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  • A postcard from a spectator of a constitutional crisis 12th June 2025
  • Explaining a 31-month sentence for a tweet 27th May 2025
  • A close reading of the “AI” fake cases judgment 9th May 2025
  • How the Trump administration’s “shock and awe” approach has resulted in its litigation being shockingly awful 22nd April 2025
  • How the United States constitutional crisis is intensifying 17th April 2025
  • A note about injunctions in the context of the Abrego Garcia case 14th April 2025
  • How Trump is misusing emergency powers in his tariffs policy 10th April 2025
  • How Trump’s tariffs can be a Force Majeure event for some contracts 7th April 2025
  • The significance of the Wisconsin court election result 2nd April 2025
  • “But what if…?” – constitutional commentary in an age of anxiety 31st March 2025
  • A significant defeat for the Trump government in the federal court of appeal 27th March 2025
  • Reckoning the legal and practical significance of the United States deportations case 25th March 2025
  • Making sense of the Trump-Roberts exchange about impeachment 19th March 2025
  • Understanding what went on in court yesterday in the US deportations case 18th March 2025
  • “Oopsie” – the word that means the United States has now tipped into a constitutional crisis 17th March 2025
  • Oh Canada 16th March 2025
  • Thinking about a revolution 5th March 2025
  • The fog of lawlessness: what we can see – and what we cannot see – in the current confusions in the United States 25th February 2025
  • The president who believes himself a king 23rd February 2025
  • Making sense of what is happening in the United States 18th February 2025
  • The paradox of the Billionaires saying that Court Orders have no value, for without Court Orders there could not be Billionaires 11th February 2025
  • Why Donald Trump is not really “transactional” but anti-transactional 4th February 2025
  • From constitutional drama to constitutional crisis? 1st February 2025
  • Solving the puzzle of why the case of Prince Harry and Lord Watson against News Group Newspapers came to its sudden end 25th January 2025
  • Looking critically at Trump’s flurry of Executive Orders: why we should watch what is done, and not to be distracted by what is said 21st January 2025
  • A third and final post about the ‘Lettuce before Action’ of Elizabeth Truss 18th January 2025
  • Why the Truss “lettuce before action” is worse than you thought – and it has a worrying implication for free speech 17th January 2025
  • Of Indictments and Impeachments, and of Donald Trump – two similar words for two distinct things 16th January 2025
  • Why did the DoJ prosecution of Trump run out of time? 14th January 2025
  • Spiteful governments and simple contract law, a weak threatening letter, and a warning of a regulatory battle ahead 13th January 2025
  • A close look at Truss’s legal threat to Starmer – a glorious but seemingly hopeless cease-and-desist letter 9th January 2025
  • How the lore of New Year defeated the law of New Year – how the English state gave up on insisting the new year started on 25 March 1st January 2025
  • Some of President Carter’s judges can still judge, 44 years later – and so we can see how long Trump’s new nominees will be on the bench 31st December 2024
  • “Twelfth Night Till Candlemas” – the story of a forty-year book-quest and of its remarkable ending 20th December 2024
  • An argument about Assisting Dying – matters of life and death need to be properly regulated by law, and not by official discretion 28th November 2024
  • The illiberalism yet to come: two things not to do, and one thing to do – suggestions on how to avoid mental and emotional exhaustion 18th November 2024
  • New stories for old – making sense of a political-constitutional rupture 14th November 2024
  • The shapes of things to come – some thoughts and speculations on the possibilities of what can happen next 8th November 2024
  • A postcard from the day after an election: capturing a further political-constitutional moment 6th November 2024
  • A postcard from the day of an election – capturing a political-constitutional moment 5th November 2024
  • “…as a matter of law, the house is haunted” – a quick Hallowe’en post about law and lore 31st October 2024
  • Prisons and prisons-of-the-mind – how the biggest barrier to prisons reform is public opinion 28th October 2024
  • A blow against the “alternative remedies” excuse: the UK Supreme Court makes it far harder for regulators to avoid performing their public law duties 22nd October 2024
  • What explains the timing and manner of the Chagos Islands sovereignty deal? 20th October 2024
  • Happy birthday, Supreme Court: the fifteenth anniversary of the United Kingdom’s highest court 1st October 2024
  • Words on the screen – the rise and (relative) fall of text-based social media: why journalists and lawyers on social media may not feel so special again 30th September 2024
  • Political accountability vs policy accountability: how our system of politics and government is geared to avoid or evade accountability for policy 24th September 2024
  • On writing – and not writing – about miscarriages of justice 23rd September 2024
  • Miscarriages of Justice: the Oliver Campbell case 21st September 2024
  • How Taylor Swift’s endorsement of Harris and Walz is a masterpiece of persuasive prose: a songwriter’s practical lesson in written advocacy 11th September 2024
  • Supporting Donald Trump is too much for Richard Cheney 7th September 2024
  • A miscarriage of justice is normally a systems failure, and not because of any conspiracy – the cock-up theory usually explains when things go wrong 30th August 2024
  • Update – what is coming up. 29th August 2024
  • Shamima Begum – and ‘de jure’ vs ‘de facto’ statelessness 21st August 2024
  • Lucy Letby and miscarriages of justice: some words of caution on why we should always be alert to the possibilities of miscarriages of justice 19th August 2024
  • This week’s skirmish between the European Commission and X 17th August 2024
  • What Elon Musk perhaps gets wrong about civil wars being ‘inevitable’ – It is in the nature of civil wars that they are not often predictable 7th August 2024
  • How the criminal justice system deals with a riot 5th August 2024
  • The Lucy Letby case: some thoughts and observations: what should happen when a defence does not put in their own expert evidence (for good reason or bad)? 26th July 2024
  • And out the other side? The possible return of serious people doing serious things in law and policy 10th July 2024
  • What if a parliamentary candidate did not exist? The latest odd constitutional law question which nobody has really thought of asking before 9th July 2024
  • The task before James Timpson: the significance of this welcome appointment – and two of the obstacles that he needs to overcome 8th July 2024
  • How the Met police may be erring in its political insider betting investigation – and why we should be wary of extending “misconduct of public office” to parliamentary matters, even in nod-along cases 28th June 2024
  • What you need to know about commercial regulation, in the sports sector and elsewhere – for there is compliance and there is “compliance” 25th June 2024
  • Seven changes for a better constitution? Some interesting proposals from some good people. 24th June 2024
  • The wrong gong 22nd June 2024
  • The public service of an “Enemy of the People” 22nd June 2024
  • Of majorities and “super-majorities” 21st June 2024
  • The strange omission in the Conservative manifesto: why is there no commitment to repeal the Human Rights Act? 12th June 2024
  • The predicted governing party implosion in historical and constitutional context 11th June 2024
  • Donald Trump is convicted – but it is now the judicial system that may need a good defence strategy 1st June 2024
  • The unwelcome weaponisation of police complaints as part of ordinary politics 31st May 2024
  • Thoughts on the calling of a general election – and on whether our constitutional excitements are coming to an end 29th May 2024
  • Another inquiry report, another massive public policy failure revealed 21st May 2024
  • On how regulating the media is hard – if not impossible – and on why reviving the Leveson Inquiry may not be the best basis for seeing what regulations are now needed 4th May 2024
  • Trump’s case – a view from an English legal perspective 24th April 2024
  • Law and lore, and state failure – the quiet collapse of the county court system in England and Wales 22nd April 2024
  • How the civil justice system forced Hugh Grant to settle – and why an alternative to that system is difficult to conceive 17th April 2024
  • Unpacking the remarkable witness statement of Johnny Mercer – a closer look at the extraordinary evidence put before the Afghan war crimes tribunal 25th March 2024
  • The curious incident of the Afghanistan war crimes statutory inquiry being set up 21st March 2024
  • A close look at the Donelan libel settlement: how did a minister make her department feel exposed to expensive legal liability? 8th March 2024
  • A close look at the law and policy of holding a Northern Ireland border poll – and how the law may shape what will be an essentially political decision 10th February 2024
  • How the government is seeking to change the law on Rwanda so as to disregard the facts 30th January 2024
  • How the next general election in the United Kingdom is now less than a year away 29th January 2024
  • Could the Post Office sue its own former directors and advisers regarding the Horizon scandal? 16th January 2024
  • How the legal system made it so easy for the Post Office to destroy the lives of the sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses – and how the legal system then made it so hard for them to obtain justice 12th January 2024
  • The coming year: how the parameters of the constitution will shape the politics of 2024 1st January 2024
  • The coming constitutional excitements in the United States 31st December 2023
  • What is often left unsaid in complaints about pesky human rights law and pesky human rights lawyers 15th December 2023
  • A role-reversal? – a footnote to yesterday’s post 1st December 2023
  • The three elements of the Rwanda judgment that show how the United Kingdom government is now boxed in 30th November 2023
  • On yesterday’s Supreme Court judgment on the Rwanda policy 16th November 2023
  • The courts have already deflated the Rwanda policy, regardless of the Supreme Court judgment next Wednesday 10th November 2023
  • The extraordinary newspaper column of the Home Secretary – and its implications 9th November 2023
  • Drafts of history – how the Covid Inquiry, like the Leveson Inquiry, is securing evidence for historians that would otherwise be lost 1st November 2023
  • Proportionality is an incomplete legal concept 25th October 2023
  • Commissioner Breton writes a letter: a post in praise of the one-page formal document 11th October 2023
  • “Computer says guilty” – an introduction to the evidential presumption that computers are operating correctly 30th September 2023
  • COMING UP 23rd September 2023
  • Whatever happened to ‘the best-governed city in the world’? – some footnotes to the article at Prospect on the Birmingham city insolvency 9th September 2023
  • One year on from one thing, sixteen months on from another thing… 8th September 2023
  • What is a section 114 Notice? 7th September 2023
  • Constitutionalism vs constitutionalism – how liberal constitutionalists sometimes misunderstand illiberal constitutionalism 24th August 2023
  • Performative justice and coercion: thinking about coercing convicted defendants to hear their sentences 21st August 2023
  • Of impeachments and indictments – how many of the criminal indictments against Trump are a function of the failure of the impeachment process 15th August 2023

