Another Sunday, another threat to trigger Article 16 – a weekend tradition

9 January 2022

Just a brief post today (Sunday) to mark what is now perhaps a weekend tradition.

It is a tradition that started some months ago – some say a year ago – and its performance is passed on from Brexit minister to Brexit minister.

The tradition is, of course, the threat to trigger Article 16.

Few may remember or care what this threat means.

Perhaps, with the passage of time, any real meaning has been lost.

The threat, as before, has been made for domestic consumption, to a government-supporting newspaper whose website is behind a paywall.

One should not doubt that this government is capable one day of triggering Article 16 – after all, it once triggered Article 50 without any clear idea of the practical consequences.

Nobody should be complacent about Article 16 never being triggered, even if the government would not know what then to do.

But.

It is telling that the threats are made domestically, by a politician appealing to their own supporters, at the weekend and behind a paywall.

It is almost as if the purpose of the threat was nothing to do with Brexit at all, and it is instead about the upcoming leadership contest of the governing party.

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The Meghan Markle litigation

8th January 2022

I do not tend to blog and tweet much about the areas of law in which I do most of my professional work as a solicitor: commercial law and media law.

This is for a variety of reasons, including the ability to commentate freely on things where there is no possibility of a conflict of interest.

So that is why I tend to blog and tweet about public law and constitutional matters, where I am less likely to have a conflict of interest.

But from time to time a media law matter comes up which I can commentate on without any concerns for conflicts of interest.

And so this week I was quoted in the Washington Post on the Meghan Markle matter.

The piece is here, and my quote as published was:

 

 

 

My quote as given was:

“The Meghan Markle court victory was not that legally significant. 
“The Mail on Sunday litigated a weak case and they lost it, without even managing to get to trial.  
“The senior editors would have been advised against publication – the Mail on Sunday have very good lawyers – but they chose to publish anyway, knowing the legal risks.
“But the case has immense cultural and media significance. 
“The newspaper chose to fight a weak case, despite the legal problems.  This could only be because they had a non-legal objective. 
“But also important was that Markle decided to press her case, instead of letting it go like other royals would have done. 
“In this way, the case could be a turning point.”

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The Markle judgments can be found here.

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I thought it may be of interest to add a little to my quote on this blog.

High-profile litigation often exists on two levels – how it is played out in the media, and what is actually happening as a matter of hard litigation.

And here, there were may reports in the media that framed Markle in a certain way.

But the Mail on Sunday case was always weak at law – and in the end it was so weak that it did not even get to trial.

Weak cases are rarely fought in civil litigation – the weaker side will usually tend to settle as soon as possible.

And so the interesting question is why it was fought – and in the answer to that question will be the genuine significance of this case.

The case is less significant in its detail than in its very existence.

The case itself has almost no legal significance: the applicable law was so obvious that Markle got summary judgment, despite the array of legal skill and talent employed by the newspaper.

But the cultural and media significance is – perhaps – profound.

Something seems to have changed.

But what?

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The collapse of constitutionalism?

7th January 2022

One of the themes of this blog is that formal codified constitutions are of less practical importance than a sense of constitutionalism.

By constitutionalism, I mean the view that there are certain rules and principles about a polity that have a greater priority than partisan expediency or personal ambition.

The polity of the United Kingdom may not have a codified constitution – but it did have, at least until fairly recently, a sense of constitutionalism.

It was what the great constitutional historian Peter Hennessy has dubbed as the ‘Good Chap theory of government’ – a shared understanding that things would not be pushed too far, and that there were self-denial ordinances for those with certain political powers.

In the United States – where there is a codified constitution – they are suffering from a move away from constitutionalism and a shift towards hyper-partisanship.

An illustration of this is this worrying photograph, from the first anniversary of the attempted insurrection:

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Once constitutionalism fails, then it does not matter what you have written in constitutional codes, your polity is in trouble.

(This is why I sometimes say constitutional law should be boring – for constitutional law provides the shared parameters of everyday political action, and if those parameters are continually contested then your political system is not a happy place.)

The responses of some government supporters to the acquittal of the Colston Four indicate a concerning lack of constitutionalism.

One member of parliament – a member of parliament! – even went as far as saying that ‘if the jury is a barrier to ensuring they are punished then that needs to be addressed.’

