Constitutional Law – The Law and Policy Blog

A note about injunctions in the context of the Abrego Garcia case

14th April 2025

What courts can and cannot order – and what those injuncted can and should do

In the United States the constitutional crisis seems to have intensified overnight, with the US government appearing to flout an injunctive order of the federal court to facilitate a deportee’s return – an order which has been upheld 9-0 by the US supreme court.

The case is that of Kilmar Abrego Garcia (as you can see from that Wiki page, his name has various versions, and this is the version which is preferred on that site, and it is there shortened to Abrego Garcia, which is also how the courts refer to him).

On 15 March 2025 he was unlawfully removed from the United States by the US government and deported to El Salvador.

The removal was unlawful as it was contrary to a court withholding order – and the US government has openly admitted that the removal was a mistake.

Abrego Garcia is now in the notorious Center for Terrorism Confinement (CECOT) in El Salvador, despite him not having any criminal record or other determination against him. He has not even been charged with anything.

On 7 April 2025 a federal court ordered that the US government “facilitate and effectuate” his return.

On 10 April 2025 the US Supreme Court unanimously upheld this order in respect of facilitating his return – though the court also held the term “effectuate” was unclear and required clarification.

Pausing at this point, why did the federal court in Marlyand not simply order the US government to return Abrego Garcia?

Why even add the words “facilitate and effectuate”?

Why not just say that the US government is ordered to ~~facilitate and effectuate the~~ return of Abrego Garcia?

Here we have to look at what injunctions can and cannot do.

Injunctions are powerful orders of any court.

An injunction typically fixes upon person [x] and if that person does not comply with the order, then [x] is in contempt and can be punished by the court.

The historical roots of the injunction in England go back to the old days of equity where the court, on behalf of the crown, would order that a person act in accordance with their (supposed) conscience – to do what was conscionable.

Of course, like a lot of equity, it was a fiction – those injuncted may or may not have any conscience about doing or not doing something – but that was the legal theory.

It is an order to ensure a person does what the court considers they should be doing.

In simple cases, an injunction will be along the lines of [x] should or should not do something.

The assumptions here are that [x] is subject to the jurisdiction of the court and what [x] is being ordered to do (or not do) is within the control of [x].

But sometimes things can get more complicated.

What if [x] is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court?

What if [x] is being ordered to do something outside of their control?

Consider the following situation:

[x] is in control of another person [y]

[x] removes [y] from the jurisdiction of the court by deporting [y] to country [z]

[x] no longer has control of [y]

[z] now has control of [y]

In this situation the court cannot order [x] to return [y] because [x] no longer has control of [y]. Returning [y] is no longer within the power of [x].

But the court also cannot order country [z] to return [y] because [z] is outwith the jurisdiction of the court.

Therefore the court cannot simply order [x] to return [y].

But what happens if [x] has acted unconscionably? Is the court impotent?

Well, the court can order [x] to do what they can to return [y].

In England, for example, a court may order [x] to use their best endeavours to procure the return of [y]. [x] may not be capable of being ordered to return [y] but they can be ordered to do everything they can do.

Going back to the Abrego Garcia case, the federal court was no doubt aware that they could not simply order his return.

That is why the court ordered the US government to facilitate his return. The court also ordered the US government to “effectuate” his return, though for many this is a less clear word, though it is not absolutely unclear.

But the word “facilitate” was probably enough – anything covered by the one word would generally be covered by the other.

If the US government, for example, had contractual or other powers to insist to El Salvador that Abrego Garcia be returned, then that should be done.

The fact that he is outside the jurisdiction of the federal court does not mean the US government can now just shrug and not do anything.

The US government is required to do what they can.

And by further order of the court, the US government is now also required to give progress reports on what they are (not) doing to facilitate the return of Abrego Garcia.

The US government does not want to do this.

As reported overnight by Aaron Reichlin-Melnick:

It would appear from the news reports that the US government is not taking the court orders in this case seriously – that they are flatly refusing to facilitate the return of Abrego Garcia.

The US government submission is here.

You will see they are not saying that they are breaching the order – but one would expect that.

You will see that they are quibbling about what the word “facilitate” means.

Formally, at least, the government claims it is not in breach – they say that the order has no application.

The US government also do not seem to be giving the updates required by the court – at least not in any meaningful way.

The impression conveyed is that the US is flouting the order – and that, even if it were within their power to “facilitate” the return of Abrego Garcia that they will not do so.

