Category: Legal Words and Phrases

How the Government both won and lost the Priti Patel High Court bullying case

6th December 2021

Today judgment was handed down in the case brought by the civil service union the FDA in respect of the Prime Minister’s determination that the bullying of the Home Secretary had not broken the Ministerial Code.

On the face of it, the government won the case.

And so this is what the press reported (and that is what time-poor news desks have published on their news sites):

But.

There are different ways that a government can win a case like this – and a closer look at the judgment shows that in substance this is not a welcome decision for the government at all.

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First, we need to know what the case was – and was not – about.

The case was not about deciding whether the Home Secretary is a bully or not – that was not what the court was being asked to determine, and the detailed evidence about bullying was not put before the court:

And, as that was not the question before the court, then the hot takes that the court has ‘cleared the Home Secretary of bullying’ are not and cannot be true.

The primary question before the court was whether it was open to the Prime Minister, given the information before him, to determine that there had not been a breach of the Ministerial Code.

The court found that, on this occasion, the determination that there had not been a breach of the Ministerial Code was one of the determinations open to the Prime Minister on the information before him.

But in reaching that conclusion the court made a number of points that were against the government – and these points may be significant in future cases.

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First, the court held that the Prime Minister’s determinations of the ministerial code were, in principle, amenable to judicial review by the courts.

The government made a spirited attempt to argue that the Prime Minister’s determinations of the ministerial code were not ‘justiciable’ – that the very subject matter was a no-go area for the High Court.

The court deal with justiciability in paragraphs 25 to 43 of a 61 paragraph judgment – about a third of the decision.

The court accepted that not every determination of the Code may be judicially reviewed.

And, of course, those judicial reviews which are heard by the court may not succeed (as with this case).

But there is nothing stopping a similar case on different facts succeeding just because of the subject matter.

That the court held that, in principle, prime ministerial determinations of the Ministerial Code are amenable to judicial review is a boon for transparency and accountability.

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Once the court had dismissed the government’s attack on justiciability, it turned to whether the Prime Minister had misdirected himself in applying the Code.

Here the key paragraph of the Code is:

“1.2 Ministers should be professional in all their dealings and treat all those with whom they come into contact with consideration and respect. Working relationships, including with civil servants, ministerial and parliamentary colleagues and parliamentary staff should be proper and appropriate. Harassing, bullying or other inappropriate or discriminating behaviour wherever it takes place is not consistent with the Ministerial Code and will not be tolerated.”

The information before the Prime Minister was an advice from Sir Alex Allan, the independent adviser on the Code.

His advice included the following:

“My advice is that the Home Secretary has not consistently met the high standards required by the Ministerial Code of treating her civil servants with consideration and respect.

“Her approach on occasions has amounted to behaviour that can be described as bullying in terms of the impact felt by individuals.

“To that extent her behaviour has been in breach of the Ministerial Code, even if unintentionally. This conclusion needs to be seen in context. There is no evidence that she was aware of the impact of her behaviour, and no feedback was given to her at the time.”

Having considered this advice, the Prime Minister’s conclusion was:

“Sir Alex’s advice found that the Home Secretary had become – justifiably in many instances – frustrated by the Home Office leadership’s lack of responsiveness and the lack of support she felt in DfID three years ago.

“He also found, however, that the Home Secretary had not always treated her civil servants with the consideration and respect that would be expected, and her approach on occasion has amounted to behaviour that can be described as bullying in terms of the impact felt by individuals.

“He went on to advise, therefore, that the Home Secretary had not consistently met the high standards expected of her under the Ministerial Code. 

“The Prime Minister notes Sir Alex’s advice that many of the concerns now raised were not raised at the time and that the Home Secretary was unaware of the impact that she had.

“He is reassured that the Home Secretary is sorry for inadvertently upsetting those with whom she was working. He is also reassured that relationships, practices and culture in the Home Office are much improved.

“As the arbiter of the code, having considered Sir Alex’s advice and weighing up all the factors, the Prime Minister’s judgement is that the Ministerial code was not breached.”

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The FDA’s claim was that, given Allan’s advice, this was not a conclusion that the Prime Minister could have legally made.

Here paragraph 58 of the judgment is important about the Prime Minister’s conclusions:

In other words: because the Prime Minister did not say Patel was not a bully, it must be that he either accepted Allan’s advice or did not form his own view.

Had the Prime Minister explicitly rejected Allan’s advice that it was bullying then it would have been a different legal situation.

The judgment then goes on in paragraph 59 to the other factors considered by the Prime Minister – it is not a paragraph easy to follow in one go, and may require re-reading:

The essence of the paragraph is in the sentences:

“In that context, the statement that the Prime Minister’s judgement was that the Ministerial Code was not breached is not therefore a finding that the conduct could not be described as bullying.

“Rather, it is either a statement that the Prime Minister does not consider, looking at all the factors involved, that it would be right to record that the Ministerial Code had been breached, or alternatively, that the conduct did not in all the circumstances warrant a sanction such as dismissal as it did not cause the Prime Minister to lose confidence in the minister.”

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The Prime Minister can consider himself very lucky to have won this case.

Once can quite imagine a differently constituted court (or the Court of Appeal) taking a harder view against the Prime Minister

The FDA, in turn, are right to aver the following:

“The High Court has decided:

 – That the prohibition on bullying, discrimination and harassment in the Ministerial Code is justiciable in the Courts.

