How to treat the parliamentary evidence today from Dominic Cummings

26th May 2021

Dominic Cummings, the former assistant to the prime minister excites strong opinions – and it is difficult to escape those strong opinions when you write or think about him.

But the attempt should be made – as what he had to say at today’s remarkable parliamentary committee hearing may or may not be important.

The approach I would recommend is as follows:-

First – avoid confirmation bias – especially when it is from an unexpected source.

Many of the things he said confirm the prejudices of those critical of the current government generally and the prime minister in particular – and there was glee to hear him, of all people, say these things.

You should be especially wary of things which affirm what you think must be true.

Second – be aware of the selective nature of the evidence.

For example – some ministers were damned, but other ministers – such as the chancellor responsible for ‘eat out to help out’ and uncertainty over furlough payments – were not criticised

Nor was the cabinet office minister blamed for any difficulty in his department.

If this was a general critique of ministerial competence then it was lopsided – and almost vindictive.

Third – be aware also of motivation.

The former assistant to the prime minister wants, of course, to be vindicated – not least because of the Barnard Castle tarnish.

He has an understandable desire to have been right all along – and his failures only being that he did not do more sooner.

And fourth – there is the issue of honesty.

The former assistant to the prime minister once admitted that the £350million-a-week promise for the NHS was a convenient lie.

He was also one of those ministers and advisers who could not and did not sign the statement of truth (under pain of perjury) about the true reason for the prorogation – and it was the lack of such a witness statement that meant the government lost the case in the supreme court.

Indeed, the fact that if he said something untrue today may have been a contempt of parliament holds no fear for him – as he already has been held in contempt of parliament and with no consequences.

It was a win-win situation today from his perspective – he could take the benefit of absolute parliamentary privilege to make serious allegations, but with none of the sanctions for that benefit being misused.

Nonetheless, a lot of what he said ‘rang true’ – and it may be that there will be evidence that substantiates his many general and detailed claims of wrongdoing by others – some of which are highly serious.

And nothing he said should be dismissed out-of-hand just because he was the one who said it.

Everything he said may be true.

But everything he said, for the four reasons above, needs to be corroborated.

Today was great political theatre – but more is needed before any reliance can be placed upon this great political performance.

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Why ‘how to regulate’ guides are invariably nice and colourful but impractical

25th May 2021

It would be unfair to name the particular public body responsible but a new guide to regulation has just been published.

The guide is lovely to look at.

Pages and pages of colourful graphics, with boxes and arrows.

A well-meaning sequence of platitudinous or vague statements are made which together are to be taken as a guide to good regulation.

The guide is pretty and clever and earnest.

And the guide seems completely useless.

One suspects no better regulation will be made because of it, nor any better regulatory decision.

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The problem is not that, on its own terms, it is wrong.

On its own terms, the guide is quite wonderful.

Like a self-contained and lovingly illustrated code in some invented language like Dwarvish or Klingon or Dothraki.

The obscure illuminated manuscripts of our public policy age.

But the guide – and many guides like it – may not correspond to reality.

*

The essence of regulation is practical, not theoretical.

The basic question is: what behaviour or outcome would happen (or not happen) but for the regulatory measure?

How will things actually be different (or the same) because of the intervention (or lack of intervention)?

And will those things really be more desirable than otherwise would be the case?

If the regulatory measure – either a rule or a decision – does not in practice affect behaviours or outcomes as desired, then it may be many things but it fails as a regulatory measure.

So: the best guide to regulation is work backwards from what is happening (or otherwise would happen) and see how that behaviour or outcome can be made to be different (or forced to stay the same) in a way desired.

*

The problem with flowchart-based – and also with checklist-based – regulation is that it makes the regulator feel that something is being done.

Like the old joke about the driver who always looks in the rear-view mirror before pulling out – it does not matter what is coming, as long as they have looked in the rear-view mirror they can proceed to pull out.

In so many fields of human activity – from drug-taking to sex work to public health rules for coronavirus and electronic surveillance and public procurement (just to take a few public policy bug bears) – there is a belief that there must be regulations, as something must be done.

The problem with colourful guides on ‘how to regulate’ the process takes priority over practical effect and implementation.

