12th December 2022
Thinking and writing about Brexit (and, yes, the book is still going) has made me realise that it is less about “Remain” losing and “Leave” winning, but more about the loss – or absence – of something else.
What that missing something is not the “middle” – for that suggests that it is merely a compromise between two extremes.
It was a particular approach to dealing with and understanding the European Union and its predecessor Community.
The approach can be seen in the works of the late economic historian Alan Milward.
See this from an obituary:
“Rejecting both past and present myths about the EU he argued that, far from being a federal project to transcend the nation state, it was (and is) a complex instrument aimed at maintaining the viability of nation states in Europe…
…his approach calls into question the ‘founding myths’ of European unity associated with the names of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, while convincingly demolishing one of the long-standing clichés of anti-EU rhetoric in the UK, namely that the EU is a unifying federal project….
…here is what Alan considered a lazy cliché, though it is still widely held in some British political circles: that the EU was the result of an aggrandising federal strategy promoted by such figures as Schuman and Monnet, and reflecting a Franco-German accord aimed at domination by erasing national states. Alan pointed out that all these rather abstract approaches failed to account for the dynamics of the EU, and instead he conducted a detailed examination of the strategies and negotiations that had led to expansion…
….The ‘Eurosceptic’ nightmare of an encroaching federal project was in Alan’s view a serious misrepresentation of the record.
But if Alan Milward was uncomfortable reading for Eurosceptics he was no easier for Europhiles.”
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Milward, tongue-in-cheek, even entitled a chapter in a book as follows:
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Milward’s general approach was not an extreme view – indeed Milward was one of the official historians of the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Communities.
It is also a view I associate with the primary architect of the form which the Single Market finally took, Arthur Cockfield.
Appointed to the European Commission by then prime minister Margaret Thatcher, Cockfield is in my mind the most significant Conservative politician of the 1980s, after the prime minister who appointed him.
As I once said on this blog, Lord Cockfield pushed forward the Single Market in a practical and sustainable way, rather than through grand design and heady rhetoric.
My January 2017 FT piece on Lord Cockfield is here.
In that I said about how he approached the Single Market:
“In 1985, Cockfield (with the full support of the then commission president Jacques Delors) produced his famous white paper in a matter of weeks, and so sound and thought-through was its content that it was used as a blueprint thereafter.”
Cockfield looked at what worked, and what would work, at a national level, and then moved on practically from there.
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The European Communities and then the European Union were not necessarily a grand federalist project, as wanted by some of its founders and as feared by its opponents.
It was (and still is) “supranational” – and so beneath the cloak of heady rhetoric, it was the means by which national interests could be and were promoted and reconciled.
For the United Kingdom, our membership record was in part rebates and opt-outs, so effective were we in promoting our (perceived) national interests.
And our policy on European integration was about putting aside the absolute positions of both sides and, well, just practically getting on with what worked for the United Kingdom.
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But.
By 2015-16, this sensible pragmatism was no longer in the political ascendency in the United Kingdom.
Which is odd, in a way, as the failure of the grandiosely titled “Constitutional Treaty” was ten years or so in the past (though many of its provisions were added by amendment to the existing Rome and Maastricht treaties), and there were no new major treaties in the offing.
It is this absence of a thing – rather than the presence of “Remain” and “Leave” – which is, in my view, a key to understanding Brexit.
And it is harder to explain something not being there than it is to explain what was there in 2015-16, and thereafter.
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“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.
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I think I understand why you’ve begun by rejecting the R/L binary but I also think it’s very tough to answer your final question other than by reference to the politics around the referendum, and which explain why it was called.
I certainly think it’s defensible to argue that Remain was the inheritor of the pragmatism you describe, and Leave was an explicit rejection of it. I think many on both sides would agree. I don’t want to speak for Leavers because I was and am not one; but my sense is they would argue that Cockfieldist “what works” Single-Market pragmatism had failed, and was failing, to halt the march to federalism and as a result, the UK was being dragged ever deeper into a superstate against its will. (The fact that I disagree with this analysis doesn’t mean I can’t comprehend it as a political position, and with due humility, it’s my current best understanding of the rational Leave position).
So the answer to “Why did this pragmatism disappear?” is “Because Leave voters stopped believing in it”. This trite answer begs the question “And why did this happen?” in turn – and that is far more complicated.
Looking forward to your book!
Might there be a case for distinguishing between “Leave” voters and “Leave” promoters? It seems unlikely that the overwhelming majority of the former gave the matter as much thought before casting their votes as did most of the latter, some of whom had been at it like a dog with a bone for decades; which does not, of itself, necessarily endow their obsession with a profound degree of rationality, any more than said dog can fully articulate what he hopes to extract from that bone.
I see the EU as a hybrid federal/confederal system, and the most advanced experiment in collaborative democracy ever attempted. There will always be fanatics at each end of the rope wanting either to pull the EU towards full federation or to return to the purity of the Westphalian nation state model, with no dreaded ‘pooling of sovereignty’ – and there will never a natural and undisputed settlement between these two tendencies, because one group will want more federalisation in the name of ‘efficiency’ (and the greater power of the combination), while others will argue that the nation states have already ceded too much sovereignty.
