Is it, at last, time to say “good bye” to Thoburn and the idea of “constitutional statutes”?

 9th February 2023

Oh dear old Thoburn, what shall be done with you?

Thoburn, the mainstay of thousands of constitutional law essays and hundreds of learned articles, does yesterday’s Supreme Court decision mean you are now no more?

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Thoburn is the 2002 “metric martyrs” case which introduced into the then quiet, sedate world of constitutional law the exciting concept of “constitutional statutes”.

Until then all Acts of Parliament were regarded as being equal, none of them any more entrenched – enshrined – than any other.

But in Thoburn the judge said, in effect, that there was a class of super-duper statutes known as “constitutional statutes” and these statutes had super-duper qualities not available to more mundane everyday statutes.

Incredible, if true.

And so Thoburn became the recent constitutional law case any student or informed pundit had to have an opinion about.

But yesterday’s Supreme Court decision on the Northern Irish Protocol may mean the dictum in Thoburn are no longer to be taken seriously.

What will law students and pundits do?

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To understand what happened with the Thoburn case we have to go back to the Victorian doctrine of the supremacy of parliament.

This doctrine holds that no statute passed by the Crown-in-Parliament can be gainsaid by any court.

But in two case in the early 1930s about the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 and the Housing Act 1925, the courts were presented with a situation where two statutes contradicted each other.

How should the courts deal with this situation?

The clever idea the courts came up with was “implied repeal” – and so the fiction adopted was that parliament in passing the later legislation knew about the earlier legislation, and so the (presumed) intent of parliament was to repeal the earlier legislation.

But as this repeal was not explicit in the later legislation, it would have to be an implicit repeal.

And this is how the interwar courts managed to disapply a piece of primary legislation, notwithstanding the heady doctrine of the supremacy of parliament.

(Of course, if no Act of parliament can actually be gainsaid by a court, then the courts should have just refused to choose between the two contradictory statutes and return the matter to Parliament to sort out – but the fig-leaf of the “intent” of parliament meant the courts could sort out the legislative mess parliament had created.)

And the legal rule from these case was that the later statute trumps – that is, implicitly repeals – the earlier statute when the two contradict.

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But in 2002 the court was faced with another seemingly awkward situation.

It was submitted in that case that the Weights and Measures Act 1985 somehow implicitly repealed the earlier European Communities Act 1973.

On the merits of the case, the court found that this was not the position.

But in a dictum – which was not about the point on which the case turned – Lord Justice Laws (and please none of the usual jokes about nominative determinism) went on a judicial frolic and speculated about implied repeal.

Could a later Act of Parliament really implicitly repeal the European Communities Act 1973, which – in turn – was the (then) basis for the laws of the European Union having effect in the United Kingdom?

On the basis of the 1930s cases then this would have to be the position, as the later statute trumps the earlier statute.

But.

As we now know, repeal of the European Communities Act 1973 would be a very complicated and far-reaching thing.

And so Lord Justice Laws posited a new category of statutes which would be immune from any implied repeal.

If there were any contradictions with an earlier “constitutional statute” then it would be the later statute that would be repealed, not the earlier one.

His dictum was as follows (which I have broke out into one-sentence paragraphs):

We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament: as it were “ordinary” statutes and “constitutional” statutes.

The two categories must be distinguished on a principled basis. In my opinion a constitutional statute is one which (a) conditions the legal relationship between citizen and State in some general, overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental constitutional rights.

(a) and (b) are of necessity closely related: it is difficult to think of an instance of (a) that is not also an instance of (b).

The special status of constitutional statutes follows the special status of constitutional rights.

Examples are the [sic] Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of Union, the Reform Acts which distributed and enlarged the franchise, the HRA, the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998.

The ECA clearly belongs in this family. It incorporated the whole corpus of substantive Community rights and obligations, and gave overriding domestic effect to the judicial and administrative machinery of Community law.

It may be there has never been a statute having such profound effects on so many dimensions of our daily lives.

The ECA is, by force of the common law, a constitutional statute.

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This was exhilarating, provocative stuff.

And it was utter flapdoodle.

There was no basis for positing such “constitutional statutes” – either then or now.

They were invented just to get the courts out of the potentially tricky situation which the judges’ contrived solution to the problems in the 1930s had got themselves into.

The notion of “implied repeal” was now a reversible switch – and it was to be the judges who decided (and not parliament) whether it would be the earlier or the later legislation that would be “implicitly repealed” by the simple expedient of the judge perhaps dubbing one or the other of the Acts of Parliament a “constitutional statute”.