There should perhaps be a new regulator to prevent flowchart-based regulation.

Perhaps it can be called OffChart.

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Why the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel legally can and should disclose the full report to the Morgan family at the same time as to the Home Office

24th May 2021

Today in parliament there was a short debate on the delays in the report in respect of the murder of Daniel Morgan, why there were successive collapses of investigations and prosecutions, and the significance of potential corrupt relationships between the press, the police and private investigation industry.

The link for watching the debate is here – and it is worth watching in full.

You will rarely see a junior minister so obviously unconvinced by their own brief – and there is an apparent contrast between her conciliatory manner and the content of what she had to read out.

(It is not unusual for junior ministers to stand in for cabinet ministers for these urgent debates – though it would have been appropriate for the home secretary to have been there.)

You get the impression that nobody – inside or outside of government – is actually convinced of the ‘national security’ and ‘human rights act’ points being taken to justify the home office’s position.

Indeed, both points seem to be ‘lines to take’ – formulated by some clever central government lawyer – as giving wriggle-room to the home office.

But neither contention adds up.

The panel report is not under the Inquiries Act 2005 – and so the exceptions under section 25 do not apply.

The most charitable explanation I can can conceive is that the government wants to avoid creating a precedent for other non-2005 Act reports being free from the same exceptions.

There are more plausible, less charitable explanations.

*

The reason why the report being presented to parliament is legally important (as well as constitutionally appropriate) is that it will give the report absolute privilege in respect of defamation when it is published to the general public.

And although a publication of the report directly to the public by the panel without going through the home secretary and parliament would be an exciting event – and no more than the home secretary deserves – it would not be legally prudent. 

But it is worth looking at the terms of reference carefully on this point – as there may be another way forward in the face of home office obstinacy.

*

The terms of reference are here – and they should be looked at in full.

Paragraph 6 indeed provides:

‘The Independent Panel will present its final Report to the Home Secretary who will make arrangements for its publication to Parliament.’

But one sentence in the following paragraph 7 is also interesting:

‘In the meanwhile, it is also envisaged that the Panel will brief the family incrementally, both on the progress of its work and on its emerging findings.’

And so is also paragraph 4(c):

‘…the Independent Panel will…brief members of the family through a final report which would be made available first to the family and then to the public at large’.

In other words: it was envisaged in the terms of reference that, although publication to the world was to be done through the home secretary and parliament, it was open to the panel to share its findings and indeed the final report directly with the family.

(Note the ‘will’ in 4(c).)

I do not know if the panel has shared the findings and the final report with the Morgan family – but not only is there nothing in the terms of reference to prevent the panel from doing this, the terms of reference expressly envisage this being done.

And there would be no greater check on any untoward redactions by the home office than the Morgan family having the original, unredacted report before them.

 

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The Daniel Morgan panel report will be the nearest we ever get to Leveson Part II

23rd May 2021

We have a lopsided view of the bad things that were happening in respect of the media around the turn of this century.

The focus has been on the press – journalistic ethics, newsroom culture and the breaches of the civil and criminal law.

But those did not happen in a vacuum.

What elements of the press did was part of a wider problem, which involved the metropolitan police and the private investigation industry.

Of course, the press took advantage of these relations and was the source of a lot of the money involved.

But there were wrongs being committed on the supply-side of the trade in personal information.

Had the Leveson inquiry continued with its phase two – that was to look at the dealings of the press with the police and so on – then we would now have a more rounded picture of what went on.

But the Leveson inquiry will now never continue to phase two.

And so the nearest we will get to a documented understanding of this supply-side will be the independent panel report on the Daniel Morgan case – a case which goes to the heart of the problematic relationship between the press, the police and the private investigation industry.

It may well turn out to be the best record we will ever get of what then happened – and how so many got away with so many things which they should not have done so.

 

The Crown and the Media – from phone hacking to the Dyson report

22nd May 2021

If anyone doubted the often indirect power of the crown in the public affairs of the United Kingdom then this week’s media news about the Dyson report is a useful reminder.

A reporter fabricated documents so as to engineer an introduction to a member of the royal family and then lied about it.