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Author: David Allen Green

The paradox of the Billionaires saying that Court Orders have no value, for without Court Orders there could not be Billionaires

11th February 2025

Those saying that Orders of the Court can be freely defied should be careful what they wish for

*

*

Imagine a billionaire, and imagine then their billions being somehow, unlawfully confiscated.

These unlawful confiscations could be in terms of their physical possessions being taken away; or titles to their real property being transferred to someone else; or the transfer away of monies in bank accounts and trust funds; or the titles in intangible property, such as intellectual property rights, being fraudulently assigned; or their contractual entitlements being wrongly nullified; or whatever.

Imagine whatever the species of wealth, it was by some unlawful means no longer to be the wealth of the billionaire.

What is the poor billionaire to do?

The billionaire would contact their lawyers, and the lawyers would then take legal actions; if needs be, the lawyers would apply to the Courts for remedies and sanctions, so that the unlawful confiscations are ceased and desisted from, and the property returned, and so on.

Whatever the species of wealth, there will be some legal means for the billionaire’s lawyers to seek legal redress form a court of competent jurisdiction.

And so in each and every case, the lawyers will be seeking an Order of the Court.

And not only would the lawyers be seeking an Order of the Court, they would be expecting that the Order of the Court would be respected and would be enforced.

*

The wealth of any billionaire (or of anybody else) is ultimately a bundle of legal rights – in contract, in property, in trusts, and so on.

It is because these rights are enforceable that the wealth exists and accumulates. Unless the legal rights are enforceable, there simply is no wealth.

And any enforceable legal right usually means ready access to an Order of the Court.

But.

If Orders of the Court have no inherent value – that it is open for others to freely disobey the Orders of the Court – then what ultimately depends on Orders of Court becomes suddenly precarious.

Therefore those – billionaires and others – who say that Orders of the Court can be freely defied, on a pick-and-choose basis should be very careful for what they wish for.

For without compliance with Orders of the Court, there cannot be any billionaires.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

Posted on 11th February 202511th February 2025Categories Contract and Commercial Law, Courts and the administration of justice, United States Law and Policy17 Comments on The paradox of the Billionaires saying that Court Orders have no value, for without Court Orders there could not be Billionaires

Why Donald Trump is not really “transactional” but anti-transactional

4th February 2025

A contract lawyer’s perspective on how Trump uses deals and deal-making

*

Contract law is (for me) the most exciting and satisfying area of law.

(Constitutional law and criminal law and media law are all very interesting in how they regulate real life activity, but only contract law is exhilarating. I once read Patrick Atiyah’s extraordinary Introduction to the Law of Contract in one go on a long plane journey, and the same author’s The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract is one of the best intellectual histories ever published.)

