Why the United Kingdom government cannot leave the ECHR without either breaching or re-negotiating the Good Friday Agreement

1st July 2023

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The overlooked obstacle to the United Kingdom withdrawing from the ECHR

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From time to time the demand comes from a government minister, or from one of their political and media supporters, for the United Kingdom to leave the European Convention of Human Rights.

This short blogpost sets out the most obvious obstacle for the government in doing this.

The obstacle – if that is the correct word – is the Good Friday Agreement.

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That thirty-six page document – which is not as read as widely as it should be – contains a number of express provisions in respect of the ECHR:

“The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency.

[…]

“There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including:  […]

“(b) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission

[…]

“The Assembly will have authority to pass primary legislation for Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to: (a) the ECHR […]”

And so on.

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The ECHR is not just mentioned in passing in a recital.

Instead the ECHR is integral to the Good Friday Agreement.

Rights under the ECHR that can be relied upon in Northern Ireland are a fundamental part of the agreement.

It was important to Ireland – and to the nationalist community – that there were rights beyond the reach of Westminster and Whitehall (and Stormont) that could be enforced directly against the state of the United Kingdom, including against the police and security services.

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When this obstacle is pointed out, sometimes the response is “Aha! Why not just have the ECHR applicable in Northern Ireland?”

Of course, there is nothing in the Good Friday Agreement which expressly requires rights under the ECHR to be directly enforceable elsewhere in the United Kingdom.

But.

Article 1 of the ECHR provides:

It may thereby not be open to the United Kingdom to be a party to the ECHR and pick-and-choose who within its jurisdiction can have the benefit of the rights.

This would be in addition to the political issues about having a further legal “border down the Irish Sea”, which presumably would not be welcome to unionists.

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Perhaps the government of the United Kingdom could seek to renegotiate the Good Friday Agreement?

This would mean Ireland agreeing that those – especially nationalists – in Northern Ireland should have their existing legal rights against the United Kingdom state removed.

It would also mean Ireland agreeing that it would not be able to take the United Kingdom to court in Strasbourg.

And it would also mean – in practice – the United States and the nationalist community agreeing that legal rights and protections are removed.

This is not at all realistic.

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And the difficulty cannot be resolved by simply copying and pasting the Convention rights into a domestic statute for Northern Ireland.

For unless the rights are as constructed and interpreted by the Strasbourg court, and unless a disappointed party can petition the Strasbourg court directly, they are not “convention rights” – even if identically worded.

(This is partly why even Dominic Raab’s “Bill of Rights” that was to repeal the Human Rights Act had the convention rights in a schedule and a duty on public authorities to comply with those rights.)

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Part of the difficulty of Brexit was because some did not know or did not care about the particular situation of Northern Ireland. Some also pretended it was not an issue, but as we now know it needed special care and attention – and it still has not been fully resolved.

Similarly those who believe just leaving the ECHR would be easy may again be overlooking the Irish and Northern Irish dimensions.

And unless the Good Friday Agreement is re-negotiated, the United Kingdom leaving the ECHR would place the United Kingdom in breach in Good Friday Agreement.

Well, at least as long as Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom.

And that would be another story.

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This post is partly drawn from this earlier blogpost.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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Understanding the significance of today’s Court of Appeal decision on the Rwanda removals policy

29th June 2023

Today the Court of Appeal ruled that the United Kingdom government’s controversial Rwanda removals policy was unlawful.

The judgment is here and there is a court-prepared summary here.

By saying the policy was itself unlawful, this means that each and every possible removal of any asylum seeker to Rwanda for their asylum application to be processed is currently unlawful. There are no current circumstances where a removal would be lawful.

The reason for the unlawfulness is that Rwanda is not a safe place for the processing of asylum claims:

This goes beyond the decision of the High Court that each particular removal happened to unlawful, on a case-by-case basis, because an appropriate process had not been followed. The High Court had said that the general policy was lawful, but each application of it so far had been unlawful.

The Court of Appeal now says that even the policy was unlawful. No removal, even with elaborate procedural compliance, would be allowed.

So both in practice and in the round the Rwanda removals policy has been held unlawful.

Opponents of the policy can celebrate – to an extent.

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Here are some further thoughts about what this decision signifies and does not signify.