I strongly recommend Luuk van Middelaar’s “The Passage to Europe” which is the best account I have read of how the EU evolved, and how it operates.
Brexit was, and is a cult. If it is seen as similar to say, the followers of David Kuresh in Waco, Texas, the denial of any possibility of “middle ground” is easily understood.
There was a middle ground, remember the “Meaningful Votes”: May’s Withdrawl Agreement, a customs union, EFTA membership, a Common Market 2.0, a CETA style FTA.
If Labour, LD and SNP had voted for any of the above, that would have won the day. Instead, Remainers preferred revocation of A50 and a second referendum.
Thanks. Fascinating and stimulating. Takes me well beyond my usual glib complaint that the referendum debate was merely between two wings of the Tories – neither of whom had ever shown much understanding of abroad.
Still leaves you with having to deal constructively with “an ever closer union”, a phrase widely used by “Europeans” throughout their development decades – and, given our growing supranational problems, a consummation devoutly to be wished.
I have a problem with what I see as an overemphasis on the economic aspects of Brexit and the EU. Of course they are very important, as many supporters Brexit now acknowledge. But the motivation of the founding fathers was more about peace, using economic arguments in order to advance their case and create mutual economic dependency between member nations.
I have spent half my life (since accession) feeling myself as much European as British or English. Our historical and cultural history, and I hope future, make me deeply resent the diminution of my Europeanness on a 48/52 vote. And with a son who is planning to give up his British citizenship for that of the EU member state in which he has lived for almost half his life I have a deep sense of loss because of Brexit that is more important to me than the economic damage to my prosperity, considerable though that is.
What I conclude is that we as a nation need a cultural peace, or at least a ceasefire, as much as a restoration of prosperity.
A practical matter with a pragmatic solution? I doubt it.
“I have a problem with what I see as an overemphasis on the economic aspects of Brexit and the EU.”
That is a refreshing change: this blog is usually accused of overemphasising the legal aspects of Brexit and the EU!
My primary reason for voting Remain was on defence & security grounds. Economics was very much second in my own ranking, even if it is what gets the airtime (and is in any case one of the necessary preconditions for defence & security). Legalities and other administrativia are a supporting act, not a lead. In my opinion it is because the EU is slowly showing signs of finding its own way in defence and security terms, and thereby posing a potential counter-point to other power centres, that there was increased interest in promoting whatever might best cause failure of the EU project, with the consequences we see. This blog may not consider or cover those aspects, but they exist nevertheless. It is true that money can be power, but power trumps money. And a tame lawyer can always be found.
The pragmatic middle got run over in UK politics, just as it always does. The cause is the absence of a codified constitution (which you seem to think is a good thing); and the use of the constitutional mish-mash that exists to be a tyranny of whoever is the power-du-jour in the Commons and able to win a vote of confidence on any given day; or in the FTP-vote in the constituencies whenever that fails. That system is designed to leave no viable middle ground. It is indefensible however many fine words one utters. Pretty much every other nation of humans on the planet has inspected the UK constitution, and rejected it.
Your comment has really resonated with me, John. As a post war baby growing up on a diet of The Dambusters, Escape from Colditz and similar, by the time I was asked to vote on continuing membership of the EEC in my 20s I felt that it was time we really did become part of the continent of Europe; it was a ‘beating our swords into ploughshares’ moment offering a chance of real reconciliation and putting the past behind us. I suppose my yes vote then was driven more by emotion than practical considerations, just as the 2016 Leave vote appears to have been.
I bitterly resent the loss of that feeling of ‘belonging’ in Europe that developed over the following years and the freedom to come and go as we pleased. It embarrasses me to return as no longer one with the citizens of 27 other European nations.
It greatly saddens me that much of my generation felt differently.
Viewing things from abroad the Eu seems to have accepted the Uk has left it’s orbit. The Eu can live with and work around the TCA . This doesn’t appear to apply in reverse.
War in Ukraine has political and land border implications which most Brits cannot fully conceptualise. Eastern Eu States have gained in influence.
Readmission is not practical. Tinkering with the TCA is . The Uk really has to decide what it wants and do something.
To paraphrase JFK: think not what the Eu can do for me but what I can do for my country!
In relation to non economic consequences the Uk is educating children with and without freedom of movement rights alongside one another. This is going to cause problems down the line.
Remember also 2023 sees the compulsory introduction of biometric testing and Schengen visas for Eu travel . This will bring a dose of realism to the debate.
The politics of the EU were unsustainable in the UK but that doesn’t excuse what followed. Once the Ref result was in all we had to do was choose a model the EU recognised and leave. There would have been some regrets on both sides but the decisions ought to have been perfectly simple.
