Solving the puzzle of why the case of Prince Harry and Lord Watson against News Group Newspapers came to its sudden end

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Spiteful governments and simple contract law, a weak threatening letter, and a warning of a regulatory battle ahead

13th January 2025

Some things from last week you may have missed.

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The weekly constitutional

Last week I expected my blogging to centre around a post I was preparing for Prospect, where my regular contribution is to branded as ‘weekly constitutional’.

This pleasing badge implies a weekly meander – but it will be one based on a recent (or non-recent) published case report. The aim is to use that judgment or other decision to show how law and action work – and do not work – in practice.

The first ‘weekly constitutional was about a significant United Kingdom Supreme Court decision that was handed down in November but which got almost no press attention (the main honourable exception was in the estimable Byline Times).

In the unanimous decision the Supreme Court justices undid a grossly spiteful attack by the then coalition government on public sector trades unions not by resorting to elaborate employment law provisions, but by applying a contract law rule so simple it is the stuff of the first weeks of any law degree.

I liked doing that post – please read it here – and I hope you will follow the ‘weekly constitutional’ post. I will post here and alert you to them, perhaps expanding on certain points.

But that post got rather drowned by the attention received by two other things that I wrote last week.

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‘Lettuce before Action’

I so wish I had thought of the above line, but it was coined by the peerless Paul Magrath, whose weekly law email is a must-read – you can subscribe here.

This is about, of course, the antics of a former Prime Minister – and indeed a former Lord High Chancellor – in sending a legal letter to the current Prime Minister.

A letter so weak it may well be the weakest threatening letter ever sent by a United Kingdom law firm.

The ‘close reading’ post I did – here – was done very quickly and promptly, and indeed so promptly that I even had to set out why as a matter of copyright and confidentiality I was entitled to publish the letter so as to comment on it.

Since the publication, the former Prime Minister has been widely ridiculed for this misfired missive – but I think there may be something more worth saying about the letter – and so I may do a post with further reflections.

*

Back in the salmon pink

Last week I was also invited to write something about about social media regulation for the Financial Times.

It is always lovely to write for what – in my biased but honest opinion – is the best newspaper, though it is always terrifyingly daunting to be published alongside proper commentators.

(Lucy Kellaway is my all-time favourite columnist in any newspaper anywhere.)

So I wrote one thing, about the inherent difficulties about regulating social media – some of which will be familiar to long-term readers here.

And is often the case, new ideas come out once you actually start something, and so I wrote a second thing about what I say as the rational drivers behind what Meta announced last week. This was based on actually listening carefully to what Mark Zuckerberg has said in his broadcast – and then reading that prepared statement even more carefully (which led to the all-important satisfying “Aha!” moment).

The two pieces were then banged into one longer piece with an overall, hopefully coherent structure.

And the resulting ‘essay’ was published in the print edition and online on Saturday.

For reasons of topicality, more than the quality of the writing, the piece became very popular.

The Bluesky stats for the article matched my Brexit posts on Twitter at the height of Brexit when I had five times as many followers.

The piece was even briefly one of the top five read FT.com pieces globally.

The sensation of this happening is not altogether pleasant.

But perhaps the one merit of the piece was that it offered an explanation for something which seemed otherwise hard to explain in rational terms.

Essentially the argument offered by the piece was:

(a) Meta has an interest in switching to a more confrontational approach with irksome foreign regulators, especially in the European Union,

(b) Meta now has an opportunity to do this because of the reelection of Donald Trump to the United States presidency,

but (c) this does not show strength but weakness, for in those foreign jurisdictions, the platforms know the respective state has the ultimate power of legal recognition.

And so this is why Meta now needs a strategic ally in the US government – and everything else follows from that.

This seemed obvious from Zuckerberg’s statement – but because it was slipped in a point number six after five rather attention-grabbing other points, but did not get the attention it should have had.

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Litigation and regulatory strategies are fascinating – in particular, where the surface theatrics of impulsiveness, hypocrisy and recklessness misdirect onlookers into thinking the underlying commercial (or political) objectives are similarly irrational.

Even Liz Truss’s letter makes sense – but solely from a political-media perspective, and not any legal perspective.

Perhaps I should write that further piece on that letter, if only to use that ‘Lettuce before Action’ line as a title.

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A close look at Truss’s legal threat to Starmer – a glorious but seemingly hopeless cease-and-desist letter

9th January 2025

How Taylor Swift’s endorsement of Harris and Walz is a masterpiece of persuasive prose: a songwriter’s practical lesson in written advocacy

11th September 2024

Taylor Swift has endorsed the Democratic nominees Kamala Harris and Tim Walz.

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Politically and culturally the endorsement is significant, but this is not really a political or cultural blog.

This is, however, a blog that sometimes provides close readings of key documents, and there are things about the endorsement that are perhaps worth noticing and remarking upon.

In essence: this endorsement is a masterpiece of practical written advocacy, and many law schools would do well to put it before their students.

*

Look carefully at the first three paragraphs – especially the use of the first person “I” and “me/my” and the second person “you” (emphasis added):

“Like many of youI watched the debate tonight. If you haven’t already, now is a great time to do your research on the issues at hand and the stances these candidates take on the topics that matter to you the most. As a voter, I make sure to watch and read everything I can about their proposed policies and plans for this country.

“Recently was made aware that AI of ‘me’ falsely endorsing Donald Trump’s presidential run was posted to his site. It really conjured up my fears around AI, and the dangers of spreading misinformation. It brought me to the conclusion that I need to be very transparent about my actual plans for this election as a voter. The simplest way to combat misinformation is with the truth.

