Category: Regulatory law

Law and lore, and state failure – the quiet collapse of the county court system in England and Wales

22nd April 2024
One theme of my blogging is the relationship between law and lore. By ‘law and lore’ I mean what people believe to be the law to be, as opposed to what the ‘black letter’ law actually is.
Few people, if any, regulate their lives by what the law actually is – for no (normal) human being can know the detail of all the laws that apply at every moment of their lives, from statutes and by-laws to contractual terms and conditions. The best that one can do is know as much actual law as you can and hope that what you believe about law corresponds with what the law actually is.

(And, of course, it may not always be plain what the law actually is, in any case.)

Another theme of my blogging is state failure. By ‘state failure’ I mean the acts and omissions by and on behalf of public officials and public bodies that indicate fundamental and/or systemic failings.

Sometimes these state failings can be hidden deliberately from the public and indeed politicians and the media, and sometimes there is perhaps no need to deliberately hide them as too few people care. In either case the ultimate problem is either lack of resources or lack of accountability, or both.

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Over at Prospect I have done a piece that illustrates these two themes: the unsexy and perhaps uninteresting topic of local civil justice – and in particular, the county court system.

Please click and read here.

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I fell onto this topic by chance. I was looking at the transcript of the recent ‘liaison committee’ of the House of Commons for something I am writing about parliamentary accountability. This committee, comprised of select committee chairs, is one of the few recent improvements in holding the executive account, with its periodic examinations of the Prime Minister.

At the most recent session, I saw that the Justice committee chair devoted about half his allotted questions to the county court system. He could have chosen many other topics – from international law to prisons – but this was the subject he selected. That in turn led me to seeing that the justice committee has started an investigation into the county court system. Such an inquiry is welcome.

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The reason the county court system combines state failure (of which it is an example) with law and lore is that, for most people the county court system would be where they would enforce their everyday legal rights and obligations in respect of civil law – contract, torts, family law, property law, and so on.

Few people would be able to commence such litigation in the more expensive and exclusive High Court – just as few people would be able to lunch at the Ritz.

Of course, most people will not ever litigate. Indeed most people will happily go through their lives without attending a county court – or even knowing where their nearest one is situated.

But they will conduct themselves often on the assumption that certain rights and obligations can be enforced ultimately.

However, if the county court system continues to collapse, then that assumption will become increasingly academic. In essence, what people believe they can enforce at court will become more lore than law.

This is not to say that there will suddenly be anarchy and lawlessness: systems of customary oral law can be very enduring, and some systems of non-enforceable law can be rather resilient.

But eventually the mismatch between what is understood to be the law and what can actually be enforced will have some effect, and that effect will, in turn, modify behaviours – and in an adverse way.

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We are getting close to local civil justice not being meaningful to many in the community.

Let us hope that, unless local civil justice is somehow revitalised, that the lag between law and lore is a long one.

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Drafts of history – how the Covid Inquiry, like the Leveson Inquiry, is securing evidence for historians that would otherwise be lost

All Saints’ Day, 2023

The Leveson Inquiry ended badly: the recommendations of the report were botched and then ignored.

But the Inquiry was not without value: the Inquiry placed into the public domain substantial evidence about the nature of the news media that otherwise would have been lost. As such the Inquiry was a boon for the public understanding of the media, even if it was a failure as a means of bringing about regulatory change.

We cannot know yet whether any recommendations of the current Covid Inquiry will be similarly of little or no import. But, as with the Leveson Inquiry before it, it is a boon of the public understanding of those with power – though this time it is revealing the doings and goings-on of those with political power instead of media power.

This is because the Covid Inquiry has “teeth” with its powers to obtain evidence. And without such teeth there can never be real accountability. The sound of accountability are the complaints and greivances of those being forced to disclose evidence against their will.

Of course, the Covid Inquiry has not got all the evidence it wants – and some of the excuses for non-disclosure seem at best implausible. But the Inquiry has got far more than any attempt by parliament or the press to hold ministers and officials accountable.

And there is no reason to believe that the actions and attitudes revealed by the disclosed evidence before the Covid Inquiry is exceptional: one can only presume that, say, Brexit was dealt with in the same way. That evidence, however, is forever hidden from us.