What will happen next?

If the US government is flouting the order, which appears to be the case, then the constitutional crisis in the United States is intensifying.

Perhaps the US government will successfully appeal to the Supreme Court and that court construes the order and the word “facilitate” to mean something other than the ordinary meaning of the order and indeed the word “facilitate”.

Perhaps the court will punish those responsible at the US government for contempt.

Perhaps even Abrego Garcia will be returned.

It is in the nature of a constitutional crisis that one cannot predict the next events to unfold – for if one could predict what will happen next then it would not be a crisis.

Perhaps nothing dramatic will happen at all – and this will be another quiet tug on the fabric of the constitution the effects of which will worsen over time.

But it is hard to see anything good coming of this.

***

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“But what if…?” – constitutional commentary in an age of anxiety

31st March 2025

What constitutional commentary can do and what constitutional commentary cannot do

There are many who are anxious and alarmed at what is unfolding in the United States.

And they are right to be anxious and alarmed – indeed, any other overall response would be strange given what is happening.

There is a certain cruelty in a good deal of what the US government is doing with its executive orders and other measures – and cruelty which is an end in and of itself.

As Adam Serwer rightly out it in his prescient 2018 article and subsequent book, this cruelty is the point.

Nothing in this post should be taken to gainsay this sense of anxiety and alarm – and still less to dismiss or discredit it. It is a perfectly sensible reaction to an unpleasant developing situation. There is nastiness and vileness, and it is horrific.

This post instead is about the limits of constitutional (and legal and perhaps even political) commentary to meet this anxiety and alarm.

For example, there is only so many times a constitutional commentator can usefully respond to the increasingly common “But what if…?” queries about possible future developments.

Today, one issue is about whether President Trump will somehow find a way to serve a third term, notwithstanding what appear (at least at first glance) to be a clear prohibition in the US constitution.

– But what if….he tried?

Well, the constitutional commentator may respond, there are these provisions in the US constitution which would appear to prohibit such a thing, and if those provisions were contested or defied it would be likely to ultimately end up at the supreme court.

– But what if….that did not work?

And it is at this second “But what if…?” that constitutional commentary effectively breaks down and offers no further useful aid to the person pressing for further answers.

A constitutional commentator may perhaps have a go at putting together a further answer, if they are feeling helpful, but both the questioner and the commentator are now leaving the realm of constitutional commentary and entering the world of speculation instead.

For there is only so much a constitutional commentator can say in response to “But what if…?”.

They can set out what the constitution provides for that eventuality and what mechanism can be applied to resolve any tension or dispute. But that is all they can do, for that is all a constitution is.

As a general (not universal) rule-of-thumb, the second “But what if…?” is the limit of any useful exchange about any constitutional query.

With the third and fourth “But what if…?” the value of any constitutional commentary will tend to fall to zero.

And that is because of the nature of constitutional arrangements: they only provide “the rules of the game” for foreseeable situations.

(In addition, few if any constitutional commentators are competent or qualified to deal with the anxiety and alarm of others. Indeed, constitutional commentators are (if they are candid) likely to make such anxiety and alarm even worse.)

All this said, here are some general points about the current constitutional situation in the United States which may provide some comfort.

First, the US government is (or is insisting) that it is complying with court orders. Yes, there are political and media figures boasting about breaching “unconstitutional” court orders – but in the court room, the US government lawyers are saying orders are being complied with.

Second, Trump and his supporters are again seeking to game the US constitution rather than breach it outright. You may recall the “January 6” violence was in respect of an attempt to get the vice-president and senate to exercise their constitutional function in respect of counting and certifying the electoral college in the favour of the losing candidate.

That clever-clever, elaborate (and misconceived) constitutional ploy failed, regardless of the violence. There is no more inherent reason to believe that the new clever-clever, elaborate (and misconceived) constitutional ploys for a third term will work.

Third, the federal executive does not have a monopoly of political power: even with a weak legislature, the federal judiciary and the states also have powers. Any analysis of scenario needs to take account not only of what powers the federal executive have (or wants to have) but which ones it does not.

At this point, a constitutional commentator setting that there are other possible outcomes than catastrophe is accused of “complacency” or “optimism”.

Alas, I am a deep pessimist when it comes to constitutional matters.

My pessimism is deeper than many will imagine.

For me it is a minor miracle that any human gathering greater than Dunbar’s Number ever endures, without breaking up in violence and recriminations.