I will be casting my vote for Kamala Harris and Tim Walz in the 2024 Presidential Election. I’m voting for @kamalaharris because she fights for the rights and causes I believe need a warrior to champion them. I think she is a steady-handed, gifted leader and I believe we can accomplish so much more in this country if we are led by calm and not chaos. I was so heartened and impressed by her selection of running mate @timwalz, who has been standing up for LGBTQ+ rights, IVF, and a woman’s right to her own body for decades.”

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In the first paragraph, she ensures that she identifies with you the reader – “Like many of you [comma]” and “As a voter [comma]”.

There are four “yous” in that first paragraph: you, you, you, you.

You are already half-nodding along. You and Swift have common ground.

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In the second paragraph, she then describes things of personal concern – but here she avoids putting “I” at the start of any sentence. This makes it look that she is describing the situation objectively.

She deftly – and convincingly – justifies making a political endorsement. The sentences “It brought me to the conclusion that I need to be very transparent about my actual plans for this election as a voter. The simplest way to combat misinformation is with the truth.” are perfectly reasonable.

Two premises leading to a “conclusion”, and in just one paragraph.

*

You will see that so far she has avoided starting any sentence with “I”.

And then, with the third paragraph, wham.

The first sentence beginning with “I” is the actual endorsement.

And then every sentence in the third paragraph begins with I: bam bam bam.

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Also, like any good advocate, Swift is careful to make the listener or reader feel that it is their own decision to make, and again this is skilfully done:

I’ve done my research, and I’ve made my choice. Your research is all yours to do, and the choice is yours to make.”

Note the rhythm: I, I, you, you, you.

The most effective persuasion is often to lead the listener or reader to making their own decision – and to make them feel they are making their own decision.

*

Finally, the pay-off: the thing that will linger.

The reader is already half-aware of what is coming, because of the photograph.

A good pay-off is often a call-back – and here, cleverly, the call-back is to the visual clue the reader would have registered before even reading.

“With love and hope,

Taylor Swift
Childless Cat Lady”

This is, of course, a swipe and a blow against J. D. Vance, the Republican vice presidential nominee.

And so Swift mocks the Lilliputian.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

Unpacking the remarkable witness statement of Johnny Mercer – a closer look at the extraordinary evidence put before the Afghan war crimes tribunal

A close look at the Donelan libel settlement: how did a minister make her department feel exposed to expensive legal liability?

8th March 2024

Yesterday over at Prospect I did a post on the curious situation of the Michelle Donelan libel settlement. Please click and read the post here.

Here I want to set out some further thoughts on what is, in one way, a remarkable law and policy news story – and what was, in another way, an accident waiting to happen given the practices now common in politics and media.

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This is her statement:

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Donelan is a Secretary of State and a Member of Parliament – and, as such, she can say and publish whatever she wants in a libel-safe way, as long as she goes about it sensibly and in the right way. The law of the United Kingdom is configured so as to allow ministers and parliamentarians an “absolute privilege” for what they say in parliament. The law is further configured so that in official correspondence, defamatory things can be freely stated (with “qualified privilege”) as long as the recipient has an interest in receiving the information, and it is said in good faith and without malice.

This configuration can be seen as unfair and one-sided – especially as, with qualified privilege, the onus is on the complainant to provide there was malice and bad faith. But this is how, in this context, the overall balance between free expression and reputation rights has been set in the public interest.

All this means that if Donelan, or any other minister, had genuine concerns about the appointments to a board of an agency which their department supervised, those concerns can be expressed and received, and it would be hard-to-impossible for any person mentioned to actually bring a claim in libel.

And so it is pretty remarkable for a minister to (purport to) do this and end up facing personal liability for libel – and to also expose their department to liability for libel.

Something wrong happened, and it needs explanaing.

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What converted this into a situation where the minister and her department became exposed to legal liability was the decision by the minister to tweet a copy of the letter stating these concerns about specific individuals.

At a stroke (of the keypad) the qualified privilege that would otherwise have protected that communication was lost. The thousands of people to whom the letter was now published had no proper interest in the contents.

And as the key accusations had not been investigated with any duly diligent checks, the publication of the letter on Twitter also could not be said to be in the public interest, which meant that an alternative defence to libel was also not available.

So not only was it a very strange thing for the minister to do, it was legally reckless.

Since the Prospect piece was written and published, it has been reported in the news that the minister had had advice before the letter was tweeted.

If this is correct, and the advice was legal advice (and not, say, a non-legal adviser nodding along), then either:

(a) the minister went against that legal advice; or

(b) the minister was given the wrong legal advice.

If the latter, then the decision to publish the letter on Twitter does not become any the less strange as an act, but the minister can at least say that she was not properly warned of the legal consequences. (And the latter is perhaps possible if the government lawyer concerned was not a media law specialist, though the law here is pretty straightforward and basic.)

But, in any case, no competent lawyer with a knowledge of media law could have advised that publishing the letter on Twitter would be covered by qualified (or absolute) privilege.

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From looking closely at information in the public domain, it would appear that the lawyers for the complainant (and she will not be named in this post, as she has suffered enough) sent a letter before claim to Donelan in her personal capacity.

(This can be inferred because the letter complained of was tweeted from her personal Twitter account, and the retraction was also tweeted from her personal account – hence the legal threat was made against her personally.)

But.

It would seem that the government immediately took the claim as meaning the department would be on the line, and so the government legal service acted for Donelan and not any private law firm.

(This can be inferred from the government statement “This [settlement] was subject to all the usual cross-government processes and aims to reduce the overall costs to the taxpayer that could result from protracted legal action.”  The reasoning for this inference is in the Prospect piece.)

Normally the government would not need to do this.

Indeed, given the rules on public expenditure, the government should not have done this – unless the government believed itself to be exposed to potential liability.

But something about how the claim was framed put the frighteners on the government, and the government legal service jumped in.

Yesterday in Prospect I averred there were two possible reasons for the government dealing with the claim, but recent news reports now suggest a third.

