Never underestimate archivists and librarians – as Donald Trump is discovering

31st August 2022

Here is a lovely story about libraries and public policy.

The year is 1983.

The library is the British Library, formerly hosted in the reading room at the British Museum and other sites.

Nicolas Barker, then the library’s head of conservation, and Lord Dainton, then the chair of the British Library Board, had a problem.

Public finances were under pressure, and spending cuts were everywhere.

But.

They needed to work out a way to convince the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher about the urgent need for the move of the library to a new purpose-built building.

They decided to keep the issue simple: no lengthy paragraphs in a wordy report, still less charts or tables.

And certainly no waffly arguments.

They instead took her half a dozen books, as well as a novel by one of her favourite authors, which were falling apart, regardless of the care being taken to conserve them.

They placed the books on the table in front of Thatcher.

Silence.

She looked with horror at the state of the books.

Silence.

And then they then said:

‘Mrs Thatcher, we need a new building because all our books will fall to pieces if they stay where they are.’

So horrified was the Prime Minister at the potential fate of the national collection that they got the go-ahead for the new building.

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There are perhaps two morals to this tale (which I have told before here and is recorded in this obituary).

One is that sometimes exhibits are more persuasive than words.

The other is never to underestimate archivists and librarians.

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That there seems a real prospect of legal jeopardy for former President Donald Trump because of a breach of American archival law.

For many watching this is evocative of Al Capone being nailed on tax evasion charges.

Archival offences seem to Trump’s supporters a convenient pretext for legal action, rather than a substantive wrong.

But.

It is a substantive wrong.

For keeping documents and other information safe both for now and for posterity is a central function of the state.

It is how the government (and legislature and judiciary) of one day speaks to those charged with power in the future.

It is how those with power can be confident that certain information does not go to those who would use that information to cause damage and injury.

Like the integrity of the currency and protecting the realm, preservation of certain information is a core duty of those entrusted with power.

And like the damaged books put in Thatcher, visual evidence can be telling:

(Source.)

Of course, few of us know the facts.

It may well be that this legal exercise comes to nothing, and Trump escapes personal legal liability again.

And Trump is entitled to due process, like you and me.

But the wrongful removal of information from a government is not a trivial thing.

For without properly documented information, modern governments could not function.

That is why laws and policies about document management and retention are so important.

And there would be a wonderful irony if laws and policies about ensuring the integrity of written information were used to check the arch-abuser of political language and post-truth politics.

POSTSCRIPT

The historian Dr Adam Chapman has provided us with this similar story – click through to read more:

 

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Giving the incoming Prime Minister a clean slate

29th August 2022

We are about to have a new Prime Minister.

The candidate most likely to become the new premier is Elizabeth Truss, about whom many of you will have Very Strong Opinions – though it still may be Rishi Sunak, about whom many of you will also have Very Strong Opinions.

They will replace Boris Johnson, about whom all of you will have Very Strong Opinions Indeed.

Of course, from a liberal and progressive perspective there are reasons to be concerned, if not fearful, about the new Prime Minister.

But.

As hard as it will be, it is I think useful to always give a new Prime Minister a blank slate.

(Even if some of the candidates’ harshest critics will accuse the candidates themselves of being blank slates.)

Here I would make two observations.

First, it is not unusual for a politician obtaining power to say and do things that are calculated so that the politician obtains power.

Such things may – or may not be – reflective of what they do once they have secured the power they seek.

Second, never underestimate any politician who “makes it” – who gets to the top of Disraeli’s greasy pole.

You may – perhaps rightly – regard them as a vacant dimwit.

Yet they are a vacant dimwit who got to be Prime Minister, against hundreds of other ambitious (and ruthless) politicians.

Deriding them for a lack of intelligence or insight does not, by itself, explain how they got to be Prime Minister while hundreds of other politicians did not.

Of course: past performance (or lack of performance) can be a fair guide to future performance.

But the unique nature of the job of Prime Minister is such previous ministerial and non-ministerial roles are not a perfect guide.

For what it is worth, I also adopt this approach to new Lord Chancellors.

Again that is a unique role – where previous jobs may not be a perfect guide.

Sometimes one can be pleasantly surprised: Michael Gove, for example, was shaping up to be a good Lord Chancellor, and not just because he was not Chris Grayling.

While other Lords Chancellors were hopeless, even if one strained to give them the benefit of the doubt.

Ones like, well, Elizabeth Truss.

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The next Prime Minister

20th July 2022

We are about halfway through the maximum length of this parliamentary term.

The last general election was on 12 December 2019 and – according to this working out – the very last date for the next general election would be 24 January 2025.

Today’s leadership vote seems to mean that the Prime Minister for that second half of this parliamentary term will be Elizabeth Truss, as she is more popular with the party members who will now vote.

