Why the advice of the Metropolitan Police that those concerned by wrongful arrest ‘wave down a bus’ is besides the point

1st October 2021

The metropolitan police have published statement in response to the public concern about the case of Sarah Everard, who was murdered by a police officer using his police powers.

The statement is here.

In the final part of the statement there are suggestions about what to do if you are arrested by a lone plain clothes officer, and it concludes with this advice:

‘If after all of that you feel in real and imminent danger and you do not believe the officer is who they say they are, for whatever reason, then I would say you must seek assistance – shouting out to a passer-by, running into a house, knocking on a door, waving a bus down or if you are in the position to do so calling 999.’

Waving down a bus.

Just think about this.

As the estimable Hannah Rose Woods avers:

Imagine the scenes of a person challenging what may be a lawful arrest by stopping a bus and getting the bus driver involved.

It would probably end up with the hapless bus driver being arrested as well.

One gets the sense that the writer of this police statement had, by the end of it, ran out of ideas and was winging it like an unprepared student in the last half-hour of an examination.

But even the other advice in the statement is unrealistic and misconceived.

Anyone challenging arrest can say hello to the offence of resisting or wilfully obstructing a constable in the execution of their duty.

They may also say hello to Mr Taser.

*

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1443889485234704401

*

Telling you how to vet whether someone stopping you in the street is actually a plain clothes police officer is rather besides the point, when it is the actual police officers that are the problem.

For this is the problem with the Everard case.

The murderer was a police officer, using police procedure.

The problem is not about public confidence about whether these people are police officers or not.

The problem is that they are police officers.

Here consider these two tweets from the writer Eleanor Penny:

https://twitter.com/eleanorkpenny/status/1443499311636025346

https://twitter.com/eleanorkpenny/status/1443502729645764609

She is absolutely right.

The problem is not that this murder was a ‘wrong un’ – a bad apple, and so on.

A problem is the immunity and impunity with which police officers routinely and casually use their coercive powers.

They know they can use their coercive powers at will, with no real accountability.

The powers of stop and of arrest are so general, and the thresholds they have to meet (or say they meet) are so low, that they can freely inflict what would otherwise would be an assault as they wish.

And even if, in a particular instance, an officer exceeds their authority, there is no real consequence for the officer: a civil action may be brought against the police force, or a complaint may be made, but the officer will continue in their job unaffected.

When you come to believe that a warrant card is a casual device, then – at the extreme – you have the situation in the Sarah Everard case.

An extreme on a scale, and not something isolated.

*

Yesterday this blog set out why the whole-life sentence for the murderer of Sarah Everard was spot-on.

Because the offence was committed by means of the use of police power, then it was so exceptionally serious as to warrant an exceptional sentence.

But.

The misuse and abuse of police powers are relevant in many other situations, and the law – and judges – should similarly be alert to their presence, and not just in the extreme cases.

And it should not be for those facing arrest to vet the credentials of an arresting officer.

Still less wave down a bus driver to get them involved and possibly also arrested.

The problem is about how police officers are, in effect, unchecked and (to use a phrase) a law to themselves, with no real accountability.

And this should not be made the responsibility of the arrestee or potential victim.

That bus has passed.

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Why the whole-life sentence for the murderer of Sarah Everard is correct

30th September 2021

Earlier today the murderer of Sarah Everard received a whole-life sentence.

Such a sentence is exceptional – the relevant statutory provision sets out five express instances where this sentence can be imposed:

‘(a) the murder of two or more persons, where each murder involves any of the following— (i)a substantial degree of premeditation or planning, (ii)the abduction of the victim, or (iii)sexual or sadistic conduct,

(b) the murder of a child if involving the abduction of the child or sexual or sadistic motivation,

(c) the murder of a police officer or prison officer in the course of his or her duty, where the offence was committed on or after 13 April 2015,

(d) a murder done for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause, or

(e) a murder by an offender previously convicted of murder.’

But if you read the provision carefully, you will see that these five categories are not a closed list, but are instead examples of offences where the ‘the seriousness of the offence…is exceptionally high’.

The use of the word ‘include’ in paragraph 2(2) of that provision tells us the list is (as lawyers say) non-exhaustive.