This sort of ‘blagging’ – as  some of those in the media would call it – was one of what was once euphemistically described as the ‘dark arts’.

And as a result of the exposure of this dishonesty, the future of the BBC (itself founded by royal charter) is now uncertain.

To throw the future of the United Kingdom’s state broadcaster into doubt requires a significant intervention.

It is an example of how the presence of a royal element to a story can electrify things.

And it is not the first time.

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The phone hacking scandal – which affected the press in a way that the Dyson report may affect the BBC – also came about because it had a significant royal element.

In short: the telephones of the royal household were hacked – just as the telephones of celebrities and newsworthy non-celebrities were hacked.

(Hacking was another of those ‘dark arts’.)

But because the target was the royal household, a different part of the metropolitan police became involved instead of those parts of the metropolitan police that the press then had a close (and mutually advantageous) relationship.

This in turn led to a police raid of a private investigator’s office, and the documents then seized in turn were a media-legal time-bomb which exploded when disclosed about the time of the Millie Dowler murder trial.

The story is set out in this thread by James Doleman, who reported on the trials (and with whom, I must add, I disagree on other issues):

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Had the mobile telephones of the royal household not been hacked then it is plausible that – even now – we would not know anything about the real extent of telephone hacking.

Such is the indirect power of the crown in our public affairs.

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The extraordinary intervention of Priti Patel in delaying publication of the Daniel Morgan report

19th May 2021

This is not a conspiracy theory blog.

Conspiracies do, of course, exist – often to cover up cock-ups, for that is usually the only time when any given group of people have the focus and motivation to act in concert.

But a conspiracy is rarely the first notion that comes to my mind to explain any odd state of affairs.

And so, in respect of the 1987 murder of Daniel Morgan, I do not know why he was killed and who killed him.

This is just not safe legal-libel speak: I genuinely have no idea, and I offer no theory.

But what is odd about this murder was the aftermath: a remarkable succession of failed investigations and prosecutions.

Here, again, there may be explanations short of a conspiracy.

Court cases and so on fail all the time, and for various reasons.

And even if those reasons point to systemic failures, often those system failures are not conspiracies but just, well, system failures.

But.

The succession of failed investigations and prosecutions in the case of Daniel Morgan also indicate that there may be concerted wrongful conduct.

And nobody who knows anything about the metropolitan police and their relationship with the tabloid media at the relevant time would be surprised if there had been undue pressure and corruption.

Still: we do not know for certain.

And this is why an independent panel inquiry was set up in 2013 to, as far as possible, get to the bottom of what happened and what, if anything, went wrong.

(My 2012 piece calling for a formal inquiry is here.)

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The panel spent eight years putting together a detailed report.

The eight year period indicates the complexity and perhaps the seriousness of the matters being investigated.

And this long-awaited report was about to be published…

…when in an extraordinary intervention Priti Patel, the home secretary, has delayed its publication.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1394982007093043201

 

We even have the remarkable sight of Patel relying on the Human Rights Act as part of the excuse for the delay.

As the panel has pointed out – in an impressively robust statement (which you should read) – there is no good reason for this intervention.

None of the supposed reasons add up, and it appears to me that the home secretary’s stated reasons are mere pretexts.

This is an extraordinary intervention by a politician in an independent inquiry.

And it also may be counter-productive – as it is drawing attention to a report that – even if it were critical – may have had little press or public attention.

After all – as I aver above – few would be surprised that bad things were happening at the time with the police and the media.

So, even if there is something in there which Patel, for political reasons, did not want in the public domain, her delay may be bringing attention to a thing others may have preferred were left not emphasised.

Some commenters believe that the report will be an exposure of the corrupt relationships between the media and the police of the time.

I have no idea.

But many will be even more interested in the report now after Patel’s extraordinary and perhaps clumsy intervention.

And we should hope that the report when published finally brings some justice for the family of Daniel Morgan who have campaigned tirelessly since his death for the truth to be revealed.

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What is Force Majeure? And why is it now being mentioned in the context of Brexit?

18th May 2021

A historian of ideas – probably Isaiah Berlin – once averred that most philosophical systems were ultimately simple affairs.

What made them complicated, it was said, were the elaborate defences and anticipations of objections so as to make the arguments advanced harder to attack or dismiss.