And so it is from a contract law perspective that this post looks at the question of whether Donald Trump, the businessman-turned-President, is “transactional” in his political approach.

This is certainly what many pundits are saying:

Are these pundits right?

Has this new conventional wisdom hit upon something?

*

From a contract law – and contract lawyer’s – perspective, Trump is not “transactional”.

Indeed, he is the opposite of transactional: he is instead anti-transactional.

A transaction is a two-way process, an exchange where a party agrees to do a thing in return for another party agreeing to do a thing.

To use old-style language, a transaction is a bargain, an exchange of promises.

And for the business people concerned in a commercial transaction, that contract has sanctity. So if a party does not comply or even breaches the contract there are remedies which are intended to place the injured party in the position they would have been had the agreement been properly performed. Often these are “money” remedies, but sometimes they can be injunctions or other court orders.

The court will enforce what the parties had agreed, for the agreement is the thing.

*

But for Trump, the agreement is not the thing.

An agreement is there to be opportunistically repudiated, and not to be performed.

An agreement offers an opportunity to gain leverage, for a new negotiation. for a new exertion of power.

This approach has also been spotted by one acute British observer:

For Trump, notwithstanding his ghost-written book The Art of the Deal, deals are not an art but about artfulness.

For Trump, a hire is only of any use so long as they can then be “fired”.

Transactions are just there for suckers.

*

There is nothing inherently weak in this anti-transactional approach: and indeed it has proved successful for Trump, both politically and commercially.

And, yes, he does deploy the rhetoric of “the deal”.

But this only makes him transactional in the same way an atheist going on about “God” makes them a Christian. There is instead a positive disbelief in the words and concepts being used.

And so each supposed agreement with Trump is a mere marker for the next use (and abuse) of leverage: few if any transactions will ever be transacted. Things will move on, there will be new exertions of power, and new things demanded.

For Trump, a contract, like Littlefinger’s chaos, is a ladder.

 

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

Posted on 4th February 2025Categories Contract and Commercial Law, United States Law and Policy14 Comments on Why Donald Trump is not really “transactional” but anti-transactional

From constitutional drama to constitutional crisis?

1st February 2025

When do constitutional problems become incapable of constitutional solutions?

*

What is a “constitutional crisis”?

There has certainly been a great deal of constitutional drama in recent years – in the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere.

But some of this drama somehow resolved itself.

In the United Kingdom, for example, the breathless threats and press briefings that the government was to do unlawful things in respect of Brexit in the end came to very little, though some (impotent) legislation was passed.

The United Kingdom supreme court in the Miller cases and parliament, by means of the Benn Act, put the government back into its constitutional box – and the once intense political-media frenzy over the Northern Irish protocol came to a whimpering end with the Windsor framework.

But sometimes constitutional dramas do spill into constitutional crises – political tensions harden into political contradictions, and these in turn can result in bloody violence.

On the islands of Britain and Ireland this has happened at least four times since the 1620s: the civil wars and political violence of the 1630s and the 1640s; the succession and religious conflicts from 1685 to 1746; the Irish war of independence and the Irish civil war; and most recently, the Troubles.

*

The execution of Charles I

*

Constitutional crises are serious political conflicts where constitutional means are unable to resolve the conflict, and the ultimate outcome of the conflict then becomes uncertain.

Often the political actors involved in the crisis will resort to violence – or be prepared to do so.

At such times it may not matter that a constitution is codified or not. For what has failed is not the form of the constitution, but its substance. The real failure is that of constitutionalism.

What then is constitutionalism? It has many definitions, but one approach is to regard it as the acceptance that there political rules and principles that should apply, regardless of partisan or personal advantage.

In other words that there are rules of the game.

What has happened in the United States over the last few days looks like a determined and comprehensive attack on various political institutions, by and on behalf of the newly re-elected President Trump.

As there are well-grounded fears that neither the federal judicial benches nor Congress will check and balance this attack, then there are the makings of a genuine constitutional crisis.

And the ultimate cause of this is not so much the failure of their codified constitution, but a deeper and wider failure of constitutionalism – including but not limited to the licence given by the United States supreme court to the president to do unlawful acts, and the failure of the Senate to discharge its constitutional obligation to convict Trump on impeachment after the attempted insurrection of 2021.

From such things, other things have now followed.

Brace, brace.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

 

Posted on 1st February 20251st February 2025Categories Constitutional Law, Constitutionalism, United Kingdom Law and Policy, United States Law and Policy17 Comments on From constitutional drama to constitutional crisis?

Solving the puzzle of why the case of Prince Harry and Lord Watson against News Group Newspapers came to its sudden end

25th January 2025

How the initial media explanations did not match the facts – and working out the explanation that did

On Wednesday 22 January the claim brought by Prince Harry and Lord Watson against News Group Newspapers was settled.

The scheduled long public trial of this claim, after many years of pre-trial hearings and manoeuvring, should have started the day before, but the parties had asked the judge for adjournments for negotiations to take place.

The judge granted a couple of short adjournments, until the Wednesday – but the trial would really then have to begin.

But the trial did not begin: the parties instead returned to court to tell the judge that the claim had been settled and that NGN had offered a formal apology and substantial damages and costs. Barring the finalisations of the details, the case was thereby over. An order – it seems a so-called Tomlin Order – was made by the court to stay the case on terms agreed by the parties.

Why had the case settled?

One possible reason seemed obvious to some pundits: the last two surviving claimants in this action, out of hundreds, Prince Harry and Lord Watson had now also finally been defeated by the costs risks of continuing. It seemed that the sheer financial might of NGN, coupled with its litigation tactic of setting onerous costs traps, had prevailed yet again.

It appeared that just like every other claim brought against NGN in respect of alleged phone hacking and alleged other unlawful invasions of privacy (primarily through the use by NGN of private investigators to commit unlawful acts – Unlawful Information Gathering, or UIG) the Duke and the Baron had been forced to settle because they could not afford to go on.

This was perhaps a fair supposition.

And so this is what many commentators said:

“In the end even [Harry] could not defy the financial risks”

“Even princes have to settle”

*

But.

This explanation did not match the available facts.

Over at Prospect I have set out in a post an alternative explanation for why the case came to an end in the manner it did – please now click here and read it.

Here I want to set out more fully the “workings” which led me both to not accept the reasons given by other commentators and to suggest another theory which did at least accord with the circumstances of how the case came to an end.

*

Useful commentary can often come from a sense of puzzlement – the reaction of “that does not make sense” – which can lead to working out an explanation which does make sense.