The first is that the government saw the tweet as being connected to her role as Secretary of State – it was part of her departmental work and, although the tweet was from her personal Twitter account, it should be treated as an official communication.

The second is that although the tweet was in her personal capacity, the litigation would drag in the department in a costly and time-consuming way, and this litigation could also develop so as to expose the department to direct legal liability about the letter to the agency. In particular, the department may be anxious that “disclosure” of internal documents could undermine any qualified privilege it had in the letter to the agency.

The third – further – reason is that the department gave the minister duff legal advice saying that the letter was safe to publish on her personal Twitter account.

Whatever the reason – whether it be one of the above, or a mix of them, or a reason not currently obvious – a decision was made that this was the department’s problem, and not just the minister’s unfortunate personal political predicament. And this decision presumably was made by a senior official under government accounting rules.

That this is the position is the only natural meaning of the government’s statement: “This [settlement] […] aims to reduce the overall costs to the taxpayer that could result from protracted legal action.”

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Once the government realised it was on the libel hook then it was sensible for the department to close down this litigation as soon as possible.

It appears that the litigation did even not get beyond pre-action correspondence. It seems no claim was issued at the High Court or served on Donelan.

The government legal service seems not to have indulged in any tiresome litigation posturing along the lines of “as taxpayers money is involved we really would need to see the case properly set out in served particulars of claim” or any other similar nonsense.

Government lawyers needed to settle this case, and fast.

There was a problem here.

Fortunately for the government, it was also in the interests of the complainant to settle this matter quickly.

A retraction was offered, with damages and costs, and this suited the complainant.

Had the complainant pressed on, there is little doubt she could have secured an apology – and the word “sorry” was not in the published retraction.

(Given the news coverage, the minister may have well apologised – as it has been widely but incorrectly reported as an apology.)

In the circumstances, both sides could be satisfied with this outcome – though one suspects there was a rather loud “Phew!” in Whitehall when the settlement was reached.

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For a government minister to visit potential legal liability on their department is remarkable, given how the law generally protects ministerial statements and communications. This required a special fact situation.

But.

This sort of thing was also an accident waiting to happen.

There is a information economy in and about Westminster – where ministers and special advisers and lobbyists and researchers and pressure groups and journalists are constantly swapping material between themselves (and sometimes those involved are wearing more than one hat).

It was perhaps only a matter of time before an example of this spilled into official correspondence, and then was tweeted from a minister’s social media account.

And when it happens there can be legal consequences.

Here it was the law of libel – but one can conceive of situations where other areas of law could be engaged, such as misfeasance in public office.

For not only is the law configured so as to protect ministers and politicians in some situations, it also configured so as to impose immense legal liabilities in others.

***

Disclosure: I was a government lawyer about twenty years ago.

*****

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

*****

Many thanks to those of you who support my blogging: I have had to have a short period away from this blog (and pretty much social media generally), but I am now refreshed and regular blogging should now resume.

A close look at the law and policy of holding a Northern Ireland border poll – and how the law may shape what will be an essentially political decision

10th February 2024
This week Prospect posted something by me on the issue of a potential border poll in Northern Ireland.

Please click (and read!) here.

This post unpacks that Prospect post – a sort of “behind the scenes” perambulation of how that post came together – and a further discussion of the issues.

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The starting point is that a potential referendum in Northern Ireland has been in the news.

On one hand:

On the other hand:

The Sinn Fein quote was:

“What I firmly believe is – in this decade – we will have those referendums, and it’s my job and the job of people like me who believe in reunification to convince, to win hearts and minds and to convince people of that opportunity – part of which, by the way, will be really consolidating our relationship with Britain as our next door neighbour and good friend.”

Asked if she meant before 2030, Ms McDonald said “yes”.

The Prime Minister’s quote was:

Rishi Sunak has told Sinn Fein to focus on the “day to day” concerns of people in Northern Ireland rather than a referendum on Irish reunification.

The PM said “constitutional change” should not be a priority for the Irish nationalist party, after newly appointed first minister

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Now we will look at the relevant legislation – the Northern Ireland Act 1998.

There are two key provisions.

First, there is section 1, which should be read carefully:

(And legislative and literary purists will react pleasingly to that “But” at the start of the second sub-section.)

That section 1 needs to be seen in the context of, well, other sections 1s.

Here is section 1 of the Ireland Act 1949 – and look especially at sub-section1(2):

You will see at sub-section 1(2) what can be called the “consent” principle – though it would be for the then parliament of Northern Ireland to give that consent (which at the time would seem very unlikely).

By 1973 that parliament was suspended, and so the Northern Ireland Act 1973 switched the giving of consent to a majority of the people of Northern Ireland:

And as my Substack has set out at length before there had been such a border poll, just before the 1973 Act was passed.

The 1973 poll was heavily in favour of the union – and the nationalists largely boycotted the vote.

At the time the poll seemed pointless from a nationalist perspective, and it was also seen as a sop from the London government to the unionist majority.

However, sometimes, things change – and demographics change.

Those seeking the unification of the island of Ireland no longer see border polls as a necessarily unionist device.

Indeed, the roles are somewhat reversed: it is now the unionists that are wary of a border poll.

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Having set out that context, let us go back to the text of section 1 of the 1998 Act:

Here there is a declaration – and you will note similar wording was used in the 1949 and 1973 Acts. The use of a declaration is not new. And it really has to be a declaration (or affirmation) as it describes something as it stands, rather than providing for something new. Section 1 does not make Northern Ireland part of the United Kingdom – that status rests on other legal instruments.

The sub-section also repeats the requirement that consent is required for this declared status to change – and like the 1973 Act it then refers to a schedule to the Act.

But.

There is that second sub-section, beginning with a “But”.