Wow.

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As I averred in a couple of pieces yesterday – here and over at Prospect – the true constitutional significance of juries is not so much about the decions that they make – but the decisions that they prevent others from making.

In essence: a jury stops a person from being convicted and punished just on the say-so of the prosecuting state.

A person may be arrested, charged and prosecuted – but if they maintain their innocence, they cannot be convicted and punished for a serious offence without the intervention of a jury.

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Of course, the Conservative member of parliament quoted above was speaking without thinking.

But that is the problem: the lack of thought – and, in particular, the lack of constitutionalism.

That politician was not alone.

A former cabinet minister said much the same.

And even the former lord chancellor Robert Buckland – who refused to resign when others did when the government proposed to use primary legislation to allow it break the law – spoke of his concerns.

This loud frustration of government supporters is, as I averred yesterday, the sweet sound of a working constitution.

But.

Their utterances also bear a more worrying meaning.

For what they are saying also indicates a collapse in constitutionalism.

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We keep drifting towards outright hyper-partisanship – Withnail and I’s arena of the unwell.

The current government routinely seeks to frustrate or remove any check or balance to its executive might, to the partisan claps and cheers of those who should but do not know better.

Some may giggle and chortle at ‘owning the libs’ .

But, in reality, there is no ownership: no sense of responsibility or care for what is possessed and can be passed on.

And so the most urgent constitutional challenge for the United Kingdom is not about codification but about culture.

How can we make politicians (and the media) care about constitutionalism again?

Or has it been lost altogether?

Perhaps it has.

Brace brace.

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The Rule of Law and the Colston Four – and why a jury acquittal shows a legal system working and not being undermined

 

The Colston Four defendants have been acquitted by a jury.

Some are contending, like this former cabinet minister, that this acquittal ‘undermines the rule of law’.

That contention is incorrect.

An acquittal is as much an aspect of the rule of law as a conviction.

Criminal courts can acquit as well as convict – both can be the outcomes of the application of due process in a particular case.

The Colston Four were acquitted by a jury – and the defendants did not deny the essential facts.

It can be open to a jury to do this – and this informative Guardian article sets out many other examples.

A jury returning a verdict that they are entitled to return is an example of the law in action, and not of a legal process undermined.

This is not to say that juries are perfect – indeed, many of the greatest miscarriages of justice have come from jury verdicts.

Juries do not always get things right.

But the constitutional importance of juries is not so much for the decisions they make, but for the decisions they take away from others.

The State may arrest, charge and prosecute a person – but they cannot convict and punish a defendant pleading ‘not guilty’ to a serious offence without a jury trial.

The implication of the former cabinet minister’s view quoted above is that it should not be open to a jury to acquit a person prosecuted for a serious offence – but only to convict and punish.

But that is not the ‘rule of law’ – it is something darker and nastier instead.

Others are fretting that the verdict creates a ‘precedent’.

It, of course, does not create any legal precedent – no jury can bind another jury, and each jury should look at the case before them on its own evidence.

Nor does it create any practical precedent – or, at least, not one which has any more force than the many previous examples set out in the Guardian article.

The real upset is that a court heard the evidence and acquitted the defendants.

This is what juries sometimes do – and they can do this because they are outwith the control of the prosecuting State.

One half-expects that this weekend’s press will see ‘government sources’ urging ‘a crackdown’ on ‘perverse’ acquittals – with a proposal for ministers to have a ‘fast track’ on imposing convictions.

And this is not to put an idea into the heads of government ministers – the idea is no doubt already there.

One irony – if that is the correct word – is that this very government sought to use primary legislation to enable ministers to break the law.

That proposal – over which the Advocate General and the Treasury Solicitor resigned (and the recently knighted former Lord Chancellor did not) – did more to undermine the rule of law than any verdict of a Bristol jury.

And the current hyper-partisanship of modern politics means that if, say, a group of fox hunters were acquitted by some shire county jury, the same people who are jeering the Bristol jury would be cheering the shire county jury instead.

But juries are juries – they make mistakes, but they are independent of State prosecutors.

And the noise of government supporters unhappy with a jury decision is the sweet sound of a working constitution.