There were at least two things which were puzzling about how the case ended.

First, there was the apology – here it is in the form circulated to reporters:

NGN's APOLOGY TO THE CLAIMANTS NGN offers a full and unequivocal apology to the Duke of Sussex for the serious intrusion by The Sun between 1996 and 2011 into his private life, including incidents of unlawful activities carried out by private investigators working for The Sun. NGN also offers a full and unequivocal apology to the Duke of Sussex for the phone hacking, surveillance and misuse of private information by journalists and private investigators instructed by them at the News of the World. NGN further apologisesto the Duke for the impact on him of the extensive coverage and serious intrusion into his private life as well as the private life of Diana, Princess of Wales, his late mother, in particular during his younger years. We acknowledge and apologise for the distress caused to the Duke, and the damage inflicted on relationships, friendships and family, and have agreed to pay him substantial damages. It is also acknowledged, without any admission of illegality, that NGN's response to the 2006 arrests and subsequent actions were regrettable. NGN also offers a full and unequivocal apology to Lord Watson for the unwarranted intrusion carried out into his private life during his time in Government by the News of the World during the period 2009- 2011. Thisincludes him being placed undersurveillance in 2009 by journalists at the News of the World and those instructed by them. NGN also acknowledges and apologises for the adverse impact this had on Lord Watson's family and has agreed to pay him substantial damages. In addition, in 2011 News International received information that information was being passed covertly to Lord Watson from within News International. We now understand that this information was false, and Lord Watson was not in receipt of any such confidential information. NGN apologises fully and unequivocally for this.

Why did this document even exist?

For example, when NGN forced Hugh Grant to settle his claim, there was no apology. Instead there was this curt statement:

“A judge recently ruled that parts of Mr Grant’s claim were out of time and we have reached agreement to settle the remainder of the case. This has been done without admission of liability. It is in both parties’ financial interests not to progress to a costly trial.”

Had the prince and the politician been forced to settle in the same way as Grant had done so, then there would have simply been a similar statement from NGN.

But, no: we got this extraordinary and unprecedented document instead.

And not only was the existence of this document a puzzle, so was its content.

In particular the first two paragraphs, which were open admissions that NGN were responsible for unlawful activity (though note admitting civil liability is not the same as admitting criminal activity – and this was a civil case).

Yes, in a later paragraph we get a sentence with the familiar words “It is also acknowledged, without any admission of illegality, that NGN’s response to the 2006 arrests and subsequent actions were regrettable.” But that qualification did not go to the open statements in the first part of the text.

It did not matter that the wrongdoing is placed with the private investigators instructed by NGN. At law it makes no difference whether such acts are done by directors or employees of a company, or by contractors on a company’s behalf: the corporate entity can and will be liable all the same.

And in this case, where much of the documentary evidence was in the form of instructions to and invoices from the private investigators, any acknowledgment would necessarily have to accept the role of third parties “working for” the company.

The rest of the statement is also remarkable – and it covers issues which were not even part of this litigation. It is essentially a wish-list of Harry and Watson of what they wanted in a NGN statement if the case was to be discontinued. The document indicated that it had been effectively dictated by the claimants to the defendant from a position of negotiating strength.

A sort of “ok, you’ve got it” situation.

The text of the apology was far, far away from the situation of Hugh Grant and the many other claimants who had been forced to settle.

And so the explanation for why the claim of the Duke and the Baron came to an end could not easily be the same.

That explanation did not make sense.

*

The second thing which did not make sense was the timing – though here the puzzlement came from experience and knowledge of practical civil litigation.

The puzzle was this: there was no particular costs reason why Harry and Watson would have to settle on the eve of trial.

Yes, each day would incur more legal costs – but by this point of the litigation the marginal increases are pebbles on a beach.

There was no inherent reason why costs would force the claimants into settlement on that day which was different from a week ago.

And had the settlement been on the basis of a brand new “Part 36 offer” (on which more below) there would be a period to respond, and there would be no real need for anxious negotations, as they are effectively “take it or leave it” devices.

Indeed, a claimant is generally in its strongest position as a trial is about to begin for the claimant gets to put their case first.

The real pressure on the eve-of-trial is usually on a defendant and not on a claimant.

And so the question becomes: what could it possibly be about a trial about to begin that would motivate a defendant into settlement?

Here the answer is perhaps plain: when a trial actually begins, all sorts of court documents and documentary evidence can enter the public domain, and as a trial continues that documentary evidence is placed before the court (and the public) and witnesses are openly examined and cross-examined.

If the objective of a party to litigation is to avoid such dislosure of things to the world, the eve of trial is the very last chance to ensure absolutely that it does not happen. Any settlement thereafter, during the trial, is risky, as complete control over various documents will have been lost.

*

And then there was another point, which came from reading thirteen or so reported rulings and judgments in respect of pre-trial hearings in this case.

NGN actually had a good arguable defence which may have prevailed at trial.

This defence was not on the actual substance of the case – there seemed no plausible answer to the questions raised by the documentary evidence that had been mentioned in the pre-trial proceedings.

It was instead a technical defence, based on limitation – that the claims had been brought too late.

The allegations in respect of phone hacking had already been struck out of the claimants’ cases, as the claimants could have brought their claims within the relevant limitation period, but did not.

The allegations in respect of other unlawful activity – UIG – had survived a pre-trial application by NGN for strike-out – but only just.

The judge had decided, on balance, that the issue of whether the claimants were out of time to bring the UIG claims was to be decided at trial.

Here the issue turned on what is called “constructive” knowledge – could the claimants have known earlier that there was a potential claim.

The judge was plainly uneasy on this point.

Here is a paragraph from a June 2024 ruling:

Sometimes I have the impression in this claim that even the claimant's lawyers don't seem fully to grapple with the Knowledge Issue, at least the constructive knowledge aspect of it, despite its having been spelt out in NGN's correspondence and explained in my judgments. So it would not be at all surprising if the claimant himself did not fully understand or grapple with it. Perhaps the position instead is the claimant's solicitors do understand it, but they are reluctant to engage with it as an issue. In the letter replying to NGN's original letter about disclosure on 7 December 2022, the claimant's solicitors didn't even address the issue of disclosure relating to constructive knowledge of the claimant prior to September 2013.

And here are three paragraphs from a July 2023 ruling:

As the judge put it elsewhere: “The relevant question […] is whether by September 2013 the Duke knew or could with reasonable diligence have known that he had a worthwhile claim against NGN for blagging or UIG conducted by PIs.”