It was all rather daft, but you will see why it was like catnip to those with an interest in constitutional law.

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Anyway, the Laws dictum was relied on by the applicants in the recent Allister litigation on the legality of the Northern Irish Protocol, which eventually reached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court decision in that case is fascinating and it warrants a post by itself, especially on respect of the developing jurisprudence of the court on devolution.

But the Supreme Court was unimpressed by the Thoburn point.

The court described the submission (again broken up into one-sentence paragraphs):

On the hearing of this appeal, the appellants submitted that the Acts of Union were constitutional statutes so that the rights in the trade limb of article VI of His Majesty’s subjects of Northern Ireland being on the same footing in respect of trade as His Majesty’s subjects of Great Britain, could not be subject to repeal or to subjugation, modification, or suspension absent express or specific words in a later statute.

In support of that submission, the appellants relied on a line of authorities starting with Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin)[2003] QB 151 for the proposition that whilst ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed constitutional statutes may not.

At para 63 of Thoburn, Laws LJ suggested that the repeal of a constitutional statute or the abrogation of a fundamental right could only be effected by a later statute by:

“express words in the later statute, or by words so specific that the inference of an actual determination to effect the result contended for was irresistible.”

The appellants submitted that the Acts of Union are constitutional Acts and that the rights to equal footing as to trade were fundamental rights so that there was no scope for implied repeal and by analogy there was no scope for implied subjugation, modification, or suspension.

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You will see that the Thoburn point has now been expanded beyond implied repeal and that “constitutional statutes” have various other super-duper legal protections.

The court held (again broken up into one-sentence paragraphs, and with my two comments interposed):

The debate as to whether article VI created fundamental rights in relation to trade, whether the Acts of Union are statutes of a constitutional character, whether the 2018 and 2020 Acts are also statutes of a constitutional character, and as to the correct interpretative approach when considering such statutes or any fundamental rights, is academic.

“Academic.”

Even if it is engaged in this case, the interpretative presumption that Parliament does not intend to violate fundamental rights cannot override the clearly expressed will of Parliament.

“Even if”

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Allister is not about implied repeal, so strictly speaking the Laws dictum in Thoburn may be said to not be applicable.

But the notion of “constitutional statutes” is plainly not taken seriously by this unanimous Supreme Court in an important devolution case engaging what Laws would have called many “constitutional statutes” , with a panel consisting of justices from Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, as well as the court’s leading public law justice, Lord Sales.

For the Supreme Court, the content of the Acts of Union have no special entrenched legal status, and they can be amended, and so on, just as any other Act of Parliament.

The question of what would happen with a direct contradiction, as in the early 1930s has been sidestepped.

But the expedient of “constitutional statutes” as suggested by Laws in Thoburn seems to have been put back in its judicial box.

Or has it?

No doubt there will now be thousands more constitutional law essays, and hundreds more learned articles, to tell us whether the dictum in Thoburn is no more.

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Another weekend, another threat to leave the European Convention of Human Rights

6th February 2023

Here we go, again.

This was a news report in yesterday’s Sunday Times:

The content of the report itself does not quite amount to the “pledge” of the headline – but the content of the report is not without interest:

“The PM has been clear he wants to introduce legislation that meets our international obligations,” a source familiar with Sunak’s thinking said. “This bill will go as far as possible within international law. We are pushing the boundaries of what is legally possible, while staying within the ECHR. And we are confident that when it is tested in the courts, we will win.

“But if this legislation gets onto the statute book and is found to be lawful by our domestic courts, but it is still being held up in Strasbourg, then we know the problem is not our legislation or our courts.

“If that’s the case, then of course he will be willing to reconsider whether being part of the ECHR is in the UK’s long-term interests.”

Senior figures say the prime minister is prepared to deploy the nuclear option before the general election if the European court strikes down his plans. But that would put the government on a collision course with MPs and particularly the House of Lords, and it is highly unlikely it would happen before the election due in 2024.

The Tories would then put withdrawal from the ECHR at the heart of their manifesto, drawing a sharp dividing line between the Conservatives and Labour. The plan is proof, allies say, that Sunak shares the hardline instincts of the Tory right on immigration.

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What can we make of this?

Perhaps this is just a weekend frolic: a political source contriving something so as to get the weekend press coverage they want at the end of another difficult week.

If so, this would not be first weekend this has happened, and it probably will not be the last.

And in any case, the last part of the news report quoted is probably political bravado: the sound of an anonymous source getting increasingly excited by what they are imparting.