In other words: other offences can warrant a whole-life sentence if ‘the seriousness of the offence…is exceptionally high’ – and what constitutes exceptionally high seriousness can be reckoned by comparison with the five express categories.

*

The murderer of Sarah Everard – and, no, I am not typing out his name – does not on the face of it fall within the five express categories.

There was not more than one victim (so not (a)), who was not a child (so not (b)) nor a police officer (so not (c)), the murder was not done for any of the specified causes (so not (d)), and the murderer has no previous conviction for murder (so not (e)).

But these are only five illustrations of where ‘the seriousness of the offence…is exceptionally high’.

That said: it would not be enough for a judge to merely assert that an offence had sufficiently high seriousness so a whole-life sentence can be imposed.

Such a sentence would be open to being successfully appealed.

And so the task of a judge imposing a whole-life sentence when the circumstances are not one of the five categories is a difficult one.

*

In the case of the murderer of Sarah Everard it seemed to me before sentencing that there was a real possibility that the judge would find a away to impose a whole-life sentence in this case.

This was because at the sentencing hearing the prosecution set out that it seemed that the offence was committed by a police officer using police powers.

And just as the law on whole life sentences recognises the special nature of police powers at (c) – ‘the murder of a police officer or prison officer in the course of his or her duty’ – it seemed to me that a murder committed by a police officer by means of the use of their police powers was comparable.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1443502936336785408

But – as Joshua Rozenberg this morning averred at his blog – it was not inevitable that the judge would find a basis to find an exception in this case – even though on the basis of the (uncontested) evidence set out in court a whole-life sentence seemed appropriate.

*

The judge – Lord Justice Fulford – did set out a basis for a whole-life sentence in this basis, and this is contained in paragraph 19 of the sentencing remarks (which should be read in full).

Here I set out paragraph 19 and I insert my comments in brackets:

‘The most important question in this sentencing exercise, therefore, revolves around a question of principle: if a police officer uses his office to kidnap, rape and murder a victim, is the seriousness of the offence exceptionally high, such that it ought to be treated in the same way as the other examples set out in paragraph 2(2).

[Here the judge emphasises the fact that the murderer had used his police powers.]

‘In my judgment the police are in a unique position, which is essentially different from any other public servants. They have powers of coercion and control that are in an exceptional category. In this country it is expected that the police will act in the public interest; indeed, the authority of the police is to a truly significant extent dependent on the public’s consent, and the power of officers to detain, arrest and otherwise control important aspects of our lives is only effective because of the critical trust that we repose in the constabulary, that they will act lawfully and in the best interests of society. If that is undermined, one of the enduring safeguards of law and order in this country is inevitably jeopardised.

[The special position of police in our society is emphasised.]

‘In my judgment, the misuse of a police officer’s role such as occurred in this case in order to kidnap, rape and murder a lone victim is of equal seriousness as a murder carried out for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

[Here the judge takes (d) as the comparator of the specified categories, and not as I suggested (c) – and you will see why next.  And note: it is not enough for the judge to assert that it was equally serious, and so he has to reason it out.]

‘All of these situations attack different aspects of the fundamental underpinnings of our democratic way of life. It is this vital factor which in my view makes the seriousness of this case exceptionally high.

[The judge argues that the values behind (d) are applicable in this case, as the manner of the murder undermines the rule of law – and now, having made that argument, he ties it to the facts of the case.]

‘Self-evidently, it would need for the police officer to have used his role as a constable in a critical way to facilitate the commission of the offence; if his professional occupation was of little or no relevance to the offending, then these considerations clearly would not apply.’

[Here he is careful to distinguish this case from situations when a murderer happened to be a police officer – for what makes this case exceptional is that the police powers were used in such a way that undermined the rule of law.]

*

This sentence may be appealed – and as it rests on an exception rather than an express category, it is possible that the court of appeal may substitute a lesser life sentence.

But.

Lord Justice Fulford is a senior and experienced criminal judge – and indeed it is rare for a Lord Justice to preside at any trial – and the reasoning in paragraph 19 is (in my view) compelling.

It is difficult to imagine better reasoning for a case to warrant a whole-life sentencing outside of the five express categories.

(And, in any case, an appeal may well be moot in this case, as the new sentence is likely to still mean the murderer is never released.)