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A legal look at the Giuffre settlement agreement on which Prince Andrew is seeking to rely

5th January 2022

A happy new year to all the readers of this law and policy blog, and welcome back.

Today’s post is about civil law – that is the law which (broadly) deals with the legal obligations we owe to each other, as opposed to criminal law which (broadly) deals with the obligations we have to the state.

In essence: in civil law you can sue or be sued, and in criminal law you can be prosecuted or not prosecuted.

Civil law – especially contract law – is fascinating, and this post takes a topical legal agreement as the basis for explaining about civil law generally and contract law in particular.

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The topical legal agreement is the recently disclosed settlement agreement between Virginia Giuffre and the now dead Jeffrey Epstein, on which (Prince) Andrew is currently seeking to rely in American litigation.

I have chosen this as a topic because it is rare for the substance of any legal agreement to be newsworthy – and legal commentators have to take our examples as we find them.

I have no view on the underlying litigation as I do not know the facts – and I have no particular view on Andrew other than a general preference for republican government and a disdain for inherited titles.

My sole purpose in this post is to use a topical legal agreement for promoting the public understanding of law.

(By way of background, I am not an American lawyer, but an English lawyer with experience of contracts and civil litigation who has spent part of their career dealing with American contracts and civil litigation, and this post draws on principles I believe are common to English and American contract law.)

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Let’s start by looking at the agreement – click and open tab here.

It is, in essence, a seven-page agreement – and so pages 2 to 8 of the pdf are the ones to focus on.

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A preliminary question is how seriously we should take the agreement as something agreed to by both Epstein and Giuffre – was it a one-sided imposition, or something freely negotiated with both sides getting legal advice?

Clause 9(c) tells us ‘This Settlement Agreement was negotiated and entered into by the Parties with the advice and assistance of respective counsel.’

This means that it is not, say, a standard form contract – but one which has been negotiated by lawyers with each party having legal advice (and the lawyers are even listed at the end of the document).

This in turn means a court will take seriously what was agreed, and it will seek to give effect to what was agreed between the legally advised parties.

This is reinforced by clause 9(a), which provides that the parties ‘confirm and acknowledge that this Settlement Agreement is being entered into without any duress or undue influence, and that they have had a full and complete opportunity to discuss the terms of the Settlement Agreement with their own attorneys.’

Of course, such a provision can – in principle – be disapplied if it is factually untrue and there was actual duress.

On the face of it, this was not an agreement imposed by one party on the other, but one which was negotiated by both parties with the benefit of legal advice.

So, again on the face of it, this is an agreement by which both Epstein and Giuffre intended to be bound.

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With that preliminary question addressed, we come to the first big question.

What was the purpose of the agreement?

This is what can be called a question of construction – putting together the agreement as a whole so that we can then, as the next stage, interpret any constituent part.

With any legal instrument, and especially contracts, construction precedes interpretation.

Here there is a clue to the purpose in the title: Settlement Agreement and General Release.

This title indicates the agreement is doing two things – and you will see that these two things are, in turn, set out respectively in clauses 1 and 2.

But before we get to clauses 1 and 2 we can also see, almost as a recital, that the parties Giuffre and Epstein both entered the agreement so as to ‘resolve the pending litigation’ between them.

This litigation is then set out in clause 1: the parties agree to dismiss a civil claim brought by Giuffre against Epstein in the Florida courts.

But clause 1 only covers part of what was agreed.

For clause 2 then sets out the General Release.

This further provision sets out a more general release than ending one particular case.

Here Giuffre accepts a substantial sum (US$500,000) – as opposed to say a nominal sum – in return for the release.

In respect of Epstein the release provides that Giuffre shall ‘remise, release, acquit, satisfy, and forever discharge [Epstein][…] from all, and all manner of, action and actions of [Guiffre] , including State or Federal, cause and causes of action (common law or statutory), suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, specialties, covenants, contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, variances, trespasses, damages, judgments, executions, claims, and demands whatsoever in law or in equity for compensatory or punitive damages that [Giuffre] ever had or now have, or that any personal representative, successor, heir, or assign of [Giuffre] hereafter can, shall, or may have, against Jeffrey Epstein […] for, upon, or by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever (whether known or unknown), from the beginning of the world to the day of this release.’