But the first part looks to me as if it may be tied to the circulation of internal government legal advice.

So with my former government lawyer hat on, let us look what could be the situation:

1. The government has a plan to deal with the boats and this plan requires legislation.

2. The government has obtained legal advice on that plan and perhaps even on the wording of the draft legislation.  This advice may be internal advice from the government legal service, and/or it could have been obtained from external specialist counsel.

3. That legal advice is that both the plan and the draft legislation may be compliant with the Human Rights Act 1998 which gives effect to the ECHR in domestic law and, if so, they will be upheld in the domestic courts.

4. However, that legal advice may also include the proviso that the ultimate  arbiter of the ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg may take a different view – either on a final or on an interim basis.

5. A minister – perhaps the Prime Minister – has decided to proceed with the plan and the legislation on the basis of this legal advice.

If the above analysis is (roughly) correct then the politics of the situation may unfold as follows.

First, if the domestic courts and/or the Strasbourg court hold that the plan and/or the legislation is/are not compliant with the ECHR then it is not the government’s fault but that of the judges and the lawyers.

Second, if the the plan and the legislation is/held to be compliant then the government had won its showdown with the judges and the lawyers – by threatening to leave the ECHR the government has got the courts to cower.

In either scenario, the government will be beyond blame.

The politics of the situation would be, if the above is correct, a win-win for the government.

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But.

If the government does lose, and the courts hold that the plan and/or the legislation is/are held not to be compliant with the ECHR, what about the threat to leave the ECHR?

This is the bit which is not really thought-through.

As this blog has set out previously, the Good Friday Agreement requires the ECHR to be enforceable directly in the courts of Northern Ireland.

(The Human Rights Act 1998 currently does this for Northern Ireland, as well as for the rest of the United Kingdom – but it does not matter what legislation does it, as long as it is done.)

There is no obvious way that the ECHR can be enforceable directly in the courts of Northern Ireland if the United Kingdom is not a party to the ECHR.

Even attempts to carve out the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom – creating yet another legal(istic) border down the Irish Sea – are unlikely to work.

This is because Article 1 of the ECHR requires its signatories to secure to everyone within their jurisdictions the rights and freedoms set out in the ECHR – and so the United Kingdom cannot be a signatory for some parts of the United Kingdom and not others (emphasis added).

And unless the United Kingdom is the signatory, the ECHR cannot have legal effect so as to be directly enforceable in the courts of Northern Ireland.

The alternative possibility that Ireland still being a signatory to the ECHR could be used as the legal basis for giving direct effect to the ECHR in the courts of Northern Ireland would presumably be a non-starter with the unionist community.

In essence: if the United Kingdom leaves the ECHR then it would seem the United Kingdom will be in breach of express provisions in the Good Friday Agreement.

And all this would be in addition to the reaction of the United States of America to a breach of the Good Friday Agreement – especially as long as Joseph Biden is President.

It is impossible to see how withdrawal could be done without upset.

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Of course, some would say it is a pity that it is only the Good Friday Agreement that would prevent the United Kingdom government leaving the ECHR.

Surely there are better arguments against leaving than that?

But even if there are better normative points to make on behalf of the ECHR, the Good Friday Agreement would be a formidable structural obstacle to withdrawal.

And changing the Good Friday Agreement would probably need the consent of at least the Northern Irish in a referendum, if not that of the voters of Ireland too.

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And it appears that current Conservative backbenchers are underwhelmed by this threat, with one correctly using the technical legal term “willy waving”.

As Politico reports:

Enough of the willy waving: Playbook has seen texts exchanged in the “Home Group” of Tory MPs in response to the story over the weekend. Replying to a message from Jonathan Gullis, who had shared it approvingly, Doyle-Price said that “willy waving about leaving the ECHR will do zilch” and declared: “I have been a member of the Conservative Party for 36 years. This group leaves me cold. Upholding the law should never be a matter for debate for a Conservative. Our Home Office is crap. If the government wants to have a phone[y] war over the ECHR instead of sorting itself out it can do it without me.”

Everyone’s a critic: There was more backlash in the group from David Simmonds, who said that “the ECHR is not the issue here. By pretending it is, we are setting ourselves up for a fall as a UK court will take the same line,” and called for reform of the asylum system. Alicia Kearns agreed that “it’s exactly as David sets it out. We cannot tackle asylum claims when we haven’t given ourselves the legal grounding on coming here illegally.” Anna Firth said that while she was happy to be proven wrong, she thought Doyle-Price was “bang on the money” about the ECHR “rabbit hole.”