*

Of course: there is a certain arbitrariness in whether a murder gets a whole-life sentence or not.

Had the facts been that Everard had got into that car for any other reason than by use of police powers, the ordeal would have been just as terrifying, but it would not have ended with a whole-life sentence for the murderer.

Or had the murderer only been pretending to be police officer, and so was not actually using police powers, it may also not have ended with a whole-life sentence for the murderer.

Victims of other murderers will suffer as much if not worse than murderers caught by the whole-life categories, but their murders will get shorter sentences.

And, of course, the victims of other murderers are not any less dead.

There is something to be said for the whole-life tariff being the starting point for murder, only to be reduced with mitigation.

(Though many other liberals will disagree, but there is nothing in my view inherently wrong with life-meaning-life for murder, notwithstanding the view of the European Court of Human Rights.)

But.

If there are to be whole-life sentences only for a minority of murder cases, then it must be right that murderers who use the coercive powers conferred by the state to commit those murders are treated as if they are attacking society itself.

And this is why the sentencing remarks of Lord Justice Fulford setting out how this offence warrants a whole-life sentence are (in my view) spot-on and we should hope this sentence survives any appeal.

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What ‘pro bono’ means, what ‘pro bono’ does not mean, and what ‘pro bono’ will not solve

29th September 2021

One of the joys of being a lawyer is that you will often be asked to do stuff for free.

The request may be from a friend or relative, or from friends of friends, or from acquaintances, or from people who only know that you are a lawyer.

Often these requests will be framed as asking you to do it ‘pro bono’ – which many seem to think is a synonym for ‘for free’.

And they will ask you to do stuff for free when they would never dream of asking, say, a plumber for something for nothing.

*

The phrase ‘pro bono’ comes from the Latin phrase ‘pro bono publico’ – which means not for free but for the public good.

And so when a lawyer – or anyone else – does a thing pro bono publico they would (or should) be doing it for the benefit of the public.

So when a person asks you to work ‘pro bono’ for the benefit of, say, their commercial company or for the value of their house, it may be that they want you to work for free when they could pay you as well as they would pay a plumber, but it is not easy to square that private benefit with ‘pro bono publico’.

*

What is, of course, ‘pro bono publico’ is the provision of legal services to those who cannot otherwise afford them.

That is because there is a public good in those who would not have access to legal advice being properly advised in dealing with the law – especially in potentially life-changing situations involving the criminal law, immigration, housing or employment.

But this is because such people getting this legal assistance is the public good – not that it is being given for free.

And so a properly resourced system of legal aid is also for the good of the public: ‘pro bono publico’.

Many lawyers choose to do work (sometimes a lot of work) for free – and those who do so are quiet saviours who often make real differences to people facing life-changing situations.

But it is not a sustainable way to provide legal services to the most vulnerable in society.

And any sensible reform of legal services should not rely on lawyers providing professional services for free, and especially not outside their areas of expertise and experience.

*

Yesterday the Labour politician and justice spokesperson David Lammy said the following in a conference speech:

‘City law firms are making billions in profit while low-paid workers see their tax bill rise and wages fall.

‘Labour recognises the importance of the private sector working in partnership with the public sector.

‘That’s why today we are announcing that a Labour government would support the introduction of a new national pro bono service.

‘With binding pro bono targets to support those who can’t afford legal advice and are ineligible for legal aid.’

*

Although like others, I have a lot of time for Lammy, I do not think this proposal is a sound one.

The city firms making these billions in profit should either be taxed more or pay a compulsory legal services levy so as to ensure that there are paying towards a properly resourced legal advice service.

And instead of having (no doubt well-meaning) City solicitors giving (say) social security law advice (or on anything else outside their usual practice areas) there could be experienced practitioners able to give speedy practical advice to those in need.

(I spent years as a trainee and junior City solicitor helping at free legal advice centres, and with the best will no City lawyer can match an experienced lawyer specialising in the relevant areas of law.)

This policy proposal is misconceived.

City law firms – and also commercial and corporate barristers – can and should be helping support areas of legal practice where there is less funding available.

But getting those lawyers to advise on things for free about which they have no particular knowledge or experience is not the best way of helping those who need help.