– That the Prime Minister must correctly apply those concepts when determining complaints against ministers.

– That it is not an excuse for bullying under the Code that a minister does not intend or is not aware of the upset and distress caused by their actions.

“These findings vindicate the claim brought by the FDA and represent a clear rejection of the idea that there are different standards for ministers than for civil servants. The FDA is applying for its full costs of the claim to be paid by the government.

“In an unexpected development, the Court also found that the Prime Minister had not acquitted the Home Secretary of bullying in his decision in November 2020. The Court has held that the Prime Minister must have accepted the advice of Sir Alex Allan that the Home Secretary had engaged in bullying (or at least that he did not reach any concluded view on the matter).”

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Whichever government lawyer drafted the conclusions of the Prime Minister ultimately won this case for the government.

A more clumsily worded statement would have meant that even this court would have decided in favour of the FDA.

The government won – just about.

But now there is a High Court decision holding that determinations of the Ministerial Code are justiciable and that the Prime Minister must act properly in applying the Code to particular cases.

The case was also decided on the bases that the Home Secretary was not exonerated of the allegations and that the lack of intention did not mean it was not bullying.

The FDA must be tempted to have one more heave – and to take this to the Court of Appeal (though there would be a risk that it could lose the gains it has made).

The government is in the harder appeal position – for it can hardly appeal a case which it has ‘won’ and so it is stuck (for now, unless the FDA appeals) with the finding of justiciability and other points made by the court.

So this is a good example of a case which both sides can be seen to have lost – but one in which both sides can also be seen as having won.

And the more significant victory, for transparency and accountability, is that of the FDA.

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The ‘c’ word – why ‘corruption’ is the accurate word for describing what the United Kingdom government is doing

16th November 2021

Corruption is more a political than a legal term – at least in the law of the United Kingdom.

For instance: there are no current Acts of Parliament with corruption in their title:

In criminal law there is no particular offence of corruption – but instead offences in respect of bribery and misconduct in public office.

Neither of these offences equate with corruption.

Bribery is too narrow – for taking and giving bribes is only a subset of corruption.

And misconduct in public office is too wide – for this umbrella term can cover official misbehaviour that is not necessarily corrupt.

In everyday legal practice the word corruption is now often lumped in with anti-bribery – with the acronym ABC being used to discuss any policies and laws that deal with such wrongful behaviour.

So to talk of corruption, at least in the United Kingdom, is not to speak of anything legally specific.

The word is about politics, not law.

So if you think term corruption should be used to describe the current government of the United Kingdom then it is because it is a better political (than legal) fit than any other term.

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The other common term on offer is sleaze.

This word is widely used perhaps for two reasons.

The first is because it was once an effective word.

As anyone who can remember the 1990s will know, this term once had considerable media and political purchase.

The word sleaze dominated and perhaps changed British politics.

And so perhaps those using the term are hoping that using the word similarly catches the worlds of media and politics alight again.

An attempt to re-live the 1990s.

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“I’m a firestarter, twisted firestarter.”

The Prodigy, 1996

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The second reason for the avoidance of the ‘c’ word is far less commendable.

It is the notion that corruption is what other nations do – and so the avoidance of the word is an example of British exceptionalism.

Here I recommend the @gathara account by Patrick Gathara and his long-running threads that frame the politics of the United Kingdom, Europe and America in the same (condescending) terms that the politics of Africa are often framed by those in the United Kingdom, Europe and America.

The threads make for uncomfortable and telling reading.

(I have seen these threads described as parody, but the thing is that they are not really parody, and perhaps the opposite, for this is exactly the style in which the media and politicians of United Kingdom, Europe and America routinely frame African affairs – it is a house style, not satire.)

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Corruption, as a word, means debasement.

Think of a corrupted program.

This is more than intended dishonesty – for things can be debased for various reasons.

The general and sustained assault by the British government on a range of institutions and bodies that provide checks and balances is an exercise in debasement.

There is no better word than corruption for what this government is doing to our polity.

For instance: the ultimate problem with the Owen Paterson affair was not so much the paid advocacy – for that had been identified, investigated and decided upon by the relevant committee, and so the system was ‘working’ – but the blatant attempt by the government to use its power to attack the committee and the system generally.

That was the real debasement.

The state of the United Kingdom is being corrupted.

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Politicians and the media use the words and phrases which they perceive as working in their interests.

And politicians and the media currently see the word sleazy as being expedient.

But they also, it seems, see the word corruption as not being advantageous.

Why would that be?

Perhaps is because to use that ‘c’ word would mean that we finally accept that British exceptionalism is a sham.

For the United Kingdom is a corrupted state too.

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The phrase ‘enshrined in law’ has met its perfect subject: sewage.

27 October 2021

At last the phrase ‘enshrined in law’ has met its perfect subject.

Sewage.

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This blog has previously averred that ‘enshrined in law’ is one of the most dishonest phrases in the political lexicon.

This is usually for one of two main reasons.

First: a commitment ‘enshrined in law’ is often accompanied by various get-outs, or is in broad terms – so it has no real legal effect.

For example, the supposed spending commitment on international aid.

Or second: the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy means that anything done by a statute can easily be undone by a statute.

This is because placing something on a statutory basis does not give it some super-duper magically entrenched power.

For example, the successive Brexit dates that were ‘enshrined in law’ before being postponed.