[…]

On the record: Bob Neill told the Financial Times that it would be “unbelievable” for the U.K. to put itself “in the same company as Russia and Belarus” by leaving the ECHR, while former justice sec Robert Buckland calls it “an undesirable state of affairs.”

 

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What seems to have happened is that that a political castle was improvised this weekend on the mound of what probably is some fairly unexceptional legal advice about whether the government’s latest plan and draft legislation would survive legal challenge at home and in Strasbourg.

On the basis of that legal advice, politicians and their advisers appear to have rapidly gamed certain political tactics, free from any thought about the structural legal problems, as well as without realising the lack of backbench support.

This is not to say that the current governing party is not capable of putting departure from the ECHR in its manifesto and, if they are again returned, seeking to put that commitment into effect.

(Withdrawal from the ECHR is unlikely before the next general election, as it was not in the 2019 Conservative manifesto, and there would be not enough time to force it through the House of Lords.)

In this age of Brexit and Trump, no such political move can be discounted.

But it would not be easy.

And it would require considerably more thought and planning than the current anonymous briefings indicate has taken place.

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What is going to now happen with the Bill of Rights?

9th December 2022

You really would need a heart of stone not to laugh like a drain:

This blog has previously compared Dominic Raab’s quest to repeal the Human Rights Act with Captain Ahab’s quest to get Moby Dick.

And it would appear that Raab is going to fail, again.

It looks likely that his “Bill of Rights” – which was to repeal the Human Rights Act and to make it more practically difficult to rely on the European Convention on Human Rights  – will be dropped.

As it is, there has been no legislative movement on the Bill since 22 June 2022, which is now almost six months ago:

The Human Rights Act 1998 will still be there, and Dominic Raab may soon not be.

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But.

Those generally supportive of the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights should not be tempted into complacency by the apparent dropping of the Bill.

There are many ways a canny government can subvert human rights protections – subtle, hidden ways.

All that has failed here is a loud and clumsy frontal attack.

In a way, such performative proposals are the easiest to deal with, as they often collapse from their own absurdity.

The Home Secretary Suella Braverman is also no friend of the European Convention on Human Rights, but she and her Home Office of lawyers will come up with less obvious proposals in upcoming legislation.

The convention itself is fairly safe as part of our domestic law, as the Good Friday Agreement expressly requires convention rights to be directly enforceable in the courts of Northern Ireland.

There is thereby little-to-no chance that the convention will be taken out of our domestic law.

And there now seems little chance that the Human Rights Act, which gives effect to the convention in our domestic law, will itself be repealed.

But in the two or so years before the latest date for the next general election – January 2025 – there is a great deal ambitious ministers can do try to do with more focused legislation.

So while we can afford a moment at this festive time of merriment to have a hearty cheer at the apparent failure of the Bill of Rights, we must stop the cheering when the Christmas decorations come down.

And be braced, braced for the new year.

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How the constitution of the United Kingdom has been tested continuously for over seven years

19th October 2022

Imagine that a group of political experimentalists had come together about seven or so years ago to devise a scheme to test just how far the constitution of the United Kingdom could be pushed.

Imagine that demonic scheme was as follows:-

First: the test of a supposedly non-binding referendum in what was normally a parliamentary system

Second: the test to see if a Prime Minister could force through an extra-parliamentary invocation of Article 50, free from any statute.

Third: the test of whether – after over forty-five years – the United Kingdom could be extracted at speed from the European Union.

Fourth: the test of whether parliament could put in place a mechanism to ensure that such a departure required a withdrawal agreement to be in place.

Fifth: the test of whether a Prime Minister could close down parliament so as to force through a no-deal departure.

Sixth: the test of how the constitution can deal with with a dishonest knave of a Prime Minister.

And now we have a seventh: the test of how the constitution can deal with a vacant fool of a Prime Minister.

I may have missed out some of the tests along the way.

We may also soon have other tests – about how to deal with a border poll on the island of Ireland, or a move towards an independent Scotland.

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The constitution has been through a lot in the last ten years – perhaps too much.

Some would say that the tests set out above “show the need for a codified constitution” – but one suspects for some anything and everything “shows the need for a codified constitution”.

In each of the tests to date, there is support for the view that our uncodified constitutional arrangements have fared relatively well.

The supreme court checked and balanced the attempted misuses of Prime Ministerial power and asserted the rights of parliament; parliament with the Benn Act forced a government to enter into a withdrawal agreement; and the body politic ejected Boris Johnson as Prime Minister, even though he had recently won a substantial majority.