If so, Boris Johnson’s cosplay of Churchill will segue into the Thatcher copslay of his successor.

The governing party as a political history re-enactment society: the Westminster equivalent of the Sealed Knot.

Regardless of the current governing party being the Conservatives, and regardless of whether the victor is Truss or Sunak, it is unlikely that after twelve years of government any governing party will be emphatically re-elected.

“Time for a Change” is a powerful political force, as Douglas-Home found in 1964, Major in 1997, and Brown in 2010.

It is not fun to be a Prime Minister when your party has been continuously in office for a long time.

It is even harder, no doubt, when you cannot be a “fresh start” from what went before.

From a policy point of view, the key question for the new Prime Minister will be whether the post-2019 programme (or lack of programme) is continued.

And if new policies are adopted, what the mandate is for those policies.

Will we have yet another Queen’s Speech this autumn?

And in more direct terms, how can Truss (or Sunak) re-orientate policy on Brexit and the Northern Irish Protocol so that outstanding issues can be better addressed, if not resolved?

Can the incoming Prime Minister effect any change in government policy (to the extent there are policies)?

For, as the recently sacked minister Michael Gove has said, the government is “simply not functioning”.

And yet another minister today did not turn up to something:

In essence, is it possible that the governing party can become serious about governing again?

Or is it going to be a long wait until the next general election?

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The lack of seriousness about policy, “mandates” and “collective ministerial responsibility”

18th July 2022

Today will be the hottest day, we are told, since records began.

It is strange to be living on such a historical day.

One would expect the “most [x] day ever” was some other time, with historical footage or monochrome photographs.

But no, it is today.

And on this hottest day since records began, we have current and very recent members of the government tearing into the government’s record in general and each others’ records as ministers in particular.

Confidential and private ministerial exchanges – easily outside the reach of even the most determined Freedom of Information request – are being casually and freely disclosed on national television.

And these disclosures are not being made because they pass some (supposedly) objective public interest test, but because such disclosures are to the personal and political advantage or disadvantage of particular candidates.

It is quite a spectacle.

If you were watching this – but were unaware of the doctrine of collective cabinet and ministerial responsibility – you would never guess such a doctrine existed.

Of course, this is a leadership election – and so perhaps one could contend that such a doctrine is suspended for the duration of the contest.

Just like the doctrine was suspended for the referendum campaign.

But.

It could also be contended that this spectacle is not an exception but indicative of a new (if temporary) norm.

When Prime Ministerial authority collapses, a cabinet full of ambitious politicians loses its only real source of discipline.

And until and unless there is another authoritative Prime Minister – and the signals from the current leadership debates are not encouraging – such public rows and confrontations may reoccur.

But there is perhaps a deeper problem.

Another explanation for the lack of collective cabinet and ministerial responsibility is a lack of seriousness about policy.

Instead of politicians being in office to implement policy, policy positions exist to promote the careers of politicians.

In this way, policies like words are the counters of the wise, but policy positions are the money of fools.

And it seems many current ministers do not care for many overall government policies to do with such issues as the economy, fiscal policy, and – notably on this hot day – climate change.

(They do, however, support – or say they support – the performative cruelty of the Rwanda deportations.)

This lack of overall commitment to government policy is especially significant given that this government is between parliaments.

As the fine columnist Zoe Williams observed about the most recent televised debate:

“Two points of unity in the hour: none of them would have Boris Johnson in their cabinet, should he ask to serve; none of them wanted an early general election.

“This is the crucible of their problem: they want to keep the mandate, while wholeheartedly disowning the mandated, and on what grounds, they have no clue.”

Williams is correct to highlight this tension, if not contradiction.

Even before Boris Johnson announced his departure as Prime Minister, this government was running out of ideas.

The most recent Queen’s Speech was an unimpressive affair, on any sensible view.

Brexit is still not “done”, and “levelling-up” is a slogan without substance.

And now, with Johnson gone, it becomes even less obvious what the governing party should do with the majority it obtained from the 2019 general election.

At least with Johnson in place, the purpose of that majority was to keep Johnson in place.

And now he has gone, even that personal and selfish purpose disappears.

Any new programme by the incoming Prime Minister will not have a general election mandate.

And if elements of that programme are controversial, then – given we are now at least over halfway through this parliamentary term – there may not be enough time to push contentious legislation through the House of Lords.

We may therefore end up with a lame duck government, unable to promote new policies and unwilling to face a general election.

This will also be in a period of weakened Prime Ministerial authority and a decline in collective ministerial responsibility.

And all this in the context of a cost of living crisis, war in Europe and ongoing climate emergency.

The general lack of seriousness about policy risks changing from being an irksome bug in our government to its characteristic feature, at a time where we most need seriousness about policy.

This is not looking good.