(It really is not a surprise that every other species in the genus Homo became extinct, despite us supposedly being the most intelligent creatures to have yet evolved: and Homo sapiens have this immense capacity for violence against other members of our own species, and the capacity to make tools as weapons for this violence.)

Constitutions are precarious things, and at some point they will all tend to fail.

The questions are when and how.

The pre-conditions are there for the US constitution to fail – and for the current crisis to become either a civil conflict or the basis of a totalitarian state.

But at the moment, there are still other possible, more positive outcomes.

Again, setting out the limitations of constitutional commentary is not to gainsay the current alarm and anxiety.

And “But what if…?” can actually be a useful question the first time it is asked – and, indeed, thought experiments are sometimes helpful or revealing.

But an infinite regression of “But what if…?” questions to a constitutional commentator helps nobody. It does not help the questioner, for no answer will address the underlying alarm and anxiety, and it does not help the commentator, who will have no useful answers.

The only thing that constitutional commentary can do is to look at the constant stream of heres-and-nows, and to set out contexts and possible outcomes.

It is a plodding, limited, often thankless task.

And let us hope that one day, constitutional law becomes dull again.

***

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Making sense of the Trump-Roberts exchange about impeachment

19th March 2025

Two public statements about the impeachment of judges – and why the Roberts one is highly significant

We are in strange constitutional times.

Yesterday there were two public statements, from the heads of their respective branches of the United States constitutional system.

The first was from the president of the United States Donald Trump on social media:

“This Radical Left Lunatic of a Judge, a troublemaker and agitator who was sadly appointed by Barack Hussein Obama, was not elected President – He didn’t WIN the popular VOTE (by a lot!), he didn’t WIN ALL SEVEN SWING STATES, he didn’t WIN 2,750 to 525 Counties, HE DIDN’T WIN ANYTHING! I WON FOR MANY REASONS, IN AN OVERWHELMING MANDATE, BUT FIGHTING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION MAY HAVE BEEN THE NUMBER ONE REASON FOR THIS HISTORIC VICTORY. I’m just doing what the VOTERS wanted me to do. This judge, like many of the Crooked Judges’ I am forced to appear before, should be IMPEACHED!!! WE DON’T WANT VICIOUS, VIOLENT, AND DEMENTED CRIMINALS, MANY OF THEM DERANGED MURDERERS, IN OUR COUNTRY. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!!!”

This social media post indicated Trump was perhaps a little disappointed with how the current case on deportations is going (covered on this blog in the last couple of days).

And unlike many of the documents examined on this blog, this Trump post really is not a difficult text to parse.

Once upon a time, when things were normal, such a statement by a president or anyone else in a position of power would have caused consternation, and maybe even triggered its own impeachment.

Now, we just expect these things – and one’s eyes glaze over such missives, with their lines of block capitals, just like one’s eyes can glaze over those irksome American contracts which insist in putting dozens provisions in block capitals so as to make them (supposedly) duly prominent.

And the fact that Trump was attacking a judge and calling for their impeachment also registered hardly a shrug.

So what? This is what he does. Next news item, please.

But.

It is a text not without interest – not for what it says, but for its context.

The timing of this post would accord with when Trump was probably being told of how the court case was going, with federal lawyers briefing him on the merits of the success of the defence.

As this blog has said, the US federal government are facing a hard time in this particular case – and there seems no obvious way that the government was not in breach of a court order.

If that was the substance of what Trump was being told, there is no wonder his response was this social media text. He would not take such news well.

But even after setting out this possible context, few would give such blather a second thought. More of the same.

But.

Then something unexpected happened.

John Roberts, the chief justice of the United States Supreme Court, put out his own public statement.

Such statements are as rare as Trumps posts are ubiquitous, and so it had the sudden effect that Trump’s posts have lost long lost.

Roberts simply said this, in a mere two sentences, and without any block capitals or exclamation marks:

“For more than two centuries, it has been established that impeachment is not an appropriate response to disagreement concerning a judicial decision. The normal appellate review process exists for that purpose.”

Bang.

Of course, this does not mention Trump expressly. And nor it is it an exceptional statement – it states the obvious.

In and of itself, it is not a radical text.

Yet the context of this text maybe makes it very potent indeed, and for at least two possible reasons.

First, it perhaps indicates that Roberts – part of the nominal conservative majority on the court – is not happy with threats to impeach judges over how cases are decided.