And this is where it becomes interesting and departs substantially from previous legislation:

The word “shall” in that provision is highly significant.

For sub-section 2 creates an obligation. If the majority in such a poll supports unification, then the government of the United Kingdom has to bring forward the legislation that would make this so.

If you read carefully, however, you will note that the obligation only goes to putting legislation before parliament. It does not actually place an obligation on the government of the United Kingdom to ensure such legislation is passed. In this technical way, the supremacy of the Westminster parliament is maintained.

But if there was such a poll majority, it is difficult to see how the Westminster parliament would reject such legislation – though presumably some unionist and conservative MPs would oppose it, regardless of the “will of the people” on this one inconvenient occasion.

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So much for section 1 of the 1998 Act – for it is in the first schedule that the real excitement begins.

(Oh, for what it is worth, lawyers tend to call them sh-edules, not sk-edules when they are in legal documents, I do not know why.)

Here are the first two paragraphs of the schedule:

The two paragraphs are doing different things.

The first paragraph confers a discretion on the government of the United Kingdom (acting through the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland). The key word is “may”.

The Secretary of State may direct there to be a vote; or, then again, the Secretary of State may not do so. It is a choice.

On the face of it, it is an absolute discretion – the Secretary of State may direct as many such border polls as he or she would like. One poll a day, every day even.

But in invisible ink, so to speak, there are limits to be discretion that are implied by law.

The discretion has to be exercised in the public interest and for the purpose of section 1. And given it is part of a statutory scheme implementing the Good Friday Agreement, it would also be necessarily implicit that the discretion should be not be exercised in the selfish interests of the United Kingdom government in maintaining the union.

But those are very wide parameters, and the courts would not intervene if the paragraph 1 discretion is never exercised in favour of holding a border poll.

(If such a poll is held, however, and a majority is in favour of unification, that would mean section 1(2) applies and legislation would have to be brought forward.)

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Now let us look at the fascinating and significant second paragraph:

This is distinct to and separate from the discretion conferred in the first paragraph, for this paragraph imposes an obligation.

The government of the United Kingdom has to hold a border poll if the condition in that paragraph is met: the government of the United Kingdom cannot choose not to do so.

The condition is framed in wide terms and contains two elements, which I will call (A) and (B): the Secretary of State shall exercise the power under paragraph 1 if (A) at any time it appears likely to him [or her] that (B) a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.

The first element (A) is about as wide as you can have as a ministerial discretion under public law (the law governing public bodies). This means a court will not intervene readily to gainsay what the Secretary of State considers to be the position.

But.

Element (B) limits that subjective discretion.

Consider the following: that there is, over a period of time, an accumulation of evidence that the nationalist parties are securing majorities both of the popular vote and of the seats on representative bodies, in successive elections, and especially for seats in the Assembly and the Westminster parliament. And that such support is not a blip but a sustained trend.

There will come a point – a tipping point – where it will be come impossible for a Secretary of State to plausibly maintain that it is unlikely that a majority would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.

It would become literally incredible.

At that point, the so-called Wednesbury doctrine (named after this case which my Substack has examined before) will apply.

The Wednesbury rule is that, as a matter of law, it is not open for a public law decision-maker to make a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable public law decision-maker would make it.

A refusal by a Secretary of State to direct that a border poll take place in certain circumstances would be Wednesbury unreasonable.

And that would then make it potentially a matter for the courts.

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The courts will not want to deal with it.

The courts will view this as a political question.

And the two judgments in the McCord litigation (here and here), where an application was made to make the government of the United Kingdom publish (and thereby abide by) a policy on when it would call a border poll, show that judges really REALLY do not want to get involved.

But.

The judges may not get to duck out of it, as much as they would like to do so.

For that second paragraph was placed on a statutory basis deliberately, so that it could have effect in a certain situation.

Here we need to look at the Good Friday Agreement.

The parties to that agreement, including the governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland, agreed the following:

Section 1 and Schedule 1 of the 1998 Act are both express parts of the Good Friday Agreement.

And the United Kingdom undertook to place the provisions on the statute book as part of their obligations under the agreement.

The sentiments behind the provisions could have been put in a mere political declaration, or a recital, or something else without any (real) legal effect – but no. The other parties to the Good Friday Agreement required the United Kingdom to place these provisions into law, and the United Kingdom freely accepted that requirement.

The other parties were wise to do so.

For by placing the obligation into legislation, a legal backstop was created where, if – if – the point was eventually reached where there was simply an abundance of evidence that a majority supported the unification of the island of Ireland, the United Kingdom could not maintain an unreasonable refusal to hold a border poll.

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Of course, in that extreme scenario, the judges may still wish not to get involved – and it is unlikely that the courts would grant a so-called mandatory order requiring the Secretary of State to direct a border poll.

But there would be no reason why the court could not grant a declaration saying instead that a refusal would be Wednesbury unreasonable.

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Another ground on which the courts may intervene is if the second paragraph was used by the government of the United Kingdom to cynically hold a snap border poll hoping that they would win, so as to gain the protection of the stipulation that another such poll could not be held within seven years.

Such a ploy would be in bad faith, and for a collateral purpose, and this would mean that a court could quash such an order.

Wednesbury and bad faith are among the very widest parameters in the public law of the United Kingdom – and they only apply in exceptional cases. But they are there, and this means that paragraph 2 of the schedule is not a law-free zone – as much as politicians (and judges) may want it to be.

There will be circumstances where nationalists can and will apply to the courts to enforce a provision freely agreed to and legislated by the British state. And so the government of the United Kingdom cannot just refuse a border poll forever, regardless of what happens in Northern Ireland.

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Of course, the condition in paragraph 2 may never be met. It may well be that the evidence never becomes that overwhelming and stark, and that support for unification (like support for independence in Scotland) never solidifies into an ongoing, sustained majority.