But the Covid Inquiry is giving us a snapshot of the nature of political power in Whitehall in the early part of this decade – and one which will assist historians for generations.

Part of the value of statutory inquiries is not in the results but in the process and what is revealed in the process – and, perhaps paradoxically, that is why many public inquiries are also indicative of the failure of our political institutions and media to otherwise hold the state properly to account.

“How did this person die? – And what lessons can we learn?”

27 June 2023

A sensible policy proposal to monitor the recommendations of coroners’ inquests

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“How did this person die?”

In any organised society this is one of the most important and basic questions that can and should be asked.

Was it a death that could have been prevented?

Are there things that can be done so that similar deaths can be avoided?

These questions are not just about the immediate, medical cause of death – but the wider circumstances which led to a person dying.

“How did this person die?” is a question which the legal system can often only answer indirectly. A police investigation and a criminal trial can sometimes ascertain the circumstances of a death when there is potential criminal liability. A civil trial can sometimes ascertain the circumstances of a death when there is potential civil liability.

But not all preventable deaths or lethal system failures are matters for the criminal and civil courts. And the purpose of court proceedings is not directly to inquire into facts generally, but to allocate legal liability – which is not always the same thing. For example, criminal proceedings especially have very strict rules of evidence.

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There therefore needs to be another way of inquiring in the circumstances of the death and drawing any lessons – distinct from and in addition to the criminal and civil courts.

A way where the focus is not on the rights and liabilities of persons, but on simply finding out what happened and what that tells us.

And there is such another way.

In England there is the ancient office of the coroner.

Coroners have long provided the public good of conducting inquests into the circumstances of deaths – and coroners can make recommendations that may prevent further deaths and avoid similar lethal system failures.

It is difficult to think of anything that serves a more fundamental public interest.

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But.

There is little wider point in coroners conducting their inquiries and making recommendations if nothing comes of the lessons that have been identified.

And this is a serious problem about our coronial system.

Here is a worked example provided by Inquest, the charity that provides expertise on state related deaths and their investigation:

And here is another case study:

As Inquest say at the end of that case study:

“…there is no central body dedicated to collating and analysing the Government’s follow-up to these recommendations to encourage positive action to prevent further deaths. Instead, it falls to families, lawyers, charities and coroners to join the dots.”

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In essence, the lack of any body (and, indeed, anybody) being responsible for monitoring what happens to coroners’ recommendations robs the coronial system of any wider efficacy.

A public good may be being served by individual inquests into particular deaths, but this public good is not being converted into a wider social benefit.

That there is even this gap is extraordinary.

Other public entities have, in turn, their monitors – for example, the inspectorates of the police and of prisons.

There are many bodies that answer Alan Moore’s question of who watches the watchmen (or, as Juvenal once put it, quis custodiet ipsos custodes?).

Given the fundamental public interest in avoiding preventable deaths and lethal system failures, it would seem to be a no-brainer of a public policy proposal.

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Inquest are today launching a campaign for such a body:

Inquest have also published this persuasive guide – from which the above case studies are taken.

Though the proposed name of a “national oversight mechanism” is a bit cumbersome – I would suggest OffQuest – there can be no sensible doubt that it is required as a thing.

And as we approach the next general election, it would seem straightforward for political parties to commit to such a body in their manifestoes.

It is a gap that should be filled and can be filled, and it is a proposal that can only have benefits.

For after all, the reason why “How did this person die?” is such an important question is that the answer can often help those who are still alive.

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Over at his Substack, Joshua Rozenberg has written a good post on this topic.

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This has been cross-posted from my Empty City substack.

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Photo credit: wikimedia commons.

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Telling the story of how the “serious disruption” public order statutory instrument was passed

14th June 2023

Here is a story about law-making told in different ways.

The law in question is a statutory instrument made under the Public Order Act 1986 – the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 – which comes into force tomorrow.

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By way of background

A statutory instrument is what is called “secondary legislation” and it has the same effect as primary legislation, as long as it is within the scope of the primary legislation under which it is made.

Statutory instruments are, in effect, executive-made legislation.  They still have to have parliamentary approval, but they are not open to amendment and rarely have debate or a vote.