This is a comprehensive list of things for which Giuffre agrees she cannot now sue Epstein.

Epstein was not only released from the current case but other cases, State and Federal.

If Giuffre was ever to litigate against Epstein again, then Epstein’s lawyers would have sought to rely on this release and have the case thrown out.

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But.

The release is not just in respect of Epstein, but also for other persons.

I will now quote the provision again but with what I had omitted now in bold:

Giuffre shall ‘remise, release, acquit, satisfy, and forever discharge [Epstein] and any other person or entity who could have been included as a potential defendant (“Other Potential Defendants”) from all, and all manner of, action and actions of [Guiffre] , including State or Federal, cause and causes of action (common law or statutory), suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, specialties, covenants, contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, variances, trespasses, damages, judgments, executions, claims, and demands whatsoever in law or in equity for compensatory or punitive damages that [Giuffre] ever had or now have, or that any personal representative, successor, heir, or assign of [Giuffre] hereafter can, shall, or may have, against Jeffrey Epstein, or Other Potential Defendants for, upon, or by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever (whether known or unknown), from the beginning of the world to the day of this release.’

These provisions in bold purport to extend the General Release granted to Epstein to other persons or entities – to give them exactly the same protection from further state and federal lawsuits as Epstein.

The term in bold, however, is not clearly drafted.

One reading is that the Other Potential Defendants are those who, on the facts alleged in the Florida litigation, could have been added as defendants to that litigation.

This would perhaps make sense as a matter of construction, as this agreement settles the case in respect of civil wrongs – torts – alleged to have happened in respect of which the Florida court had or has jurisdiction.

This reading is reinforced by the provision in clause 1 that the Court will be asked to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this settlement agreement.

Clause 7 expressly provides that the parties envisaged this matter also capable of being litigated in federal courts (bold added):

In the event of litigation arising out of a dispute over the interpretation of this Settlement Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its cost of litigation, including attorneys’ fees and other reasonable costs of litigation. Should the federal court not retain jurisdiction, the Parties (and any third party) agree that the courts of the 15™ Judicial Circuit of Palm Beach County shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter and shall have personal jurisdiction over the Parties (and third parties).’

What the agreement does not seem to envisage, however, is the matter being litigated in another state, other than Florida.

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In my view, the General Release probably should be constructed as providing protection to Other Potential Defendants in respect of the issues raised in the Florida proceedings.

(This narrow construction would be notwithstanding the General Release is in more general terms than the dismissal in clause 1.)

So, if Andrew – by reasons of residence/jurisdiction, or the facts alleged by Giuffre in the Florida case – was not capable of being a defendant to the Florida proceedings then – as a matter of construction – then it is difficult for me to see how he can take the benefit of the General Release.

The agreement would not have been for him.

In essence: if Andrew could not have been jointly or separately liable for the tort claim within the Florida jurisdiction then the General Release may not apply.

That said: a judge could take a wider view of what the General Release covers, and that it covers not just the Florida allegations.

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There is, however, a possible problem here for Giuffre’s lawyers – for the term Other Potential Defendants must mean something.

The term Other Potential Defendants cannot mean nothing – for this is a negotiated and formal agreement, and the presumption is against surplusage.

If Giuffre’s lawyers contend that the General Release does not extend to Andrew, they must be able to explain who actually was to be covered by by the term Other Potential Defendants.

What Giuffre’s lawyers need to be able to do is to show who would be in the class of Other Potential Defendants – if not Andrew.

And if they can give a plausible meaning to that phrase without it including Andrew then they will address this problem.

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Now we turn to interpretation, as opposed to construction.

Some commentators, with little or no background in contract law, have gone straight to the term Other Potential Defendants and speculated what that phrase could mean.

But a clause is not a legal instrument, and still less a selected quote from a clause.

Yes, Andrew – like you reading this – is a potential defendant: indeed everyone other than Giuffre is.

But a settlement and a General Release in respect of a Florida case is unlikely to create a legal basis of releasing all potential defendants everywhere in the world in respect of any claim brought by Giuffre about anything – not least because the Florida court would not have jurisdiction to enforce such a general release.