In the constitution of the United Kingdom it is impossible for any provision to be ‘enshrined in law’ in any meaningful way.

It will always be one political move away from circumvention or frustration, or a simple parliamentary move away from amendment or repeal.

The phrase ‘enshrined in law’ is therefore used by political and media fools, or by political and media knaves taking you to be a fool.

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And so yesterday this dreadful phrase found its natural policy home.

The government’s apparent u-turn (or u-bend, in the circumstances) over sewage.

Last night the government published this statement:

“The Government has today (26 October) announced that the Environment Bill will be further strengthened with an amendment that will see a duty enshrined in law to ensure water companies secure a progressive reduction in the adverse impacts of discharges from storm overflows.”

This statement is political sleight-of-hand (and in a normal world would not be on an official government website in this form, but – hey – those days have gone).

For instance, the term ‘further strengthened’ is in tension with the government’s own backbenchers voting against the house of lords amendment on this very point.

What has happened, of course, is that there has been a political storm overflow, drenching those nod-along government supporters who voted down the amendment with the raw product of popular dissatisfaction.

And so the government has had to reverse its position, while getting publicly funded officials to misdirect the public about it being a ‘further strengthening’.

But.

If you look carefully at the statement you will notice something that is not there.

There is no text of an amendment.

And this, no doubt, is because the there is no text of the amendment, for the amendment does not yet exist.

So we have the spectacle of the government asserting that there will be a ‘further strengthening’ of a bill without saying how this will be done.

Just words, and air.

And it is this vapour is what will be ‘enshrined in law’.

Misdirection upon misdirection: government by panicky press release.

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Whenever the phrase ‘enshrined in law’ is used then there is foolishness and/or knavery afoot.

Either the person saying this does not understand the law or that person is wanting to mislead you about the law.

And, in either case, something is being done that has not been properly thought-through.

The phrase has always come with a smell.

And we now know what that smell is of.

Sewage.

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Advice for new Law students: read the ******* cases

20th September 2021

From time to time lawyers in the media (including social media) are asked for advice by those about to study law.

There is lots of good advice to be had – for the study and the practice of law is hard, and is with most hard endeavours there will be useful tips from those of us who have gone before.

For what it is worth, I have one piece of advice.

(This is not, of course, the only useful advice – but it is the only advice I have to give.)

And this one piece of advice is simple: read the cases.

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Reading a case can be hard.

Working out why a case was decided in one way – and not another way – is often not easy.

Working out the extent to which anything in a case is an authoritative proposition that can apply to other cases is hard.

Working out whether the [x + y =+ z] that led to a decision in a certain case would also apply when there is only [x + y but no z] is hard.

But to really understand law – at least the law of England and Wales – there is no good substitute for the slog.

And the reward from this slog is profound.

For once you know how a case was decided (and how it was not decided) you have that knowledge for yourself.

Nobody can take it from you.

And so you will have the intellectual tools to answer any essay or examination question.

The alternative is not to read the cases – to rely on, say, lecture notes or what textbooks (or ‘nutshell’ guides) tell you what that case says.

But to rely on such secondary (sometimes tertiary) sources is like directing somebody to a destination based on overhearing someone else’s directions, rather than actually knowing the way yourself.

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Of course: this is an ideal.

Sometimes limits to time or access to resources will mean that you cannot read the cases for yourself.

Sometimes you will have to rely on what somebody else is telling you what the case means and when it will apply.

Sometimes you cannot (reasonably) be expected to have read the relevant cases.

But you should be conscious that this is not as good as reading the cases for yourself.

And if you read the cases, you will engage differently with textbooks and lecture notes.

Rather than relying on such sources for what the cases say, they become more useful for understanding how cases hang together.

You may find you do not even need some textbooks at all.

You may find that you spot possible errors or misconceptions or oversights in textbooks.

You may even find you spot possible errors or misconceptions or oversights in the judgments themselves.

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Once you have gutted a case and mastered that case you are in at least the same position as any other lawyer with a view on that case.

A lawyer who has access to a case, and has the time to understand the case, and has taken that time to do so, will be the equal of any other lawyer on that case.

Knowing the case law can thereby be a great equalising – even democratic – force.

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Other lawyers will give you advice on how to study law – advice you may find more useful than the advice in this post.

Some lawyers will even disdain my advice – often because their previous educations allow them to wing exams confidently.

And some lawyers – me included – will say that the actual practice of law requires many other attributes than the ability and willingness to read a case.

But taking all these counterpoints at their highest, my advice for anyone about to study law remains simple.

Read the ******* cases.

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Legal drafting and computer programming – a post in memory of Sir Clive Sinclair

19th September 2021

Some of the best legal drafters you will meet – those who put together formal legal documents such as contracts and acts of parliament – will have a background in computer programming.

This post sets out an explanation for this, from the perspective of an experienced legal drafter, as to why it seems (from the outside) the legal drafting process is similar to the computer programming process.

Of course, this perspective is that of a lawyer and writer – but I hope it is in general enough terms that the comparison it seeks to make is of some wider interest and validity to experienced programmers and others.

(My own coding skills are almost literally BASIC (and some HTML).)

The perspective set out below will be separated out into items, line-by-line, as-a-whole, and stress-testing, as well as a conclusion and a tribute.

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Items

By items I mean particular symbols or words – the smallest useful things to be typed.