But that a condition is not (easily) met does not make it any less of a condition at law. The government of the United Kingdom knows it is there, and the nationalist community knows it is there.

It is no longer an absolutely free choice by the government of the United Kingdom whether there is a border poll or not.

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Holding a border poll for Northern Ireland is essentially a political matter.

And in the real world, it is a matter that will undoubtedly be decided by politics, and not by courts.

Yet it is not a situation where the law is entirely absent. The 1998 Act sets a longstop where, if a certain condition is ever met, a border poll has to be held – even if the United Kingdom does not want to do so – and that a majority in that poll for unification has to be respected.

And this is a key and express part of the Good Friday Agreement, that carefully crafted (and extraordinary) document which has had so many long-term effects on our polity.

*

Going back to the quotes at the top of this post:

The suggestion is that Sinn Fein believes they will be able to show a sustained majority for unification within ten years; while the British government wants the political majorities in Northern Ireland to signify other day-to-day things, unconnected with the unification question.

You can see why, for both, these are the lines-to-take.

An objective of the nationalists is to create a “majority” situation where it would be unreasonable for a border poll not to be held; while an objective of the British government is to have a situation where a Secretary of State in good faith can reasonably believe that no such majority (yet) exists.

But if and when a political decision is made for the poll to take place, there will be some regard to the ultimate legal position under the first schedule to the 1998 Act.

As always: law shapes policy and politics; and politics and policy shape law.

And the policy and politics that shaped the extraordinary and consequential Good Friday Agreement (and the 1998 Act) in turn continue to shape the policy and politics of the United Kingdom.

*****

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

A close reading of Twitter’s legal letter to Meta: a guided tour of a weak litigation letter

7th July 2023

This is a close reading and exposition of the letter sent on behalf of Twitter to Mark Zuckerberg, the chairman and chief executive officer of Meta.

The letter is dated 5 July 2023 and has been published at the Semafor news website.

For the reasons set out below, this letter reads to this English litigation lawyer as being weak. Perhaps that view is wrong, and that there is some super-duper legal-magic which an American lawyer can see in this letter and which this post cannot.

But unless there is something which this post is missing, this is about as weak a litigation letter as can be, without the letter saying nothing substantial at all.

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Please note that I am not an American lawyer, and so everything which now follows in this post should be read subject to this proviso.

In particular, I am an English lawyer (though trained at an American law firm in London) with twenty years of various experiences as a litigator, usually for potential defendants at early stages of disputes. This means I have read more litigation letters than is good for any human being.

Litigation letters really do comprise an odd and distinct genre of literature.

There is sometimes a lot going on – and sometimes a lot not going on – in a litigation letter.

You need to be able read what is there, and to work out what is not there.

*

Let us begin with the first paragraph of the the letter sent on behalf of Twitter to Meta:

First you will see the strange “as successor in interest” formulation of who the letter is being sent on behalf of. This is because of this recent business news:

Nothing in this post rides on this strange formulation, but it is worth noticing in case X Corp ever needs to establish any legal rights to sue.

*

What is more immediately interesting is the “Based on recent reports…”.

This is early warning sign of a weak letter.

The letter could say “we have direct evidence” or even “we have in our possession documentary proof which we attach”.

But the letter does not say either of these things.

Instead, the sender states that the evidence is only (news) reports.

The letter then connects these “recent reports” to “serious concerns”.

Again, this is mild.

There is no allegation of breach – just a statement of “serious concerns”.

A strong letter would begin with something like “we have in possession direct evidence [or proof] that [you are in breach of the following legal obligations]”.

But this letter backtracks straightaway from any such a robust position.

*

The first paragraph then seems to become aggressive: “systemic, wilful, and unlawful misappropriation”.

To an unexperienced eye this looks striking – and it is intended to look striking.

But such strident words have already been weakened by the framing.

Compare and contrast:

“we have in possession direct evidence that you are engaged in systemic, wilful, and unlawful misappropriation in breach of your legal obligations”

with

“based on reports we have concerns that you are engaged in systemic, wilful, and unlawful misappropriation”.

*

From this very first paragraph this does not look like a serious letter.

If the author of the letter could have put the allegations more highly then they would have done, but they did not.

And this is no doubt because they could not.

As a genre of literature litigation letters are often far more significant for what is not said than for what is said.

(This is perhaps the only thing litigation letters have in common with the prose of Jane Austen.)

A non-litigator may read such an opening as in this Twitter letter and be worried at what is said; but an experienced litigator will read that paragraph and will spot what is not said.

*

Now the second paragraph:

We know from the first paragraph that the allegation made in the second half of this paragraph is based on reports rather than on any other evidence and so this paragraph has to be read with this in mind.

As such the allegation is nothing more than a supposition.

The language “deliberately assigned…specific intent…in violation of…” again looks forceful, but is based only on (news) reports. No evidence is offered, let alone any proof.

(And in any case Meta denies any Threads engineers are former employees of Twitter.)

There are also no specifics in this paragraph – no particularisation at all.

There is instead the vaguest possible reference to“trade secrets and other intellectual property”.

Patents? Copyright? Trademarks?

Who knows?

Perhaps nobody knows.

*

The third paragraph goes over the page:

Here we have“highly confidential information” now thrown in as well, but again without specifics or particularisation.

*

Then there is the deft but weak “intends to strictly enforce”.

This is not even a clear and present threat to sue.

It is at best a threat to possibly sue in the future, maybe.

The “reserves all rights” is also a weak sign.

The relevant rights of Twitter will presumably exist regardless of any formal statement of reservation.

If Twitter is able to obtain civil remedies and an injunction without notice then it does not need to tell Meta that it is formally reserving its rights. Such words are ornaments not instruments.