Often the parliamentary approval of statutory instruments goes through on the nod, but sometimes they need to have a positive vote in favour.

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The government’s version

The first way of telling the story is from the government’s perspective.

The statutory instrument was put to a vote in the House of Commons on Monday with the Home Secretary herself leading the debate.

At the end of the debate there was a contested vote, which the government won:The (elected) House of Commons having shown its approval, the House of Lords did not pass a “fatal” motion against the statutory instrument.

Instead the House of Lords passed a motion (merely) regretting the Statutory Instrument:

The vote (against the government) was as follows:

The House of Lords also had a specific vote on a fatal motion, which was defeated:
And when the official opposition was criticised by for not supporting the fatal motion, a frontbencher was unapologetic:

And this is the first way of telling this story: there was a Commons vote; the Lords showed disdain but did not exercise any veto inn view of the Commons vote; and so the statutory instrument became law as the result of a democratic legislative process.

Told this way, the story is about how laws can and are made by such a democratic legislative process

Nothing to see here.

But.

But but but.

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The constitutionalist version

There is another way of telling this story.

This account starts with the Public Order Act 2023 when it was a bill before parliament.

At a very late stage of the passage of that bill the government sought to amend it so as to include provisions that were substantially similar to what ended up in the statutory instrument passed this week.

The government failed to get those amendments through the House of Lords. and so they were dropped from the bill before it became an Act.

As a House of Lords committee noted:

The Home Office could not answer these basic questions:For this committee to say that it believes “this raises possible constitutional issues that the House may wish to consider” is serious stuff.

What had happened is that the Home Office, having failed to bounce parliament into accepting these amendments into primary legislation by very late amendments, has come up with this alternative approach.

Told this alternative way, the story is not about how laws can and are made by a democratic legislative process.

Instead, the story is about how a democratic legislative process can be frustrated and circumvented by the executive.

Instead of using primary legislation so as to make substantial (and illiberal) changes to the law, the government has used statutory instrument which cannot be amended or considered in detail, and has used its whipped House of Commons majority to face down Lords opposition.

Plenty to see here.

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The story may continue

Yet this is not how the story (told in either way) may end.

The thing about statutory instruments is that, unlike primary legislation, they can be challenged at the High Court.

This means that there can sometimes be a sort of constitutional see-saw: the convenience of using statutory instruments (as opposed to primary legislation) can be checked and balanced by an application for judicial review.

And that is what the group Liberty is doing, and its letter before claim is here.

In essence, the argument is that – notwithstanding the parliamentary approval – the statutory instrument is outside the scope of the relevant provisions of the Public Order Act 1986.

Liberty seems to have a good point, but any challenge to secondary legislation is legally difficult and it is rare that any such challenge ever succeeds.

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The moral of the story?

The moral of the story, however it is told, is perhaps about the general weakness of our constitutional arrangements in respect of limitations placed upon rights and liberties.

A government, using wide enabling legislation, can put legislation into place that it cannot achieve by passing primary legislation.

This cannot be the right way of doing things, even if Labour is correct about these illiberal measures having the support of the House of Commons.

There are some things our constitutional arrangements do well – and here we can wave at Boris Johnson and Elizabeth Truss having both been found repugnant and spat out by our body politic.

But there are things our constitutional arrangements do badly – and the increasing use (and abuse) by the government of secondary legislation to do things they cannot (or will not) get otherwise enacted in primary legislation worrying.

And a government casually and/or cynically using (and abusing) wide enabling powers is not a story that usually ends well.

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Why [x] should be regulated.

17th May 2023

Concerns about the implications of [x] have led to calls for it to be regulated.

In a “nightmare scenario” one leading politician has said that “[x] could get out of control” with “unimaginable consequences”.

The politician added that they had read reports about [x] and that “something really should be done”.

“Why is the government not doing something about [x]?  Doesn’t the government care?”

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“Doesn’t the government care?”

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An official spokesman rejected the allegation that the government does not care about [x] and commented that “all options remain open, including regulation and even prohibition”.

Surveys show that members of the public when asked if “x should be regulated?” generally say that it should be regulated, unless those members of the public are asked if “[x] should be banned?”, and then they say it should be banned instead.