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First, and from a practical perspective, the government’s far bigger problem was the initial High Court judgment. It does not really matter if a policy is (theoretically) lawful if the procedural protections required for each individual case are such that, in practice, removals are onerous and extraordinarily expensive.

I blogged about these practical problems when the High Court handed down its judgment:

Today’s ruling that the policy itself is unlawful makes no real difference to the government’s practical predicament with the policy in individual cases.

And the government appears not to have appealed the adverse parts of the High Court judgment.

The Home Secretary, and her media and political supporters, can pile into judges and lawyers because of today’s appeal judgment. But their more serious problems come from the last judgment, and not this one.

The Home Office is simply not capable or sufficiently resourced to remove many, if any, asylum seekers to Rwanda even if the policy was lawful.

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Second, the Court of Appeal decision today is likely to be appealed to the Supreme Court.

And, from an initial skim read of the relevant parts of the judgment, one would not be surprised if the Supreme Court reverses this Court of of Appeal decision.

Today’s Court of Appeal decision is not unanimous – the Lord Chief Justice was in the minority on the key question of whether Rwanda was a safe country for processing asylum claims.

The Supreme Court is (currently) sceptical of “policy” type legal challenges, and is likely thereby to defer to the Home Secretary’s view that Rwanda was a safe country for processing asylum claims – a view also shared by the two judges at the High Court and the Lord Chief Justice.

If the Home Office appeals to the Supreme Court then one suspects it is likely to win.

(Though it must be tempting to the Home Secretary to now abandon this – flawed – policy, and blame the judges.)

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Third, any appeal to the Supreme Court will take time. As it has taken until June 2023 for an appeal decision for a December 2022 High Court decision, it may be another six months before there is a Supreme Court hearing and decision.

And in that time, and unless a competent court decides otherwise, all removals will be unlawful as a matter of policy.

If the government wins at the Supreme Court then there would presumably be further delays while individual challenge-proof removal decisions are made.

In other words, the period for any actual removals before a general election next year will be short.

Even with a Supreme Court win, it will be that few if any asylum seekers are removed to Rwanda before a likely change of government.

(Though it cannot be readily assumed that an incoming government will change the policy.)

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Fourth, it should not be overlooked by opponents of the Rwanda removals policy that the appeal lost today unanimously and comprehensively on every other ground:

These defeats are not any cause for opponents of the policy to celebrate.

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Finally, there is a possibility of a work-around, which the government could adopt.

In the Abu Qatada case it was held by the courts that a deportation to Jordan for a trial was unlawful because of the use of evidence extracted by torture in the Jordanian legal system.

And so the United Kingdom government did a deal that the Jordanian legal system changed its ways so that the deportation could take place.

Abu Qatada was then, lawfully, deported.

(And then acquitted by the Jordanian court in the absence of such evidence.)

This deportation was presented by the United Kingdom government as a win against pesky human rights lawyers – when in fact the government had in reality complied with the judgment.

Similarly, the United Kingdom government may work with the Rwanda government to improve the asylum system, and correct the evidenced defects, so that concerns of the majority of the Court of Appeal are addressed.

No doubt the government would then similarly present any Rwanda removals on this basis as a win against pesky human rights lawyers – but again it would be the government complying with what the court would have approved.

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The judgment released today is long – and nobody commenting on the judgment today – politician or pundit – can have read it and properly digested it.

This post is thereby based only on initial thoughts and impressions.

That said, there is reason today for opponents of the Rwanda removals policy to celebrate.

But perhaps not too much.

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This has been cross-posted from The Empty City Substack.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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“How did this person die? – And what lessons can we learn?”

27 June 2023

A sensible policy proposal to monitor the recommendations of coroners’ inquests

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“How did this person die?”

In any organised society this is one of the most important and basic questions that can and should be asked.

Was it a death that could have been prevented?

Are there things that can be done so that similar deaths can be avoided?

These questions are not just about the immediate, medical cause of death – but the wider circumstances which led to a person dying.

“How did this person die?” is a question which the legal system can often only answer indirectly. A police investigation and a criminal trial can sometimes ascertain the circumstances of a death when there is potential criminal liability. A civil trial can sometimes ascertain the circumstances of a death when there is potential civil liability.

But not all preventable deaths or lethal system failures are matters for the criminal and civil courts. And the purpose of court proceedings is not directly to inquire into facts generally, but to allocate legal liability – which is not always the same thing. For example, criminal proceedings especially have very strict rules of evidence.