But the constitution needs a rest, on any view.

Constitutional law has now been continuously exciting for seven years; and it should never be exciting for more than a few weeks at most, if at all.

And as I type this, a Home Secretary is resigning and government backbenchers are threatening to vote against in a “confidence” motion.

The constitution is not going to get a rest anytime soon.

Brace, brace.

Again.

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Article 16, again – what, if anything, has changed?

26th August 2022

Article 16, again.

Here is this blog in February 2021:

In September 2021:

And in October 2021:

There are many more.

Like many commentators on Brexit, it feels like I have written sixteen articles on Article 16.

There was a time when every weekend had a Sunday newspaper briefed that Article 16 was about to be triggered.

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And here we go again.

What new can be said?

In some ways, there is not a lot that is new to say.

Triggering Article 16 will not have the dramatic – cathartic  – effect that some breathless political and media supporters of the government believe it will have.

A gun is not fired, just a talking shop established.

And the provision cannot be used to dismantle the Northern Irish Protocol.

If you want to read more along those lines. click on the links to the explainers above.

But.

Some things have changed.

And it may actually be wise for the government to trigger the provision.

This is because the United Kingdom is now in the absurd position of proposing primary legislation on the Northern Irish Protocol under the pretence that it is “necessary” for the United Kingdom government to not perform or comply with its obligations under the protocol.

The government raced to putting forward this draft legislation without going down the Article 16 route that was intended to deal with any problems with the protocol.

By actually setting up a formal talking shop on the protocol then there is the possibility of constructive engagement with the European Union, rather than this silly legislative exercise.

Article 16 should have been triggered ages ago – as it would enable structured talks.

The reason one suspects that the government has not triggered Article 16 is that ministers know – or should know – that it will not have the exhilarating effects set out in the government-supporting media.

But it could have beneficial effects – and any safeguard measures would have to proportionate and time-limited.

Article 16 may therefore offer a way of choreographing a resolution of the perceived issues over the Northern Ireland Protocol.

Of course: this assumes that our government under the incoming Prime Minister wants a solution and is operating in good faith.

Just typing those words makes one realise how unsound such an assumption is.

But.

Structured talks under the Article 16 regime can only be a good thing and the government’s scarce time and resources would be better used in doing this than in pursing the misconceived primary legislation to allow the government to break the law.

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How the Good Friday Agreement means the United Kingdom government cannot leave the ECHR (without breaching the Good Friday Agreement)

12 August 2022

From time to time the demand will come from a government minister, or from one of their political and media supporters, for the United Kingdom to leave the European Convention of Human Rights.

This short blogpost sets out the most obvious difficulty for the government in doing this.

The difficulty – if that is the correct word – is the Good Friday Agreement.

This thirty-six page document – which is not as read as widely as it should be – contains a number of express provisions in respect of the ECHR:

“The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency.”

“There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including:  […] (b) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission […]”

“The Assembly will have authority to pass primary legislation for Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to: (a) the ECHR […]”

And so on.

The ECHR is not just mentioned in passing in a recital.

The ECHR is integral to the Good Friday Agreement – and that rights under the ECHR can be relied upon in Northern Ireland is a fundamental part of the agreement.

This means that if the United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland) leaves the ECHR there will be breaches of the Good Friday Agreement.

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When this is pointed out, sometimes the response is “Aha! Why not just have the ECHR applicable in Northern Ireland?”

Of course, there is nothing in the Good Friday Agreement which expressly requires rights under the ECHR to be directly enforceable elsewhere in the United Kingdom.

But.

Article 1 of the ECHR provides:

It would thereby not be open to the United Kingdom to be a party to the ECHR and pick-and-choose who within its jurisdiction can have the benefit of the rights.

This is in addition to the political issues about having a further legal “border down the Irish Sea”, which presumably would not be welcome to unionists.

And so, one can either have the United Kingdom outside of the ECHR or one can have the Good Friday Agreement, but it is difficult to see how you could have both.

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There are other ways to deal with the problems (as perceived) with decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.

In 2012 – during the Conservative-led coalition – there was the “Brighton Declaration”.

And the Supreme Court is already unafraid of showing its independence, as it did in 2013 – and which was welcomed by Conservative ministers:

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As this blog previously averred, there is also a distinction to be made between human rights law as a legal reality and “Human Rights Law!” as an event of political rhetoric.

Last October, the Lord Chancellor made a speech to the Conservative party conference where (tellingly) the only example he gave of a wayward human rights court decision was where the law had already been changed.