For both the coder and the drafter each item will (or should) have a purpose.

(Even if that purpose is to be deliberately redundant –  we once caught out a copyright infringer because they had duplicated intentionally dud code that could not have been there without naughty copying.)

For the lawyer, each word in a formal legal document has (or should have) a purpose: it has been chosen instead of other words, and also instead of no words at all.

Here there is the ‘rule against surplusage’.

If a legal document says a thing then (it is presumed) that thing is there for a precise purpose.

And if it serves no purpose, then it should not be there.

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Line-by-line

Here we look at lines of code or clauses (or sections or articles) of a legal document – short sequences of items.

The intention with a line or a clause is that there is a thing meaningful enough to have meaning in and of itself – in effect: a proposition.

That one can look at it and say: that line or clause does this – but not that.

Most coders and lawyers are capable of producing such discrete things.

Certainly any competent lawyer should be able to draft a simple clause: ‘[x] shall do [y] in return for [z]’.

But – at least for lawyers – the difficult thing about drafting is not in composing a single clause but with the next two stages.

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As-a-whole

The first real difficulty with a legal document – as perhaps with a program – is getting clauses to work together as a whole.

That clause one does not contradict clause two, and that clause three is workable in view of clauses, one, two and four, and so on.

In this way, a legal document is usually complex – and not linear.

Each clause not only has to fit in with the clauses immediately before and after (like, say, a verbal jigsaw) but with every other clause in the document.

If clause sixty does not work with clause five then there is a potential problem.

And so, although some legal instruments are readable – sometimes elegant – they are not linear texts like an elementary short story.

I understand this is also the approach to coding – line 60 of a program has to match line 5.

The goal is therefore to create a thing as-a-whole that is internally coherent.

But.

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Stress-testing

And this is the second big challenge.

One can have a legal instrument – or a computer program – that is beautiful in its internal coherence, where each intricate point works with other intricate point.

And it still will be useless if it does not work in practice.

For legal instruments and computer programs are (or should be) practical things.

Instruments, not ornaments.

If a contract or an act of parliament fails any test provided by reality – then it is not reality that is ultimately at fault.

And similarly (it seems to me) a program that fails a test provided by reality – then it is also not reality that is ultimately at fault.

I have long thought, for example, that draft legislation should always be published – almost in Beta mode – for stress-testing before any actual implementation.

And that all legislation should be subject to regular testing and review, rather than just being dumped on to the statute books.

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Conclusion

Of course: as you read the above – just as I typed the above – exceptions and differences will come to mind.

And such exceptions and differences are to be expected – for I am not contending that two things are identical, only that they may be similar, and so I am identifying only points of similarity.

I could have posted a sequence of points of difference, though I do not think that would have been an especially interesting post to read or write.

And, again, I aver that although I am an experienced legal drafter, my coding skills are otherwise limited.

But there is, I think, something in the understanding that legal codes and computer codes may have similarities, and also that there is something in the understanding whether the coding processes that go into both are similar.

If there are similarities, then – in turn – there may perhaps be many things that the two disciplines can learn from each other.

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Tribute

This post is prompted by the news of the death of Sir Clive Sinclair.

In the 1980s my introduction to programming was the rubber-key BASIC shortcuts of the Sinclair Spectrum 48.

It was by learning how to code that I first developed the skills that, later, made me actually enjoy the drafting of complex legal documents.

‘IF [x] GOTO [y]’ has – at least for me – a lot to answer for.

</tribute>

END

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Why ‘legally ringfenced’ is a phrase used by political knaves to take you for a fool

7th September 2021

Another late-night revelation about our current government-by-essay-crisis:

The phrase ‘legally ringfenced’ is a legal and political nonsense.

It is a legal nonsense because nothing in the United Kingdom can, in any meaningful way, be ‘legally ringfenced’ .

This is because of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, which means a parliament can make or unmake any act of parliament.

Nothing – to use a similar dishonest phrase – can be ‘enshrined in law’.

Even if there were a provision put in a statute – with super-duper protections intended to prevent its repeal or amendment – the provision and all those super-duper protections could be repealed or amended with a simple parliamentary majority.

And it is a political nonsense for it is a trick that that has been played before and which has been exposed as trick before.

The international aid budget was, supposedly, legally ringfenced.

The fixed-term parliaments act was, supposedly, enshrined in law.

The current triple-lock on pensions likewise, and so on.

And so on.

But still politicians use this trickery – and still too many nod-along by these impressive sounding phrases.

The claims ‘legally ringfenced’ and ‘enshrined in law’ do have a rhetorical purpose, of course.

They invoke the majesty of law to charge up what would otherwise be a banal political utterance.

An utterance intended to reassure waverers or even win over somebody who would otherwise be opposed.

And in that way, it is perhaps slightly significant that politicians still feel law has sufficient respect so that political statements can be framed as grand legal announcements.

But it is trickery all the same.

Any politician who uses the phrases ‘legally ringfenced’ and ‘enshrined in law’ is a knave – and a knave taking you to be a fool.

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Should ‘Lord of the Flies’ be the basis of school rules? Today’s #HotTopic

3rd July 2021

Over on Twitter, the educationalist and head teacher Katharine Birbalsingh set out in a thread her thinking about school rules.