And if Roberts is not happy, it is likely that other conservative justices such as Amy Coney Barrett are unhappy too.

Given that Trump and his supporters hope and expect the conservative majority on the supreme court to ultimately uphold a lot of what they are currently doing, this statement was a signal that this majority cannot be taken for granted.

Second, it appears to also be a signal of judicial leadership. Roberts is implicitly telling the other federal judges across America who are having to adjudicate legal claims arising from the current political turmoil not to be intimidated by threats of impeachment.

(Any impeachment would also require two-thirds of the senate – votes which the conservatives have not (yet) got.)

If it is such a signal of leadership then, again, this is not good news for Trump and his bullying supporters.

Was it proper for Roberts to make such an extra-judicial statement?

Already conservative senators are saying that Roberts has trespassed onto the arena of the legislature, for it is Congress that decides whether to impeach.

(Such senators, of course, are silent on whether it was proper for the president to usurp the role of Congress on impeachment – but presumably such intellectual consistency is for the hobgoblin of little minds.)

But in any case Roberts was correctly stating the appropriate response to disagreeing with a court decision – you appeal, which is certainly proper for a chief justice to say.

And by saying what is the appropriate response, you are also necessarily saying what is not the appropriate response, and there is nothing wrong with him doing that expressly.

One never would have expected the president and chief justice to engage in, what is in effect, a twenty-first century pamphlet war – to have such a row in public.

To his credit Roberts avoided joining with Trump expressly, but the meaning of his speech act was plain: it was a public correction, if not a contradiction, of the president of the United States. It was a public rebuke.

Roberts would not have enjoyed doing this, and so there must have been for him a compelling reason to overwhelm his usual reluctance to make such statements.

(One wonders if he is also tempted to make a general statement that court orders should also be complied with unless appealed – though that may be too close to the facts of many currently contested cases.)

Many – fully aware of Roberts’ own rather illiberal judicial record – were unimpressed with this intervention. It was too little, too late and he only has himself to blame for much of the current law and policy dumpster fires.

Perhaps.

But here Roberts did do the right thing, and for that he should be commended – even if much of the rest of his record should be condemned.

And if politics is about getting people to shift their position to a better position, then any such move should always be welcomed.

Of course, the Roberts statement will make little difference to the current spectacular legal and political breakdown of the United States.

But it is a signal that those seeking to bring about this breakdown are not going to have it all their own way.

***

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The fog of lawlessness: what we can see – and what we cannot see – in the current confusions in the United States

25th February 2025

“l’histoire […] [est] après tout qu’un ramas de tracasseries qu’on fait aux morts.”

[“History […] [is] an annoying trick we play upon the dead.”]

~ Voltaire

(See here regarding the translation.)

A war or a revolution or a riot often makes little sense to contemporaries. There is a metaphorical fog, and there is confusion. Information is incomplete or unreliable. There is anxiety and excitement. Nobody really knows what is going on.

It is only in the later clear prose of a good historian, or the elegant prose of a confident judge, that the events seem to take some form of order: that what was messy and complex becomes a neat linear narrative, with reasoned conclusions based on tested evidence.

But it is not like that for those at the time.

What is actually happening currently in the United States is unclear.

There is a metaphorical fog, and there is actual confusion. Information is incomplete or unreliable. There is anxiety and excitement. Nobody really knows what is going on.

Not even those instigating the chaos know what is going on: they are too busy moving fast and breaking (and taking) things.

They may have some vague ideas about what they will do next, but one suspects what they will do next will come down to opportunism and cunning more than anything more concrete.

But in this fog there are certain things which can be made out.

For example, there are individuals who are insisting on being constitutionalist – despite the intense pressure and open threats to be otherwise.

There are the federal prosecutors who refused to apply for the prosecution of a politician to be dismissed:

There is the federal judge who appointed an independent lawyer to assist the court when nobbled prosecutors were found to apply for that dismissal:

There is the governor who said “see you in court” in the face of a president announcing that they were the federal law:

“See you in court” is a phrase that conveys the essence of the rule of law: that there is a forum where assertions of power can be tested for their legality.

And then there are things which are not being said.

Here is what seems to be the sound of constitutional silence:

Some are suggesting that the lawyers here are acting in bad faith, and that they do indeed know whether DOGE has an administrator.

Perhaps.

But what is more likely – and what would be far more significant – is that the lawyers do not actually know if DOGE has an administrator.

