Category: Transparency

The folly of diverging from the GDPR just because we can

26th August 2021

Like a dog that caught the car, the United Kingdom government is wondering what to do with Brexit.

Today’s offering, reported in the Telegraph is overhauling or replacing or something to do with GDPR – the European Union’s detailed data protection regime.

The flavour of the suggestion is in these tweets:

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The proposal has the usual signs of superficial thinking, with the ‘ending red tape’ and ‘row with Brussels’ lines that are the substitute for any serious policy thought.

In fact, the rows will not be with Brussels – the European Union and its businesses will be at ease with the United Kingdom erecting yet another non-tariff barrier against the interests of British businesses.

The rows instead will be with those British businesses, which will now have two lots of red tape to negotiate instead of one.

This is so bleedingly obvious that it really should not need typing out.

None of this is to say that the GDPR is perfect legislation – it certainly is not.

But compliance with one technical and complicated regime is onerous enough – multiplying such regimes just because we can is folly.

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Ministers and their political and media supporters will clap and cheer at this exercise in nose-cutting in spite of a face.

The European Union, like bemused household cats, will just stare at the spectacle.

It is all rather silly, and rather depressing.

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The United Kingdom’s digital economy will not so much turbocharged but torpedoed.

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The ‘benefit of hindsight’ is becoming the modern ‘benefit of clergy’ – politics, accountability and rhetoric

25th August 2021

There are various means by which those with political power can evade accountability for what they do and do not do.

(By ‘accountability’ I mean those with political power being obliged to give an account for what they have done and not done.)

One means is by minimising or removing any formal checks and balances within our constitutional arrangements – answering to parliament, the independence of our courts, the effectiveness of judicial review, an impartial civil service, public service broadcasting and so on.

A second means is to disregard informal and non-legal self-restraints within the constitution – to ignore the ‘good chaps’ theory of the constitution, where so much depends on the willing observance of unenforceable conventions and rules of procedure.

A third means is to ensure that any special method of accountability – such as a public inquiry – is as delayed or limited as possible, if it takes place at all – and if it does take place, the ‘lessons learned’ are for another generation of politicians.

And a fourth is by means of rhetoric.

In particular, the increasingly regular occurrence of ministers and political appointees invoking ‘hindsight’.

In the commons, the prime minister responds to explanations of how he could have dealt with foreseeable things in a timely manner – regarding Brexit and other things – with the jibe ‘Captain Hindsight’.

The politically appointed head of the national health service test and trace programme told a parliamentary committee, with a straight face:

‘With the benefit of hindsight the balance between the supply and the demand forecast wasn’t right. Clearly that is true.’

And, now with Afghanistan, we have the foreign secretary explaining why he carried on taking a holiday during the fall of Kabul:

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Brexit.

COVID-19.

Afghanistan.

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In most, if not all, of these situations the potential problems were bleedingly obvious in real-time, at the time.

What was required was not hindsight but foresight.

But we now have a group of politicians who have realised they can benefit from a special form of political herd immunity by deriding criticism as ‘hindsight’.

And this, in turn, provides them with a licence to not properly think things through at the time and to take decisions (or not take decisions) for reasons of perceived political expediency.

For they know, in the back of their minds, that when things go wrong all they have to say to critics:

‘…with the benefit of hindsight’.

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A healthy polity does not greatly depend on formal constitutional instruments – and legalistic words in a document can only make so much difference.

A healthy polity instead depends on issues that can be characterised as ‘cultural’ as well as constitutional – the general sense of what those with political power can get away with.

And, as the very stuff of a political culture is largely words, symbols and communication, when that culture is debased then it becomes significantly more difficult to hold ministers to account.

The ‘benefit of hindsight’ is becoming the modern ‘benefit of clergy’.

If this trend continues, then our polity will be the worse for for it.

And this will not only be obvious with…

…well, hindsight.

**

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Why ministerial resignations and sackings are often a substitute for genuine accountability for policy failures

22nd August 2021

A couple of days ago the post on this blog was about Dominic Raab and ministerial resignations.

In that post I averred that this clamour for a ministerial resignation tells us three things: that the minister had enemies within government (else the incriminating material would not be available); that the press was not protecting the minister; and that there was sufficient interest from the public for the issue to be subject of so many news reports.

The one thing the clamour did not tell us – at least directly – was whether the minister had actually done anything wrong.

And ministers get things wrong all the time – it is just that the relevant material is not disclosed and/or the press do not join the attack and/or few outside Westminster would be interested.