So as to reduce the scope for any misrepresentation, here is the thread in full:

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My immediate response to this earnest exposition was to tweet that it was priceless that a thread about academic standards started off by confusing Lord of the Flies with Lord of the Rings.

This was what would have been called in the days of the school standards urged, a ‘howler’.

And this howler prompted treasured memories of Alan Partridge’s Hot Topic:

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Caller:  ‘Well I enjoyed the Hobbit more than “Riverdance”. And I think that lots of boys on an island killing a fat boy is not so enjoyable as Gandalf, with a long white beard.’

Alan Partridge: ‘Okay, if you’ve just joined us, we’re talking about who is the best lord. “Lord of the Rings”, “of the Dance” or “of the Flies”. That’s tonight’s “hot topic”.’

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Katharine Birbalsingh was not amused:

And so, as a courtesy, and with my immediate point having been made, I deleted my tweet.

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But as a further recompense for my irksome tweet, I thought I should set out some thoughts about ‘rules’ – in schools and elsewhere.

After all, this is a blog about law and policy – and laws are rules, and education policy is a policy.

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One important quality that rules should have is, as Katharine Birbalsingh avers, consistency.

But there are other important qualities.

Another important quality of rules is credibility.

If a rule seems daft – indeed absurd – then it will be difficult for the individuals affected to take the rule seriously.

And if a rule is not taken seriously, people will tend not to comply with the rule, and those charged with enforcing the rule will tend to avoid enforcing it.

So, for example:

‘But we don’t enforce silence or sitting up straight in society, so why in schools?’.

The reason why those rules would not be enforced in society is because they would be daft rules, and they would be derided.

There are enough problems in getting people to comply with the legal rules that do exist:

‘Our prisons are packed.’

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Another important quality of rules is that they are proportionate and just – both in their nature and in their enforcement.

But a problem with strict rules – especially those with onerous sanctions – is that there can be no restraint on those enforcing the rules.

The enforcers become the bullies.

Power tends to corrupt, as some old liberal once said, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

And so we come to the crux of Katharine Birbalsingh’s argument:

‘…the main thing that makes a school good or bad is its CULTURE.  And that culture is hugely dependent on strict rules to ensure a few don’t ruin it for the many.’

[Block capitals in the original.]

One way of thinking about this proposition is to replace the word ‘school’ with the word ‘society’:

‘…the main thing that makes a society good or bad is its CULTURE.  And that culture is hugely dependent on strict rules to ensure a few don’t ruin it for the many.’

In this recasting, you have what is the essence of illiberal totalitarianism.

Your rights are restricted, but it is only for your own good, and to protect you from the Other.

Given that the thread jumps from points about schools to those about society, it is not (I hope) unfair to set out this transposition, and its implications.

Back in the context of a school (or indeed any particular institution within society), the imposition and enforcement of strict rules can be the means by which the few (those who impose and enforce rules) can indeed ‘ruin it for the many’ (those who have to comply with those rules – or else).

Strictness as an end in and of itself can be as much a means of bullying of the ‘many’ as what the strictness purports to address.

*

Now we come to the hobgoblins on the beach.

The schoolchildren in Lord of the Flies.

These are the horrors – the marooned turnip-ghosts – from which we need to protect our children.

If adults do not step in, it will go all Lord of the Flies.

*

A good response to Katharine Birbalsingh’s point here is this tweet:

*

Lord of the Flies is one of those books about which anyone who knows of it will have an opinion about it.

And often that opinion will have been formed (or imposed) at school when it was a set text.

There is, of course, not one ultimately correct view of any literary text.

(This is where literature perhaps differs from law, where the conceit is that each legal text has an ultimate correct meaning – ho ho.)

In her thread, Katharine Birbalsingh was positing (or was intending to posit) the island in Lord of the Flies as the world of lawlessness – the anarchy, the chaos that every small-c conservative fears:

‘Because as society has laws, schools need order. Otherwise bullying/harassment. Lord of the [Flies].’

Of course, one of the places in our society which are nearest to the anti-ideal of this lawlessness, where bullying and harassment are rife are, well, prisons:

‘Our prisons are packed. We remove permanently those who won’t obey laws.’

And, other than a few dozen full-life sentence prisoners, the intention is that all convicts – over 80,000 of them – are to return to society after this experience of bullying and harassment.

*

The counter-argument to Katharine Birbalsingh’s thread is that the imposition and enforcement of strict rules as an end in themselves can become a means of the ‘bullying and harassment’ that she claims to want to avoid.

Or the rules may become discredited and thereby pointless.

The important qualities for any body of rules are consistency (on which she is right) but also credibility and proportionality.

Otherwise the rules become part of the problem, and not part of the solution.

Rules are crucial – and as a law and policy commentator, I would say that wouldn’t I, else I would have nothing to commentate on – but their strictness is not an important quality.

Credibility and fairness are far more important than strictness.

Rules are an essential means of moderating power relationships – and they prevent those with power from injuring or exploiting those without power.

The principle of the rule of law means that legal rules bind the mighty as well as the weak.

And so to function properly rules need to have legitimacy, and not just firmness.

For, when rules lose their legitimacy…

…it all goes a bit Lord of the Flies:

‘“We’ll have rules!” [Jack] cried excitedly. “Lots of rules! Then when anyone breaks ’em–”

[…]

‘Jack was the first to make himself heard. He had not got the conch and thus spoke against the rules; but nobody minded.