I have no idea if this is true, as I have no head for philosophy, but I have often thought the same can be said for contracts.

Most agreements are also relatively simple – and most of us, every day, enter into oral contracts which are nothing more than ‘I give you [x] in return for [y]’.

Written out, such contracts would not need to be longer than one sentence – a single clause.

What makes a legal agreement complicated – and what can make a written contract go on for hundreds of pages of clauses and schedules – are the provisions dealing with what will happen if one party does not do [x] or the other party does not do [y].

This is because most written contracts are not there for when things go well: they are there for when things go badly.

The more provisions that are in a contract, the more allocations of risk and protections for the parties if there are problems.

For high-value or significant agreements, teams of lawyers will painstakingly (and often expensively) go through every possible and foreseeable eventuality, and will then allocate risk accordingly as between the parties.

There will also be detailed provisions setting out the processes for resolving and remedying problems.

In most circumstances, those provisions will not ever be used.

(As a general though not universal rule, the more effort that goes into putting a contract together, the less scope for genuine disputes later.)

But sometimes a thing can happen to disrupt an agreement that has not been addressed in the agreement.

This disruptive event can have three qualities: (1) it will be outside the control of the parties (else all you would have is a potential breach); (2) it will be outside of the allocations of risk in the agreement (else the agreement already deals with what will then happen); and (3) it will affect the performance of obligations under the agreement (else it would not matter).

In legal language, such a disruptive event is said to ‘frustrate’ the agreement.

*

In English contract law, such frustrations often lead to unfair and uncertain results – and every law student will know of the so-called ‘coronation cases’.

Lawyers elsewhere, however, approached this sort of predicament differently and developed the doctrine of ‘force majeure’.

A force majeure event is a thing that (1) is outside the control of the parties; (2) is outside of the allocations of risk in the agreement; and (3) affects the performance of obligations under the agreement.

If the doctrine applies there is then some certainty of what will then happen in the event of a force majeure event – sometimes the consequences can be agreed between the parties, or the consequences may be provided for under the general law.

Force majeure, however, is a residual thing – if the parties have foreseen the particular risk and allocated that risk then the terms of the agreement should take priority.

This means (generally) the more detailed the agreement, the more limited the scope for force majeure.

The analysis set out by me above is from the perspective of an English commercial lawyer but the doctrine also exists in what is called ‘public international law’ – that is the law that regulates relations between countries (and also international organisations):

You will see the public international law document quoted provides that a thing cannot be a force majeure event if (a) it is because of the conduct of the state seeking to rely on it and (b) the risk of it happening has not been allocated.

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What all this means is that it is often difficult in practice to rely on force majeure when there is in place a detailed and specially negotiated agreement.

This is because the parties will have foreseen and addressed most practical problems.

And even if there is a force majeure event, that also does not mean it is a ‘get out of an agreement free’ card – as all that may result is a temporary relief from fulfilling an obligation until the force majeure event is over.

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The reason why force majeure is in the news is because David Frost, the United Kingdom minister responsible for Brexit negotiations, appears to think that force majeure can be relied on to relieve the United Kingdom from its obligations under the Brexit withdrawal agreement and its Northern Ireland protocol.

The news report says:

‘Force majeure is a legal concept through which a party can demand to be relieved of its contractual obligations because of circumstances beyond its control or which were unforeseen.

‘The suggestion is contained in a 20-page letter the UK has sent to the European Commission.’

To which the response should be: good luck with that.

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In practice, any reliance on the doctrine of force majeure by the United Kingdom will come down to two particulars: (1) what is the (supposed) particular force majeure event, and (2) what is the particular obligation that is (supposedly) affected by that event.

Until this is known, one cannot be completely dismissive.

But.

It is difficult to believe that there is any event that (1) affects the performance of a particular obligation under the Northern Ireland Protocol which (2) is not within the control of one of the parties and (3) is not addressed in the protocol.

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And in response to the thread on Twitter on which this blogpost was based, this scepticism was endorsed by Jonathan Jones, who was the United Kingdom’s chief legal official during the Brexit negotiations:

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That the United Kingdom government had not thought through or cared about the detail of the withdrawal agreement was not unforeseeable.