“Whatever [x] is,” said one person in a vox pop, “it shouldn’t be allowed.  And what about the children?”

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“What about the children?”

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Independent observers said that [x] is not capable of being defined, let alone regulated or prohibited, and dismissed concerns as “being responses to loaded questions” but they also admitted fearing that their observations would be relegated to a long paragraph towards the end of this article which few would actually read.

Supporters of [x] yesterday refused to be interviewed for this article, commenting instead by email that whatever they said would be relegated to the end of this article, coming after and before what they said would be “scaremongering”.

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“Scaremongering”

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The final word must go to the politician who called for regulation of [x] who also said “[x] should now be allowed,” when asked with a differently framed question, adding “there is too much red tape”.

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Here is evidence that we are moving – at last – into post-Brexit politics and policy-making

23rd January 2023

Last week there was a (very popular) post on this blog about regulation and the supposed “bonfires” of “red tape”.

Most of the points in that post were general, but a particular point was made about the misconceived Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill.

That Bill contains this remarkable provision as clause 1:

In other words, laws – thousands of them – will all be repealed by automatic operation of law, unless specific exceptions are made.

And nobody knows how many:

Rarely has there been an approach to legislation this daft, and it is hard to think of any legislative exercise where daftness has been on this scale.

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Of course, this causes confusion, including to business.

One may think businesses would welcome such drastic deregulation – but, in fact, businesses are far more welcoming to consistency.

In his speech today, the director general of the Confederation of British Industry addressed the problems of this Bill.

First, he did not dismiss regulatory divergence in principle:

“…I must say something about the UK’s regulatory divergence from Europe. The Government is convinced this is a major opportunity for growth. And I agree it can be too.

“But it’s a bit more complicated, than scrapping overnight many of the terms of trade we’ve used for decades.”

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So this means he is not opposed outright to what the government calls “Brexit opportunities”.

But it has to be done in a measured, case-by-case approach, and with hard realism:

“Because divergence is high-stake politics and economics.

“Often, we don’t consider the EU’s possible counterplay, and where they could outcompete us. We also need to recognise that divergence will often shrink our market size and/or add a skip-load of red tape. The party of deregulation risks simply doubling the amount we have.

“So, while it can definitely work – witness the historic success of the City of London and our rapid Covid vaccine approval – you have to run the numbers to make sure it’s not a complete own-goal.

“And it will take far more than a regulation play to make the UK win global share of global sectors.”

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He then mentioned concrete examples:

“…the Retained EU Law Bill [is] creating huge uncertainty for UK firms.

“Companies are asking will we really erode maternity and paternity regulation or health and safety standards like the General Product Safety Directive?

“Or rapidly change regulations on REACH, which governs the use of chemicals? With billions of pounds of industry costs?

“Or create the potential for firms being underinsured because it’s harder for analysts – who don’t know what laws will be retained – to effectively price risk into products?

“Do we really want to subject the public – and industry – to another round of mass confusion and disruption, just when we’re trying to exit recession?”

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The speech, however, did more than offer a critique, it also offered a contrast.

It referred to a development which I (and perhaps also you) missed just before Christmas: the appointment of Patrick Vallance and others to consider post-Brexit regulation in five particular areas – digital technology, green industries, life sciences, advanced manufacturing and the creative industries.

The speech avers:

“The Chancellor has appointed Sir Patrick Vallance to lead a thorough review into securing possible prizes in five high-growth sectors. This is the right approach. Serious reflection and consideration.

“The complete opposite in fact of the Retained EU Law Bill […]

“Instead, let’s review, retain, reform and – where appropriate – repeal EU law the Vallance way. Smartly. Not the Retained EU Law Bill’s way. Foolishly.”

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This must be the correct approach in principle: “the Vallance way”.

Yes, the Vallance review may come to nothing.

Indeed, it may never be heard from again: such reviews come and go, and sometimes even disappear with anyone noticing, or caring.

But as a statement of principle, this approach is compelling.

And it shows that even this government is capable of going about legislative and regulatory reform the right way.

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The CBI cannot be regarded as a vehicle for remoaners.

And the speech today was not expressly or implicitly a call for the United Kingdom to rejoin the European Union – or even just the single market.