As such “Human Rights Law!” is often a turnip-ghost, which has been created by politicians and the media just to scare themselves and others.

For every actual problem with the ECHR there is a practical way of addressing that problem that does not require the United Kingdom’s departure from the ECHR.

And often, stripped of political and media gloss, the apparent problems are not there.

As with the Brighton Declaration, and as with the Supreme Court, problematic features of the ECHR and its application by the Strasbourg court can be dealt with in other ways.

Ways that do not also involve breaching the Good Friday Agreement.

That is what politicians should do.

And that – one hopes though no longer expects – will be what politicians will end up doing.

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The resignation of Boris Johnson – and why that is not enough for good government to return

7th July 2022

Well.

This morning I was writing a Twitter thread on what would happen if all government minsters resigned.

For such a surreal thing to be of any practical concern, rather than for academic speculation, indicates that it has been an odd few days in the politics of the United Kingdom.

And now the current Prime Minister has announced his resignation.

He is not going immediately – but the process for a finding a new Conservative party leader will now start and it seems to me that Johnson cannot now do anything to stop that process.

Once that process produces a new leader, that leader will be invited to form a government by the Queen, and Johnson – by automatic operation of the constitution – will instantly cease to be Prime Minister.

He may go even sooner, with a ‘caretaker’ Prime Minister put in place until a new Conservative leader emerges.

Johnson may remain in office, but his announcement today means he has lost ultimate control of his political fate.

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His resignation shows the operation of another constitutional rule – perhaps the most fundamental constitutional rule of all.

That rule is that Hubris is usually followed by Nemesis.

Wise politicians know this – and so they run tight ships, knowing that the pull of the tides can result in capsizing or being wrecked.

Less wise politicians assume their moment of great power will last forever.

Johnson – a successful electoral politician – was brought down not by any great policy issue or national crisis.

From Partygate and the Owen Paterson affair, he and his circle made unforced error after unforced error.

He and his circle believed that they could casually defy rules and conventions.

And so the ship of state became a ship of fools.

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Johnson in December 2019 had the greatest prizes that the constitution of the United Kingdom can bestow on a Prime Minister.

He had won an emphatic general election victory – and so he had the “mandate” that meant he could translate his programme into practice without delays in the House of Lords.

And he had a substantial majority – of eighty – which meant he could get through the House of Commons legislation and revenue provisions without opposition.

He even had, with Covid and then Ukraine, two huge unifying issues for him to pose as a Churchillian leader.

Yet, two-and-a-half years later, he is resigning.

And the mandate and the majority have been wasted.

The latest Queen’s Speech was an embarrassing sequence of proposals, showing that the government had no direction.

And the one thing that Johnson and his government did do – Brexit with a withdrawal agreement – he was seeking to break.

Power without responsibility, as another Prime Minister once said in a different context.

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Brexit was begat by the Conservative and Unionist Party.

The 2016 referendum was an exercise in party management, and it was from that egg that Brexit first emerged.

After 2016 the Conservative and Unionist Party said Brexit should mean Brexit, and they campaigned on that basis.

And under Johnson, the Conservative and Unionist Party “got Brexit done”.

But Brexit, being ungrateful, is destroying the Conservatives and dismantling the Union.

The revolution is devouring its begetters.

It is a political morality tale.

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And so good bye then Boris Johnson, if not now but soon.

The curious thing is that he may not even be the worst of the post-2010 Prime Ministers.

It was David Cameron who risked the future of the country on a single turn of pitch-and-toss – and with no preparation for a Leave vote.

It was Theresa May who insisted that Brexit had to be done, at speed, with its ‘red lines’ that kept the United Kingdom outside the Single Market.

These macro political mistakes were profound.

And we now have the greatest political mess in living memory, if not modern history.

It is time for the excitement to die down, and for a return to the dull work of taking government seriously.

The ejection of the repugnant Johnson from the body politic is a necessary step towards such political good health – but it is not a sufficient one.

Let us hope that we have not left it too late for there to be a recovery.

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Should the “Bill of Rights” make provision for the right to an abortion?

29th June 2022

At Prime Minister’s questions today, the Lord Chancellor – deputising for the Prime Minister – was asked if the right to an abortion should be placed in the “Bill of Rights” currently before parliament.

He responded:

“…the position on abortion is settled in UK law and it is decided by hon. Members across the House.  It is an issue of conscience, and I do not think there is a strong case for change.  With the greatest respect, I would not want us to find ourselves in the US position, where the issue is litigated through the courts, rather than settled, as it is now settled, by hon. Members in this House.”