[…]

‘“The rules!” shouted Ralph.

‘“You’re breaking the rules!”

‘“Who cares?”’

Who indeed.

**

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Whatever happened to the concept of ‘maladministration’?

28th June 2021

The recent report from the independent panel on Daniel Morgan used the concept of ‘institutional corruption’ – and on this you can see my Financial Times video here and my post here.

But the deployment of such a term makes one think of other terms that come and go in law and policy – and one such term is ‘maladministration’.

It is an odd term – it does not quite mean ‘illegal’ or ‘unlawful’ and so it does not fit into the neat binary of what is called ‘public law’ – the law that regulates what public bodies can and cannot do.

In principle, it would appear that a thing is capable of being maladministration without it also necessarily being unlawful – either as a matter of public law or as an instance of misconduct/misfeasance in public office.

The notion is that maladministration goes to the thing being complained of having an administrative remedy – rather than a judicial remedy.

*

The term ‘maladministration’ is used in English law, see section 5(1)(a) of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 that established the office known as the ‘ombudsman’ (emphasis added):

‘[the ombudsman] may investigate any action […] to which this Act applies, being action taken in the exercise of administrative functions of that department or authority, in any case where […] a member of the public […] claims to have sustained injustice in consequence of maladministration in connection with the action so taken […].’

The act, however, does not define ‘maladministration’ – and all one can glean from the provision quoted is that the term is something to do with the performance of an administrative function.

In R v Local Commissioner for Administration for the North and East Area of England, ex p Bradford Metropolitan City Council (1979), the court of appeal averred that ‘maladministration’ had an open-ended meaning, covering ‘bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on’.

This is a broad definition.

In 1993 the ombudsman said that ‘maladministration’ included an ‘unwillingness to treat the complainant as a person with rights; refusal to answer reasonable questions; knowingly giving advice which is misleading or inadequate; offering no redress or manifestly disproportionate redress; and partiality’.

These are serious things  – indeed these can even constitute criminal offences.

*

Given the breadth of the definition of ‘maladministration’, and the seriousness of what it can cover, it is strange that we do not have more use of the word in the public discussion of failures in the public sector.

For example, the Guardian and the Financial Times each seem to have used the word only twice in respect of United Kingdom matters in 2021.

And this is despite ‘maladministration’ being a term recognised at law and for which parliament has provided a scheme for administrative remedies.

*

Why do we hear so little of the term ‘maladministration’?

The reason cannot be that there is no maladministration – from the post office scandal and the Daniel Morgan report to the problems to do with Covid procurements and the exams fiasco, maladministration, like love and Christmas, is all around.

At least the failures that are covered by the word ‘maladministration’ are all around.

*

So these leaves two possibilities.

Either: the system of administrative remedies is working so well that that the maladministration that does take place is quickly remedied and the complaints resolved.

Or: the system of administrative remedies is not working, and so complainants are having to resort to public law and other means for their complaints to be addressed.

If the latter, this could mean that the reason we hear so little of the word ‘maladministration’ is that is not a practically useful term.

And if that is the case – that the reason we hear so little of the term ‘maladministration’ is that it is not practically useful – then why would that be the case, when parliament has set up an elaborate (and expensive) ombudsman scheme to deal with ‘maladministration’?

Given the ombudsman scheme – formally known as the the parliamentary commissioner for administration – and given the sheer amount of public sector failings, one would expect that the term ‘maladministration’ would be a commonplace in law and policy discussions.

But it hardly features.

So: is the real reason we hear so little of the term ‘maladministration’ in United Kingdom law and policy that the scheme of  (to use the ombudsman’s full title) is not working?

Some posts coming up on this blog are going to find out.

**

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The meaning of ‘institutional corruption’ – how the Daniel Morgan independent panel set about defining the term

26th June 2021

The independent panel report on Daniel Morgan found that the Metropolitan police was – and is – institutionally corrupt.

To dispute this finding – let alone to attempt to repudiate or refute it – requires you to do one (or both) of two things.

Either you have to challenge the facts on which the finding is based – and this is difficult in respect of the Daniel Morgan report, which is comprehensively sourced and footnoted (and all the report’s critical findings would also have been put to those criticised for their response as part of the preparation of the report).

Or you have to challenge the definition itself.

And so this blogpost sets out the definition adopted and then applied by the panel in the compilation of the report.

*

The relevant part for the definition is deep inside the report, on pages 1022 to 1025 of this pdf (page numbers 1017 to 1021 of the document itself).

The starting point is the terms of reference for the panel, which included:

‘The purpose and remit of the Independent Panel is to shine a light on the circumstances of Daniel Morgan’s murder, its background and the handling of the case over the whole period since March 1987.

‘In doing so, the Panel will seek to address the questions arising, including those relating to:

‘[…] the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for the murder from being brought to justice and the failure to confront that corruption […].’

(Please note that in this post I break the paragraphs of the report out into sentences for flow and sense.)

*

The panel, however, did not just proceed from the terms of reference, but sought to understand what ‘corruption’ meant in this context:

‘The Terms of Reference give a vague formulation of […] the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible.

‘There are two possible interpretations of this.

‘It could mean that,

‘i. one or more police officers became aware after the murder of who was responsible and protected them; or

‘ii. one or more police officers who were not aware of who was responsible for the murder committed corrupt acts for their own reasons, and in so doing compromised the investigation with the result that there was no evidence capable of proving who was responsible for the murder and of bringing them to justice.’