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There therefore needs to be another way of inquiring in the circumstances of the death and drawing any lessons – distinct from and in addition to the criminal and civil courts.

A way where the focus is not on the rights and liabilities of persons, but on simply finding out what happened and what that tells us.

And there is such another way.

In England there is the ancient office of the coroner.

Coroners have long provided the public good of conducting inquests into the circumstances of deaths – and coroners can make recommendations that may prevent further deaths and avoid similar lethal system failures.

It is difficult to think of anything that serves a more fundamental public interest.

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But.

There is little wider point in coroners conducting their inquiries and making recommendations if nothing comes of the lessons that have been identified.

And this is a serious problem about our coronial system.

Here is a worked example provided by Inquest, the charity that provides expertise on state related deaths and their investigation:

And here is another case study:

As Inquest say at the end of that case study:

“…there is no central body dedicated to collating and analysing the Government’s follow-up to these recommendations to encourage positive action to prevent further deaths. Instead, it falls to families, lawyers, charities and coroners to join the dots.”

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In essence, the lack of any body (and, indeed, anybody) being responsible for monitoring what happens to coroners’ recommendations robs the coronial system of any wider efficacy.

A public good may be being served by individual inquests into particular deaths, but this public good is not being converted into a wider social benefit.

That there is even this gap is extraordinary.

Other public entities have, in turn, their monitors – for example, the inspectorates of the police and of prisons.

There are many bodies that answer Alan Moore’s question of who watches the watchmen (or, as Juvenal once put it, quis custodiet ipsos custodes?).

Given the fundamental public interest in avoiding preventable deaths and lethal system failures, it would seem to be a no-brainer of a public policy proposal.

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Inquest are today launching a campaign for such a body:

Inquest have also published this persuasive guide – from which the above case studies are taken.

Though the proposed name of a “national oversight mechanism” is a bit cumbersome – I would suggest OffQuest – there can be no sensible doubt that it is required as a thing.

And as we approach the next general election, it would seem straightforward for political parties to commit to such a body in their manifestoes.

It is a gap that should be filled and can be filled, and it is a proposal that can only have benefits.

For after all, the reason why “How did this person die?” is such an important question is that the answer can often help those who are still alive.

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Over at his Substack, Joshua Rozenberg has written a good post on this topic.

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This has been cross-posted from my Empty City substack.

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Photo credit: wikimedia commons.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

The government is running out of time

26th June 2023

In the words of the eminent jurist Paul Simon:

“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me

“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me
While I looked around for my possibilities”

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One hard structural fact about the politics of the United Kingdom is that the government is running out of time.

By automatic operation of law the next general election has to take place by 28 January 2025.

That gives the current government about 580 days left, maximum, before a general election which many forecast that the governing Conservative party will lose.

About 580 days sounds a lot, but it really is not – at least in parliamentary terms.

That date presupposes that the general election is called at the last possible moment – 17 December 2024 – leaving the longest possible election campaign.

Current speculation is that the next general election will be in October 2024, which means the last parliamentary session will need to be over by September 2024, and given summer breaks, that basically means legislation will need to passed by June/July 2024.

So that is about 365 to 400 days.

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We are still – remarkably – within the same parliamentary session that commenced two prime ministers and one monarch ago in May 2022.

And as the Hansard Society averred in May, few of the Bills announced in that speech have become law:

It is expected that there will be a new King’s Speech this November.

This means that it is highly likely that there is just one more parliamentary session left before a general election – November 2023 to June/July 2024.

(There is the theoretical possibility of more than one remaining parliamentary term if the government has a sequence of truncated parliamentary sessions, with multiple openings of parliament.)

One implication of there being only one more parliamentary session before an election is that it is probable that there is not enough time to force any new legislation through the House of Lords under the Parliament Act, for that requires a Bill to be approved in successive sessions.

And then there are the recesses:

As one adds up the delays and holidays, and the speculation of an election by October 2024, the gross figure of 580 days becomes a lot less in practical legislative terms.

The grand hourglass of parliamentary time is running out for the current government.

We are not talking years, we are now talking months – and soon we will be talking weeks.

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And not only time is against them – there is the problem of legislative preparation.

Put simply: this government is not very good at preparing legislation.

