17th August 2021
When I was at school in the 1980s, the well-meaning progressive teachers showed us the film Threads.
The purpose, no doubt, was to make us pupils think critically about the cold war and the (then) nuclear arms race.
The primary impact it had on me was, however, different – and this was because of how the film portrayed the telephones in the bunker.
The film gave me a life-long fascination about the nature of practical political authority and control.
Here on YouTube some helpful person has put together the bunker scenes from the film:
If you watch these scenes with special regard to the telephones, you will see the telephones going from an active means of communication, to an inactive means, to being discarded, and then to finally damaged beyond repair.
And this matches the collapsing political authority of those in the bunker.
To begin with there are other people at the end of the telephone, and then there is nobody, and then ultimately nobody cares – or knows.
The political authority of those in the bunker, like the communications, is cut off.
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The lesson I learned from this as a pupil was it was not enough to have people who want to be in control and to believe themselves to be in control – there also had to be infrastructure, and for there to be people to accept that control.
Without such infrastructure and deference, those ‘in control’ are akin to the motorist wriggling a gear stick or pressing the brakes when both have been disconnected.
Those ‘in control’ may as well be playing with some grand political simulator.
And so I became interested in processes and transmissions and logistics and policies and rules and laws, and less interested in personalities and partisanship.
To answer the question: just what happens when the telephone rings out but it is not answered?
I suspect that this not the intention of the film makers, or the teachers.
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I mention this because of the impotence many in the West now feel about the fall of Kabul.
There is a general sense that something should have been done.
Here is our current foreign secretary:
Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab says "no one saw this coming, we would have taken action if we had" regarding Taliban takeover of Afghanistan
— Sky News Breaking (@SkyNewsBreak) August 17, 2021
The phrase “no one saw this coming” could be the motto of the United Kingdom government since at least 2016.
And here is Susie Dent, the subtle genius who no doubt will be regarded by future historians as the best political commentator of our age:
Word of the day is ‘imprescience’ (19th century): a total lack of foresight and foreknowledge.
— Susie Dent (@susie_dent) August 17, 2021
All true: but even if we had the foresight, what could have been done?
Of course: the execution of the final departures could have been better.
But beyond the arrangements for the final exit, it is difficult to see what further control the West could have had.
I'm as depressed as anybody about what is happening at the moment in Kabul. I certainly think Biden could have handled it a lot better. But I do not have the confidence others seem to have that the Taliban could have been kept at bay indefinitely.
— Lawrence Freedman (@LawDavF) August 16, 2021
European leaders are right to see the collapse of Afghanistan as another blow to the credibility of the West. However, not a single one of them would lift (or did lift) a finger to prevent it.https://t.co/My68DeorAB
— Anne Applebaum (@anneapplebaum) August 17, 2021
And part of the problem for the United Kingdom is that not only do we have no control, we also have no meaningful policy for what we could do.
Here, there are some hard truths on the lack of any meaningful United Kingdom policy in this RUSI post:
‘This week’s ignominy may be set instead against some of the blithe statements made just six months ago in the Integrated Review: that the UK will be ‘a problem-solving and burden-sharing nation’; that it already demonstrates a ‘willingness to confront serious challenges and the ability to turn the dial on international issues of consequence’; that the UK will embody ‘a sharper and more dynamic focus in order to adapt to a more competitive and fluid international environment’; and that it will ‘shape the international order of the future’.
‘The UK’s Afghanistan experience demonstrates none of this.
‘Instead, it speaks to a generation of political leaders who have too easily fooled themselves that being Washington’s most reliable military ally constitutes in itself an effective national strategy.
‘Such a relationship may be one element of an effective strategy, but it cannot simply be the strategy.’
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Yesterday this blog looked back to a 2017 Financial Times post where I put the old calls for ‘regime change’ together with other simple notions from the first part of this century, as part of a general politics of easy answers:
Since 2017, with the ongoing experience of Brexit but also with Covid and many other things, we still see the politics of easy answers.
The sense that all that needs to be done when something must be done is for politicians to want it to be done.
The hard and complicated work of policy and (meaningful) strategy is often not even an afterthought.
We have politicians in their modern-day bunkers, thinking that having telephones to hand will be enough for their will to be done.
But political power hangs on, well, threads.
And those threads snap easily, if they exist at all.
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