There should be instead legal advice centres in every community with the resources in place for lawyers who actually know what they are advising on to help those who are unable to get legal advice elsewhere.

That would not be for free – for they would need government funding – but it would be for the public good.

That is: ‘pro bono publico’.

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‘Regardless of Brexit’ – why bad policy-making is a more serious problem than Brexit

28th September 2021

Over at the Financial Times today there is an outstanding piece of journalism (again) by Sarah O’Connor.

In this article she explains why temporary/emergency migration schemes can be misconceived:

‘But it’s not always that simple. It is common for migrant workers to borrow money to pay for visas, transport and recruitment fees, which makes them vulnerable to exploitation. In addition, unlike under the EU’s free movement of labour, they are usually tied to a specific employer or recruiter which makes it hard for them to leave if they are treated poorly. As a result, the schemes can exacerbate poor pay and conditions in some sectors and calcify employers’ dependence on migrants.

‘One study by the US Economic Policy Institute concluded: “We cannot point to one historical example in which a temporary labour shortage has been remedied with a temporary labour migration programme, and then employers returned to hiring local workers.”

‘A favourite aphorism of migration experts is that there is nothing so permanent as a temporary migration programme.”

The article should be read in full here.

And then, setting out other examples, she avers:

‘None of this was inevitable. If the government had really wanted to improve the quality of jobs in the food and transport sectors, it could have done so regardless of Brexit.’

*

And on Twitter, another insightful commentator Dr Anna Jerzewska set out the following thread:

And today Jerzewska correctly comments on O’Connor’s piece:

*

There are purists who will say that any Brexit would be bad, for there was no way the process of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union could have gone well.

To an extent, the purists are correct: there was no way such a fundamental shift to settled commercial, policy and legal relations could go uniformly well.

But.

There is no reason why Brexit had to be done this botched way.

And this is not just the captaincy of hindsight.

(For example, in 2017 I set out some practical suggestions for how Brexit could be done better.)

Yet for political reasons, Brexit was done in a rush and with no planning or real thought (that is, with no real policy) as to what post-Brexit arrangements should be put in place.

And it is this policy failure – literally, the failure to have a policy – which is, alongside Brexit and Covid, the cause of so many of the current discontents and disruptions.

What Brexit is revealing and exposing are the policy failures of successive government, and especially recent governments.

Like discovered checks in chess, things have moved that show deep vulnerabilities that had hitherto been hidden.

And because the post-Brexit government is not serious about policy, and has no grasp of dealing with complex situations, we get expediency and bluster instead.

*

Perhaps – like a policy equivalent to a market adjustment – a new group of politicians will now emerge to supply the policy seriousness that is now demanded.

This would be like how in many wars, new worldly commanders come to the fore to replace the clumsy peacetime generals who make the initial mistakes.

Perhaps.

But unless we soon have a generation of politicians that have the measure of the practical problems facing the United Kingdom then there can only be more chaos and crisis-management, instead of planning, thought and policy.

Brace brace.

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Laws are to be suspended and the army is to be called in – and why we should be concerned when activating the law of civil contingencies becomes a civil necessity

27th September 2021

Once upon a time it would be sensational news that the army was to be called in and that laws were to be suspended.

It would indicate, perhaps, something about either a failed state or an unforeseen emergency, or both.

As it is, the news seems almost commonplace – and that it would be more exceptional nowadays for the news to be less sensational.

The laws that are to be suspended are competition laws – which (we are told) would otherwise prevent petrol companies from coordinating with each other.

I am not an energy law specialist – though I know a little about competition law – and it would be interesting to know exactly how current competition laws would prevent coordination in the current situation.

This law-suspension exercise has the grand name of ‘activating the Downstream Oil Protocol’.

*

‘Dispatch War Rocket Ajax.’

Flash Gordon screenplay, 1980

*

And the official statement is here, and it includes this:

‘Known as The Downstream Oil Protocol, this step will allow Government to work constructively with fuel producers, suppliers, hauliers and retailers to ensure that disruption is minimised as far as possible.

‘The measure will make it easier for industry to share information, so that they can more easily prioritise the delivery of fuel to the parts of the country and strategic locations that are most in need.’

As competition law in this respect is about preventing what would otherwise be cartel behaviour, then it would appear that the fuel industry want to (or need to) do something between themselves that would otherwise carry potential legal risk as cartel behaviour.

