Mr Little QC then made submissions.’

Here the court are not even deigning to describe the Attorney-General’s contribution as submissions – a ‘submission’ is something one submits to the court for consideration – but merely as remarks.

(The Supreme Court adopted a similar remarks/submission distinction when a former Attorney-General appeared (out of his depth) at the first Miller case: ‘Following opening remarks made by HM Attorney General, Mr Eadie QC in his submissions on behalf of the Secretary of State, did not challenge much if any of the factual basis of these assertions…’ – paragraph 57 here.)

We now turn to the submission that were made, if not personally by the Attorney-General, but by another barrister on their behalf.

Paragraph 83 (emphasis added):

As to the length of the custodial terms, we note a striking feature of the submissions. When applications are made by the Attorney General for leave to refer to this court sentences which are said to be unduly lenient, it is frequently on the basis that the judge fell into error by failing to follow a relevant guideline. In this case, however, the argument advanced by the Attorney is that the sentence of Long, and therefore the sentences on Bowers and Cole, were unduly lenient because the judge erred in failing to depart from the relevant guideline.

Just as political journalists have their codes, so too do judges.

And to describe as position as ‘striking’ is to say that it is barking – and the rest of the paragraph explains why.

In essence: unduly lenient sentences are those which depart from the guidelines and not those made in accordance with them.

This is then followed by paragraph 84 (again emphasis added):

‘That is, to say the least, an unusual submission. It involves the proposition that in the circumstances of this case, a sentence within the guideline offence range was not within the range properly open to the judge, who was instead required to pass a sentence outside that range. We think it regrettable that, in advancing that submission, the structure and ambit of the guideline were not addressed. Nor was any sufficient explanation given why it is contended that the judge was not merely entitled to depart from the guideline but positively required to do so.’

Here ‘unusual’ means, in effect, beyond barking – and again the rest of the paragraph sets out why.

These are obvious points and would have been plain to government lawyers.

But as ‘friend’ of the Attorney General said, ‘[s]he was met with strong opposition from civil servants to pursue this case’.

And paragraphs 83 and 84 set out why.

*

Taking these three texts together we can see that the judiciary are alert to the motivations of the Attorney-General and are resistant to the attempts to politicise the office, and that the judiciary will be unafraid to reject ‘striking’ and ‘unusual’ submissions made on behalf of the Attorney-General.

The judges are not stupid or unworldly – they know exactly the import of coded criticisms in public speeches and judgments.

The Attorney-General may be sending signals, but so are the judges.

*

But this Attorney-General will not care.

The political job is done – and one can imagine the claps and cheers of the ‘friend’ quoted in the Daily Express article. 

She took on the ‘wet, liberal judges being soft on criminals’.

But this political job has been done at a cost.

Although a politician, the Attorney-General is entrusted with highly important decisions in respect of not only referring ‘unduly lenient’ sentences, but also in respect of many other legal matters, from contempt of court to the operation of the crown prosecution service.

But the conduct of the current Attorney-General is such that their credibility as a decision-maker capable of making such decisions on the appropriate basis is open to doubt.

This quick win for a political ambitious Attorney General is at the cost of the standing of their office.

The Attorney-General is weaponising her legal responsibilities for political purposes.

This is a remarkable, striking and unusual predicament.

And given that the Attorney-General is not only doing this recklessly but with apparent enthusiasm means that there is no reason for anyone watching it happen in real time to be unduly lenient.

*****

This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising a topical law and policy matter – each post is published at about 9.30am UK time.

Each post takes time, effort, and opportunity cost.

If you value the free-to-read and independent legal and policy commentary both at this blog and at my Twitter account please do support through the Paypal box above.

Or become a Patreon subscriber.

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*****

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated.

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