In whatever way Other Potential Defendants is to be interpreted as including and not including, it is not an exercise in anything goes.

Other Potential Defendants cannot be interpreted as including Andrew if, as a matter of construction, the agreement would not apply to him.

On the other hand, if Andrew could plausibly have been added as a defendant to the original Florida case, then the phrase can be interpreted so as to include him.

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But.

Even if the agreement can be constructed so as to cover Andrew and the phrase Other Potential Defendant interpreted as including him, there are two further problems for his lawyers.

The first is that, whatever is said on the face of the agreement, there can be rules of law and public policy that may preclude reliance on such an agreement by a defendant in another case in another state.

The essence of Andrew’s objection is that Giuffre should not be allowed to sue him for alleged civil wrongs – that she should not even have access to a court for a determination of her case.

No court will simply nod-along with such a contention – it is a serious matter to remove a person’s right of access to a court.

And so even if Andrew can be brought within the terms of the General Release, a judge may find as a matter of policy that the claim brought by Giuffre should be heard anyway.

A court, of course, would not be likely to do this if the claim was brought against Epstein (or his estate), as he was full square within the terms of the General Release.

But Andrew is at least one step away.

The second further problem is that, even if the agreement can be constructed as to cover Andrew and the phrase Other Potential Defendant interpreted as including him, it may not be legally open to Andrew directly to enforce the provision.

Andrew was not privy – that is, a party – to the original agreement (and, indeed, he is not even named).

This legal principle of privity of contract prevents a stranger to a contract either taking the benefit or bearing the burden of an agreement to which they are not a party.

In essence: it would have been for Epstein (or his estate?) to enforce the term protecting Other Potential Defendants, and not Andrew or another potential defendant directly.

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For completeness, you will see the agreement also provides the following:

‘It is further agreed that this Settlement Agreement represents a final resolution of a disputed claim and is intended to avoid litigation. This Settlement Agreement shall not be construed to be an admission of liability or fault by any party. Additionally, as a material consideration in settling, First Parties and Second Parties agree that the terms of this Settlement Agreement are not intended to be used by any other person nor be admissible in any proceeding or case against or involving Jeffrey Epstein, either civil or criminal.’

Some commentators have leapt on this provision, but I do not think it takes us in any direction very far (though the judge may disagree).

It is not Giuffre who is seeking to rely on the settlement agreement – but a third party.

And the terms are not being relied on by Andrew as admissible evidence of liability or otherwise, but on a question of law in respect of jurisdiction.

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As I aver above, I am not an American lawyer, but an English lawyer with experience of contracts and civil litigation who has spent part of their career dealing with American contracts and civil litigation.

But even if this agreement were under English law, I could not confidently predict what a judge would do.

This is because the agreement – while clear in its primary aim of protecting Epstein from further suit – is not clear about third parties, and this is no doubt because that the position of third parties was not the main purpose of the agreement.

The agreement has been taken from its primary context of protecting Epstein and into a context which the parties perhaps did not envisage.

And so it is not a surprise that the agreement is less clear in this context.

Had the lawyers for the parties in this agreement expected this contract to be used by third parties, then the provisions in respect of third parties would be set out more clearly – but they did not, and so they are not.

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We are currently awaiting the judge’s decision on whether Andrew can rely on this agreement.

In my view, Andrew’s lawyers have the far harder task.

They have to show that, as a matter of construction and interpretation, the General Release covers him when he is not named and is not a party to the agreement; that no rule of law and policy means he loses that protection; and that he can enforce the protection regardless of the lack of privity.

All this, so as to extinguish Giuffre’s right of access to the court, which no court will do lightly in any case.

Giuffre, in turn, only has to succeed on one of these points – though her lawyers will need to explain what Other Potential Defendants means if not the likes of Andrew.

And even if Andrew succeeds on this technical defense, Giuffre may still win on appeal.

In summary and in conclusion: Andrew’s lawyers should be prepared to defend the substantial claim, rather than to rely on this technical defense.

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Christmas break

23rd December 2021

This blog is going to have a few days off over Christmas.

There has been a post every day now for well over a year, and a break would be nice.

Thank you for putting up with my drivel.

Thank you especially to those who leave such high quality, non-irksome comments.