Perhaps more will be come clear on this as the protocol is activated, though it seems such relaxations of competition law have been done before in other recent emergencies:

If this is what is being done, we should note that the relaxations – or suspensions -of law do not have any real parliamentary oversight or control.

*

And now the army.

(Source)

But as this news report explains:

“It is understood that it would take up to three weeks to fully implement, because some of those mobilised may already be on other deployments and others could be reservists.’

And so, by the time the army arrives, it may be too late – and it certainly is not something that is intended to happen in the next few days.

This manoeuvre is known, it seems as activating ‘Operation Escalin’.

*

‘Dispatch War Rocket Ajax.’

Flash Gordon screenplay, 1980

*

Just as constitutional law should be dull and it is not a good sign when constitutional law is exciting, the same can be said for the law of civil contingencies.

It is not normal for laws to be suspended and for the army to be used for civil matters – and it should never become normal.

But.

The various problems facing the United Kingdom mean that what are civil contingencies are becoming civil necessities.

Brace brace.

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The government proposes a Christmas gift for emergency visa workers: a deportation order on or after 25 December 2021

26th September 2021

Ebeneezer Blackadder:
In fact, there is something in your stocking, Baldrick, something I made for you.

Baldrick:
Ah, well that’s the best kind of gift, Mr. B. What is it?

Ebeneezer Blackadder:
It’s a fist. It’s for hitting people with. See?

– Blackadder’s Christmas Carol (1988)

*

The government’s proposal was daft to begin with.

An extraordinary proposal, even for this government.

And just in case you would not believe me, here is the BBC tweet announcing it – and the BBC’s name is good upon ’Change, for anything it choses to put its name to.

The necessary implication of the government’s proposal is that by automatic operation of law these lorry drivers who will deliver our Christmas goods and these poultry workers who will provide the Christmas turkeys will become illegal aliens at the stroke of midnight on Christmas Eve.

What a Christmas present for those who choose to come over here to provide services, goods and food for those of us in Great Britain.

The following tweet on this is (I think) intended as satire:

But as Zoe Gardner observes, it it not far off the actual legal position:

She is right: that would be the legal position on Christmas Day.

*

And as this blog averred yesterday, there is no reason to believe this quick fix will work in any case.

Let us remember what happened last year.

There is thereby no particular reason to think there will be a rush of workers wanting to help Great Britain out at this time of need.

And so the proposal may become an(other) example of the post-Brexit government discovering that the many problems created by Brexit are not capable of quick easy solutions.

Inviting such workers on terms where – once they have delivered Christmas goods in their lorries and helped provide the turkeys for Christmas dinners – they will literally become illegal aliens at the strike of midnight – is a thing not even Charles Dickens would have imagined.

To adapt Blackadder:

Ebeneezer Blackadder:
Thank you for helping save the British Christmas, there is something in your stocking, something I made for you.

EU migrant worker:
Ah, well that’s the best kind of gift, Mr. B. What is it?

Ebeneezer Blackadder:
It’s a deportation order. It’s for deporting people with. See?

*****

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“Can any of you drive a lorry?”

25th September 2021

Some magazine covers are for the ages.

This The New European cover captures the current predicament of the current United Kingdom in respect of migration.

On one hand, the government is strident in its attempt to exclude migration.

Brexit-supporting politicians boasted about ending ‘freedom of movement’ as an end in and of itself.

(It always seemed odd to hear those boasts about ending freedoms – as if ending a freedom was something to be proud about.)

The current home secretary loudly wants, as a matter of policy, to deter cross-channel migration – a policy aimed at and appreciated by those who clap and cheer at such things.

And on the other hand, we not only have damaging self-inflicted labour shortages – we also now have a significant reversal of policy.

The United Kingdom government has realised – in perhaps the first of what will be a telling sequence of realisations about Brexit in reality – that ending freedom of movement causes serious problems as well as prompting claps and cheers.

*

One of the causes of this situation is that that those who wanted to suddenly and drastically end migration had no grasp of what would happen in practical, messy reality.

Brexit was (and remains) a political attempt at treating a complex problem as a simple problem.

And so we keep bouncing between the fantastic realm of slogans and the mundane world of reality.