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Ministers are now just not turning up to things

14th July 2022

One of the current leadership contenders for the governing party said – aloud – that something or other “needs to become a little less about the leader and a lot more about the ship”.

One ship that comes to mind given the dysfunctional antics of the governing party is the (literally) fabulous Ship of Fools.

But from the perspective of Whitehall, the more obvious ship is the Mary Celeste.

Last week – only last week – we had mass ministerial resignations that left at least one government department with no ministers in the House of Commons.

Whether government departments actually require ministers to be in place absurdly became a matter of practical concern, rather than for academic speculation.

But now, even the ministers who are in place are not turning up to having their policies scrutinised.

Yesterday:

And today:

So, if you were to wonder whether any specific minister has resigned, the only answer is that attributed to Dorothy Parker on the death of Calvin Coolidge:

How can they tell?”

Current ministers just do not seem to care any more.

And as this blog as recently averred, infantile “culture war” politics are not about policy, but a substitute for policy.

They are easy things for the media to ask about, and easy things for certain politicians to resort to, and are thereby useful for both the media and the politicians as an alternative to discussing anything actually useful.

And such “culture war” politics seem not to be “cutting through”:

It appears that the (supposed) wedge issues were Westminster bubbles, all along.

What a surprise.

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And so we have this general emptiness where policy – and politicians – should be.

This void is not because of any lack of issues that require urgent policy attention.

Such issues are legion.

It is because there is a deepening and widening disconnect between politics and policy.

Like Benjamin Disraeli’s “two nations”:

“between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws.”

Disraeli posited that this described the rich and the poor; but it could now describe the gap between those who dominate politics and the media and those who do not.

The problem is that those concerned with politics and the media are not interested in the grunting, gruntful hard work of actual policy-making.

The concerns of those charged with making policy are not with the slog of policy formulation and implementation.

We had until recently photographs of packed cabinet meetings, with ministers and others “who attend”:

But from a policy perspective, that same table may as well be empty:

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We are now half-way through this Parliament, with a government with a substantial majority, and we are reduced to empty departments and absentee ministers.

And – given the shallow nonsense of the current leadership contenders about tax-and-spending as well as culture wars – there is little prospect of a new Prime Minister changing the course of the ship of state, so as to close the gap between politics and policy.

In the words of the eminent jurist Marwood:

“We are drifting into the arena of the unwell. Making an enemy of our own future.”

Brace, brace.

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The resignation of Boris Johnson – and why that is not enough for good government to return

7th July 2022

Well.

This morning I was writing a Twitter thread on what would happen if all government minsters resigned.

For such a surreal thing to be of any practical concern, rather than for academic speculation, indicates that it has been an odd few days in the politics of the United Kingdom.

And now the current Prime Minister has announced his resignation.

He is not going immediately – but the process for a finding a new Conservative party leader will now start and it seems to me that Johnson cannot now do anything to stop that process.

Once that process produces a new leader, that leader will be invited to form a government by the Queen, and Johnson – by automatic operation of the constitution – will instantly cease to be Prime Minister.

He may go even sooner, with a ‘caretaker’ Prime Minister put in place until a new Conservative leader emerges.

Johnson may remain in office, but his announcement today means he has lost ultimate control of his political fate.

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His resignation shows the operation of another constitutional rule – perhaps the most fundamental constitutional rule of all.

That rule is that Hubris is usually followed by Nemesis.

Wise politicians know this – and so they run tight ships, knowing that the pull of the tides can result in capsizing or being wrecked.

Less wise politicians assume their moment of great power will last forever.

Johnson – a successful electoral politician – was brought down not by any great policy issue or national crisis.

From Partygate and the Owen Paterson affair, he and his circle made unforced error after unforced error.

He and his circle believed that they could casually defy rules and conventions.

And so the ship of state became a ship of fools.

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Johnson in December 2019 had the greatest prizes that the constitution of the United Kingdom can bestow on a Prime Minister.

He had won an emphatic general election victory – and so he had the “mandate” that meant he could translate his programme into practice without delays in the House of Lords.

And he had a substantial majority – of eighty – which meant he could get through the House of Commons legislation and revenue provisions without opposition.

He even had, with Covid and then Ukraine, two huge unifying issues for him to pose as a Churchillian leader.

Yet, two-and-a-half years later, he is resigning.

And the mandate and the majority have been wasted.

The latest Queen’s Speech was an embarrassing sequence of proposals, showing that the government had no direction.

And the one thing that Johnson and his government did do – Brexit with a withdrawal agreement – he was seeking to break.

Power without responsibility, as another Prime Minister once said in a different context.

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Brexit was begat by the Conservative and Unionist Party.

The 2016 referendum was an exercise in party management, and it was from that egg that Brexit first emerged.