And here the word “know” is crucial – do they have knowledge?

They may have an understanding, a guess – or they may have heard somebody say something.

But if they do not know, they do not know.

And they are not going to mislead the court otherwise.

Indeed, whether DOGE actually exists is becoming more of a question for a theologian or a philosopher than for a mere legal commentator.

Perhaps soon all this will settle down, and the fog and confusion will clear, and we will see what has really happened.

The problem is that in fog and confusion a lot of things can happen which we cannot now know and maybe will never know.

It takes time to “see you in court” – and one does not know what one cannot see before one eventually gets to court.

By the time a court intervenes – and the adults stop the infantile antics – a lot of damage can be done – and certainly a lot of data and other material can be taken.

The law is sometimes not well placed to deal with what happens under the fog of war.

***

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The president who believes himself a king

23rd February 2025

A telling joke told by the president of the United States

During the last week the president of the United States compared himself to a king.

Of course, it was intended to be a joke – not in the sense of being funny, but in the sense of saying something without any adverse consequences.

But what struck me when he said it is that this is exactly sees power: that all power – executive, legislative, judicial – flows from him, and is ultimately exercisable by him. He wants to block laws and ignore court orders at will.

As such he does see himself as an absolute ruler.

In the United Kingdom – or at least in England – the theory is that while all power flows from the Crown, it is institutionalised so that the legislature legislates (as the “Crown-in-Parliament”) and the courts adjudicate (including in the Royal Courts of Justice).

But.

The “founding fathers” who devised the United States constitution rejected this approach – for them, the executive, legislature, judiciary each derived their powers separately from the constitution document itself – and not from the executive.

Trump’s approach is a flat contradiction to this codified constitutional arrangement.

I have written more about this over at Prospect – please click and read here.

***

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Making sense of what is happening in the United States

18th February 2025

How can we make sense, from a constitutionalist perspective, of what is currently going on in the United States?

Perhaps it cannot make sense, perhaps it is senseless – and so there is nothing more to be said.

Or perhaps one day we can look back at what is happening, with glorious hindsight, and see that it makes perfect sense.

Perhaps.

This post, however, is an attempt to make some sense of what is happening, based on currently available information.

First, there is not – yet – a constitutional crisis in the United States, though it seems from the outside that the United States is very close to one.

Yes, there is conflict – but constitutions exist to regulate conflict. It is only a constitutional crisis when a constitution fails to resolve that conflict: when tensions harden to contradictions, which in turn can even prompt civil discontent and even violence.

And yes, there seems to be defiance by the executive of court orders, though the picture here is not clear. There are court skirmishes and filed appeals, and it may be that the apparent defiance is bluster and not reality. It is too soon to tell.

But if the executive branch deliberately and openly (and brazenly) defy the orders of a federal court then, yes, that would be a crisis. It would be a serious contradiction the outcome of which is not clear. Such a crisis may not lead to civil strife, but it would still be an unstable, unpredictable situation.

Second, it would appear that an attempt is being made to avoid Musk having any legal responsibility for what this DOGE entity is doing:

It will be (grimly) fascinating to see how this somewhat desperate tactic works out in court.

One would hope that such a tactic should fail before any objective judge looking at substance of matter, but it may work before partisan Trump appointed judges. ‪

And we should remember that Musk is no legal tactician or strategist, let alone 4D chess player when it comes to the courts.

He got himself in legal knots in his attempt to withdraw from buying Twitter, which he was then legally obliged to purchase:

And he could not even arrange his own pay-rise in the company he actually controls:

This is not masterful legal strategy or tactics, just loudly confident, well-resourced legal blundering.

Curiously Trump is a lot more legally cautious than Musk, and Trump is instinctively good at avoiding (evading) legal responsibility under a general air of plausible deniability.

Yes, he has not always succeeded – and he has criminal and civil findings against him – but these are very few compared to the sheer number of legal threats he has faced in his political and business careers.

Think about how he managed to get out of almost all the cases against him about 6 January 2021 – from impeachments to federal prosecutions.

Think about how he has always avoided personal bankruptcy – despite his many business failures.

One suspects Trump would never have ended up having to buy Twitter against his will because of legal blunders.

This reckless/cautious distinction is one key difference between Musk and Trump.

One suspect that after all this, Trump will deftly survive/avoid the legal consequences of DOGE shenanigans, and Musk and his cronies will not.