Here the government’s reversal of some visas (the applications for which will be tied up in red tape) may not even work as a policy change.

If so, then such an abrupt reversal may not be enough to solve the problem this government has created for itself – and for us.

And if there is to be a sequence of realisations, where Brexit slogans – one can hardly call it an ideology – do not match Brexit reality, then the government will find that quick-fix reversals will not work either.

It is one thing to realise that reality does not match up with your slogans, but it is another to realise that no policy reversal will match up to the policy mistake you have made.

And so we may end up with a bunch of stressed, washed-out, desperate and directionless politicians – facing the question: can any of you drive a policy?

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The Law and Politics of triggering Article 16

24th September 2021

So the United Kingdom government is again contemplating triggering Article 16.

A recent post on this blog set out what – at law – this means.

In essence: triggering the article means a formal process will begin which may enable the United Kingdom and/or European Union to take ‘safeguard’ measures to protect the operation of the Northern Irish protocol.

On the face of it, Article 16 is not about ‘suspending’ the Northern Irish protocol but about repairing and thereby protecting the functioning of the protocol.

All because Article 16 can be ‘triggered’, that does not make it a gun.

But.

Law and politics are different things.

And sometimes legal processes can be commenced as a cover for (or as an accompaniment of) political manoeuvres.

This possibility was highlighted last week by the sagacious Steve Peers:

Maybe the European Union too would welcome the triggering of Article 16 so that it can move to a position that it may not be to adopt without such political and legal cover.

Maybe.

But even taking this political possibility at its highest, there remains the fact that the Article 16 process in and of itself is not intended to be a route for suspending the protocol but for (as it says expressly) safeguarding it.

And it is against this background we come to yesterday’s infantile tweet from the United Kingdom minister David Frost:

Or: please answer the telephone, please.

As Frost was the United Kingdom politician who actually negotiated and endorsed the agreement containing the protocol, it is an especially pathetic plea.

And those in Northern Ireland who benefit from access to the single market, while the rest of the United Kingdom face all manners of shortages, may not agree that the protocol is having a negative effect.

(And also the ‘clearly’ is also a tell – politicians tend to use the word when a thing is not clear.)

But the first sentence of the tweet looks as if the government is seeking to frame the issue as meeting the seriousness criterion for triggering Article 16.

Maybe they will.

Maybe.

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If the United Kingdom government triggers Article 16 – and the United Kingdom government has done dafter things regarding Brexit – there will no doubt be claps and cheers.

And – and this should not be discounted – the Article 16 process could result in a political deal.

But what is not intended to happen is that the process, by itself, leads to the suspension of the protocol.

And if that is what the United Kingdom government is banking on, then this will turn out to be another needless misadventure in the story of Brexit.

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“I’ve always thought that a free trade deal with the U.S. would be difficult” – and what this Prime Minister’s falsehood tells us about law and policy

23rd September 2021

Once upon a time a Brummie solicitor and pundit averred that a post-Brexit trade deal with the United States was ‘in the bag’.

That Brummie solicitor and pundit was not me – though I did have fun with this boast in a Financial Times piece.

Jones was not the only figure to assume that a post-Brexit trade deal with the United States would be easy.

Almost all Brexiters who had an opinion on the matter assumed that such a trade deal would be a given.

And one such Brexiter was the now prime minister Boris Johnson.

But now he denies he ever said it.

Here, this short video should be watched in full.

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Shameless stuff.

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There are at least two issues here.

The first was the readiness of Brexiters to assume international free trade deals were easy – that they would naturally follow from Brexit with the United Kingdom having a fully independent trade policy.

This sentiment may be derived from cod-historical notions about Victorian Britain – where it is imagined that the likes of Richard Cobden would pop across the channel to negotiate a free trade deal and still be home for tea.

In the mundane world of 2021 – as opposed to the giddy biscuit-tin world of nostalgic reenactments – new trade deals are rarely quick or easy, and often may not be worth having at all.

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The second is that the prime minister knows he can say things that contradict what he said before and that few, if anyone, will care.

And this is despite the internet making it easier to expose such lies and other discrepancies.

Other than for the sake of it as a public good, there is no real point in setting out the falsehoods.