Hard Brexit came as a bolt from the blue, a hard right coup orchestrated by Tufton St. who destroy everything they touch, latest foul up Liz Truss. The ERG tendency needs purging from the Tory party in perpetuity.
Hopefully a new government can bring back some stability to our EU relations, all they have to do is ask. It is to be hoped that Starmer isn’t as obtuse as he appears.
Humans being tribal, at least part of your missing bit must be a sense of belonging. I happened to live in Canada during the ’95 referendum and could watch British Columbians waiving “Quebec, on vous aime” flags, even though many would never set foot there. Their image of Canada had Quebec as part of it. Back in Europe in ’14, I was deeply disturbed by the Scottish referendum because, as (back then) a Brit first and a jock second, they were messing with my sense of who I was. And so with the arguments of the ’16 referendum which became so visceral that they created two antagonistic poles: those to whom being European was significant (not even necessarily being in the EU, but with a sense of belonging to this global neighbourhood and recognising common, even complimentary cultures) and those who would never emotionally set foot there (even if they had a flat in Spain and could walk to an Irish pub nearby).
The ’16 vote was never just an argument about EU membership, it was an argument about who we are. On one side, property owning elderly often selfishly imposing their retrospective dream of early morning whistling milkmen delivering to a largely white neighbourhood in a cosy, jobs for life Hovis ad, against Generation Easyjet. The youngsters should have easily won, but could not be bothered getting out of bed. Coming out of the EU cannot resolve this antagonism, for either side. My country and my patriotism, is broken.
The author of this piece in The Atlantic https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2022/10/uk-economy-disaster-degrowth-brexit/671847/ agrees.
Brexit, here, is a cautionary tale for the US.
I think national identity will almost always be more powerful than European identity; the nation state has so much more history than the EU and directly provides so much more to its citizens.
The nations that have made a success of EU membership seem to be the ones that have redefined the nation in European terms. To be Irish is to be European, an heir to the saints and scholars and exiles who made continental Europe their home over the centuries, the Europe that was England’s difficulty but Ireland’s opportunity. To be German is to be a good European, to make amends for a terrible past, while honouring Germany’s positive contributions to Europe, and so on.
The cool English pragmatism and transactional approach – what’s in it for us? – of Westminster never attempted this. Pragmatism is a good way to conduct diplomacy, but no way to win a referendum or a general election against identitarians and culture warriors.
We, the British Europeans, just have to brush ourselves down and start again, building that European culture from the bottom up, as the big Westminster parties won’t do it. It will be a culture that also takes a distinctively English form, as that’s where the heart of the problem lies.
………it is the rejection of all that is European, that I cannot thole.
Remain, in my view, was the middle ground. The extreme would be more integration with the EU. We weren’t given a choice about that.
Another way of posing this question would be to ask what changed between 1999/2000 and 2012, when the die was already cast.
One proxy for this might be to consider when the UK Civil Service ceased sending it’s brightest and best into the European Commission. Fast Stream entry to the EC closed under Brown, I think.
German reunification and the consequent sidelining of its Atlanticist factions, the surprising (for us) decision by the Central European states to align with Germany over the UK (despite our promotion of EU eastward expansion), and shifts in the balance within the EU institutions from QMV, as well as the more assertive European Parliament all shifted the balance.
Iraq and our decision to back Bush over European solidarity was also a big issue in Brussels.
Then the failure of the Single Market for Services in 2004 – with it’s rejection by referendum in France and the Netherlands – and EU proposals that would affect financial services meant our interests were being affected directly. (Unsurprisingly, City funding for Brexit was never in short supply).
All good reasons to oppose the EU. Without subscribing to Cummings’ theories about the senescence of institutions.
There is an equally long list of reasons to support our membership – but you’re not a pro-EU blog!
I think a lot of the distaste for the EU began with the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. As a result of the 2001 Laeken Declaration, the European Convention was created to work on the Lisbon Treaty, presided over by Giscard d’Estaing. We were told at that time that there was a recognition of some European overreach, and they signalled that Lisbon would provide clearer lines around “subsidiarity”, providing a process to roll back any overreach. Maybe that was a myth, but that was my perception at the time of what was supposed to happen. Of course, it didn’t.
Although I am a Europhile, I recognised that many European people do not support a federal Europe. Many of them fought for their freedom from various empires over the last 120 years, and were not in the mood for rejoining a new empire. A flexible arrangement keeping lots of small countries together, but retaining true national independence, many could live with that. Preserving the European project required due care for that political reality and diversity of view, lest the many nationalists get sufficient support to break it.
When the Lisbon Treaty failed to deliver any strengthening of subsidiarity, or any rolling back of overreach, a lot of people felt betrayed by that. Many also felt betrayed by their own governments, so many of which just signed on the dotted line, it would seem. There was a bit of pushback in Ireland and some other places that needed a referendum, but it got over the line.
I think that ultimately provided the major impetus for what has led to Brexit, and also the detachment of Hungary and Poland from the EU core. We see also a lot of discontent and provocation in many other places we think of as the European core, like the Netherlands and Denmark.