Third, the three key legal protections for Trump’s administration may not apply to the civil (not criminal) liability that may be triggered by what DOGE is doing:

- - Presidential pardons do not apply to civil liability – if Musk and others involved with DOGE are sued, no presidential pardon will help them.
  - The recent Supreme Court ruling giving the president a certain immunity from criminal prosecution similarly does not apply to civil matters.
  - Control of the Department of Justice will not help when matters fall to be determined by the federal courts – not all of which are (yet) dominated by Trump appointees.

The civil exposure – from being sued rather than being prosecuted – of those involved in DOGE would seem eye-wateringly high.

All sorts of contractual, proprietary, data and other rights of individuals appear to have been freely disregarded.

And on the face of it, the presidential machine offers no protection from suit from those whose rights have been breached.

No wonder Musk and others are now trying to distance themselves from legal responsibility for DOGE.

And fourth, and to return to an old theme of this blog: the legal form of a constitution – codified, “written” or otherwise – offers no protection in and of itself when key political actors care not for constitutionalism.

(Constitutionalism is when those with political power accord with organising rules and principles despite partisan or personal advantage.)

There is no formal impediment to determined unconstitutional behaviour.

The real problem is how one gets politicians – and voters – to care about constitutionalism.

And that is a problem which has no obvious answer.

***

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From constitutional drama to constitutional crisis?

1st February 2025

When do constitutional problems become incapable of constitutional solutions?

What is a “constitutional crisis”?

There has certainly been a great deal of constitutional drama in recent years – in the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere.

But some of this drama somehow resolved itself.

In the United Kingdom, for example, the breathless threats and press briefings that the government was to do unlawful things in respect of Brexit in the end came to very little, though some (impotent) legislation was passed.

The United Kingdom supreme court in the Miller cases and parliament, by means of the Benn Act, put the government back into its constitutional box – and the once intense political-media frenzy over the Northern Irish protocol came to a whimpering end with the Windsor framework.

But sometimes constitutional dramas do spill into constitutional crises – political tensions harden into political contradictions, and these in turn can result in bloody violence.

On the islands of Britain and Ireland this has happened at least four times since the 1620s: the civil wars and political violence of the 1630s and the 1640s; the succession and religious conflicts from 1685 to 1746; the Irish war of independence and the Irish civil war; and most recently, the Troubles.

The execution of Charles I

Constitutional crises are serious political conflicts where constitutional means are unable to resolve the conflict, and the ultimate outcome of the conflict then becomes uncertain.

Often the political actors involved in the crisis will resort to violence – or be prepared to do so.

At such times it may not matter that a constitution is codified or not. For what has failed is not the form of the constitution, but its substance. The real failure is that of constitutionalism.

What then is constitutionalism? It has many definitions, but one approach is to regard it as the acceptance that there political rules and principles that should apply, regardless of partisan or personal advantage.

In other words that there are rules of the game.

What has happened in the United States over the last few days looks like a determined and comprehensive attack on various political institutions, by and on behalf of the newly re-elected President Trump.

As there are well-grounded fears that neither the federal judicial benches nor Congress will check and balance this attack, then there are the makings of a genuine constitutional crisis.

And the ultimate cause of this is not so much the failure of their codified constitution, but a deeper and wider failure of constitutionalism – including but not limited to the licence given by the United States supreme court to the president to do unlawful acts, and the failure of the Senate to discharge its constitutional obligation to convict Trump on impeachment after the attempted insurrection of 2021.

From such things, other things have now followed.

Brace, brace.

***

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Some of President Carter’s judges can still judge, 44 years later – and so we can see how long Trump’s new nominees will be on the bench

New year’s eve, 2024

The former US President Jimmy Carter, who has just died, left office in January 1981 – just under 44 years ago.

Yet one of his many bench nominees was still actively serving as a federal judge as recently as 2021:

And that list also indicates that about 29 of those judges – while not on active service – have the semi-retired “senior status” and so can still serve as judges if required.

This shows the significant lingering power of every US President on the shape of the judiciary.

A 100 year-old president former president has died who left office over 40 years ago, and yet his appointments can still decide cases.

Bringing this around to today: the newly re-elected Donald Trump and the Republican Senate will be appointing a raft of young conservative judges to the judicial benches, in addition to those which were appointed during his first term.

And some of these will still be judging (or able to judge) in 40 or 50 years – long after many of you reading this post may be here.

The lingering effect of the two Trumpite moments will last for political generations. Some appointed judges may see out ten or more presidential terms and still be judging.