It was instead refreshingly post-Brexit – about how we go about making policy and laws within our shifted post-Brexit parameters.

The more our politics and policy-making moves in this direction, the better.

The absolutist clamour of Brexiters and the purist refusal of Remainers are both, in their ways, failures to practically deal with our post-Brexit situation.

The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill is now as much an artefact from yesteryear as a leaflet calling for a further referendum.

We are at last moving, slowly, into post-Brexit politics and policy-making – and the government needs to catch up.

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Artificial Intelligence and how it will affect commercial lawyering (and legal blogging)

17th January 2023

Here is a thought:

Or, to perhaps put it another way: could Artificial Intelligence replicate, or even replace, the work of your normal contracts lawyer?

As someone who has spent over twenty years as a commercial lawyer (constitutional law is my interest, and contracts law my drudgery) I would say the answer is yes, and no, and but.

And as a coda, I will aver that those of us who write and comment on legal blogs may face a problem too.

Yes

The yes is a recognition that a certain amount of contracts law in practice is ploddery.

You have a standard form contract, and you read every clause, and you put all the clauses together.

Many standard clauses are what is called boilerplate – their effect, and often their very wording, are identical from one contract to another.

And even clauses which can vary from one standard from to another – payment arrangements, service levels, and key allocations of risk – do not vary very much.

In larger law firms, the task of reviewing, and even drafting, such contracts is given to junior lawyers, even trainees.

Many non-legally qualified contracts managers and procurement officers are better than many commercial lawyers in dealing with straightforward commercial contracts.

And so just as a text comparison program can identify differences between contracts better than almost any human, then a computer which has a bank of hundreds, if not thousands, of standard contracts would be able to identify standard and deviant clauses.

Such a computer may even be able to propose amendments to the deviant clauses so as to place the contract onto a more standard basis.

So, yes, some straightforward contracts reviews could be done by Artificial Intelligence.

No

Standard form contracts are subject to special legal rules in case law and statute, especially when they are for business-to-consumer transactions, and so a store of contracts would not enough: external legal expertise can be necessary.

And being able to advise a client on whether a standard form contract will be in their commercial interests or not is not something Artificial Intelligence is likely to be able to do soon.

That is because assessing commercial risk in a particular situation is not a form of abstract calculus, for it requires an understanding of industry, business, economic, social and human factors.

And, of course, not all commercial contracts are on standard forms.

Certain transactions require bespoke contracts, dealing with the allocations of risk of a range of things that could go wrong.

In IT and media contracts, for example, there often needs to be an understanding of technological risks so that the legal risk allocations match and mirror what problems can happen in practice.

A well-drafted and hard-negotiated bespoke commercial contract is as much a work of cooperation, conflict and collective endeavour as you will find anywhere else in human activity.

But

There is a problem.

The good lawyers who can advise on standard and bespoke contracts can do so because of their apprenticeship in dealing with straightforward clauses in everyday contracts.

You do not have child prodigies in practical law: a practice takes, well, a lot of practice.

One reason for this is that contracts are not linear documents but complex instruments: each clause can and should relate to other clauses.

And the only way to master complex instruments is to understand how the elements of that instruments all fit (or do not fit) together in given practical situations.

(I have said before that legal drafting is akin to coding in making sure lines all work together.)

This means that if Artificial Intelligence replicates and then replaces the work of junior contract lawyers it is difficult to see how senior contract lawyers will gain their necessary experience.

Coda

Perhaps a better route for Artificial Intelligence would be to replicate and then replace the work of legal bloggers and their commenters.

Perhaps the blogpost above was written by Artificial Intelligence, and perhaps also some of the comments below will be too.

If so, then Artificial Intelligence can merrily create blogposts and comments, rendering us all redundant.

Brace brace.

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The law and lore of the offside offence

16th January 2023

There was a controversial offside decision this weekend in a high-profile football match.

Usually, for anyone with an interest in the game, it is plain if a player is offside or not and, if so, whether there has been an offside offence.

But this understanding is rarely based on someone studying the laws of association football.

Instead it is often based on watching hundreds – thousands – of instances, playing in matches, discussing incidents with others, reading reporters and hearing commentators.