It was, to use another technical legal term, bleedingly obvious.

It is difficult to conceive of anything that could be a force majeure event that is not already subject to the provisions and processes of the Northern Ireland Protocol.

On the face of it, therefore, the resorting to ‘force majeure’ by the United Kingdom looks desperate – a makeweight argument deployed for want of anything more compelling.

There is, however, the delicious legal irony in the circumstances of the United Kingdom seeking to rely on a French legal doctrine used to cure the inadequacies of English law-making.

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The British Museum, looted artefacts, and the law

 4th May 2021

This post is prompted by an outstanding and thought-provoking book about museums.

The book is The Whole Picture: The colonial story of the art in our museums & why we need to talk about it by Alice Procter (Amazon page here – but do order from your local bookseller if you can).

Two thoughts that the book provoked for me were about the British Museum.

This post sets out those two thoughts and where those thoughts then led me.

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The first thought was a recollection of this eloquent and plausible 2004 justification by the museum’s then director Neil MacGregor of the museum’s position relating to controversial items in its collection. 

The passage in that piece that struck me at the time and has stayed with me was this about the founding of the museum back in 1753 (and I have broken up the paragraphs for flow):

‘To ensure that the collection would be held for the benefit of citizens, and not the purposes of the crown, Parliament hit upon a solution of extraordinary ingenuity and brilliance.

‘They borrowed from private family law the notion of the trust. The decision that the museum would be run not as a department of state, but by trustees had – and still has – crucial implications.

‘Trustee ownership confers duties rather than rights. Trustees must derive no benefit for themselves, but hold the collection exclusively for the advantage of the beneficiaries.

‘The collection cannot be sold off.

‘The museum was set firmly outside the commercial realm, a position epitomised by the principle of free admission.

‘Even more astonishingly, it was in large measure removed from the political realm.

‘Trustees are not allowed by law merely to follow government orders: they have to act as they judge best in the interest of beneficiaries, including, crucially, future and unborn beneficiaries.

‘Who are the beneficiaries for whom the trustees hold the collection?

‘Startlingly, they are not just the citizens of Britain.

‘The British Museum was from the beginning a trust where the objects would be held “for the use of learned and studious men [in 1753 they were mostly men], both native and foreign”.

‘In his will, Sloane had declared his desire that his collection should be preserved “for the improvement, knowledge and information of all persons”.

‘The rest of the world has rights to use and study the collection on the same footing as British citizens.’

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I have often thought about that passage.

It is convincing as far as it goes – once an item is part of the collection it is safeguarded and retained for the benefit of all.

But.

There was something missing.

*

Here we come to the second thought provoked by the book.

This is a legal principle – known to lawyers and also normal people – which is known in its Latin form nemo dat quod non habet.

In plain language: a person cannot have a greater property right (‘title’) in a thing than the person who provides them with the thing.

So if I provide you with a thing – but I do not own it to begin with – then you will not own it either.

Applied to the British Museum, it seemed to me that it was all very well the British Museum boasting of how well an item in its collection will be looked after under the terms of its trust – but that was no answer if the original acquisition was unsound.

Nemo dat quod non habet – or garbage in, garbage out in legalese.

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So with these two thoughts I then wondered: what is the position in respect of an artefact in the British Museum if the acquisition was tainted?

That, for example, the person providing the item had stolen it?

And this query led me to the British Museum Act 1963 and the 2005 case of the Attorney General vs the British Museum.

In essence, once an item is part of the British Museum collection, the 1963 Act provides only only a narrow basis for the trustees to ‘dispose’ of the items.

This narrow basis is primarily set out in section 5 of the 1963 Act.

(There is also an exception for transferring an item to another museum – and there is an exception for the return of human remains.)

*

So unless an item in the collection is within the scope of section 5 of the Act then, in effect, the trustees of the British Museum cannot at law give back the item – regardless of the circumstances of its acquisition.

What this meant in practice was illustrated in the 2005 case.

The museum had purchased after the second world war four items that has been looted by the Nazis from their owner.

The issue before the court was whether there was implicit exception to the terms of the British Museum trust in respect of when there would be a moral obligation to return the items.