*

The panel then said that it was taking its term of reference,

‘[…] the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for the murder from being brought to justice and the failure to confront that corruption […]’

to mean,

‘whether there was any police corruption affecting the investigation of the murder and making it impossible to bring whoever was responsible to justice’.

Here the panel had regard to the metropolitan police’s own admission that there had been a ‘failure to confront the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for the murder from being brought to justice’.

*

So that it how the panel was to interpret its term of reference.

But this does itself not tell us what the ‘corruption’ word means.

As the panel noted:

‘The Panel’s Terms of Reference do not include a definition of corruption.’

As the terms was not defined in there terms of reference, the panel had to work out its own definition.

In doing so, the panel looked at other definitions and uses of the word:

‘The Panel has therefore developed its own definition, drawing upon the definitions of corruption and corrupt behaviour used by relevant bodies.

‘Such bodies include the Independent Police Complaints Commission and its successor organisation, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, the National Police Chiefs Council, the College of Policing and the Metropolitan Police.

[…]

‘To inform its analysis, the Panel has drawn upon the report of the mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, the report by Mark Ellison QC on his review concerning the Stephen Lawrence investigation, the report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel and the subsequent report by the Right Reverend James Jones KCB, the report of the Gosport Independent Panel, and the work of the public inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire.

‘These inquiries and reports provide important insights into serious failures of a variety of public services, including but not limited to the police, and address the complex issues of accountability and corruption.’

*

Having had regard to how other inquires and reports have defined and used the word ‘corruption’, the panel also considered the common definitions and uses of the word:

‘The generic definition of corruption is ‘dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery’.

‘This definition suggests that for dishonest conduct to amount to corruption the person acting corruptly must be someone in power or exercising powers.

‘This definition would apply to police forces, prison, probation and healthcare services, or other organisations serving the public.

‘In these settings, ‘corruption’ may denote the misuse of authority in terms of deviance from the law, professional norms, ethical standards or public expectations.

‘In common parlance ‘corruption’ is also used to refer to the venal behaviour of persons who do not hold positions of power, but who do have something to sell, or who act as corrupters in that they bribe persons exercising powers to commit corrupt acts: it follows that people within and outside the police may be involved in ‘corrupt behaviour’.’

*

Having had regard to these other definitions and uses, the panel then went back to its own terms of references:

‘The Panel’s Terms of Reference require it to consider, primarily, wider questions relating to corruption.

‘It is asked to address:

‘i. ‘police involvement in the murder’.

‘By any reasonable person’s definition, if police officers commit or assist in planning a murder, it is not only the most serious crime of taking a person’s life, but it is also the gravest breach of the duties of a police officer.

‘ii. ‘the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for the murder from being brought to justice and the failure to confront that corruption’.

‘The ‘corruption’ is not explained further, but the Terms of Reference refer to the fact that ‘in March 2011 the Metropolitan Police acknowledged “the repeated failure of the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] to confront the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for the murder from being brought to justice”.

‘iii. ‘the incidence of connections between private investigators, police officers and […] the media and alleged corruption involved in the linkages between them’.

‘To do this, the Panel has adopted an expansive approach to ‘corruption’, including the conduct of the police and the behaviour of other individuals linked to the police or involved in corrupt activity with them.’

*

So having considered how the term ‘corruption’ is or had been used elsewhere – from similar reports to common parlance, and having also considered what the word must mean in the context of the terms of reference, the panel then set out the definition of ‘corruption’ for the report.

It was a broad and deliberately flexible definition:

‘The Panel has adopted a broad definition of corruption for the purposes of its work.

‘The definition below is based on the key elements of dishonesty and benefit, and allows for the involvement of a variety of actors and a variety of forms of benefit:

‘The improper behaviour by action or omission:

‘i. by a person or persons in a position of power or exercising powers, such as police officers;

‘ii. acting individually or collectively;

‘iii. with or without the involvement of other actors who are not in a position of power or exercising powers; for direct or indirect benefit :

‘iv. of the individual(s) involved; or

‘v. for a cause or organisation valued by them; or

‘vi. for the benefit or detriment of others; such that a reasonable person would not expect the powers to be exercised for the purpose of achieving that benefit or detriment.

‘The Panel has used this definition to consider the conduct of the police officers involved in the investigations of the murder of Daniel Morgan.

‘The Panel includes in its wider definition of corruption some instances of failures on the part of senior officers/managers, acting as representatives of their organisations.

‘The documentation reveals the following wide range of actions and omissions by senior postholders on behalf of their organisations; many of these actions and omissions have been identified in the reports of other independent panels and inquiries:

‘i. failing to identify corruption;

‘ii. failing to confront corruption;

‘iii. failing to manage investigations and ensure proper oversight; 

‘iv. failing to take a fresh look at past mistakes and failures; 

‘v. failing to learn from past mistakes and failures;

‘vi. failing to admit past mistakes and failures promptly and specifically;

‘vii. giving unjustified assurances;

‘viii. failing to make a voluntarily commitment to candour; and ix. failing to be open and transparent.’

*

The panel were also aware that important in understanding any practical definition is an understanding of what is not included:

‘[…] failings do not all automatically fall within the definition of corruption. Some may result from professional incompetence or poor management.’