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Why blog about law and policy?

22nd December 2021

This is just a brief post today about the difference between law and policy, and the relationship between the two.

First: the two are different.

Law is (ultimately) about what one can enforce or have recognised by a court.

Policy is about achieving certain outcomes that will not be (or may not be) achieved but for such policy.

Laws are often part of a policy – along with resources, prioritisation, organisation, communication and leadership.

And policy is also sometimes part of law: a court may, as a matter of ‘public policy’ avoid certain outcomes, such as preventing open justice or access to the courts.

You will see the law/policy balance in many areas, if you look carefully.

The difference between guidance and prohibitions in public health (and the blurring of the line).

Or the extent to which post-Brexit policy (or lack of policy) depends on changes to what was agreed in the withdrawal treaty and the Northern Irish protocol.

Or the current small-c approach of the Supreme Court to (supposed) judicial activism.

Or how supporters and opponents of abortion in the United States are going about legislating and litigating in ever-more ingenious ways.

For me this relationship between law and shaping policy, and between policy and shaping law, is fascinating.

Black letter law is dull – it is akin to reading sheet music and attempting to create the tune in your head.

Law, like music, comes alive in its performance.

And other than very technical areas of the law, law is about changing (or not changing) the world about us, so that certain outcomes happen instead of others.

So this is why I commentate about law and policy – it is a way of practically understanding what is (and what is not) going on.

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Brexit policy is, after five years, with the Foreign Office – and this is good

Winter Solstice, 2021

One of the daft things about Brexit – and there have been many – is that the Foreign Office was not made responsible for Brexit policy after the referendum.

This was because, in part, the Foreign Office was distrusted by Brexiters.

Instead we had, first, a pop-up department with no centre of gravity in Whitehall – DExEU, if you remember it – and then we had David Frost as a floating minister-negotiator without much civil service support.

All this was misconceived.

It meant that, for example, the network of diplomats in member states were at least one step way from those conducting negotiations, and the United Kingdom negotiators often seemed unaware of what was behind the European Union negotiation mandate.

It also meant that – with trade or with Northern Ireland – there was little regard for the international context of the negotiations.

And it meant the talent and experience pool for the negotiators was far more shallow than it needed to be.

Regardless of one’s views as to the merits and party political political significance of Foreign Secretary Elizabeth Truss now being responsible for the negotiations, it is a Good Thing that the Foreign Office is now responsible for post-Brexit policy.

It is, in a way, an administrative counterpart to the Liberal Democrat victory in North Shropshire, where voters in a heavily Leave constituency were not deterred from voting for a pro-EU party – another example that the spell of Brexit hyper-partisanship is beginning to fade.

A Leave constituency can now be safe with a pro–EU party, and post-Brexit policy can now be safe with the Foreign Office.

That said, there is still the gap as set out in a previous post on this blog: the absence of an actual post-Brexit policy.

But we are more likely to get one with the Foreign Office being responsible for post-Brexit policy than we would do with a flimsy (and virtual) government department or a shouty minister-negotiator with no department.

At some point, there will be a realisation that a close and sustainable association agreement, with joint institutions, needs to be put in place between the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Our current post-Brexit policy should be thinking and working backwards from this objective, ensuring that when we get to that (more) stable state the United Kingdom is in the best possible position.

Brexiters need to stop being defensive: they have got their Brexit, and the United Kingdom is not a member state of the European Union – no rearguard is necessary.

Remainers and rejoiners, in turn, need to accept that the United Kingdom will not be joining the European Union for at least a generation.

We should not continue with the heightened politics of 2016 – with Brexiters, remainers and rejoiners all re-fighting referendum issues like a historical battle re-enactment society.

Maybe Truss is not (yet) the right politician to move Brexit policy to the next stage.

But the Foreign Office is the right department.

And so it is a welcome move.

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The myth of “Not Now” – why a crisis is a good time to change Prime Minister

20th December 2021

One of the defences used to defend against getting rid of the current Prime Minister is that it should not be done in the midst of a crisis.

This view is misconceived.

In 1916, in midst of the Great War, Asquith was replaced with Lloyd George.

In 1940, when things seemed at their worst, Chamberlain was replaced by Churchill.