Accordingly, a sustained clamour for a ministerial resignation will always tend to tell you more about political weakness rather than policy failure.

In essence: a political scandal is a function of having political or media enemies and not of policy incompetence.

Now, I want to develop this point to say that even when there is a resignation, this is not an especially practical form of accountability.

The failures that may have prompted the resignation will usually still be there – and the catharsis of the resignation may change the political mood, but may not mean any substantial change, still less redress or compensation for those affected.

The minister who has resigned often does not have any long-term adverse effects to their political career – and after a suitable period, they will often resume their senior political roles – sometimes again and again.

In this way, a ministerial resignation is too often not an exercise in accountability – but a substitute for it.

The resignations – which now can have a ritualistic quality – are what the political and media classes do to pretend to themselves and others that there is accountability within our political system.

‘there are calls on [x] to resign’

‘there is increasing pressure on [x] to resign’

‘[x] has resigned’

[…]

‘[x] returns to office’

And nothing else changes.

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More effective accountability would be for [x] to stay in office, and account for failures and the reasons for the failures on the floor of the house of commons and before select committees, to appear before relevant public inquiries, and to co-operate with bodies such as the national audit office.

That is for ministers to own their mistakes and to, well, account for them – for that is the very meaning of that word: accountability.

But we get none of this, and we get cosmetic personnel changes instead.

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Much the same as the above can also be said for ministerial sackings.

Again, this is often political theatre – even soap opera.

Little if anything actually changes with a sacking, little is accounted for.

Some political drama, perhaps, that is forgotten in a day or two.

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Dismissals and resignations are, of course, part of any system of accountability – as resorts and sanctions.

But they are not the entirety of any meaningful form of political accountability.

For meaningful political accountability is the last thing any politician actually wants.

**

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The three reasons why Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab is facing demands for resignation – and why it is not because he has actually done anything wrong (which he has)

20 August 2021

There are serious calls for the foreign secretary Dominic Raab to resign – so serious that there is a real possibility that he may actually soon do so.

This political situation means, in practical terms, that three pre-conditions have been met.

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The first is that there are those in government – officials and/or politicians – who want the foreign secretary to resign (or at least be significantly embarrassed).

Without those in in government being opposed to the foreign secretary, the media would not have been provided with the material with which they are supporting the demands that he should resign.

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The second is that those in the news media also want the foreign secretary to resign (or at least be significantly embarrassed).

If the foreign secretary had good (that is, information supply) relations with the lobby and other political journalists then, even if somebody else in government was against the foreign secretary, he could ride this crisis out.

But, for some reason, the news media have done a cost-benefit analysis of Raab staying as foreign secretary, and they see no reason to shield him.

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The third is that the public – or at least a significant portion of the public – care.

Something in this story has received public attention.

For even if those in government wanted Raab out, and the press saw no advantage in shielding him, there still would be no clamour for his departure – unless there was also any interest by the public.

It would be a Westminster village thing, and so on.

But there is public attention, and the public appear to be unimpressed.

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So, for there to be a serious political-media demand that the foreign secretary should resign the following three conditions have been met: (1) someone in government – minister or official – wants him out, (2) the media will not protect him, and (3) the public are sufficiently interested so as to make this a story.

The absence of any one of these three pre-conditions would mean the foreign secretary would probably be safe.

That these three pre-conditions have all been met is what makes him politically vulnerable.

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But.

Notice what is not one of the pre-conditions.

There is no pre-condition that the minister has actually done anything wrong.

That factor is almost politically irrelevant.

In fact, ministers get things wrong all the time.

But such ministers are usually safe – as no other minister or official wants him or her out, and/or the media will protect him or her, and/or the public are not sufficiently interested so as to make it a story.

This means there is no necessary corresponding link between (1) a minister doing (or not doing) something that means that he or she should resign and (2) that minister facing any serious clamour for him or her to resign.

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In an ideal polity, all ministers – all of the time – would be under the same critical scrutiny as to the performance of their duties as Raab is now.

And our political system would be better for it.

But most of the time – almost all of the time – such practical accountability does not happen.

Ministers get things wrong constantly, but they are usually protected.

And this is because no other minister or official wants him or her out, and/or the media will protect him or her, and/or the public are not sufficiently interested so as to make this a story.

So they are often safe.

And this is the difference between a political resignation or sacking story in the news – and there not being one.

This is the accountability gap.

**

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The Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill does not do a lot – but the little it does do should be welcomed

9th August 2021

Over at the Times there is a news report about the Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill currently before parliament.