Is he right?

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In respect of abortions, the Labour MP Stella Creasy recently tweeted:

And, after the Lord Chancellor’s comments today, she tweeted the following:

Does she have a point?

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I happen to be strongly in favour of a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion – but the question here is not about the ultimate rights and wrongs of the abortion issue.

It is about whether the “Bill of Rights” should be put to this use.

From the Lord Chancellor’s perspective, the abortion issue is “settled” – at least in England and Wales – and here he presumably means the Abortion Act 1967.

And to the extent that abortion was legalised in England and Wales by an Act of Parliament, rather than by a (contentious) Supreme Court decision as it was in the United States, the Lord Chancellor has a little bit of a point about it having been determined by parliament, and not by the courts.

But it is not much of a point.

In part, the issue is not politically “settled” – and as recently as 2008 MPs were substantially divided as to the term limits for abortions.

And as Creasy avers, the position in Northern Ireland was not legally changed until very recently (with her astute and deft amendment to the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019):

And so, thanks to that amendment, there are now the Abortion (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2020.

Of course, making access to abortions legal is not the same as providing practical access to abortions, as many on Twitter pointed out in response to Creasy’s first tweet.

And some may say there is not much point providing legal access in Northern Ireland but not practical access:

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The “Bill of Rights” issue is not whether the substantive law on abortion should be changed – the substantive legal position has been changed.

The issue is whether a general right to an abortion should be placed in the “Bill of Rights”.

Here the position is less straightforward

On one hand, this blog has repeatedly warned of the folly of “enshrining” things in law.

This is because nothing can be meaningfully “enshrined” in law – as amendment or repeal is only a parliamentary exercise away.

And the “Bill of Rights” already has provisions that are legally meaningless – there is, for example, a proposed right to a trial by jury which goes no further than saying that if you already have a right to a trial by jury then you have a right to a trial by jury.

But.

If we are going to have a “Bill of Rights” then there is an argument that it should, well, contain some rights – and perhaps rights which have not been articulated plainly in other statutes.

And the Lord Chancellor’s objection that including such a right in the “Bill of Rights” would mean “the issue is litigated through the courts, rather than settled, as it is now settled, by hon. Members in this House” makes no sense.

A statement of a general right in the “Bill of Rights” would not, by itself, lead to any more litigation than there would be already under the current legislation.

The United Kingdom would not suddenly become the United States just by adding this right to the “Bill of Rights”.

Indeed, providing the right in primary legislation is pretty much the opposite of what has happened in the United States.

The real reason, one suspects, for the opposition of the Lord Chancellor and other government ministers, is that the “Bill of Rights” is not for this sort of rights.

The right to an abortion is the wrong sort of right for what they are seeking to do with the “Bill of Rights”.

It is not intended that the legislation will actually confer new rights – despite its portentous title.

The intention is that the legislation will make it more difficult for people to practically rely on their rights.

So, although one can doubt the efficacy of “enshrining” things in domestic law, Creasy’s proposed amendment perhaps serves a helpful purpose in exposing the “Bill of Rights” as not being about rights at all.

And if such a right is included in the “Bill of Rights” then it may lead to the issue being more “settled” than the 2008 debates and the Northern Ireland experience indicates it to be.

If we are to have a “Bill of Rights” then this is presumably the sort of right – highly relevant to actual people – that should be included.

But what do you think?

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The need for evidence and the Northern Irish Protocol Bill – the background to a rather interesting parliamentary amendment

28th June 2022

One of the most fundamental distinctions in legal practice is that between law and evidence.

Anybody can assert “[X] is guilty of murder” or “[Y] had broken a contract” but mere assertion is not enough for a court.

A court will need to see and assess the evidence that [X] is guilty of murder or [Y] had broken a contract.

And it is only when the evidence is applied to the law, and the law applied to the evidence, that a court will hold (or not hold) [X] to be a murderer or [Y] to be in breach of contract.

Mere assertion is not enough.

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Yesterday in the House of Commons the Foreign Secretary asserted that that the proposed Northern Irish Protocol Bill was ‘necessary’.

The asserted ‘necessity’ justified, the minister claimed, the legislation being brought forward.

Legislation that on the face of it is a breach of international law – and can only only be saved from being such a breach by the doctrine of ‘necessity’.

But.

It is one thing to assert that a thing is the case, and another to show that it is the case.

And so it is with the use of “necessity” by this government to justify bringing forward this otherwise law-breaking bill.

It is not enough for the government to tell us it is “necessary” – they need to show it.