After 2016 the Conservative and Unionist Party said Brexit should mean Brexit, and they campaigned on that basis.

And under Johnson, the Conservative and Unionist Party “got Brexit done”.

But Brexit, being ungrateful, is destroying the Conservatives and dismantling the Union.

The revolution is devouring its begetters.

It is a political morality tale.

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And so good bye then Boris Johnson, if not now but soon.

The curious thing is that he may not even be the worst of the post-2010 Prime Ministers.

It was David Cameron who risked the future of the country on a single turn of pitch-and-toss – and with no preparation for a Leave vote.

It was Theresa May who insisted that Brexit had to be done, at speed, with its ‘red lines’ that kept the United Kingdom outside the Single Market.

These macro political mistakes were profound.

And we now have the greatest political mess in living memory, if not modern history.

It is time for the excitement to die down, and for a return to the dull work of taking government seriously.

The ejection of the repugnant Johnson from the body politic is a necessary step towards such political good health – but it is not a sufficient one.

Let us hope that we have not left it too late for there to be a recovery.

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“Oh no, not again” – the story of the Human Rights Act and of the new “Bill of Rights”

23rd June 2022

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“Curiously enough, the only thing that went through the mind of the bowl of petunias as it fell was ‘Oh no, not again’.”

– Douglas Adams, The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy

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Legal and constitutional commentators are the petunias of the modern age.

The current bout of constitutional excitements started in around 2015, and these excitements have carried on relentlessly since.

Again and again the government has threatened to do something – or done something – drastic in respect of our constitutional arrangements.

Seven or so years later it is rather exhausting to keep up.

And giving up is tempting.

But keep up we must, as these are serious matters – even if government and its political and media supporters do not take them seriously.

For the political and media supporters of government will clap and cheer at each of these constitutional disturbances – and will delight in the ‘libs’ being ‘owned’.

Well, this ‘lib’ is more bored than owned.

But commentary must be offered, if only as a corrective to the narratives of those currently in power and those who support them.

And so this is the story of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the supposed “Bill of Rights” with which the government wants to replace it.

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Before the Second World War, a certain sort of English person would have boasted not of having rights but of having liberties.

The notion was that an English person was free to do whatever they wish, unless it was prohibited.

The self-image was of a robust anti-authoritarianism – and it was an image which gained wide purchase.

And to an extent it was a fair depiction – the powers of the Crown had generally been made subject to Parliament, and most exercises of state power could be contested before a court.

But.

The Victorian doctrine of parliamentary supremacy – which asserted that Parliament could make or un-make any power it wanted – had as an unfortunate implication that the subject was powerless in the face of a determined executive dominating the legislature.

This implication was noticed by, among others, a Lord Chief Justice – Lord Hewitt – who in 1929 published The New Despotism warning of the illiberal power of the British state.

And in the Second World War what Hewitt warned of in theory was carried out in practice with the government’s use of the defence regulations.

For all the comforting self-image, there was not in practice robust English liberties that would actually protect the subject against the king’s government – let alone the citizen against the state.

Perhaps there never had been.

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Following the Second World War there was a spate of international conferences and organisations that purported to declare and protect rights.

One of these, of course, was the European Convention on Human Rights.

This convention provided for a number of rights, contained in articles.

Some of the rights were set out in the original convention, and some were added in later protocols.

The convention was connected to the Council of Europe, which now comprises most European states:

By being party to the convention, a country agrees to be bound by the convention as a matter of international law.

Some claim that the convention was promoted by Winston Churchill and drafted by Conservative lawyers – but their contribution should not be overstated (see this fine book for what did happen).

The United Kingdom at the time the convention was ratified in 1951 did not see the convention as controversial or as being inconsistent with domestic law.

The convention did not only provide for rights but it also established a court to determine whether any signatory – as a matter of international law – was in breach of its obligations under the convention.

That court is the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, of which you may have heard.

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What happened next is not widely known.

As is described in a House of Commons library paper:

“Although the UK ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1951, it was 1965 before the UK Government declared, by an option under then Article 25 of the Convention, that it would accept the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to individual complaints. The optional clause was debated in late 1980, amid charges that the Court was “interfering with the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty” and “limiting [the UK’s] freedom of action”, but in 1981 and subsequently it was accepted for five more years. In 1994, during the negotiation of Protocol 11, the UK tried in vain to ensure that the right of individual petition would remain optional. The Government thought the Court had too much power, and the possibility of non-renewal of individual petition would act as a check on its authority.”

The United Kingdom did not allow anyone to actually petition the Strasbourg court until 1964.

And until relatively recently – the mid-1990s – governments of all parties resisted the reach of the Strasbourg court.

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This resistance had the following effects.

First, it created immense costs and delays for individuals who wanted the United Kingdom to comply with its international obligations.