*

And now look at what is not here: there is no deadline.

There is no ultimatum.

There is no “unless [x] by [y date] then we are instructed to do [z]”.

Nothing.

*

Now onto the fourth and penultimate paragraph:

This is framed as a warning.

But it is a warning that does not substantiate anything so far in the letter.

In essence, Meta is merely being told to conduct itself lawfully.

There is no evidence, still less proof, that Meta is doing any of the things mentioned unlawfully – just a bare accusation.

And again, as in the previous paragraph, there is no deadline or ultimatum for Meta to say it will comply with this demand.

There are no requests for undertakings.

Twitter also “reserves all rights” – but nothing in this paragraph sets out how those rights are going to be enforced.

This penultimate paragraph is thereby again just decoration.

*

And now the final paragraph:

At last there is some substance to the letter, but not much.

In English civil litigation there is an obligation on potential parties to a possible dispute to retain relevant evidence if they are aware that litigation is contemplated. I suspect there is a similar obligation in American civil litigation.

But in England sending a letter only to put a party on notice to retain documents for possible litigation is about level one on the litigation Richter scale.

It is the least possible substantial reason to send any litigation letter.

Such notice can make a legal difference in that Meta cannot now deny it is aware that litigation is contemplated.

This demand at least looks as if a litigation letter is doing something: that the letter is justified in its existence.

But this is a weak final paragraph to a litigation letter.

*

Taken in its entirety the letter is a bundle of suppositions, bare accusations, and reservations of (already existing) rights, with a small blow of the litigation trumpet with a notice to retain documents provision in the last paragraph.

No evidence is provided or even mentioned, let alone proof; there are no specifics or particularisations; no precise laws are cited; and there are no deadlines or ultimatums; and no demands for undertakings.

The letter does not even ask for a response – such as an undertaking or confirmation.

(And one thing a wise litigator does with a weak letter is not to ask for a response, as it looks yet weaker when no response will be coming.)

Overall, this is the weakest possible letter that could have been sent on behalf of Twitter to Meta – that is other than the letter having no substance at all.

*

Litigation letters have many (potential) audiences.

The best ones are written with the court in mind: how would this letter look to a judge? Those letters are the scary ones – and paradoxically the letters which are most likely to mean a case is resolved before court.

(The best way to avoid going to court in civil litigation is to prepare for court.)

Good litigation letters will also force the other side and their lawyers to think about their legal position afresh.

And then…

…there are letters which are the consumption of the client and/or the media.

Some clients sometimes demand that such a litigation letter is sent even when there is little or no case, and this is the sort of letter that gets sent in those circumstances.

The audience for this sort of letter is not the other side, still less the court, but the client itself – and perhaps the public and media.

*

Perhaps evidence will come to light of wrongdoing by Meta.

Nothing in this post – a disclaimer! – should be taken to mean that there is no possible legal case that X Corp can bring to enforce its rights against Meta.

But any such claim would require a very different letter to this one.

And that would need a very different letter – with evidence and specifics and particulars and deadlines and ultimatums. The sort of letter which this letter is not.

And if such a serious letter is sent (and published) then we will know that a serious legal situation is afoot.

But, for the reasons set out above, and from the perspective of an English litigation lawyer, this is not a serious letter.

***

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

A close reading of Suella Braverman’s account of her unauthorised email

All Saints’ Day, 2022

On Wednesday 19 October 2022, at 4.55pm, the then (and now again) home secretary Suella Braverman tweeted her resignation:

*

The resignation letter contained the following passage:

“Earlier today [ie, the Wednesday], I sent an official document from my personal email to a trusted parliamentary colleague as part of policy engagement, and with the aim of garnering support for government policy on migration.

“This constitutes a technical infringement of the rules.

“As you know, the document was a draft Written Ministerial Statement about migration, due for publication imminently.

“Much of it had already been briefed to MPs.

“Nevertheless it is right for me to go.

“As soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported this on official channels, and informed the Cabinet Secretary.”

*

Those sentences largely speak for themselves and so do not need much of a gloss.

But do note that last sentence: “As soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported”.

Not just “as soon as I realised” but also “rapidly reported”.

Read that sentence carefully.

The image that the author of that letter wishes to convey here is striking: the author acted quickly, and by the author’s own initiative.

*

Now let us turn to another text by the same author.

This is the further letter sent by the author, this time to the Home Affairs Select Committee yesterday.

You can read this letter in HTML and in pdf.

This further letter is longer than the first letter, at six pages with a one page appendix.

Pleasingly it has numbered paragraphs, which rather makes it look like a court pleading or statement of case, but also makes it easier to navigate our way around – and so where relevant I will refer to the relevant paragraphs in brackets as [Para (x)].

Now let us have a close look.

*

We are not told the reason for this letter: it seems not to be a letter that has been requested by the Committee or required by any provision or resolution.

It appears thereby to be a volunteered and unsolicited account of the circumstances of the resignation – and this is reinforced in the letter:

“Given the level of speculation about the sequence of events that led to my resignation, including several inaccuracies, herewith is a detailed account about the circumstances of my resignation. I know how important the issues being raised are, and that is why I want to be fully transparent with Parliament and specifically with your Committee.” [Para 3]

As there was no request or requirement for creating and publishing this text, it is not clear what the motivation is for the creation and publishing of the text.

One possibility is that it is an attempt by the home secretary to frame and spin certain content of the letter that may come into the public domain by some other means.

*

Contained in this further letter is the following information about what was emailed.