It may be that NGN would have successfully relied on this defence at trial.

But unfortunately for NGN it would have to be mounted at trial.

In pre-trial hearings, NGN tried hard to have the UIG claim knocked out, like the phone hacking claim, or to have it dealt with as a preliminary issue – and they almost succeeded, but the judge hesitated and said it was a matter for a full hearing.

By which time it would then be too late for NGN, if their goal was to prevent a public trial.

*

When NGN succeeded in knocking out out the phone hacking allegations on the basis of limitation, it was presented by their spokesperson as a triumph – a “significant victory”:

“The High Court has today, in a significant victory for News Group Newspapers, dismissed The Duke of Sussex’s phone hacking claims against both the News Of The World and The Sun. […]

“Mr Justice Fancourt then dismissed the duke’s phone hacking claims against both the News Of The World and The Sun on the grounds that the claim had been brought too late.

“This substantially reduces the scope of his legal claim. The exact nature and scope of any trial of the remainder will be the subject of further hearings.”

But it was not a significant victory for NGN.

It was in fact a significant defeat.

NGN’s strongest legal defence – perhaps their only defence, but still a strong one – would have to be heard at full trial, rather than be the knock-out blow before the trial.

*

The reason why it is significant that NGN actually had a good arguable defence in this case is that it make it even more puzzling that they were so anxious to settle on the eve of trial.

A defendant in possession of such a good – if technical – complete defence would be tempted to let the trial run its course, win on the limitation defence, and then hammer the claimants for legal costs.

But NGN didn’t.

NGN did not want a trial, even if there was a good chance of their limitation defence succeeding.

*

So what could explain all this?

The volunteered apology with its open admissions and statements on matters which were not even part of the litigation?

The anxiety that the case has to end before a public trial began?

The urge to end a case even where the defendant had a good (if technical) defence at trial?

And then there were other odd details, which required knowledge and experience of civil litigation to pick up: there had been no application for a statement in open court (which can happen when a Part 36 claim had been accepted) and the case had ended with a Tomlin order (or similar) which is not the means be which a case usually comes to an end because of costs pressures under Part 36.

It was a curious situation, which every detail made curiouser and curiouser.

*

Before we get to the solution, a quick word now about Part 36.

Part 36 describes a process in civil litigation where a party (either a defendant or a claimant) makes a formal offer to settle a claim.

If the other party does not accept the offer and instead proceeds to trial, that other party has to then “beat” the offer.

If the judge awards compensation less than the offer or no compensation at all (the judge at this stage is not told about the offer) then the party that did not accept the offer is heavily penalised for costs of the other party on the so-called, onerous “indemnity” basis. And costs often are far in excess of the compensation,

This means a party that rejects a reasonable offer is at risk of losing in reality when it nominally wins.

As a mechanism, it concentrates the minds of the parties to litigation wonderfully.

And in the vast majority of cases it works well – to the benefit of both claimants and defendants.

But it is a system which can be gamed – though how it can be reformed without losing its benefits for majority of cases is a difficult question.

If a party makes a Part 36 offer which is higher than any amount that could possibly be awarded by a judge, then the other party has no real choice but to accept the offer and end the case.

And this is what happened with Hugh Grant and other claimant in this litigation.

They still – theoretically – had the right of access to a court and a full trial – just as nominally we all have the right to go for lunch at The Ritz.

But in reality a claimant has to end the case.

Unless, of course, you have a claimant who is as determined as the two remaining claimants in this case.

*

And so we come to the eve of trial (or indeed, but for the last minute adjournments, the day of trial).

Every other claimant, bar the two remaining, had settled – including being forced into settlement by generous Part 36 offers.

The application to strike out the entire claim on the basis of limitation failed.

The application to have the limitation defence heard as a preliminary issue failed.

Nothing in the litigation strategy of NGN – otherwise highly successful – had worked.

And yes, NGN had a good arguable defence – but it was a defence which could only be used if the trial went ahead.

Offers of cash were not working – the remaining claimants wanted more than cash – they wanted admissions.

And there could not be another adjournment – the trial was about to begin, and NGN would lose control over all sorts of documents and evidence the moment the trial commenced and as it continued.

What could NGN possibly do?

They had only one remaining option – a nuclear button option or, to switch metaphors, one final pill in the litigation medicine chest.

They could admit liability for the claim – or at least signal to the claimants that they would now accept liability for the claim.

*

By admitting liability for the claim, it would not then matter who at NGN knew what or when, and how far up the organisation went the instructions and knowledge of wrongdoing- the corporate entity would still be liable.

And if they accept the claim, then there would be no need for a full trial.

Harry and Watson could not force a full trial even if they had wanted to do so, for there would be no issue to be tried.

It would stop, at a stroke, the possibility of documents being disclosed and matter being dealt with in public court.

The cost of this move, however, was to shatter the litigation strategy that had hitherto been so successful with other claimants.

The cost of this move would also be a public statement on terms dictated by the claimants – the “ok, you’ve got it” situation.

And the cost of the move would be, well, costs. Lots and lots of costs.

A defendant admitting liability at the opening of a trial can expect to be hammered by the court for costs on an indemnity basis, and then hammered and hammered again.

As it was, the defendant did not need to formally admit the claim – it was enough to tell the claimants that it would be prepared to as a basis for settlement.

And so a public trial was avoided.

*

If this theory – and it is only a theory, based entirely (with one exception – the Tomlin Order point, which came from someone in court) on a close reading of the public domain documents and a knowledge and experience of civil litigation – is correct then many things are explained, which otherwise cannot be explained.

It explains the volunteered public apology in its wide-ranging terms and its open admissions – in contrast with how the Hugh Grant claim and other claims ended.

It explains the timing – which cannot be explained by costs risks on the defendants.

It explains why NGN did not proceed to trial even though it had a good arguable but technical defence.

It explains all the odd procedural technical details of how the case came to an end.

It makes sense – wheras the “costs risk” explanation of other commentary did not make sense and match the facts.

*

All this said, it is still only a theory – the above is an explanation which matches the available facts.

But it provides a solution to something which was otherwise very puzzling.

***

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Posted on 25th January 202526th January 2025Categories Close readings, Communications and Media & Law and Policy, Courts and the administration of justice, Litigation, United Kingdom Law and Policy11 Comments on Solving the puzzle of why the case of Prince Harry and Lord Watson against News Group Newspapers came to its sudden end

Looking critically at Trump’s flurry of Executive Orders: why we should watch what is done, and not to be distracted by what is said

21st January 2025

Around Westminster, the most useful guides to the nature of modern politics may not be the journalists and commentators, still less the ‘think tanks’ with their portentous names and solemn but flimsy ‘reports’.