As the Hansard Society politely put it:

Parliamentary time for bills should not be, say, “step one’‘ of a process but about “step four” – after policy formulation, consultation and development – all within or by departments.

And so if you factor in the time to actually put together new practical – that is, passable – legislation then not even the maximum 580 days are really enough.

Even if following the conference season this year there is a “whizz-bang” King’s Speech with lots of legislative proposals, that whizzery and bangery needs to being prepared now in departments, and there is not a lot of evidence of any whizzery and bangery taking place anywhere in Whitehall at present.

Not only does the government need enough time to get legislation through parliament and implement it before the next general election, ministers and departments need lead-in times to get the legislation to be in any state to pass.

The time left looks very tight.

Too tight.

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What we have is a government that not only is running out of time, but in some ways has already ran out of time to do anything radical and substantial in its one (likely) remaining parliamentary term.

And what makes this even more remarkable that this is a government elected in December 2019, on the back of Brexit, which had a substantial majority – only the second overall majority the Conservatives had had since 1992.

In legislative and policy terms, that majority has been largely wasted.

(Which may be a good or bad thing, depending on your politics.)

This is a government running out of possibilities.

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“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me

“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me
While I looked around for my possibilities”

 

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This has been cross-posted from my (newly renamed) Empty City substack.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

The Empty City – and the nature of practical law and policy commentary

25th June 2023

Here is a painting of an empty city.

It is a perfect, bright, ideal(ised) empty Renaissance cityscape.

And here is another (almost) empty though less cheerful cityscape:

It is from the great twentieth-century artist De Chirico.

Scroll up and down and compare and contrast the two urban depictions.

Similar architecture, but the latter has flawed inconsistent perspectives and a more ominous (near-)emptiness.

(You may have noticed that both the pictures above have often been banners or avatars for my social media accounts.)

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Much of practical law and policy commentary offers a contrast between ideal systems, on one hand, and the incoherence and contradictions of reality, on another.

That is: between how things should work and how they do (and don’t) work – between the ideal Renaissance City and a latter day De Chirico city.

I have also spent most of my life in and around large cities, and so much of my writing carries urban perspectives – which, again like perspectives in a De Chirico painting, don’t always neatly join in the middle.

Anyway, this is just a way of saying I have changed the name of my Substack to Empty City.

I like the new name, and I hope you don’t mind it too.

And if you can subscribe at the Substack, that would be wonderful.

Apologies and publication schedule update

23rd June 2023

I hope all of you had a happy midsummer* – and now it will be another year before we get this much sunlight again.

My website had some unexpected problems, and it has been offline for a couple of days for repair and so on – and for this I apologise.

I have thereby taken some time to work on some long-delayed longer pieces for you.  These essays should be ready soon. I am sorry for the delay.  Researching and writing original detailed long-form content is not as easy as I sometimes fool myself into thinking it is.

I am also considering moving to a new publication schedule, of posting stuff here when there is something worth posting, rather than aiming to post once every weekday.

Sometimes this may mean a number of posts on a day, or a few weekdays between posts.

It also should mean fewer typos.

(Well. We can always hope.)

I am also thinking through the relationship between this site and the Substack.  At the moment I am usually publishing the same content on both.  But I am wondering if there should be divergence.

Let me know your response to any or all of the above by replying what you think in the comments below – I will read the comments though not necessarily publish them, and mark any comments which are “not for publication” accordingly.

I am especially anxious that those of you who are kind enough to support this site via Patreon and PayPal should feel that you are getting something in return.

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*For those of you in other hemispheres, please amend my text according to your taste.

How to approach the oral evidence at the Covid Inquiry

Midsummer Day, 2023

There are now big political names giving oral evidence at the Covid Inquiry for the first “module” covering the preparedness of the government for a pandemic.

This is just a brief post to point out that you should not over-emphasise the theatrics of certain exchanges between the witnesses and counsel, however dramatic or even gladiatorial those exchanges seem to be.

This is not a film or a play; it is not even a trial.

The best way to understand what each witness has to say, once the evidence has been given, is to click onto the “documents” part of the Covid Inquiry site.

And then you should find at least two documents.  The first is the witness statement of the relevant witness provided before the questioning, and the second is the transcript of the questioning.

For example, this is David Cameron’s witness statement – and this is the transcript of his session.