The judge – the very head of the court of chancery and equity – held that the trustees did not have the power to do this, even if they wanted to do so (which they plainly did).

Any application of the principle of nemo dat quod non habet appears to have been precluded by operation of the Limitation Acts.

The judge did indicate in passing that if title in the items had not passed on acquisition then the items would not have (technically) formed part of the collection of the first place and thereby the terms of the trust and section 5 would not apply.

But it would presumably be out of time for title in respect of a 1945 acquisition to be contested sixty years later.

Happily, there was a (fascinating) recommendation by the (wonderfully named) Spoliation Advisory Panel that the heirs to the person whose art had been looted be compensated by an ex gratia payment.

And since the 2005 case, there is now the Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act 2009 that provides a statutory basis for the return of items looted by the Nazis.

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For items looted by the Nazis, therefore, the legal position is now that the loot can be returned – even if it is part of the collection.

But what of items looted by others at other times and other places – why should the unfairness caused by only one manner of theft be addressed?

To its credit (to an extent) the British Museum is open that this is an issue.

On its press page, it has links to explanations as to its positions in respect of what it calls ‘contested items’.

(It also has a page setting out how it has settled the Nazi loot claims.)

The impression that the British Museum is no doubt seeking to promote with these pages is that it is taking the issues seriously and is sensitive to grievances.

But.

The attempt to give this impression is not convincing.

This is partly because the leadership of the museum is still wedded to the notion that the terms of the trust gives it some elevated status that means the grubby question of acquisition is not relevant.

In 2018, the current chair of the British Museum trustees wrote the Guardian in almost identical terms to those employed by MacGregor in 2005:

‘In what was one of the great acts of the Enlightenment, in 1753 parliament established the British Museum as a trust, the first of its kind in the world, which was to be run independently of politics and of parliament. This autonomy has been central to its scholarship and public purpose for the past 265 years. […]

‘Trustees today have three broad responsibilities: to conserve and enhance the collections for ever; to generate new knowledge, especially by supporting the kind of research that is only possible in a large encyclopaedic museum; and to make the collections accessible to the whole world. They work with colleagues across the UK and around the world to share knowledge and objects from their collections as widely as possible. But they don’t see the objects for which they are responsible as negotiating chips in a political debate.’

But again, this go-to ‘trust’ defence says nothing to the issue of how the items were acquired.

*

In 2019 one trustee resigned, and she gave as one of her reasons (which is broken up for flow):

‘In November 2018, a French report commissioned by President Macron recommended the full restitution of looted African artworks.

‘It burst open the debate over the repatriation of cultural artefacts. Museums, state officials, journalists and public intellectuals in various countries have stepped up to the discussion.

‘The British Museum, born and bred in empire and colonial practice, is coming under scrutiny. And yet it hardly speaks.

‘It is in a unique position to lead a conversation about the relationship of South to North, about common ground and human legacies and the bonds of history.

‘Its task should be to help us all to imagine a better world, and – along the way – to demonstrate the usefulness of museums.

‘This would go some way towards making the case for keeping its collection in London.

‘But its credibility would depend on the museum taking a clear position as an ally of coming generations.’

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It is correct that the provisions of the 1963 Act prevent the trustees from giving away or giving back items in its collection.

And the operation of the Limitation Act means that, as the chair of the spoliation panel said in one report, the position of the museum is legally impregnable. 

Nemo dat quod non habet may well be a principle of law – but it is subject to statutory bars and exclusions.

But.

As with the items looted by the Nazis, where there is a will there is a way.

Legislation may be required – similar to the 2009 legislation for holocaust items.

And even without legislation, the position of the museum – but-for-the-legislation – could be made more clear – as it was in the 2005 case above.

But instead the impression one gains from reading around the subject is that the museum hides behind terms of the 1963 Act – that it is an excuse not for thinking seriously about the issue.

For even if the Limitation Acts rob the principle of nemo dat quod non habet from having practical legal consequences, it still has the full force of a moral imperative.

Instead of rhapsodising about the heady genius of the 1753 trust, the leadership of the museum should be conscious that nothing about the terms of the trust goes to how the items were acquired.