*

And now the panel comes to what it meant by ‘institutional corruption’:

‘However, when the failures cannot reasonably be explained as genuine error and indicate dishonesty for the benefit of the organisation, in the Panel’s view they amount to institutional corruption.

‘A lack of candour on the part of the Metropolitan Police in respect of its failings is shown by a lack of transparency, as well as prevarication and obfuscation.’

*

The panel then amplifies or illustrates this ‘institutional corruption” term elsewhere in the report:

‘The family of Daniel Morgan suffered grievously as a consequence of the failure to bring his murderer(s) to justice, the unwarranted assurances which they were given, the misinformation which was put into the public domain, and the denial of the failings in investigation, including failing to acknowledge professional incompetence, individuals’ venal behaviour, and managerial and organisational failures.

‘The Metropolitan Police also repeatedly failed to take a fresh, thorough and critical look at past failings.

‘Concealing or denying failings, for the sake of the organisation’s public image, is dishonesty on the part of the organisation for reputational benefit and constitutes a form of institutional corruption.’

[…]

‘When failings in police investigations are combined with unjustified reassurances rather than candour on the part of the Metropolitan Police, this may constitute institutional corruption.

‘The Metropolitan Police’s culture of obfuscation and a lack of candour is unhealthy in any public service.

‘Concealing or denying failings, for the sake of the organisation’s public image, is dishonesty on the part of the organisation for reputational benefit.

‘In the Panel’s view, this constitutes a form of institutional corruption.’

[…]

‘Unwarranted assurances were given to the family, and the Metropolitan Police placed the reputation of the organisation above the need for accountability and transparency.

‘The lack of candour and the repeated failure to take a fresh, thorough and critical look at past failings are all symptoms of institutional corruption, which prioritises institutional reputation over public accountability.’

The report also provides explicit illustrative examples of institutional (as opposed to non-institutional) corruption on pages 1073-1075 of the pdf (page numbers 1069-1071).

*

The report describes the careful consideration that went into defining both ‘corruption’ and ‘institutional corruption’.

The challenge, therefore, for those who wish to dismiss the finding of the independent panel that there was (and is) institutional corruption at the metropolitan police is either to deny the examples or to fault its definition and application.

It may be that some of those defending the metropolitan police see nothing (that) wrong in the internal solidarity and reputational protection that the panel describes as ‘institutional corruption’.

That it is not denied that bad things happened, but that they cannot be described as ‘institutional corruption’.

They may just not like such a term being used of such things.

*

Given the care with which the panel considered and then defined (and then applied) the word ‘corruption’ that was expressly part of its terms of reference, any casual knee-jerk dismissal will not be sufficient.

A critic has to do better than to shake their head.

As I have set out in this Financial Times video, the panel have made out a substantial charge of ‘institutional corruption’ – and so this now requires an equally substantial response from the metropolitan police.

**

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Judicial review, Dominic Cummings and ‘Potemkin paper trails’ – and why courts require reasons for certain decisions

11th June 2021

In three tweets in a thread posted this week, Dominic Cummings, the former assistant to the prime minister, refers to ‘Potemkin’ paper trails and meetings.

*

What does he mean?

And does he have a point?

*

What he is alluding to, of course, are the ‘Potemkin’ villages, where things in bad conditions were dressed up to be in good conditions so as to mislead others.

In the context of judicial review, Cummings presumably does not mean that bad reasons would be dressed up as good reasons.

What he instead intends to mean is that there could be artificial reasons and contrived meetings the purpose of which was to make a decision judge-proof.

To a certain extent, he has a point.

In the judicial review case in question, had there been evidence of officials conducting any form of evaluation exercise then the tender award may have been harder to attack legally.

And such an exercise could, in reality, have been nothing other than going through the motions rather than anything that could have actually led to another agency actually getting this valuable contract.

But this is not the reason the courts require reasons for certain decisions – and it may not have changed the judgment in this case either.

*

Judges and courts are not stupid and naive.

Judges and courts know full well reasons can be artificial and contrived.

The judges were once barristers and solicitors and, as such, they would have had considerable experience of advising clients on providing reasons for certain decisions. 

The purpose of requiring reasons for decisions – and for ministers and officials to say they are true reasons – is to make it more difficult for bad and false decisions to be made.

For example – take the decision by the government to seek a prorogation of parliament in 2019.

No minister or official – or adviser – was willing to sign a witness statement (under pain of perjury) as to the true reason for advising the Queen to prorogue parliament.

And without such a sworn (or affirmed) reason, the government lost the case.

Reasons also provide a reviewing court with a basis of assessing whether a decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision could have made it, and also of assessing whether relevant considerations had been included and irrelevant considerations were excluded.

Providing reasons does not provide an escape route for cynical and irrelevant and unreasonable decision-making.

But it is an impediment, and one that makes it harder for ministers and officials to get away with bad decision-making. 

*

And in the recent judicial review, it is not clear to me (as a former central government procurement lawyer) that even an artificial ‘Potemkin’ exercise would have necessarily saved the decision from legal attack.

Awarding a high-value contract to cronies where a nominal (though documented)  exercise of discretion had not shown any actual objective advantage over other possible suppliers would still have been open to legal attack.

So this is not necessarily a case where the failure to provide a ‘Potemkin’ paper trail is to blame for the loss of a legal case.

The pram may well have fallen down the stairs anyway.

*****

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