Sometimes the Inquiry will also publish other documentary evidence that has come up in the oral evidence sessions, for example this.

By comparing the witness statement with the oral evidence (and any additional documentary evidence) you will see exactly where the Inquiry is probing – and also where the Inquiry may not be satisfied by the content of a witness statement.

The nature of any inquiry does not lend itself to sudden courtroom fireworks; indeed, a line of questioning may seem very dull to onlookers until you realise what is said in the statement.

Remember, inquiries are often reliant on the evidence provided – a sort of GIGO principle.

And these oral sessions are intended to complement the written witness statements, and so the transcript should be read with the statement.

Those who only read media summaries, or catch snippets of the more notable exchanges, often end up surprised with what any inquiry produces.

Before you form Very Strong Opinions on what witnesses to the inquiry are supposed to have said, take a few moments to read the witness statement and then the transcript for yourself.

And you are lucky: because of the internet and an impressive Covid Inquiry website this – actually intellectually satisfying – exercise can be done with ease.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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Life after Brexit – and “exceptionalism”

20th June 2023

There is a useful general rule of writing: if more than one person, in good faith, mistakes the point you are making then it is the fault not of the reader, but the fault of the writer.

This is a general rule, not a universal law, and so it has exceptions; but it is true far more often than not.

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And so, when on Friday, in response to my quick post on life after Brexit a number of usually sensible respondents (here and elsewhere) thought I was guilty of the very “exceptionalism” of which I was accusing others, it was moment to think and reflect.

Was I unclear?  Or was I being inconsistent, even hypocritical?

I hope it is not the latter, and so I am going to take advantage of this being my own blog to have another go at setting out my view on what the United Kingdom should do now it is outside the European Union.

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First, the situation is – well – exceptional.  No sovereign state has ever before become an “ex-member” of the European Union.

The nearest analogue is Greenland – not a sovereign state – which left the (predecessor) European Communities – not the European Union.

And so whatever relationship the United Kingdom now has with the European Union necessarily will be distinct and unusual, regardless of the attitudes of those in both the United Kingdom and the European Union.

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Second, in saying that there should be joint institutions – “I would prefer the United Kingdom to formally remain outside the European Union while, over time, and in substance, evolving joint institutions, policies and rules in partnership with the European Union” – I am only referring to things which are already in place.

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement provides, for example:

And in the withdrawal agreement, for example:

To say that a suggestion that the United Kingdom and European Union should evolve joint institutions is “exceptionalism” is simply to say you have not read or understood the agreements already in place.

The institutions are already there.

My view is that as the agreed institutional framework is already in place – though in embryonic form – they should in a trial-and-error manner become a ever-firmer basis of the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union.

This would make the ongoing relationship practicable and sustainable, rather than some whizz-bang big-bang set of new institutions.

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Third, any institutional relationship should be at the pace of both the United Kingdom and European Union – a collaborative approach that is, I aver, distinct from “exceptionalism”.

It is just as important that it works for and suits the European Union as it works for and suits the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom should not get (and certainly will not get) special, selfless treatment from the European Union.

But there are possible association relationships that would suit the ruthless self-interest of the European Union as well as the interests of the United Kingdom.

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The foreseeable future is unlikely to be either the United Kingdom following a trajectory towards an illusory goal of splendid isolation or the United Kingdom being accepted back as a full member state of the European Union.

The United Kingdom instead has to prepare for life on the outside of the European Union, seeking to build the most practical and sustainable relationship consistent with the political totem of the 2016 referendum result.

You may hate the 2016 referendum result – and you are welcome to keep re-fighting the 2016 referendum – but given that neither the governing nor main opposition party are seeking to reverse Brexit (or even offer a further referendum) then the result of that referendum has to stand.

And our policy for the next five to ten years at least has to accept this.

The United Kingdom and the European Union have two detailed agreements with joint institutions.

I would submit that it is not “exceptionalism” to see how such a structured relationship now goes, and to also see what the United Kingdom and the European Union can jointly make of it.

I would submit that “exceptionalism” is pretending that that this is not the mundane reality and that – perhaps by magic – something else can and should happen instead.

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There is another rule about writing that one should never answer critics.

Well.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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The remarkable fall of Boris Johnson – and what it tells us, if anything, about our constitutional arrangements?

19th June 2023

In December 2019, Boris Johnson had the greatest prize that our constitutional arrangements could bestow.