For example, in the case of Malone – in my view, one of the most important constitutional cases in the last hundred years – a 1977 incident did not reach a Strasbourg judgment until 1984.

There the Strasbourg court held that any surveillance of the individual by the state had to have a lawful basis.

The English court had held, in effect, that just as it was open to any subject to do as they wish unless prohibited, it was also open to state bodies to do as they wished unless prohibited.

That’s robust English liberties, for you.

The Malone decision in turn led to the United Kingdom placing its surveillance regime onto a legal – and thereby legally contestable basis.

But it took seven years for the judgment to happen.

Second, it meant that lawyers developed various means of referring to Strasbourg jurisprudence in domestic courts.

I remember seeing this article as a law student in the mid-1990s:

By then it was getting rather silly.

A United Kingdom litigant seeking to rely on their convention rights had to go to the cost and delays of going to Strasbourg, or had to find a clever lawlerly way of relying on Strasbourg caselaw in a domestic case.

But what that litigant could not do is rely on their convention rights in a straightforward way before the domestic courts – even though the United Kingdom was bound by the convention (and by the Strasbourg court’s interpretation of the convention) as a matter of international law.

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And then, in 1997, the electorate of the United Kingdom returned a Labour government:

Things could only get better, or so people thought.

And one thing the government did to make things better was to introduce legislation so that the convention could be relied on in domestic courts.

This would not only solve the increasingly absurd problem of the costs and delays of individual petition and indirect reliance, it also gave effect to a key provision of the Good Friday Agreement which was signed in April 1998.

One of the express bases of that agreement was that the convention had to be capable of being directly enforced in the courts of Northern Ireland – in particular against the Northern Irish Assembly:

And so the Human Rights Act 1998 came into being, which allowed direct access to the courts for breaches of the convention, and not just for those in Northern Ireland.

As the government of the day boasted in an allusion to the popular football song: rights were brought home:

The Act took effect on 2 October 2000.

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But.

The Human Rights Act never gained universal support.

This is for, I think, two main reasons.

First, the popular media disliked how English judges created an entirely new tort – misuse of private information – on the back of the 1998 Act.

The Act does not expressly provide for any such cause of action.

But case-by-case, the courts crafted a new basis for suing for breaches of privacy.

And the courts did not ‘develop’ the corresponding right of free expression in any comparable way.

Few reporters and editors came to see the Human Rights Act as an instrument that would protect them like their American counterparts who could point to their constitutional rights.

Second, the politics following 2001 and 9/11 pushed against human rights protections.

It is difficult to imagine the Human Rights Act being enacted after 2001 had it not been enacted before.

The Labour governments became more illiberal, as anti-terrorist act followed anti-terrorist act.

And by 2006:

Human rights may well have come home – but they were now unloved by the Act’s own parents.

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At this time, the then-opposition Conservatives were becoming even more opposed to the Human Rights Act than the Labour government.

So also in 2006:

The 2010 Conservative manifesto (twelve years ago):

“To protect our freedoms from state encroachment and encourage greater social responsibility, we will replace the  Human Rights Act with a UK Bill of Rights.”

The 2015 Conservative manifesto (seven years ago):

“The next Conservative Government will scrap the Human Rights Act, and introduce a British Bill of Rights. This will break the formal link between British courts and the European Court of Human Rights, and make our own Supreme Court the ultimate arbiter of human rights matters in the UK.”

The 2017 Conservative manifesto (five years ago) placed a foot on the ball:

“We will not repeal or replace the Human Rights Act while the process of Brexit is underway but we will consider our human rights legal framework when the process of leaving the EU concludes.”

And then most recently, in the 2019 Conservative manifesto:

“We will update the Human Rights Act and administrative law to ensure that there is a proper balance between the rights of individuals, our vital national security and effective government.”

As it happens the government elected on the back of that latest manifesto is not prosing to “update” the Human Rights Act but now to repeal it – at least in form.

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Alongside these manifesto commitments, there have been various attempts to find a practical way of repealing or updating the 1998 Act.

In 2011 there was a commission established by the government:

But this went nowhere.

In 2014 the then justice secretary launched a new attack at Conservative party conference.

And that went nowhere.

And in 2015-16, the then prime minister was again about to take on the Human Rights Act – and may well have done so but for Brexit:

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And now, in 2022, we have yet another attempt to repeal the Human Rights Act, twenty-five years after the Human Rights Bill was introduced by the incoming Labour government.

The difference now, however, is that the proposals have reached the stage of draft legislation before Parliament.

And the justice secretary proposing the new legislation, Dominic Raab, is a long-term opponent of the Human Rights Act and was the junior justice minister under Cameron responsible charged with finding an alternative to the Act.

In effect, the Human Rights Act is Moby Dick to Raab’s Captain Ahab.