And judicial time limits are now more unlikely than ever: Trump and the Republican senators have no interest whatsoever in limiting the enduring power of their nominees. And presumably as and when (or if) the Democrats ever regain power, they will have no interest in limiting the terms of their appointees.

This is a practical effect of how what some say (or hope) may only be short-term political surges can have consequences that will last decades.

(See also: Brexit.)

We are not dealing only with the politics of the here and now, but about the law and government of the hereafter.

Perhaps things will one day get better for liberals and progressives.

Perhaps.

But it is going to be a long haul.

Happy new year to the readers of this blog.

Thank you for your ongoing support.

There is going to be a lot to write about in the new year – and I am also going to explore the law and policy of AI, following my Candlemas story.

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The shapes of things to come – some thoughts and speculations on the possibilities of what can happen next

8th November 2024

The working assumption of many in reaction to the re-election of Trump as President is that he will serve a full term.

And that is the most likely outcome, as that is what presidents tend to do once elected: they serve out their term.

But there are other possible outcomes.

Some outcomes are morbid, and they are possibilities for any president, especially for one advanced in years.

And there is the possibility he may step down mid-term – or be replaced mid-term.

If Trump stands down mid-term, the new President Vance could pardon him for all and any federal crimes (though not state crimes). This would meet one of Trump’s presumed objectives for having re-run for President.

And if the timing of the replacement is done just right then a President Vance has the prospect of up to (but not quite) ten years in office: here the Twenty-second amendment to the US constitution provides:

“Section 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. […]”

If the replacement is done on the day after the second anniversary of the start of the term, then there would seem nothing to prevent a President Vance from then running for election and then re-election as President.

[Edit – in other terms: (2 years minus one day) plus 4 years plus 4 years.]

It can also be noted that in a way Trump has done his job for his backers in getting re-elected and, accordingly, there is nothing more he can personally do for them which another friendly occupant of the Oval Office cannot also do. If their objective is dominance over the medium- to long-term then they will be already thinking about the approach to the 2028 election.

And if there are doubts (real or otherwise) about the cognitive alertness of President Trump there is also the Twenty-fifth Amendment, where a President can be effectively removed against their will, on declaration of the (well) Vice-President and others.

On the other hand, a President Trump serving a full term may suit his backers just fine.

Trump is not a President to personally drive legislation through Congress – he is not a Lyndon Johnson or a Franklin Roosevelt.

But with a Republican Senate he does not need to do so: they can drive through the legislation themselves, subject to the final composition of the House of Representatives.

What a lazy president enables is for those around him to dominate the judicial nominations and discretionary powers.

So we can expect a raft of conservative nominations for the judicial benches – and for Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito to stand down and be replaced by 40 or 50 year-old strong conservatives, nominated by Trump and approved by the Senate. That will secure the Supreme Court for the conservatives for at least another twenty years, if not more.

And we can expect a huge amount of Executive Orders and such like, which in turn will be upheld by conservative judges – for who needs congressional legislation when you can have the combination of executive rule-making and nod-along judges?

Those around Trump will not be the inexperienced incoming staffers of the 2017 presidency, but people who know what to do and how to do it, many with hard experience of the first Trump presidency.

They will know what to do so as to fit things around a golf-playing president.

Trump himself may not be busy, but those around him will be.

Brace, brace.

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A blow against the “alternative remedies” excuse: the UK Supreme Court makes it far harder for regulators to avoid performing their public law duties

22nd October 2024

Not all cases of constitutional import involve the high drama of cheering campaigners and disappointed ministers – or of cheering ministers and disappointed campaigners.

But the cases set out what is constitutionally proper and improper all the same.

Last Wednesday to relative media silence (other than in local media) the Supreme Court handed down its decision in a Northern Ireland case about appropriate legal action for a complainant to take so as to prevent harmful chemical gases and noxious smells escaping from a waste disposal site.

This is perhaps not the most glamorous set of facts for any legal case – and this is perhaps a pity, as the Supreme Court decision asserts a point of fundamental constitutional importance: about the ability of a person to access the courts for judicially reviewing public bodies not doing their regulatory job.

By way of background, there is an excuse which is deployed again and again by public bodies seeking to escape being taken to court for judicial review.

(In general terms, judicial review is the process by which a court will decide whether a public authority is correctly exercising its legal powers.)

The excuse is that the complainant has to “exhaust other remedies” as judicial review “is the remedy of last resort”.

In this case, the complainant Mrs McAleenon was told that she could not go to court to get public bodies to properly regulate what was going on at a waste disposal site.

On the face of it, the local council and the Northern Irish Environment Agency and the Northern Ireland department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs all had powers to do something about it:

But the complainant (and other local people) believed that these public bodies were not doing what they should be doing about the problem.

And it was a problem – this was certainly not a trivial issue:

One would think that this was a straightforward position: some local people had a problem, and there were public bodies who could and should do something about problem.

This would seem to be as basic a situation for modern public law and administration as one can conceive.

The public authority regulator should do its regulatory job.

But for Mrs McAleenon and her neighbours it was not a straightforward position.

When she threatened to take the public bodies to court so as to make them perform their public duties, she was told that she could not do this.

Instead, she was told that she had to do other, far more risky and expensive legal things first.

She was told by the public bodies, seriously, that judicial review should be not be available because she had “adequate alternative remedies”, in that she could herself launch a private prosecution against the owner of the waste disposal site, or could bring nuisance claim against the owner of the site.

Mrs McAleenon applied for judicial review anyway, and at first instance the court sided with her.

But then the public bodies appealed and the Northern Irish court of appeal went against her in a detailed judgment.

The appeal judges ruled that “there were two alternative remedies open to the appellant to provide her with the relief she required if her claims are correct, namely cessation of the alleged nuisance on the Site. Each of these remedies, we find, offered her the opportunity of obtaining relief against the alleged wrongdoer”.

She should not be able to go to court against the regulator, the judges said, because her real complaint was against the site.

Mrs McAleenon applied to appeal to the Supreme Court, and she was given permission.

One issue in the case was that there were disputes over facts and contested evidence – and judicial reviews usually do not deal with factual disputes and contested evidence. Judicial reviews are normally about pure issues of law in respect of agreed facts. As such, cross-examination of witnesses and competing expert reports and so on are rare in judicial reviews.

This looks as if it may have influenced the appeal judges – as other legal procedures were more used to assessing evidence at trial.

But it is entirely open to a judicial review court to deal with factual and evidential conflicts.

The Supreme Court took the view that judicial review should not be refused just because there were factual and evidential conflicts.

But the Supreme Court went far further than this, and said – in effect – that for Mrs McAleenon the availability of criminal and private law procedures were not even alternative remedies in the first place.

In essence, when the complaint is against a public body as a regulator, it is irrelevant that the complainant may also have a remedy against a party that is not being properly regulated.

In two key paragraphs, the Supreme Court set out the public importance – and public benefits – of the complainants having access to judicial review against regulators:

The Supreme Court also made the point that access to an Ombudsman may not also be an adequate alternative legal remedy:

This dicta should please those who (correctly) are concerned about the general ineffectiveness of the Ombudsman system.

The Supreme Court remitted the case back to the Northern Irish court of appeal for it to be properly decided.

This is the press release from the successful appeal solicitors Phoenix Law, who should be congratulated for a great piece of appellate work on a crucial if unglamorous issue:

This case may have significant implications across regulatory law, both in respect of environmental issues and otherwise.

The decision strengthens the “public” element of public regulation.

Regulated entities already often have rights of appeal as well as access to judicial review. (And many regulated entities often seem to have “captured” their regulator and have established cosy relationships.)

But members of the public who are unhappy with how the regulator is performing its public duties are now in a stronger position.

No longer can such complainants be palmed-off and-waved away by the regulator with the message that they should just directly sue – or prosecute – the regulated entity bothering them.

No longer can they just be told that they should – at great expense and risk – first exhaust “alternative remedies” and not bother the regulator.

Complainants now have Supreme Court authority for being able to go to court to get regulating public authorities to do their jobs properly.

There is a great deal of discussion about whether the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is small-c conservative or not.

But this case, perhaps together with the 2021 Majera case, show that when it comes to the province of judicial power, the Supreme Court will firmly assert and defend the proper role of the courts in our political system.

For not all cases of constitutional importance, limiting what the executive in its various forms can get away with doing and not doing, are glamorous actions about high politics.

Sometimes they are about other, more mundane noxious things.

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Direct links (as Bailii links can be problematic on some apps):

Supreme Court decision: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2024/31.html

Northern Irish Court of Appeal decision:

https://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NICA/2023/15.html

2021 Majera decision:

https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2021/46.html

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.