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One response to this news is to doubt that cabinet ministers are sentient beings.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1424658384020819971

But that would be silly.

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The bill is worth looking at, both for what it does and what it does not do.

The six-clause bill – with three operative clauses – does very little.

Clause one provides for an ‘Animal Sentience Committee’ to be established and maintained.

There is, of course, no need for primary or indeed any legislation for a committee to be formed.

Committees can be formed and dissolved informally in central government.

Clause two provides that the committee ‘may’ (not ‘shall’ or ‘must’) produce and publish reports on which government policies might (not necessarily will) have ‘an adverse effect on the welfare of animals as sentient beings’.

The committee also ‘may’ (again not ‘shall’ or ‘must’) make recommendations for how the government may have ‘all due regard to the ways in which the policy might have an adverse effect on the welfare of animals as sentient beings’.

Again, this is weak stuff – the committee would have no legal obligation to produce any reports or recommendations at all.

The bill certainly does not place a direct statutory duty on departments to have ‘all due regard to the ways in which [a] policy might have an adverse effect on the welfare of animals as sentient beings’.

(Though such a duty should, in my view, exist.)

Clause three – the last of the operative clauses – is the one where there is (slight) legal kick.

When a report is published, the government ‘must’ (and not only ‘may’) lay a response before parliament within three months.

The government’s response may be in the barest terms, just saying the report and any recommendations are noted, and it will have discharged its duty.

And that is it.

That is all the bill does.

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On the face of it, there is nothing in the bill that warrants the response of some ministers as described in the Times article.

In particular, there is little formal scope for anything to be ‘hijacked’ by ‘activists’.

And even if the committee were to publish a critical report packed with ambitious recommendations, there is nothing which would legally oblige the government to do anything different from what it would want to do anyway.

The bill (like the international aid legislation and other examples) is not especially substantial legislation.

One is not surprised that the government’s website says that the bill is ‘enshrining sentience in domestic law’.

That word: ‘enshrining’.

Hmm.

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But.

Perhaps because of my own bias (as a supporter of animal rights), I think there is something to be said for this legislation, weak as it is.

Even if there is no legal obligation on the government to follow any recommendations, it does oblige the government to publicly address any report and thereby any recommendations.

That obligation may turn out in practice to be as ultimately ineffective as the similar obligation on the government to report on why it is not complying with the international aid target.

It is, however, better than nothing.

It forces some accountability.

This duty being placed on a statutory basis makes it a little more difficult for the government to ignore any concerns altogether, which would be the case if the proposal had not statutory basis at all.

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The definition employed by the bill for animals – a lovely piece of drafting – is that ‘“animal” means any vertebrate other than homo sapiens’.

This is perhaps a little problematic – as there are invertibrates that are sentient and indeed highly intelligent (as this blog has recently discussed).

As Peter Godfrey-Smith sets out in his outstanding book Other Minds: The Octopus, The Sea, and the Deep Origins of Consciousness:

‘If we can make contact with cephalopods as sentient beings, it is not because of a shared history, not because of kinship, but because evolution built minds twice over.

‘This is probably the closest we will come to meeting an intelligent alien.’

The bill however provides that ‘invertebrates of any description’ can be added to the category of sentient animals by a secretary of state, spineless or otherwise.

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Usually I would be disdainful of such gesture-based ‘enshrining’ legislation – and I am sceptical about much of this bill.

The only direct merit of this legislation is in terms of forcing departments to take account in policy-making the sort of concerns that departments should be taking of anyway.

The recent turn away by the supreme court from allowing policy challenges in judicial review probably means that any non-compliance by a department with the committee’s recommendations will not get any judicial remedy.

But there could be indirect effects – though not the feared ‘hijacks’ of Rees-Mogg and others.

Courts when dealing generally with questions of animal rights will now be aware that the legislature had provided for a formal mechanism for policy recommendations about animal welfare to be taken seriously.

That may not make any direct difference in any litigation, but the existence of a statutory scheme would inform and promote judicial and legal awareness that the welfare of animals is not a trivial or extremist position.

This legislation is a small step towards enforceable animal rights (or at least to an enforceable duty that animal welfare be considered in policy-making) and it should be welcomed for what little it does – though that is a lot less than what its supporters and opponents aver that it does.

**

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Westminster and Whitehall have a laissez-faire approach, not to the economy but to the polity.

31st July 2021

Another Saturday.

Today’s Financial Times revealed how some are paying for access to ministers and policy-makers.