It does not matter that the criminal justice system is in crisis, scarce ministerial time and departmental resources will be devoted to repealing the 1998 Act.

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The 1998 Act is unlikely to survive this assault.

There is enough time for the bill to pass before the next general election, and there is sheer determination to get the bill through.

But.

The essentials of the Act will remain.

The Good Friday Agreement will still require that the convention can be given direct effect in the courts of Northern Ireland.

The United Kingdom will still be bound by the convention as a matter of international law.

If the domestic courts do not protect convention rights then litigants can still go to Strasbourg.

The United Kingdom will still be required to comply with the decisions of the Strasbourg court.

And resourceful lawyers – and judges – will still find ways of referring to Strasbourg jurisprudence in domestic courts when determining convention rights.

And so one consequence of the new bill is that cost and expense will be added to the process of relying on convention rights under a treaty that will still bind the United Kingdom under international law.

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As this blog set out yesterday, the core of the new bill is the same as the 1998 Act.

The convention rights are still listed in the schedule; the definition of convention rights is the same; and the key obligation on public authorities to comply with the convention is also the same.

What the bill does is to introduce a number of provisions that will make it far more difficult for litigants to rely on those rights in domestic courts.

Over at the blog of Professor Mark Elliott there is an outstanding post – written within a day of the publication of the new bill – that details all the new legislative contraptions and devices, the purpose of which is to inconvenience the litigant seeking to rely on their convention rights.

Elliott’s post should be read and circulated as widely as possible.

And Elliott’s conclusion is compelling:

“the Government’s strategy appears to involve making it more difficult for human rights to be enforced in UK law both by marginalising the domestic influence of the ECtHR and by limiting the capacity of domestic courts to uphold Convention rights.”

And this is why – jaded and fatigued as any sensible person must be who is keeping up with this government’s ongoing attack on our constitutional arrangements – we have to be vigilant about this latest exercise in limiting the ability of individuals to rely on rights which the United Kingdom is bound to protect by international law.

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The government is not – and cannot – take the United Kingdom out of the European Convention of Human Rights – at least not without breaching the Good Friday Agreement.

The government is still obliged to give effect under international law to the rights contained in convention – and individuals will still have the right to petition the court.

But after twenty years of trying, the current government party has put forward the means of attacking the Human Rights Act by limiting the ready enforcement of these rights by individuals.

And so as a bowl of petunias once no doubt thought: brace, brace.

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The curious resignation letter of Lord Geidt – what it says, what it does not say, and what it signifies

16th June 2022

Lord Geidt is an unlikely man of steel.

Yet it appears that steel was the reason for his resignation.

And so, as a discreet but embarrassed courtier, he has chosen to exit via the ‘trade’ route.

(Photo by Chance Agrella from Freerange Stock – donation made.)

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See this outstanding and informative thread from the estimable trade expert Sam Lowe for the practical background to this matter:

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But what can we make of the resignation letter and the reply?

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Lord Geidt comes from a diplomatic background.

And diplomats, like lawyers, are wordsmiths.

(It is just that their wordsmithery is often about imprecision and ambiguity, in contrast to the lawyerly lust for precision and clarity.)

He will have chosen his words and formulations carefully.

So let us look at the operative paragraph:

An “impossible and odious position” is quite a striking thing to say.

(Though “deliberate and purposeful” seems a tautology.)

The Prime Minister’s letter sets out more about the request for advice:

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There is a lot here that does not make immediate sense.

Lord Geidt for all his many merits is not a lawyer, still less a trade lawyer.

There would be no obvious reason for “tasking” him for a view on something to do with the legality of tariffs.

The question must have come before him another way.

Some are speculating that it may be because of party donations, but this appears to be being denied (though the denial is in a curious form):

My current suspicion is that there may have been a request for a ministerial direction to do something with which an official did not feel comfortable, which then somehow got referred to Lord Geidt.

Who knows.

But connecting the [X] of a steel tariffs issue to the [Y] of an ethics adviser resigning is not easy.

And this is the case even if Lord Geidt simply used this issue as a pretext to resign.

There is something missing here.

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But.

What is not missing here, however, is that this incident shows that our current Prime Minister is at best indifferent to two rules-based regimes.

The first is the Ministerial Code – which, as this blog has previously averred, is a constitutional nonsense, as it offers no real check or balance whatsoever to any Prime Minister.

The second is the rules-based system of the World Trade Organisation.

You may recall government-supporters during Brexit clamouring for the United Kingdom to trade on ‘WTO terms’.

It often seemed they did not know what that actually meant, and it was said because it sounded good.

Well.

It seems that the government of the United Kingdom is as contemptuous of this type of international law as it is of others.

This very week we have seen the government of the United Kingdom seek to break international law with the Northern Irish Protocol Bill and make aggressive noises about compliance with the orders of the European Court of Human Rights.