They are perhaps instead the con-artist conjurers on Westminster Bridge – whose activities are detailed in this fine piece.

For it is these lowly tricksters that remind us that we should watch what is done, and not to be distracted by anything else.

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The Conjurer, painted by Hieronymus Bosch

*

In the United States and the United Kingdom there is currently a lot of noise and a lot of misdirection.

As a famous chess player once observed:

“The point of modern propaganda isn’t only to misinform or push an agenda. It is to exhaust your critical thinking, to annihilate truth.”

*

The constant noise and endless misdirections are indeed exhausting.

By the time any of the noise and misdirections are translated into action (or inaction), you are tired to notice and others will be too tired to care.

We will be onto the next outrage, and then the next, and the next.

The hard thing is to separate out what is done (and not done) from what is said.

*

In the United States there has been a flurry of Executive Orders from the newly inaugurated President Donald Trump.

This sounds very impressive, and it sounds very scary.

But, an Executive Order is not a precise thing – it is a generic term to describe a range of documents that can come from the President.

As this US academic explains:

Some of these Executive Orders will be instruments provided for and envisaged by pre-exisiting enacted legislation: and these will usually have direct legal effect.

Others will have no legal framework and have no legal basis for having any effect.

Many will range between these two extremes.

All will be ‘Executive Orders’ put forward and signed by the President – but pretty much that is all they will have in common.

And according to another US observer, many of these Executive orders are not even of serviceable quality:

This is not surprising: competent legal drafting is not easy, and many of these “Executive Orders” are from pressure groups and professional antagonisers.

Like the Truss legal letter recently examined on this blog, what you have here are media-political devices disguised in the form of legal documents.

But it is a mask, and what we are seeing is essentially a masquerade.

*

This is not to say that some – maybe many – of these Executive Orders are not going to have adverse effects for somebody – especially in the short term.

Indeed, given the many partisan conservative judges now on the federal bench, there will be energetic judicial exertions to give effect to otherwise shoddy Executive Orders.

But what it does mean is that we should be careful not to accept everything at face value.

For a flurry of Executive Orders may be little different from a flurry of Press Releases.

And we should be mindful that we are dealing with con-artist conjurers.

***

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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Posted on 21st January 202521st January 2025Categories Constitutional and Legal History, Constitutionalism, United States Law and Policy9 Comments on Looking critically at Trump’s flurry of Executive Orders: why we should watch what is done, and not to be distracted by what is said

A third and final post about the ‘Lettuce before Action’ of Elizabeth Truss

18th January 2025

The final piece of evidence which shows, on balance, that it was not intended as a serious legal letter

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So far this blog (here and here) has provided an immediate close reading of the libel letter sent by the former Prime Minister to the current Prime Minister, and yesterday it set out a more considered approach.

But there is one further thing which perhaps should be noted about the letter.

Let us look again at the first and final pages (which for reasons given in the previous points, I have taken out the letterhead of the law firm, though there is a reference to it on the the final page, which was unavoidable if I were to show the letter did not have a “wet ink” signature).

*

There is something else missing, apart from the “wet ink” signature.

It is something which would normally be at the top of the first page, or maybe sometimes at the bottom of the last page.

The letter circulated to the media does not include any of the usual “furniture” of a legal letter: a reference number, the identity of the lawyer sending it, the email address for the recipient to respond to, and so on.

As this was a letter which explicitly was sent by email, then an email address for a response would be normal.

And given the law firm sending the letter lists three postal addresses for three offices, there would be a need at least for a file reference number or other identifying paraphernalia.

But there is nothing.

*

Taken together with the evidence already detailed in the previous posts that this is a weak litigation letter, then this suggests one of the following scenarios:

1. the version of the letter sent did not have a “wet ink” signature, no reference number and no identifying information as to the lawyer and office which sent it;

2. the version circulated to the press was an unsigned “client copy” of the version of the letter sent, and the letter which was sent did have a reference number and identifying information as to the lawyer and office, and either Truss or someone in her circle leaked their “client copy” version of the letter;

3. the version sent and circulated to the press was not “leaked”, but was instead deliberately crafted and intended as a publicity version for release to the media, and so care was taken that this publicity version removed any identifying details.

Normally(!) the first option would the least likely, because it would odd indeed for a multi-office law firm (as opposed, say, to a High Street one-person firm) to have no identifying information whatsoever on a litigation letter for any reply to be directed to the right person.

Yet if it is the third option, then this would mean that the letter was never intended by Truss to be taken seriously by the recipient: it was always and entirely a media-political exercise.

*

On balance, taking together both the muddled content (and lack of content) of the letter and the accumulation of telling details, this letter was never intended to be a credible litigation letter, it was always an exercise in publicity.

Your response to this may be (and perhaps should be) “duh, no surprise there, Sherlock” – but it is one thing to assert that a letter has no credible legal purpose, and another to demonstrate it could have no credible legal purpose, and to demonstrate on balance that it could have no credible legal purpose is what this short series of posts set out to do.

And, if so, it is an unwelcome development that lawyers’ letters are being. used for such a media-political purpose.

***

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This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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Posted on 18th January 2025Categories Courts and Politics, Courts and the administration of justice, Litigation, Texts and Textual Analyses, United Kingdom Law and Policy6 Comments on A third and final post about the ‘Lettuce before Action’ of Elizabeth Truss

Why the Truss “lettuce before action” is worse than you thought – and it has a worrying implication for free speech

17th January 2025

Before we start, the “lettuce before action” (for “letter before action”) line has been taken from the estimable Paul Magrath, whose weekly legal email is a must-read.

I really wish I had thought of the line for last week’s post.

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The post last week provided a quick close reading of the gloriously bad libel letter sent on behalf of the former Prime Minister Elizabeth Truss to the current Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

That post was done at speed: I wanted to respond to what the letter actually said, before I was aware of what others said it said. This is always the best way of engaging any formal document: work out what you can from reading the text yourself, before seeing what others tell you the text says.

This approach has its advantages – and also its disadvantages, not least that one can miss things others will see.

There was also the problem I did not then have access to the second page – though it was fun to speculate what could be on that second page.

This is now a more considered post, adding to the points made in the first post (which I think stands quite well), with the bonus of what seems to be the second page.