Of course, specific ‘contested’ items will raise specific concerns and objections.

And there is the possibility that items could leave the collection only to be destroyed or lost to the black market – though this risk should not be over-stated, still less assumed.

But as a general rule, the British Museum and other museums should accept morally (if not legally) that if an item was acquired when those from whom the item was taken did not give permission then, as a matter of principle, the item should be returned.

And if the law does not permit this, then the museum should be unafraid to aver that the law should be changed.

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The Post Office scandal: as the problem was about non-disclosure, then logically an inquiry with powers to compel evidence is required

1st May 2021

The Post Office scandal is being described fairly as one of the most widespread miscarriages of justice in legal history.

One of the fundamental problems that led to this scandal was non-disclosure.

The managers (and presumably the lawyers) knew information about the reliability of their Horizon software but did not disclose it.

Had that information been disclosed then (depending on the timing of the disclosure) prosecutions would not have taken place, or defendants would have been found not guilty, or convictions could have been more speedily appealed.

And so, given this fundamental problem of non-disclosure, it is remarkable that the government’s response is an inquiry that cannot compel the disclosure of evidence.

Just think about it.

The government’s non-statutory inquiry has its own web page and terms of reference.

And if you read through the documents on the page, what is said is fine as far as it goes.

But it does not go far enough.

For example, one of the terms of reference is expressly in respect of obtaining information:

‘[to b]uild upon the findings of Mr Justice Fraser, by obtaining all available relevant evidence from Post Office Ltd, Fujitsu and BEIS to establish a clear account of the implementation and failings of Horizon over its lifecycle’.

Yet, as where there is blame there will be claims, the various entities mentioned will have reason to not disclose anything which could lead to civil or even criminal liability.

They will have engaged lawyers to advise them on their obligations in respect of the disclosure of information for the inquiry – and that advice would give them legal cover to refusals to share information.

And what goes for documentary evidence goes to witness evidence too, as this tweeter well observes:

What we therefore face is one problem that was caused by non-disclosure being followed by another problem caused by a different type of non-disclosure.

There is no good reason why the inquiry into the Post Office scandal does not have statutory powers to compel evidence.

And, given that non-disclosure was at the heart of the miscarriages of justice, every good reason why it should.

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How, in practice, can a prime minister be prevented from lying to the House of Commons?

30th April 2021

The relentless and casual dishonesty of the current prime minister Boris Johnson may still have political or parliamentary consequences.

But just as a thought-exercise, say, would it be a good idea to put the prime minister under oath (or affirmation) at PMQs?

Then, in theory, the prime minister’s mind would concentrate wonderfully, as he would be under some sort of punitive sanction in the event he knowingly said something false.

In this way, the position of the prime minister would be akin to a witness in a legal case, who is under pain of perjury in the event that they do not say the truth.

It is the sort of notion that can appeal to the mind’s eye.

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But.

It would not work easily in practice.

For example: who would determine whether the prime minister is saying something untrue or not?

If the house of commons as a whole, they can do this by motion already – although this will not happen in practice to a prime minister with an overall majority.

And, if not the house of commons as whole, who?

The speaker? A committee? An official?

How would they go about assessing whether there had been a falsehood or not?

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And then there is the deeper – almost categorical – problem.

The prime minister is not providing evidence in answer to parliamentary questions.

This by itself differentiates the prime minister from a witness in legal proceedings.

A prime minster may be asked to give an account of the government’s position – an explanation, rather than a list of facts.

Indeed, any statements of fact are merely incidental to this giving of an account.

A prime minister can thereby provide a full answer to a parliamentary question and not state any fact at all.

Accordingly, the witness-perjury model is not an exact fit.

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But how do you stop a prime minister – or any other minister – from stating untruths at the dispatch box?

Thee polite constitutional fiction is that honorable and right honorable members do not lie in parliament – and that is why they cannot (other than by a parliamentary motion) be accused of lying. 

But this ‘good chaps’ theory is being flouted – brazenly so.

We therefor have a problem without an easy solution.

Putting the prime minister under oath may not work – but what would?

How can – in practice – there be a check and balance to a prime minister lying in the commons – if mere conventions do not matter any more?

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