The rules of the World Trade Organisation are now the third international law regime the government of the United Kingdom want to be free from this week – and it is still only Thursday lunchtime.

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At the heart of this government is a sense of lawlessness – that in area after area there is the view that rules do not and should not apply.

The resignation of Lord Geidt seems to be a double-whammy of two such areas – the Ministerial Code and WTO rules.

But it could have been compliance with the orders of the European Court of Human Rights, or compliance with the Northern Irish Protocol, or compliance with Covid regulations, and so on.

And so on.

Perhaps we will find out more about the circumstances of this particular resignation.

But we already know from previous resignations that much of what has happened is already all too clear.

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The curious clause one of the Northern Irish Protocol Bill

14th June 2022

Let us start at the beginning, for it is a very good place to start.

And at the beginning of the Northern Irish Protocol Bill, just after the title, purposes, and preamble, is clause 1.

(A ‘clause’ is what becomes a ‘section’ by legal magic when a Bill becomes an Act.)

Clause 1 provides:

There will be time to look at the other provisions of this Bill, but let us take a moment to look at clause 1.

The content of the clause is not part of the title, purposes or preamble to the Bill.

No, we can check, and it has a clause number.

Clause 1 is intended to be part of statute, to have the force of primary legislation.

But.

It does not seem to be law.

I do not know what it is.

It is called ‘Introduction’ – as if it was part of some Penguin Classic.

But the the title, purposes and preamble are usually all the ‘introduction’ a statute needs.

For example. the purposes tell us that the Bill is to make “provision about the effect in domestic law of the Protocol on Ireland/ Northern Ireland in the EU withdrawal agreement, about other domestic law in subject areas dealt with by the Protocol and for connected purposes.”

That will tell a court what the Act will be for, if a court needs an introductory aid to construction or interpretation of any of the provisions.

The provisions of this clause 1 do not create obligations, or confer any discretions or rights.

What are they doing?

Are they capable of legal effect, in and of themselves?

Are they intended to have legal effect, in and of themselves?

Are they intended to be aids to construction or interpretation of any of other provisions, in the case of ambiguity or doubt?

If so, how?

What are they supposed to be?

They read more like a policy statement or explanatory note for the Bill – but these are separate documents that the government has also published.

The published explanatory notes do not help us:

“[S]ummarises”?

Is the purpose of a clause to “summarise”?

“[M]akes clear”?

Oh dear gods.

If the rest of the Bill needs a provision like this so as to “make” things “clear” then the drafting of the other provisions needs to be done again.

Perhaps clause 1 is just to get “Union with Ireland Act 1800 and the Act of Union (Ireland) 1800” somehow onto the face of the Bill – indeed on to page one – so as to placate unionists?

And, applying the rule against surplusage – that courts give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute so that no clause is rendered superfluous, void, or insignificant (definition taken from here) – what actual difference does clause 1 make to the rest of the Bill?

If clause 1 were – say – to be deleted, what difference would it make to the legal effect of the Bill once enacted?

The fear must be that the creeping use of legislation as a form of political propaganda – press releases by other means – has now infected the very statutory provisions themselves.

It is difficult to imagine what the parliamentary drafter intends by clause 1 as to its legal effect.

Perhaps this has happened with other Bills – and, if so, please leave comments and links below with examples.

Perhaps it a commonplace, and I have missed it in other legislation.

But it does not seem right.

And it perhaps suggests that the government does not sincerely intend to place this Bill on the statute book, and that the Bill as a whole – and not just clause 1 – is merely for political consumption.

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POSTSCRIPT

 

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The bare “necessity” – how the legal position of the United Kingdom on the Northern Irish Protocol Bill makes no sense

13th June 2022

The government of the United Kingdom published this evening the Northern Irish Protocol Bill.

This Bill is so the government can breach (or “not perform”) its obligations under the Northern Irish Protocol.

The government has also published not the legal advice in support of the Bill, but their legal position.

But it is not even a legal position.

It is a lack of a legal position.

As a legal justification placed into the public domain this is even weaker than taking a lockdown journey to Barnard Castle to test one’s eyesight.

The government is legally even weaker than many legal commentators thought.

We were expecting some clever whizz-bang argument, desperate but perhaps just about plausible.

But we have got this instead.

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Let us look why this is so weak to the point of non-existent.

The government’s “position” is as follows.

Step one – the government sets out what it sees as “necessity”.

“The doctrine of necessity provides a clear basis in international law to justify the non-performance of international obligations under certain exceptional and limited conditions. It has been accepted by the International Court of Justice and is reflected in the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, which successive UK governments have regarded as generally reflective of customary international law. By way of summary, the term ‘necessity’ is used in international law to lawfully justify situations where the only way a State can safeguard an essential interest is the non-performance of another international obligation.”