And for the reasons set out below, there is a worrying implication in the letter in respect of free expression. This is perhaps odd coming from a politician who often emphasises her free speech credentials.

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First, here is the full letter with what appears to be the second page (which has been taken with thanks from here):

 

 

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The second page, which I speculated must have contained all what was missing from the other pages, in fact adds nothing substantial to the letter.

Here it is again:

But, for completeness, the second page tells us that the words complained of were not said in parliament and so there is no issue of the absolute privilege for what is said in parliament (paragraph [7] and the footnotes to paragraph [4]).

And Paragraph [9] somehow manages to weaken what is already a very weak letter.

We already knew that this was a “cease-and-desist” letter that somehow did not set out what would happen if the recipient did not cease and desist. Paragraph [9] now sets out the sender is not even demanding a legal remedy at all.

In litigation terms, paragraph [9] should have instead been in an accompanying “without prejudice” proposing an offer for a compromised outcome. But for some reason it was included in, and thereby undermines, the “open” letter that would be placed before the court when the matter came to trial. It is a strange inclusion in such a letter.

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As set out last week, this libel threat is poor.

It is perhaps the weakest libel threat ever sent by an English law firm.

That said, it is in my view just about within the scope that a law firm could properly send, given very precise instructions.

But those very precise instruction would have to be to the effect of “send the weakest litigation letter you can”.

And so for that reason, I am not making a point of mentioning the law firm.

We should not visit the sins of a client upon a lawyer, and Truss – like you and me – is entitled to legal representation.

*

Now are some further, more considered observations on the letter.

Notice the bulk of the letter is concerned with the appended expert’s report, including – impressively – a paragraph [16] with seven(!) sub-paragraphs.

This bulk makes the letter rather lop-sided.

The “legal” bits of the letter are nowhere near as detailed as the “economic” bits.

The impression this gives is that the origin of the letter was probably this report, which was then given to lawyers with the instruction of somehow building a legal letter on top of it.

The letter was thereby likely to be a device for promoting the content of the report, which it certainly did.

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And this then probably explains the existence of this letter.

As was set out last week, it is an utter failure as a libel threat.

Although – with a squint – one can see that it just about meets the requirements of a legal letter, it is plain that was not its purpose.

(And perhaps one error last week was for this blog to treat it earnestly, on its own terms, as a legal letter.)

It is not a serious legal document, but a political and media document.

And contrary to the “Private and Confidential” marking on its front page, it would appear that the intention of the client (if not of the law firm, who would have no control of the matter) was for it to be leaked and published.

That this is the case is further evidenced by the circulated version being unsigned.

For while some legal letters are not signed, and there is no strict requirement for an “ink” signature as such, it is also often the case that the client copies of correspondence are also not signed, just the letter which is actually sent.

It would seem that the letter must have been leaked either by the client or someone in her circle.

*

As regards the expert report, a number of commenters have focused on the identity of the expert.

But it does not matter if the economist’s report on which the letter was relying was by John Maynard Keynes or Adam Smith.

It made no sense to rely on an expert’s report in respect of facts which the same letter also said were “clear”.

That is not what expert reports are for in civil litigation.

*

And now we come to the possible implication of the letter for free expression.

Reading the letter as a whole, including the now non-missing page two, the threat made against the Prime Minister could be made by her against any person at all who said the words complained of.

There is nothing in the letter which would limit the alleged liability to the Prime Minister for saying those words.

Generally libel is blind to the identity and motives of the person who “publishes” the words – in this case says words reported in the media.

The framing of the letter is such that any person who published the words complained of would be liable to Truss for general damages.

The letter is addressed to Starmer, but it describes a claim Truss could also make against world.

Fortunately this letter is so hopeless that nobody will end up with legal liability.

But the premise of the letter is an extraordinary widening of legal liability for political speech, catching many political speech-acts on social media and other published media which most be people would assume was part of their everyday free speech in criticising Truss for what she did with the economy.

Given that the sender often promotes her belief in free speech, this is perhaps further evidence that the content of this letter was not really thought-through by Truss, beyond being the means of widely circulating a certain favourable (but probably legally inadmissible) report.

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The Prime Minister gave what must be the most appropriate response to this letter in PMQs on Wednesday.

“I got a letter this week from a Tory voter in a Labour seat.

“I hope that they do not mind me saying who it was—it was Liz Truss.

“It was not written in green ink, but it might as well have been.

“She was complaining that saying she had crashed the economy was damaging her reputation.

“It was actually crashing the economy that damaged her reputation.”

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There has been no announcement of any formal reply by Starmer to the letter, which is not surprising given the letter did not ask for a reply, still less (remarkably for a supposed cease-and-desist letter) demand any undertakings, and the letter also did not include any deadline.

Truss, however, seems to want to have the last word.

On X (previously Twitter) she responded to the Prime Minister’s jibe:

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Here, if Truss sincerely thinks accusing someone of crashing the economy is defamatory (subject to any defences), then she is with her “closer to home” comments herself defaming someone else in turn.

But at least she put “cease and desist” letter in ironic quotes.

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Politicians and others (and their lawyers) should always be careful in using any litigation documents – from letters before action to third party submissions – for the purposes of publicity.

Judges certainly do not like it.

And if done badly, you also end up looking very silly.

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At Substack, last week’s post on Truss has now overtaken the post on Taylor Swift to become the second most popular post ever published on that blog.

And this is fitting in a way.

For an alternative title for this post could have been: “Litigation (Liz Truss’s Version)”.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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Posted on 17th January 202518th January 2025Categories Courts and Politics, Courts and the administration of justice, Litigation, United Kingdom Law and Policy7 Comments on Why the Truss “lettuce before action” is worse than you thought – and it has a worrying implication for free speech

Of Indictments and Impeachments, and of Donald Trump – two similar words for two distinct things

16th January 2025

Over at Prospect, for this my “weekly constitutional” post I have done something on why the ultimate fault for Trump not being held to account for what he did on 6 January four years ago is not with the failed, now effectively out-of-time prosecution, but with the fact it was not dealt with properly by the Senate when Trump was impeached.

This was something which should have been dealt with by impeachment, not indictment.

It was the wrong i———ment word.

This is not to say there are not problems with the prosecution, and I mentioned some of these in a post here a couple of days ago, when the special prosecutor’s report was published.

But.

Even taking the prosecution at its highest, it was wrong tool for the job.

When the Senate acquitted Trump over what he did on 6 January 2021 and so did not disqualify him from office (a political and not a legal sanction), all else followed.