Over time, someone can build up a good working knowledge of the rules and how they should and should not apply.

In a word, for many football fans, the knowledge of the sport is lore, rather than law.

And this is no different for many games and sports, and indeed it is true for most people in every day life about the laws of the land.

But every so often something so distinct happens that the common folk knowledge of a rule, and how it is should and should not be applied, can seem deficient.

And so we had the sight on Match of the Day of the pundits putting Law 11 of the laws of association football on the screen for viewers to read the offside offence themselves.

The one thing which struck me was one single, awful word which has no place whatsoever in any formal rules or laws, either of association football or of anything else.

“…clearly…”

Those who are geeks about the rules of football may be able to explain the purpose of that dreadful “c” word in this code.

But the job of any formal law, rather than lore, is to provide a precise rule capable of being applied to relevant facts so as to create a binary situation: the rule either applies or does not apply,  and if it applies it has either been infringed or it has not been.

It is not clear (ahem) what the “c” word adds to the rule, and it seems to make the rule less precise.

As it happens, most people who watched the incident, using only the lore of offside, believed an offence had been committed.

But the referee who had to apply the formal rule said otherwise.

And, as is so often the case, lore gets things right, and the law does not.

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Good bans v. bad bans, and how can you work out the difference?

11th January 2023

Hurrah, single-use plastics are being banned.

They are being banned in the European Union:

And now they are to be banned here:

Hurrah, hurrah.

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But.

Some followers of this blog will say that the “Hurrahs” seem odd, given my general wariness of “banning” things.

(This 2011 New Statesman post is still one of my favourites.)

Surely: if we outlaw plastic forks, only the outlaws will have plastic forks?

There is something to that: banning a thing is not a magical spell.

All a legal prohibition means is that the thing prohibited is attended by different legal consequences than before.

And certainly banning a thing in-and-of-itself is rarely an instant solution to any problem.

Here, however, may be an example of where a ban is proportionate and likely to achieve its public interest goal, without adverse externalities.

If you really want a plastic fork, then presumably you can still make them.

If you collect plastic forks, you can still add to your collection from a suitable dealer and proudly show that collection off on your Instagram account.

The ban is instead about the use of such products in the marketplace.

According to the consultation document, the government has been mindful that there are substitutes in place, and the impact of the ban has been assessed:

The government also said that banning such things is not its preference: 

This is a sensible approach, and it is heartening to see that there is considered and apparently evidence-based approach to putting in place a prohibition.

If only all proposed prohibitions – and the continuation of existing prohibitions – were subject to such a considered approach.

Prohibitions have their place in public policy – this is a liberal blog and not a libertarian one – but too often in politics and media the “ban” is a form of magical thinking.

Let us hope this is not a single-use policy approach, and that it is recycled for other policy areas.

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A look at Keir Starmer’s proposal for a “Taking Back Control” Bill

5th January 2023

Today the leader of the main opposition party in the United Kingdom gave a speech.

You can read a version of Keir Starmer’s speech on the Labour party website.

One part of it which seems possibly interesting from a legal perspective is a proposal for a “Taking Back Control” Bill.

This is what the speech said:

“So we will embrace the Take Back Control message. But we’ll turn it from a slogan to a solution. From a catchphrase into change. We will spread control out of Westminster. Devolve new powers over employment support, transport, energy, climate change, housing, culture, childcare provision and how councils run their finances.

“And we’ll give communities a new right to request powers which go beyond this.

“All this will be in a new “Take Back Control” Bill – a centrepiece of our first King’s speech. A Bill that will deliver on the demand for a new Britain. A new approach to politics and democracy. A new approach to growth and our economy.”

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This call for de-centralisation and devolution will face the two fundamental problems every such call has faced since the nineteenth century.

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The first problem for de-centralisation and devolution is the doctrine of the supremacy of the Westminster parliament.

This doctrine, which in good part was a Victorian innovation not known to earlier jurists, tells that all legislative power in our polity rests with the Crown-in-Parliament.

This means that no other body in the United Kingdom can legislate other than to the extent permitted by the Westminster parliament.

Recently this doctrine was illustrated by the Supreme Court decision on a reference by Scotland’s Lord Advocate.