Step two – the government sets out that “necessity” means it has “no other way” than to put forward this legislation:

“… the strain that the arrangements under the Protocol are placing on institutions in Northern Ireland, and more generally on socio-political conditions, has reached the point where the Government has no other way of safeguarding the essential interests at stake than through the adoption of the legislative solution that is being proposed. There is, therefore, clear evidence of a state of necessity to which the Government must respond to.”

Step three – the government ties the two steps together to assert that “in light of the state of necessity” the “non-performance” (ie breaching) of its obligations under the Northern Irish Protocol would be justified under international law:

“The Government recognises that necessity can only exceptionally be invoked to lawfully justify non-performance of international obligations. This is a genuinely exceptional situation, and it is only in the challenging, complex and unique circumstances of Northern Ireland, that the Government has, reluctantly, decided to introduce legislative measures which, on entry into force, envisage the nonperformance of certain obligations. It is the Government’s position that in light of the state of necessity, any such non-performance of its obligations contained in the Withdrawal Agreement and/or the Protocol as a result of the planned legislative measures would be justified as a matter of international law. This justification lasts as long as the underlying reasons for the state of necessity are present. The current assessment is that this situation and its causes will persist into the medium to long term.”

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Ah, the bare legal doctrine of necessity.

The general issue with “necessity” at law is that any of us can at any time assert that it is “necessary” to breach an obligation.

This means that, in legal practice, “necessity” is made very difficult, if not impossible, to rely on as a defence for breaking any obligation.

In the domestic law of England and Wales, for example, every law student is introduced to the singular facts of the 1884 case of R v Dudley and Stephens to show how limited the defence of necessity is to a criminal charge.

And now, in 2022, “necessity” is being invoked in respect of a different type of shipwreck: the government’s post-Brexit policy.

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In international law, the principle of “necessity” is similarly limited in its scope.

Here is Lord Anderson QC, whose tweets should be read carefully:

 

Anderson links to a digest of the applicable law which sets out the four conditions that all have to be met together:

– the State’s act is to safeguard an essential interest against a peril;

– the peril shall be grave and imminent;

– the course of action followed shall be the only way available; and

– no other essential interest shall be seriously impaired as a result of the breach.

The digest also states that the excuse is unavailable where the State has (substantially) contributed to the situation of necessity.

These are high hurdles to meet.

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But there is more.

The parties to the Northern Irish Protocol – the United Kingdom and the European Union – have already expressly agreed a scheme for dealing with any problems under the protocol.

This mechanism is set out in Article 16:

And this annex to Article 16:

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The United Kingdom and the European Union contemplated the possibility of problems and agreed a way of dealing with them, which would enable parts of the protocol if – ahem – necessary to be temporarily disapplied.

It makes no sense – whatsoever – for the government to race to seeking to rely on the principle of “necessity” under international law for breaching the protocol without triggering the Article 16 process first.

As one tweeter said:

There is no answer to this point – and there can be no answer to this point:

There are no possible circumstances where the United Kingdom can resort to the the principle of “necessity” under international law without going through the Article 16 process first.

And the government – despite many threats – has not triggered the Article 16 process.

The “position” published today even admits the government believes that the Article 16 were met:

“In July 2021, however, the Government assessed in the Command Paper that, as a result of both diversion of trade and serious societal and economic difficulties occasioned by the Protocol, the conditions for the exercise of the rights provided for under Article 16 of the Protocol were already met.”

But the government then did nothing under Article 16 on that basis.

For the government to not trigger Article 16 instead of resorting to the the principle of “necessity” under international law is beyond rational comprehension.

Wookies coming from Endor makes more sense.

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And there is even more.

So “necessary” is this proposal that the legislation will take at least months, if not a year to pass into statute.

Such a leisurely timeline does not indicate urgency – and it does not show that the problem is “grave and imminent”.

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Putting what is said today together with this blog’s recent posts (here and here) on the strange way that the government is claiming to have legal cover for this proposal, it seems that the First Treasury Counsel was asked to accept as an assumption that it was “necessary” for the United Kingdom to break its international obligations.

The so-called Treasury Devil then questioned that assumption, and he was correct to do so.

This “legal position” does not provide any legal cover.

It makes no sense, even on its own terms.

It is a contrivance.

As my University of Birmingham colleague Dr Adrian Hunt avers:

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The reality is that the problems which the government mention were entirely foreseeable when they negotiated and signed the protocol, and were indeed foreseen.

The government then just wanted to “get Brexit done” – everything else was detail.

And the problems which have arisen are the main reason the protocol included Article 16.

So not only were the problems foreseen, a solution was also envisaged.

It is difficult to conceive of a weaker basis for the government of the United Kingdom to assert “necessity” as a breach of international obligations.

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