He had led his party to a substantial majority at a general election; his party had the mandate for its proposals in its manifesto; he had the command of his cabinet and his party; and he had even stripped out of his parliamentary party many more moderate Tories.

The opposition was in disarray, and the official opposition had had one of its worst election results in its history.

Few, if any, prime ministers have even been in such a strong position.

He had the prospect of at least one parliamentary term, perhaps more.

Yet now, less than one parliamentary term later, Johnson is not only out of government, he is out of parliament.

There is no comparable downfall in our parliamentary and political history.

Perhaps this story can be understood in purely personal terms: that Johnson was the author of his own downfall.

But.

Just as every politician gains power in a particular constitutional context, every politician who loses power also does so in a particular context.

Had some things been different, had certain events and processes take another course, Johnson could well still be prime minister.

Johnson may well have willed himself into power, but he certainly did not intend to lose power.

A sequence of events meant that it became outside of his control as to whether he could continue to be prime minister, and a further sequence of events meant that it became outside of his control as to whether he would “beat” the privileges committee.

The constitution of the United Kingdom regurgitated Johnson from our body politic and spat him out.

(And the the constitution of the United Kingdom then also regurgitated Elizabeth Truss from our body politic and spat that prime minister out too, though not as far.)

Had our constitutional arrangements been more rigid – more fixed, perhaps codified – it may well be that it could have been harder to get rid of Boris Johnson from government and then from parliament.

For, to repeat, after the last general election, Boris Johnson had the very greatest prize that our constitutional arrangements could bestow, and it is difficult to see how that prize could have ever been formally wrestled away from him by any codified procedure.

Our constitutional arrangements certainly could be a lot better in so many ways – but on the specific question of the ejection of Johnson: could our constitutional arrangements actually have been better?

And if that question seems to you to have a complacent premise, there is then the far more worrying, far less complacent question: what does it say about our constitutional arrangements that such a figure was ever able to get the greatest prize our constitutional arrangements could bestow in the first place? 

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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Why the United Kingdom should not “re-join” the European Union – the United Kingdom should start any application from scratch

16th June 2023

The flaws and the errors of the case for Brexit are many and obvious, but those who oppose and want to reverse Brexit also have a problematic case.

In particular, and as this blog averred a couple of years ago, the notion that the United Kingdom can “re-join” the European Union is misconceived.

The United Kingdom is unlikely to “re-join” the European Union – if that is taken to mean that the United Kingdom will simply be able to step back and resume its role and position, almost as if nothing had happened.

Instead, those who support the United Kingdom being a member of the European Union will have to do is to make the case afresh.

And that will be difficult, as it will require a settled majority support for membership in our polity – and currently neither even the governing party nor official opposition support membership.

The occasion for this post is a fine article over at Byline by the academic Professor Jacob Öberg, which should be read by all who are interested in the topic.

He also has done a Twitter thread:

 

His article is optimistic – the United Kingdom ever being a member state is not impossible:

But: it is optimism coupled with hard realism.

And he emphasises rightly that it is for the European Union to be satisfied that we are ready to be a member.

(Indeed, the idea that the European Union should let us back just because we ask them too is a form, of course, of British exceptionalism.)

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My view, as you may know, is different – and it is one which is not shared with many, if anyone.

I would prefer the United Kingdom to formally remain outside the European Union while, over time, and in substance, evolving joint institutions, policies and rules in partnership with the European Union.

I think only such a close relationship over time, with the United Kingdom not technically being a member state, is sustainable and practical given the state of British politics.

As I type this, I can anticipate 101 responses to this position, and I am sure some will be set out below, but it is in my mind the only view that marries the need for closeness with paying tribute to the Brexit totem.

A totem which will be there, even if you despise it.

Pro-Europeans had over forty years to “win” the argument on European integration, and they failed when it mattered in 2016.  And now with the enduring fact of the Brexit referendum, the overall argument is even less likely to be won – or at least be seen to be won.

Some may say that practicalities do not matter that much, and the case for outright European Union membership should be made, and that we should accept nothing less.

My worry is that is the counsel of perfection, and that it will miss the opportunity of actual closer relationships in the meantime.

Let Brexiters have their technical sovereignty, and let us also have a substantial and practical close association with the European Union, while nominally being outside.

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