In both cases, of course, this was because there was an alternative candidate who had the support of opposition members of parliament.

But it has also happened in other situations.

In 1990, during the build up to the Gulf war, Thatcher was replaced by Major – and by the governing party’s own members of parliament, not the opposition.

And indeed, it need not only be an intra-parliamentary affair.

In 1945, when there was no reason to believe the war with Japan would soon end, the British electorate replaced Churchill with Attlee.

And if you go further back, there are many half-forgotten prime ministers who were replaced at times of uncertainty or peril.

So, in historical context, the unusual thing is to retain a prime minister in a crisis rather than not to do so.

This is one of the features – some would say merits – of the flexible nature of the constitution of the United Kingdom (and of Great Britain before 1801).

A Prime Minister can be dumped quickly.

Of course: things are different now.

Any new leader of a political party has to go through a process of being elected (or, if unopposed, approved) by party members.

And there is no real prospect – as with Lloyd George or Churchill – of a politician currently becoming Prime Minister without also being the leader of their party.

So the reason why we cannot just get rid of the current Prime Minister, notwithstanding his inability to do the job, has more to do with the mechanics of party organisation (and, no doubt the leadership ambitions of others) than constitutional practice or historical precedent.

And that is a pity – as both constitutional practice and historical precedent point to a period of uncertainty or of peril as being the best time to get rid of a Prime Minister who is not up to the job.

Indeed, the singular lack of credibility of the current prime Minister in respect of public health and abiding by the rules means that it is imperative that he is replaced with someone who can be taken seriously in imposing public health restrictions.

Instead of ‘not now’ it should be ‘now, of course, now – for when else?’.

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What follows the resignation of David Frost?

19th December 2021

Today is a Sunday, and on many previous Sundays this blog has covered claims in the weekend press about what Brexit minister David Frost intended to do with Article 16 of the Northern Irish Protocol.

But this Sunday is about what the Northern Irish Protocol has done to David Frost.

And in essence – the Protocol is still there, and David Frost is not.

So what happens now?

Some are discussing who Frost’s replacement would be.

But this does not really matter.

For until and unless the United Kingdom thinks through what it wants from its post-Brexit policy, the problems associated with the Frost tenure will still be there.

And the question of who should succeed Frost is less important than the question of whether there even needs to be a Brexit ministerial job.

By which I mean that the (apparent) job of Frost was to force the European Union into renegotiating the Protocol, and that attempt has failed – and it will keep on failing.

Instead, we need to have a period focused on implementation and ongoing review of the Protocol, rather than weekly confrontational drama.

This is a task that could be done by a senior diplomat or official, reporting to the Cabinet – rather than a mid-ranking non-cabinet minister.

But whoever is appointed (if anybody), there still needs to be something that the United Kingdom wants to achieve that is realistic: a post-Brexit policy.

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At the moment we do not have any post-Brexit policy.

We instead have slogans and impossible demands.

We have no balanced and considered approach, reconciling the conflicting political and economic elements of Brexit.

We have no achievable vision of what the United Kingdom wants in the years (and decades) to come following Brexit.

And without a vision and without a policy, any Brexit minister will be without a clue what to do.

We will not have a worthwhile post-Brexit policy while Boris Johnson stays as Prime Minister.

He may go soon, or he may hang on.

But we will have to wait until he is no longer prime Minister before we can develop a serious strategy for our relationship with the European Union.

Until then we will just have the soundbitten, flimsy understanding of the easily bored.

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And so, like a succession of Russian dolls, each problem fits inside another.

The successor to Frost does not matter because of the larger problem of what is the point of a Brexit minister – and that problem is within the larger problem of there not being a post-Brexit policy.

One day, after the current Prime Minister is no longer in office, there will be politicians who will have the vision and drive to put in place a sustainable association agreement with the European Union.

And that day will come – as the present chaos and incompetence cannot (or should not) continue forever.

The only worry is how long it will take for us to get there.

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Please help this daily law and policy blog survive.

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This law and policy blog provides a daily post commenting on and contextualising topical law and policy matters.

If you value this free-to-read and independent legal and policy commentary – both for the you and for the benefit of others – please do support through the Paypal box above, or become a Patreon subscriber.

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Comments Policy

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated.