Law and lore, and state failure – the quiet collapse of the county court system in England and Wales

(And, of course, it may not always be plain what the law actually is, in any case.)

Another theme of my blogging is state failure. By ‘state failure’ I mean the acts and omissions by and on behalf of public officials and public bodies that indicate fundamental and/or systemic failings.

Sometimes these state failings can be hidden deliberately from the public and indeed politicians and the media, and sometimes there is perhaps no need to deliberately hide them as too few people care. In either case the ultimate problem is either lack of resources or lack of accountability, or both.

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Over at Prospect I have done a piece that illustrates these two themes: the unsexy and perhaps uninteresting topic of local civil justice – and in particular, the county court system.

Please click and read here.

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I fell onto this topic by chance. I was looking at the transcript of the recent ‘liaison committee’ of the House of Commons for something I am writing about parliamentary accountability. This committee, comprised of select committee chairs, is one of the few recent improvements in holding the executive account, with its periodic examinations of the Prime Minister.

At the most recent session, I saw that the Justice committee chair devoted about half his allotted questions to the county court system. He could have chosen many other topics – from international law to prisons – but this was the subject he selected. That in turn led me to seeing that the justice committee has started an investigation into the county court system. Such an inquiry is welcome.

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The reason the county court system combines state failure (of which it is an example) with law and lore is that, for most people the county court system would be where they would enforce their everyday legal rights and obligations in respect of civil law – contract, torts, family law, property law, and so on.

Few people would be able to commence such litigation in the more expensive and exclusive High Court – just as few people would be able to lunch at the Ritz.

Of course, most people will not ever litigate. Indeed most people will happily go through their lives without attending a county court – or even knowing where their nearest one is situated.

But they will conduct themselves often on the assumption that certain rights and obligations can be enforced ultimately.

However, if the county court system continues to collapse, then that assumption will become increasingly academic. In essence, what people believe they can enforce at court will become more lore than law.

This is not to say that there will suddenly be anarchy and lawlessness: systems of customary oral law can be very enduring, and some systems of non-enforceable law can be rather resilient.

But eventually the mismatch between what is understood to be the law and what can actually be enforced will have some effect, and that effect will, in turn, modify behaviours – and in an adverse way.

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We are getting close to local civil justice not being meaningful to many in the community.

Let us hope that, unless local civil justice is somehow revitalised, that the lag between law and lore is a long one.

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Could the Post Office sue its own former directors and advisers regarding the Horizon scandal?

16th January 2023

Time is a problem for the Post Office, and its government owners, in making any legal claim against Fujitsu.

This is because any claim would probably be for breach of contract, and the limitation period for suing for breach of contract is normally six years from the breach.

Unless there was concealment – and here it is plain that the Post Office knew there were serious problems by 2013 (and no doubt for a long time before) – it is rare for a court to extend the limitation period.

At the House of Commons business select committee hearing today Fujitsu accepted a “moral obligation” to provide compensation. This indicates that Fujitsu’s response is PR-driven rather than strictly legalistic, as there is probably no legal obligation to compensate for any breaches obvious before six years ago.

(There may be a possible indemnity that may still be legally live in the Post Office Horizon contract, outside the limitation period, but that is unlikely.)

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But.

The Post Office, and its government owners, may have claims against its own former directors and advisers for any wrongs in respect of how the scandal has been dealt with in the last six years.

In essence: could Paula Vennells and others be sued?

It would be interesting if any such recovery is sought.

 

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How the legal system made it so easy for the Post Office to destroy the lives of the sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses – and how the legal system then made it so hard for them to obtain justice

 

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A role-reversal? – a footnote to yesterday’s post

1st December 2023

Discussing yesterday’s post with a long-suffering friend, the following thought came to mind.

In the Rwanda judgment, the Supreme Court goes into detail as to the work needed on the ground to make the removals policy robust and practical; and, in turn, the government is seeking to use parliament to simply declare a policy legal instead of illegal.

This seems quite the role-reversal: the court setting out what needs to be done as a matter of policy, instead of the executive and the legislature, and the executive threatening to use the legislature to decide whether something is lawful.

Strange, if you think about it.

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The three elements of the Rwanda judgment that show how the United Kingdom government is now boxed in

30th November 2023

This post is about three elements of the judgment of the Supreme Court on the Rwanda policy – and how the Supreme Court decision means that the Rwanda scheme cannot be saved by legislation and treaties alone.

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These three parts indicate the difficulties for the government if they seek to use legislation so as to circumvent the judgment.

And two of these parts are about things which the Supreme Court did not decide.

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The first of these is about, of course, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Here it should be noted that the court had granted permission for the Convention to be raised as a ground of cross-appeal:

(The government appealed – as they lost at the Court of Appeal – but some of the asylum seekers cross-appealed on points on which they had lost.)

The Supreme Court dutifully set out the Convention point in two paragraphs of the judgment:

You will see, however, that even in these paragraphs the court is careful to set out the Convention position alongside other applicable laws.

The court then makes this point about other applicable laws explicit:

In essence, the court is stating that the ECHR point does not stand alone.

And then in paragraph 106, towards the end of the judgment, the court says (with emphasis added):

This means that even if the ECHR did not apply directly, and even if the Human Rights Act did not exist, then the court would have decided the case the same way anyway, because the key legal principle is in other other applicable law.

That key legal principle is non-refoulement – that is the legal rule that requires that refugees are not returned to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The court found on the evidence before it that there was such a risk if the asylum-seekers were removed to Rwanda.

It thereby follows that if the government were to bring forward legislation to limit the effect of the Convention in Rwanda removal cases it would not make any difference. The courts would just rely on other laws for the same point.

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And this brings us to the second part, which is rather fascinating.

This is the thought-provoking – indeed, provocative – paragraph 25:

Now this is quite the passage.

So-called “customary international law” is, almost by defintion, outside the power of any one nation state to change. It will apply anyway. As the court says:

“the significance of non-refoulment being a principle of customary international law is that it is consequently binding upon all states in international law, regardless of whether they are party to any treaties which give it effect.”

A nation state may break that law, but they cannot unilaterally change it.

In other words there is no legislation whatsoever the government can bring forward that will mean that this rule would not apply to the United Kingdom.

Deftly, the court ends this point with “as we have not been addressed on this matter, we do not rely on it in our reasoning”.

This suggests that if the Rwanda policy is re-litigated to the Supreme Court, even if the government somehow excludes all the applicable legal instruments (and not just the ECHR and Human Rights Act) then the court may well still hold that the policy is unlawful, on the basis of customary international law.

That is quite the marker.

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The third part is about what the court did decide.

Here paragraph 105 is worth a very close look:

Here the court is stating that mere formal changes – such as placing the Rwanda policy on the basis of a treaty, as opposed to a flimsy MoU with no legal effect – will not, by themselves, render the policy lawful.

A treaty – which would provide for enforceable rights for individuals – would be necessary, but it would not be sufficient.

The real change required is that there be compelling evidence that, in practice, the Rwanda scheme will “produce accurate and fair decisions”.

And this is also outside of the scope of what the government can push through parliament: for no mere Act of Parliament can by itself change the situation on the ground in Rwanda.

Either the Rwanda scheme can be shown to produce the results required by the applicable laws – and, if need be, customary international law – or it cannot.

And if it cannot, it would seem that the Supreme Court will again hold the policy to be unlawful, whatever legislation is passed at Westminster.

This case now comes down to evidence, not law.

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Without relying on the ECHR the Supreme Court has placed the government in a rather difficult situation if the Rwanda scheme is to continue.

It would seem that only actual improvements in practical policy can now save the scheme – not clever-clever “notwithstanding” legislation.

And for a Supreme Court that had developed a reputation for being deferent to the executive and legislature on “policy” matters, this is a remarkable position.

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On yesterday’s Supreme Court judgment on the Rwanda policy

16th November 2023

Yesterday the Supreme Court handed down its appeal judgment in the Rwanda policy case.

For an informed view on the case, it is worth taking the time to watch Lord Reed, the President of the court, giving the summary of the judgment:

A court-approved summary can also be read here – and the full judgment is here.

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I wrote a couple of quick posts on the case yesterday for the mainstream media.

At the Financial Times, I did an “instant insight” (and it certainly had one of those two qualities) which emphasised two things which were immediately evident about the case.

First, it was remarkable – and, to me, a surprise – that the current Supreme Court under Lord Reed, which is generally regarded as deferent to the executive and legislature on “policy” matters, went unanimously against the government.

In essence, and to echo John Kander and Fred Ebb’s New York, New York: if a government cannot win on a “policy” matter before a Lord Reed Supreme Court, it cannot win that case anywhere.

Second, the court – perhaps showing more political sense than the entire cabinet – deftly avoided resting the case on the European Convention of Human Rights or the Human Rights Act.

Both instruments were, of course, mentioned in passing – but the effect of the judgment would have been just the same had neither instrument applied to the facts.

The court instead had regard to a range of other legal instruments and sources of law, including what is called customary international law.

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Over at Prospect, I approached the judgment from a different perspective, and I averred that the government could have won the case had they wanted to do so – by which I meant that the government could have negotiated a treaty with Rwanda that would have addressed the concerns ultimately expressed by the Supreme Court, instead of relying on a flimsy Memorandum of Understanding.

And this was not just a commentator-with-hindsight, it was what the government had been explicitly warned about a year ago by a House of Lords committee:

Some other commentators are not with me on this point – and they say that even a substantial treaty with Rwanda, which ensured there was no risk of asylum seekers being wrongly returned to their country of origin, may not have been enough to save the policy in this appeal.

Perhaps they are right and more would have been needed, but on any view such a treaty would have been necessary, if not sufficient: a non-enforceable MoU was inherently inadequate.  It would not have been relied upon had the government been actually serious about this policy.

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I am now thinking about writing a detailed post on the case from a constitutionalist perspective; but in the meantime, let me know below what you think about the decision and what you reckon to be its significance.

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The courts have already deflated the Rwanda policy, regardless of the Supreme Court judgment next Wednesday

10th November 2023

Even if the United Kingdom government wins on the lawfulness of the policy, it has already lost in respect of procedure

Those interested in day-to-day politics in the United Kingdom are now looking to next Wednesday for the Supreme Court decision to be handed down on the lawfulness of the Rwanda policy.

The conventional wisdom is that if the current Home Secretary is still in post on Wednesday, a Supreme Court defeat for the government may be the basis for the Home Secretary to resign and campaign for the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Convention on Human Rights, or something.

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Nobody outside the court will know the result in advance and so the hand-down will be a moment of drama and excitement.

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On balance, any legal challenge to “policy” – that is an approach to general political problems – is likely to fail.

For an entire policy to be quashed it would require that each and every possible application of the policy in any concrete situation must be unlawful – that there is nothing that can be done to save a decision in a particular case.

Courts are reluctant to do this – not least because policy is usually the province of politicians, and judges will not want to trespass.

And the current Supreme Court under Lord Reed often seems cautious in dealing with “policy” challenges.

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There perhaps are reasons why this particular policy may be unlawful in the round – and if it was not arguable that the policy was itself unlawful the Supreme Court would not have heard the case – but it would not be shocking if the Supreme Court sides with the government and holds that some applications of the policy may be lawful, subject to certain conditions.

And here is the nub of the situation, which many in politics and the media seem to be overlooking: the courts have already held that there are strict and onerous conditions in particular cases.

These conditions are so strict and so onerous, it may well be that few if any asylum seekers will be relocated to Rwanda, even if the Supreme Court rules that the general policy is legal.

Followers of this blog may recall posts about this at the time of the initial High Court decision and the Court of Appeal decision:

As this blog has before averred, the government can both win and lose a legal case at the same time.

And even if the government wins on whether the policy is lawful, the procedural protections already insisted upon by the courts in the application of the Rwanda policy will present difficulties for a Home Secretary after next Wednesday.

Whoever that is.

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“Computer says guilty” – an introduction to the evidential presumption that computers are operating correctly

Performative justice and coercion: thinking about coercing convicted defendants to hear their sentences

21st August 2023

(Source)

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The court system is inherently about performance: about justice being seen to be done.

And the legal system, more generally, is inherently about coercion: about people being forced to do things they otherwise would not do.

So taking these two things together, performative justice and coercion, both of which are deeply fixed in our culture, it is difficult for many to understand why a convicted defendant cannot simply be coerced to attend a courtroom to hear the sentencing remarks of the judge.

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The many have a point: it does seem an odd gap in the practice of criminal law, a lacuna in the world of courts and coercive force.

But.

There are genuine practical problems about having this particular form of coercion.

What happens if the defendant refuses to perform their allotted role and disrupts the court? Ordering back to their cells rather defeats the point of obliging them to be present.

And how do you meaningfully punish someone for non-compliance when they already face a life sentence?

There are also important points about placing at risk those court workers who would be expected to enforce the requirement against an unwilling defendant.

Like many things in criminal justice, and in the law generally, there are not easy answers to what seem easy questions: no deft solution to those who clamour that something must be done.

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There is, however, perhaps another way of thinking about this.

And this is to focus on the sentence of the court being the actual punishment.

That sentence may include incarceration and other things.

But the sentence is the thing.

It is the sentence which provides (or is supposed to provide) the output of justice – the sanction which the court holds to be the proportionate and, well, just response to the offence that has been found to have been committed.

Anything in addition to the sentence, even things which seem must be done, is separate from the sentence.

We should be wary about adding performative elements in addition to the sentence handed down by the court – especially elements intended to show further retribution.

Of course, part of a criminal sentence often serves the purpose of retribution.

But even in the most extreme cases, the purpose of retribution has to be balanced by other elements by a court.

The further we go from the sentence being the punishment, because of a clamour for there to be even more dramatic performative elements, the less the sentence itself can be regarded as the product of the justice system.

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Perhaps attendance orders for certain convicted defendants can be built into the court process, or even be made part formally of the sentence.

After all, as said above, there is already plenty of performative and coercive elements in criminal justice system. One more will not make that much difference.

But until such orders are properly integrated into the process, the concern should be that such elements are not made substitutes and supplements for the actual sentence.

The sentence is the thing, and it should always be the thing.

And even when the scales of justice are lopsided with the weight of the most awful of crimes, they nonetheless remain scales.

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A note of caution for those clapping and cheering at the latest indictment of Donald Trump

8th August 2023

 

(Picture credit.)

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The former president of the United States is facing serious legal trouble, with a serious criminal indictment which takes seriously his role in the 6 January insurrection, and – what is more – he also faces a serious judge taking her job seriously.

No matter how many times one types “serious” it is hard to overemphasise how serious this is for Trump and, by extension, for the United States generally and for the liberal constitutionalist notion that nobody, not even Donald Trump, is above the law.

But.

Taking this seriously also should also mean that those looking on should not give way to elation and celebration.

And this is because, as with all contested litigation, there is the possibility that this case can be lost as well as won.

It is too early to be clapping and cheering.

Imagine the following scenario: the prosecution throw everything they can at Trump. Each charge is evidenced and each witness comes up to proof.

Imagine that the case against Trump could not be framed better and could not be put before the court better.

Imagine a dream prosecution, one where everything goes right.

Imagine all that and then imagine, for this is litigation and all contested litigation is ultimately uncertain, that Trump is found not guilty.

This is not actually a fanciful point: the laws being relied upon by the prosecution are not commonly prosecuted and there is doubt as to the reach of those laws.

And Trump will be fighting for his political life – and whichever lawyers he manages to employ the duration of the trial will also be seeking the best possible presentation of the defense.

There is a non-trivial possibility that Trump may be found not guilty.

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What this would mean – or at least what Trump and his supporters will take it to mean – is not that Trump has escaped condemnation and conviction.

It would instead be taken to mean complete and absolute vindication of Trump both in respect of the incidents of 6 January and of his framing of the prosecution as a “witch trial”.

The consequences of such a vindication will be profound and lasting.

Of course, this possibility does not mean that the prosecution should not go ahead.

Nothing in this post should be taken to mean that the prosecution should be aborted.

The point of this post is not about prosecution practice and discretion: indeed, as far as one can tell, the prosecution is doing a good, impressive job.

The point of this post is to counter the jubilation at the indictment.

This is high-stakes litigation, in a case which may (as they say) make law.

Perhaps the prosecution wins and, after exhausting all and any appeals, Trump is held to be criminally liable for his role. If so, those opposed to Trump can then clap and cheer.

But we are not yet near that outcome, and the implications of the prosecution not succeeding need to be taken seriously too.

A great deal rides on this case, and the outcome is not certain.

Brace, brace.

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