The letter tells us about a written ministerial statement to be laid in parliament on the Thursday (the day after the email and then the resignation). [Para 4]

The letter also tells us that the statement was connected to the Office of Budget Responsibility forecast in respect of the then expected fiscal statement on 31 October 2022, and this indicates the possibility of the statement having some market sensitivity. [Para 4]

On the Tuesday (the day before the email and the resignation) the statement was a four-page document in near-final form. [Para 5]

The statement, we are told, “contained high level policy on illegal migration and legal migration proposals” and that it “consisted of high-level proposals for liberalising our migration rules under the Points Based System for workers, for example increasing the number of low-skilled foreign workers, as well as general plans for controlling illegal migration”. [Para 6 and 8]

(The hyphen comes and goes for “high level” and “high-level” for some reason.)

We are not told the statement’s security classification, though we are assured it was not “SECRET” or “TOP SECRET”. [Para 7]

We are also told that the statement did not contain “any information relating to national security, the intelligence agencies, cyber security or law enforcement. It did not contain details of any particular case work. It did not contain any market-sensitive data as all the data contained in the document was already in the public domain.” [Para 7]

That last sentence is curiously worded.

It is carefully limited to “data”.

If there was nothing in the statement which was market sensitive then the obvious thing to say would be to say there was no information which was market sensitive.

The author could have then just added “market sensitive” to the information listed in the preceding sentences.

But the author chose not to do this.

There are many kinds of market-sensitive information other than data – for example, how the data was to be used and what models or assumptions were to be employed.

But the denial is limited carefully to “data”.

We can only wonder why.

*

The draft statement was incomplete.

There were “some sentences which had not been fully agreed by all departments” and there was to be a meeting at 1pm that Wednesday of the relevant sub-committee that was to agree a final version. [Paras 6 and 9]

Given the mention of the Office for Budget Responsibility, one of the departments would presumably have been the Treasury.

*

At 7.25am the author used her personal email address to email the draft incomplete statement to the government backbench member of parliament John Hayes. [Para 12]

The covering message was:

“Dear John, What do you think? I’ll need to take a view this morning by 10am.” [Para 12]

What did he think of what?

Presumably the request was for his thoughts on the proposed amendments in the text from other departments, as he would know from previous briefings the position of the author.

This would accord with the 10am deadline, which would allow the author time to consider Hayes’ views in advance of the 1pm cabinet committee meeting.

We are then told about how the email was sent with an unintended recipient:

“I addressed it to Sir John’s parliamentary email and intended to copy his secretary’s parliamentary email address. However, I entered the incorrect email address for his secretary unintentionally and unknowingly.” [Para 12]

*

Hayes did not reply by 10am, but somebody else did.

This unexpected reply was at 8:34am:

“‘This has been sent to me in error.’ I did not recognise the person who had sent this message, but noted that it was from a parliamentary email address with a similar name to Sir John’s secretary.” [Para 14]

The author then tells us that at “before or around 10am” she saw this 8:34am message from the unintended recipient.

The “before” here is vague.

Nonetheless, “[t]his was the moment that I realised that I had made a mistake by sending it to an unintended recipient.”

When was that moment?

The “before” could mean any time between 8:34 and 10am.

And what did the author decide to do?

Two things.

*

First, the author sent an email at 10:02 to this stranger:

“Please can you delete the message and ignore. Thanks”.

Note that at this point the author says she does not know the recipient – just that it is someone with a similar name to the intended recipient.

Note also the author does not ask the recipient to confirm deletion, and just leaves it with it with a mere “Thanks”.

Perhaps she thought that was which was needed, and that is all that would come of it.

*

The second thing we are told the author decides to do is “that I would inform my officials as soon as practicable”.

This term “as soon as practicable” is also vague.

But whatever it means it does not mean promptly or immediately, or indeed “rapidly”.

As it happens, the author does not seem to inform her officials for quite some time.

This is even though she is, on her own account, located at the Home Office. [Para 17-18]

*

At 11:31am, the Chief Whip sends a WhatsApp message to the author asking her to speak to Andrew Percy, the member of parliament to whose assistant the email had been unintentionally sent.

The author tells us she did not see this message at the time.

*

At 11:33am Percy emailed the author as follows:

“Suella

“I am really not sure that government documents should be being shared with members of your former campaign team via gmail.

“Can you tell me what the Ministerial Code says on this and what the processes are in the Home Office for the sharing of sensitive government documents via gmail.

“Simply asking my team to delete this email and ignore it is not an acceptable response to what appears, on the face of it, to be a potentially serious breach of security.

“I am considering a point of order on this issue and have raised it with the Chief Whip.

“I hope an explanation will be forthcoming. You are nominally in charge of the security of this nation, we have received many warnings even as lowly backbenchers about cyber security.

“Andrew Percy.”

The author claims not to have seen this Percy email at the time, and the Percy email is only quoted later in the letter which gives an impression that it was a later development.

Indeed, both the Chief Whip’s message and the Percy email are deftly inserted in this further letter outside of the strict chronology of the day’s events, and so it is not obvious on first reading how early in the day’s events they had been sent.

*

By 11.50am there is no indication that the author has informed her officials when she encounters the Chief Whip and Percy. [Para 19]

We are then told of a coincidence.

“At 11.50 in Members’ Lobby, and by coincidence, I saw the Chief Whip and Andrew Percy MP. The Chief Whip asked me to speak to Mr Percy MP. He told me that my email had been received by a member of his parliamentary staff. He was concerned about my having sent the email to Sir John and to his staff member.” [Para 19]

She then gives an apology (to which we will return), but there is still no indication that she had informed her officials.

This is now nearly two hours after her “Thanks” email and three-and-a-half hours after the 8.35am email alerting her to the mistake.

On her own account, it is only at this point she knows who the email was sent to – for at 10:02 she had not known who the recipient was and assumed that whoever they were they would just delete it as requested (without confirmation).

*

It is now noon:

“At midday I decided that I would not attend PMQs as planned, so that I could take action regarding my mistake. I returned to my parliamentary office. This was the first opportunity I had had to communicate in full what had happened.” [Para 21]

*

The “in full” here is doing a lot of lifting.