This is one thing that George Orwell perhaps did not correctly anticipate in Nineteen Eighty-four – there would be no need to employ the likes of Winston Smith to go back and change the historical record, as it would make no difference as to whether people believed new false claims.

The future instead turned out to be President Trump and others waving away such inconvenient truths as ‘fake news’.

For as this blog has said many times: exposing lies is not enough when people do not mind the lies.

So we are now in a bubble of faux-historical sentimentality and hyper-partisanship, where the truth of the historical record makes no difference.

You may think the bubble cannot carry on, but yet it does.

It is the paradox of our age: it has never been easier to expose a falsehood, yet the falsehoods continue to have purchase.

And from this many of our current problems in law and policy follow.

**

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Are President Biden’s comments on ‘the Irish Accords’ a life line for the Human Rights Act?

22nd September 2021

Yesterday United States President Biden spoke about his concern about a possible change to what he called ‘the Irish Accords’.

From the context of the question and answer, Biden meant the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement – though the question was framed in terms of the Northern Irish Protocol of the Brexit withdrawal agreement.

The question and answer are here and you should watch and listen for yourself:

You will see in the tweet above that the estimable Sonya Sceats, the chief executive of Freedom from Torture, avers that the exchange is a life line for the Human Rights Act 1998.

Is she right?

And what is the connection between that exchange and the Human Rights Act 1998?

Here we need to see what the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement says.

In respect of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the agreement says the following:

‘There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including […] the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission [and] arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’

and

‘The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency’.

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These passages are explicit: the ECHR is a ‘safeguard’ and the ECHR has to be enforceable in the courts of Northern Ireland.

The agreement does not expressly mention the Human Rights Act 1998 – not least because that legislation had not yet been passed at the time of the agreement.

But one of the things that the act does in respect of Northern Ireland – as well as for the rest of the United Kingdom – is to make the ECHR enforceable directly in the courts.

This is instead of requiring a party seeking to rely on the ECHR to petition the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, as was the position before the act took effect.

Of course: you do not – strictly – need the Human Rights Act 1998 to be in place to fulfil the express requirements of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, as long as the ECHR remains enforceable locally in Northern Ireland.

But if the Act were to be repealed – which is a long-term goal of the new lord chancellor and justice secretary Dominic Raab – then there would need to be replacement legislation in place the very day the repeal took effect for ECHR rights to remain directly enforceable in the courts of Northern Ireland.

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So does this mean the Human Rights Act 1998 is safe?

I am not so sure.

I averred on this blog when Raab was appointed (and I am sorry to quote myself):

‘And one would not be surprised that one stipulation made by Raab in accepting the position as lord chancellor is that he get another crack at repealing the human rights act.

‘If so, then the act will probably be repealed – though there will no doubt be a less strikingly (and provocatively) entitled ‘European Convention on Human Rights (Interpretation and Incorporation of Articles) and Related Purposes Act’ in its stead – not least because the Good Friday Agreement provides that the convention has to be enforceable in Northern Ireland.’

Having seen the exchange with Biden, I am now wondering if my (dismal) view is correct.

A wise government of the United Kingdom will be anxious not to give the slightest indication that anything related to the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement was up for any change – and continuing local enforcement of the ECHR is an express provision of that agreement.

A wise government, concerned about its relations with the United States, would thereby not touch the repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 with a barge pole.

It would just take one credible complaint that the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement was at risk, and there would be an international problem.

Repealing the Human Rights Act 1998 would not be worth these risks – especially as it would have to be replaced immediately with legislation having the identical effect in respect of Northern Ireland.

But we do not have a wise government – we have a silly government.

And given the long-term obsession of the new lord chancellor with repealing the Human Rights Act 1998 – and that this may even be a reason for why he accepted his political demotion – one can see the repeal (and its immediate replacement) still going ahead in symbolic form – even if not in much substance.

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But the politics of symbolism does not just have one direction.

Against Raab’s fixation with the symbolism of repealing the Human Rights Act 1998 is the transatlantic symbolism of doing anything that could remotely affect the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.

So it may be that Sceats’ view is correct – and the Human Rights Act 1998 is safer than before.

But, on any view, repeal seems an unwise political path to take, given how much politically – and how little legally – is at stake.

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