What Trump did on 6 January 2021 also fitted various general criminal offences according to the published report, but that was incidental.

It was essentially a political wrong – and so it should have been dealt with by political means.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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Posted on 16th January 202516th January 2025Categories Accountability, Competition law, Courts and Politics, Courts and the administration of justice, Litigation, United States Law and Policy4 Comments on Of Indictments and Impeachments, and of Donald Trump – two similar words for two distinct things

Why did the DoJ prosecution of Trump run out of time?

14th January 2025

How was Trump able to time-out a significant prosecution?

The volume of the United States Department of Justice (DoJ) report dealing with the prosecution of Donald Trump over the event of 6 January four years ago has just been published.

It will take time to digest – and please note this blog is not written by an American lawyer.

But there is one key question that has to be asked of the report and the failed prosecution it details and describes.

And it goes to the last portion of the report:

“but for Mr. Trump’s election and imminent return to the Presidency, the Office assessed that the admissible evidence was sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction at trial.”

This balanced CNN report from earlier this year provides informed views as to the delays, with defenders and critics of the DoJ process both quoted.

My preliminary view as a commentator on litigation matters is that the prosecution underestimated the effective lawyering of Trump’s advisers and also underestimated how the courts may go against them.

They had what seemed a one-sided litigation strategy – that is to say, not a meaningful litigation strategy at all.

If a party to a dispute has absolute control over events, it does not need a strategy.

A litigation strategy instead is needed so as to anticipate and deal with what the other parties can and will do, and what the courts can and will do.

Trump’s lawyers had a strategy of delay and obstruction – and it worked very effectively, at least with the federal prosecutions (though not entirely, of course, with the New York fraud prosecution, though they still ensured the sentencing there was too late so as to be meaningless).

Not for the first time, those who though they had the measure of Trump underestimated his sheer will for survival.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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Posted on 14th January 202514th January 2025Categories Criminal Law, Democracy, Elections and Voting, United States Law and Policy21 Comments on Why did the DoJ prosecution of Trump run out of time?

Spiteful governments and simple contract law, a weak threatening letter, and a warning of a regulatory battle ahead

13th January 2025

Some things from last week you may have missed.

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The weekly constitutional

Last week I expected my blogging to centre around a post I was preparing for Prospect, where my regular contribution is to branded as a ‘weekly constitutional’.

This pleasing badge implies a weekly meander – but it will be one based on a recent (or non-recent) published case report. The aim is to use that judgment or other decision to show how law and action work – and do not work – in practice.

The first ‘weekly constitutional’ was about a significant United Kingdom Supreme Court decision that was handed down in November but which got almost no press attention (the main honourable exception was in the estimable Byline Times).

In the unanimous decision the Supreme Court justices undid a grossly spiteful attack by the then coalition government on public sector trades unions not by resorting to elaborate employment law provisions, but by applying a contract law rule so simple it is the stuff of the first weeks of any law degree.

I liked doing that post – please read it here – and I hope you will follow the ‘weekly constitutional’ post. I will post here and alert you to them, perhaps expanding on certain points.

But that post got rather drowned by the attention received by two other things that I wrote last week.

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‘Lettuce before Action’

I so wish I had thought of the above line, but it was coined by the peerless Paul Magrath, whose weekly law email is a must-read – you can subscribe here.

This is about, of course, the antics of a former Prime Minister – and indeed a former Lord High Chancellor – in sending a legal letter to the current Prime Minister.

A letter so weak it may well be the weakest threatening letter ever sent by a United Kingdom law firm.

The ‘close reading’ post I did – here – was done very quickly and promptly, and indeed so promptly that I even had to set out why as a matter of copyright and confidentiality I was entitled to publish the letter so as to comment on it.

Since the publication, the former Prime Minister has been widely ridiculed for this misfired missive – but I think there may be something more worth saying about the letter – and so I may do a post with further reflections.

*

Back in the salmon pink

Last week I was also invited to write something about about social media regulation for the Financial Times.

It is always lovely to write for what – in my biased but honest opinion – is the best newspaper, though it is always terrifyingly daunting to be published alongside proper commentators.

(Lucy Kellaway is my all-time favourite columnist in any newspaper anywhere.)

So I wrote one thing, about the inherent difficulties about regulating social media – some of which will be familiar to long-term readers here.

And is often the case, new ideas come out once you actually start something, and so I wrote a second thing about what I say as the rational drivers behind what Meta announced last week. This was based on actually listening carefully to what Mark Zuckerberg has said in his broadcast – and then reading that prepared statement even more carefully (which led to the all-important satisfying “Aha!” moment).

The two pieces were then banged into one longer piece with an overall, hopefully coherent structure.

And the resulting ‘essay’ was published in the print edition and online on Saturday.

For reasons of topicality, more than the quality of the writing, the piece became very popular.

The Bluesky stats for the article matched my Brexit posts on Twitter at the height of Brexit when I had five times as many followers.

The piece was even briefly one of the top five read FT.com pieces globally.

The sensation of this happening is not altogether pleasant.

But perhaps the one merit of the piece was that it offered an explanation for something which seemed otherwise hard to explain in rational terms.

Essentially the argument offered by the piece was:

(a) Meta has an interest in switching to a more confrontational approach with irksome foreign regulators, especially in the European Union,

(b) Meta now has an opportunity to do this because of the reelection of Donald Trump to the United States presidency,

but (c) this does not show strength but weakness, for in those foreign jurisdictions, the platforms know the respective state has the ultimate power of legal recognition.

And so this is why Meta now needs a strategic ally in the US government – and everything else follows from that.

This seemed obvious from Zuckerberg’s statement – but because it was slipped in a point number six after five rather attention-grabbing other points, but did not get the attention it should have had.

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Litigation and regulatory strategies are fascinating – in particular, where the surface theatrics of impulsiveness, hypocrisy and recklessness misdirect onlookers into thinking the underlying commercial (or political) objectives are similarly irrational.

Even Liz Truss’s letter makes sense – but solely from a political-media perspective, and not any legal perspective.

Perhaps I should write that further piece on that letter, if only to use that ‘Lettuce before Action’ line as a title.

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Posted on 13th January 202513th January 2025Categories Artificial Intelligence, Blogging and bloggers, Close readings, Communications and Media & Law and Policy, European Union Law and Policy, Regulatory law, Supreme Court, UK Supreme Court, United Kingdom Law and Policy, Words and Things16 Comments on Spiteful governments and simple contract law, a weak threatening letter, and a warning of a regulatory battle ahead

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