The author had been at the Home Office by her own admission between 10am and 11.20am.

Some communication with her officials would have been possible after the 8.34am email or the 10.02 email.

And who does she “communicate in full” to?

Her Private Secretary?

No.

Her Permanent Secretary?

No.

The Cabinet Secretary?

No.

It is to her Special Adviser (a political appointee), and not her Private Secretary or her department’s Permanent Secretary, or the Cabinet Secretary.

We are then told:

“There, I explained the above chronology to my Special Adviser and asked him to phone my Private Secretary immediately.” [Para 23]

She does not herself tell the Private Secretary directly, for some reason.

“I asked [my Special Adviser] to inform my Private Secretary of the chain of events set out above and make clear that I wanted to fully report the breach and follow official processes. I wanted official advice on what I needed to do next. This included any reviews that were deemed appropriate by senior civil servants.” [Para 23]

She does not herself tell the Private Secretary of the chain of events, for some reason.

We are then told it is only after she has asked her Special Adviser to tell the Private Secretary that she reads the Percy email of 11:33am. [Para 23]

And then we are told that it only after seeing the Percy email that she saw the Chief Whip’s message of 11:31am. [Para 24]

*

Back to the Special Adviser being asked to inform the Private Secretary:

“Immediately after being told, my Private Secretary discussed the issue with the Permanent Secretary, and with his agreement then flagged the issue on my behalf to the Prime Minister’s Private Office and the Cabinet Secretary’s Private Office. This was the first time the Prime Minister’s Private Office or the Cabinet Secretary’s Office had been informed. As a result of my actions, the Cabinet Secretary was told for the first time. Separately, and unbeknownst to me at the time, the Chief Whip had also notified the Prime Minister of this issue. This was not known to me until after these events.”

There are two very interesting turns of phrase here.

The “Immediately” implies promptness.

And the “As a result of my actions” suggests that she was directly responsible for the Prime Minister’s private office and Cabinet Secretary’s office being informed, when in fact it had gone as follows: Author > Special Adviser > Private Secretary > Permanent Secretary > Cabinet Secretary.

*

It is now almost 1pm on the Wednesday.

The original email had been sent at 7.25am; the email from the unintended recipient was at 8.34am; the thanks-and-please-delete email had been sent by her to a stranger at 10:02am; the Chief Whip’s message had been at 11:31am; Percy’s email had been at 11:33am; and the meeting with the Chief Whip and Percy had been at 11:50am.

But on the author’s own account, she still has not spoken or otherwise communicated directly with any Home Office officials (as opposed to her own Special Adviser) about the matter.

And then:

“At 12.56 and 12.57, I emailed all of the relevant emails to my Private Secretary as part of my referral to officials.” [Para 27]

There is no reason given why this did not happen before.

*

Ministers are busy people, and they can be swamped with information and communications.

And so nothing in the above should be taken to mean that the author is not being accurate as to when she actually saw messages.

Indeed, this post is set out on the basis of the author being accurate in what she says in the further letter.

*

But.

If we go back to the author’s resignation letter, we see the following:

“As soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported this on official channels, and informed the Cabinet Secretary.”

This statement is not consistent with what the author said in the further letter.

If we accept that the 8.33am email was not seen at the time, the mistake was realised “before or about” 10am.

Her Special Adviser was not asked until after noon to contact officials , and there was no direct contact with officials until almost 1pm.

If her further letter is correct, then “[a]s soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported this on official channels” cannot also be correct.

The author also did not inform the Cabinet Secretary.

On her own account, it was: Author > Special Adviser > Private Secretary > Permanent Secretary > Cabinet Secretary.

Yet the normal and natural meaning of “[a]s soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported this on official channels, and informed the Cabinet Secretary” is that the author herself directly informed the Cabinet Secretary.

This was not the case, if her account in the further letter is correct.

*

For completeness, the further letter also states:

“Following my referral and subsequent resignation, the Home Office conducted a review of my use of personal email and verified the above sequence of events. The review also identified that within the period between 6 September and 19 October, I had sent official documents from my government email to my personal email address on six occasions.”

Note: six.

Note also that it is not said that she only sent official documents to her personal email six times, but only that six occasions have been “identified”.

It would have been easier just to say that author only did this six times, but this other form of words was chosen instead.

Those six occasions would have been in addition to the incident described above.

We are also not told how many times those official documents had been forwarded.

And note the dates: there may have been, on the face of this wording, other occasions in her other government roles, outside of those specified dates.

*

At the meeting with the Chief Whip and Percy, the author says she said:

“I apologised and said that this was the first time that I had used my personal email to send an official Home Office document to someone outside government, that there was no risk to security due to the content, and that I would ensure that this would never happen again.” [Para 19]

Note: “first time”.

The appendix to the letter lists six times the author had forwarded emails from her official email to her personal email:

The 19 October incident above is not one of these, because the relevant draft statement was forwarded to her from her Special Adviser.

If what the author says what she assured the Chief Whip and Percy is correct, then the position would be that not one of these six documents was then forwarded.

We must also assume that none of the times official documents were forwarded to her by her Special Adviser (such as above) that they were not also sent outside of government.

*

The letter of 31 October 2022 from the home secretary to the chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee is carefully drafted and, as with any carefully drafted document, rewards careful attention.

There are turns of phrase and framing of information in that letter that could give an impression different to that which would be gained from a close reading.

But a close reading shows that the portion of the resignation letter that says “[a]s soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported this on official channels, and informed the Cabinet Secretary” cannot be correct.

The further letter raises more questions than provides answers.

Either her resignation letter is correct or this further letter is correct.

But not both.

***

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***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome.

The comments policy is here.