In effect, the Scottish parliament is merely another statutory corporation, subject to the rule of ultra vires.

The Westminster parliament will not easily forego this legislative supremacy and – if we adhere to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy – it may be impossible for the Westminster parliament to do so.

This means that any de-centralisation and devolution is at the Westminster parliament’s command: Westminster can grant this seeing autonomy, and Westminster can easily take it away.

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What we do have are numerous devolution and local government statutes, all defining and limiting what various authorities can and cannot do.

There is no real autonomy – even for the Scottish parliament.

No ability to do things despite what the Westminster parliament would like an authority to do.

Ambitious projects by local authorities – such as when the Victorian town of Birmingham (not even yet a city) went and bought and operated its own gas and water industries – would be impossible now.

That is real de-centralisation and devolution – doing things the centre cannot stop.

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The second problem for de-centralisation and devolution is in respect of policy and administration, rather than law.

It is the sheer dominance of HM Treasury in Whitehall and the public sector more generally.

For example, HM Treasury has a monopoly in respect of almost all fiscal and financial – that is, tax-raising and borrowing – powers.

(Even the Scottish parliament has limited autonomy to vary income tax rates and the Scottish government power to borrow money.)

And no public body has complete fiscal autonomy – and, indeed, many public bodies rely on central government for grants and financing.

It is unlikely that Whitehall will happily allow regional authorities and devolved administrations absolute power to raise taxes and borrow money.

*

And now back to the word “control”.

Unless regional authorities and devolved administrations have absolute power to raise taxes and borrow money, or to make rules and mount ambitions problems, then they do not have “control”.

Instead, “control” will stay – as it always does – with Westminster and Whitehall.

Westminster and Whitehall can extend the leash, but they can pull the leash back.

That is not “control”.

*

Looking more closely at Starmer’s speech, it is not clear to whom this “control” is to be actually given.

Consider the following passages (emphases added):

“…the Britain that Labour can build. A fairer, greener, more dynamic country with an economy that works for everyone, not just those at the top. And a politics which trusts communities with the power to control their destiny.”

“Giving communities the chance to control their economic destiny. The argument is devastatingly simple.”

“It’s not unreasonable for us to recognise the desire for communities to stand on their own feet. It’s what Take Back Control meant. The control people want is control over their lives and their community.”

“We need to turbo-charge this potential, but Westminster can’t do that on its own, it can only do it with communities. That’s why Labour will give them the trust. The power. And the control.”

And so on.

There is noting specific here as to who will get this supposed “control”.

Will it be existing local authorities or new regional bodies?

Will it be new legal entities smaller than existing councils?

And – most importantly if this really is about “control” – what will happen if those “communities” want to do something which Westminster and Whitehall do not want them to do?

*

Starmer did list some of the topics where there could be devolution of powers: “employment support, transport, energy, climate change, housing, culture, childcare provision and how councils run their finances”.

But devolution is not granting “control”, as there will be limits to what even the most ambitious local authority will be able to do in the face of any opposition from Westminster and Whitehall.

And there is also a respectable argument – which you may or may not endorse – than on issues such as transport and housing, there needs to be far less local autonomy, not more, so for us as to escape the ongoing blight of NIMBYism.

*

Starmer insisted in his speech that the “Take Back Control” will be turned from “a slogan to a solution”.

And it we missed the import of that rhetorical turn, Starmer then said it will be turned from “a catchphrase into change”.

(This is reminiscent of his predecessor Tony Blair’s wonderful statement once that “[a] day like today is not a day for soundbites, we can leave those at home, but I feel the hand of history upon our shoulder with respect to this, I really do.”)

But there is nothing in this speech which does go beyond slogans and catchphrases.

There is no substance to the supposed “controls” which are to be given “back”.

And there is nothing specific as to whom or what those “controls” are to be given.

*

You may have Very Strong Opinions on de-centralisation and devolution.

You may welcome Starmer’s speech as a good and welcome signal of change.

You may oppose it as it may mean impediments to policies which may need to be directed at the national level.

But what one cannot say is that it tells us much, if anything, about how de-centralisation and devolution is to work in practice.

And it says nothing about how – at least in England – local authorities can break free from the real controls of Westminster and Whitehall.

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