As any competent screenwriter would tell you: show, don’t tell.

One government backbencher, Sir Bob Neill, asked about the evidence which supported the government’s position:

“To return to the legal point, she will know that the application of the doctrine of necessity requires both the legal tests to be met and the evidential base to be there, because it is largely fact-specific to show whether those tests have been met. I know that the Government have been working hard to assemble that evidential base, but can she tell us when it will be available to the House so that we can form a judgment as to whether those legal tests are met and, therefore, proportionality and necessity are met? It would be helpful to have that before we come to a conclusion on the Bill.”

The Foreign Secretary’s response indicated she had missed the point:

“I thank my hon. Friend for that point. There are clearly very severe issues in Northern Ireland, including the fact that its institutions are not up and running, which mean that the UK has to act and cannot allow the situation to drift. I do not think that we have heard what the Opposition’s alternative would be, apart from simply hoping that the EU might suddenly negotiate or come up with a new outcome.”

It is not enough to ask the opposition about what they will do – it is for the government to make out the necessity.

And it is not enough for her to assert that there are “clearly very severe issues” – and as this blog has said before many times, anything described by a politician as “clear” tends not to be.

Neill also asked this question of a former Lord Chancellor, Robert Buckland:

“He refers to the doctrine of necessity and the tests that must be met. I think he will agree that, whether it be imminent or emerging, there has to be evidence that the high threshold is met. Does he think that, in common with the approach adopted in the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, if there is evidence so pressing as to justify a departure from an international agreement, with the risks that that involves, it should be brought back to this place for the House to decide in a vote? As was then suggested in that Bill, on the evidence available, there should be a parliamentary lock on the use of that important step.”

The former Lord Chancellor also did not have a clue:

“My point is simply that this is not a matter of law or a question of legality. There is a respectable argument that can be deployed by the British Government to assert necessity, but this is not about the law; it is about the evidence that the Government will need to marshal to demonstrate that point. The Government’s responsibility is to be a good steward of the Good Friday/Belfast agreement.”

And the former Lord Chancellor also said:

“…a lot has been said about necessity, as if it requires imminent peril or an immediate threat facing us just outside the door. Nobody is saying that we face that, but necessity in this context does not require that degree of imminence; it requires a degree of real threat, and growing evidence of a real threat to our essential interests. 

“I would argue that there is such growing evidence. Clearly north-south is entirely unaffected—the respect we are showing for the single market is clear—but there is a growing problem when it comes to east-west.”

Buckland asserts there is “growing evidence” but – other than broad generalisations – he cannot point to any.

This is not impressive.

Neill’s comment that there are those in government putting together an evidence base for saying that the bill is “necessary” may be well-informed or it may be, well, charitable.

But it can only be right that the evidence for necessity be made available to Members of Parliament before this bill is passed.

Neill has now put down an amendment for the next stage of the bill’s passage which will require there to be a dedicated vote in the House of Commons before the powers in the bill can be used.

This would mean that a minister would have to come to he House of Commons to make a positive and specific case of necessity before the powers in the bill could be replied upon on the basis of “necessity”.

It would be a wise provision – and there cannot be a good argument against it in the circumstances (though there will be plenty of bad ones).

Strangely, the strongest criticism of the bill in yesterday’s debate came from Theresa May, in a speech that nobody following this blog could have put better – read it in full here.
Of course, this is the same Theresa May whose fateful decisions after the referendum to rule out membership of the single market and customs union led directly to the current botched Brexit.

(And, yes, it it tempting to keep re-fighting the battles of 2016, like a military re-enactment society.)

But here May is spot-on.

It is disappointing, of course, that Neill, May and other government backbenchers did not vote against the principle of the bill at the reading yesterday.

This, however, may owe to the logistics of the exercise of amending the bill at the next stage – they are keeping their various powders dry.

What is obvious, however, is that the government cannot – as of yet – make out the evidence base for “necessity”.

If the Neill amendment is adopted, ministers may be required to put forward their evidence base, if they have one.

And if they cannot put forward the evidence base, then ministers may not be able to rely on necessity.

Their bluff would be called.

And sometimes it is, well, necessary to call the bluff of ministers.

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My Financial Times video on the Northern Irish Protocol Bill

17th June 2022

Over at the Financial Times I have done a video guided tour of the Northern Irish Protocol Bill, famed around the question of whether it is a breach of international law.

It is free-to-view and you can see it here.

Produced by the estimable Tom Hannen.

I am happy to respond to any sensible questions about the the video in the comments below.

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