Tomorrow’s Sunday newspapers will reveal more problems in respect of the government – and more about those paying for access to ministers and policy-makers.

(This, of course, follows the extraordinary and extravagant decisions by ministers and officials in respect of procurements, including in respect of the pandemic.)

And as this thread on Twitter shows, the supreme court – which will be followed by other courts – appears to be making it more difficult for policy to be subject to judicial review.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1421366537567576067

All this in the context of what this blog avers is an ‘accountability gap’ in Westminster and Whitehall in respect of the formulation and administration of policy.

It is almost like watching a landscape painting being done in reverse, with an ever greater empty space in the middle of a canvass.

The space where accountability should be.

We have an increasingly unregulated State – a laissez–faire approach, not to the economy but to the polity.

Anything goes – whatever minister and officials in each department can get away with.

Anything goes – with only the lightest supervision by the judiciary and the legislature, and with many supervisory bodies rendered impotent.

And when anything goes, all sorts of things will go on.

**

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Why both the Science Museum and Shell were unwise to agree to a ‘gagging’ clause

30th July 2021

Last night Channel 4 news revealed that the science museum in London had agreed to a ‘gagging’ – or non-disparagement – clause in a sponsorship agreement with Shell.

This revelation has been a reputational disaster for both parties.

Here is Greta Thunburg:

In my view, both parties deserve this flak – as it was an unwise provision to have in such an agreement.

They only have themselves to blame.

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One difference between a good contract lawyer and a wise contract lawyer is to know the difference between a provision being available for an agreement and a provision being appropriate for such an agreement.

The agreement here was a sponsorship agreement – and in the normal course of things, and as between private commercial parties, such a non-disparagement clause would be unexceptional.

Such a clause does two things.

First, it expressly regulates what a party can and cannot do.

Second, it provides an express basis for terminating a contract (or for some other legal remedy) if the provision is breached.

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In this particular case, Shell could well have ‘taken a view’  – to use a common commercial lawyers’ phrase – on the risk of whether the science museum would disparage Shell.

And if so, whether Shell would really want to rely on such an express provision in ending the sponsorship agreement.

Yes: there was a risk of disparagement – but did it really need to be dealt with on the face of the agreement?

Really?

Or was it a risk that could be better managed by other, less legalistic means?

A far greater risk – and one which was entirely foreseeable, and indeed has to come to pass – is that the clause itself would be disclosed.

Shell was contracting with a public body in a highly sensitive political and media context.

There was a strong chance – indeed a virtual certainty – that at some point the terms of the sponsorship agreement would enter the public domain.

And when this happened, that the reputational fall-out would be far worse than any disparagement that the clause itself would ever manage.

The insertion of such a clause in such an agreement was a media catastrophe in the making.

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Some lawyers may bleat that such a clause was ‘reasonable’ – and they are right insofar that such a clause would be sensible in a normal sponsorship agreement between private parties.

But the very same provision can be absolutely lacking in reasonableness in this media and policy sensitive context.

To the extent there was any serious risk of disparagement by the science museum of Shell, then Shell should have taken the view that there were far better and less legalistic means of addressing the risk.

And the science museum should in turn have insisted that there should be no clause that would limit their ability to discuss any of the issues relevant to the sponsorship.

In essence: this was not a contractual clause that Shell should have insisted on.

And it certainly one to which the science museum should not have agreed.

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Threats to doctors and nurses and lifeboat crews – and why laws and law enforcement are not enough

25th July 2021

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‘…we are indeed drifting into the arena of the unwell. Making an enemy of our own future.’

– Marwood, Withnail and I

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Every so often it seems that the culture wars are coming to an end, and then you get extraordinary things like this:

https://twitter.com/sbattrawden/status/1418984363304394762

A speaker tells a crowd in Trafalgar Square that doctors and nurses should be ‘hung’.

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People are abusing lifeboat crews.

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Doctors and nurses and lifeboat crews are perhaps the last individuals that would be insulted and threatened in a decent modern society.

Without any of the mirth of the Withnail and I film, we can echo the sentiment that our country is drifting (ever further) into area of the unwell.

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Those who defend such abuse may seek to say that it is only ‘freedom of speech’.

But no society has absolute free speech.

An immediate verbal threat of harm is not a protected speech act – just as forging a cheque or planning a robbery are not protected speech acts.

And dealing with threats to inflict hurt on other humans is what the law has, in part, always been about.

But to say a thing is against the law is not the same as saying the law would be effective in prohibiting such abuse.

Indeed, the laws as they stand would cover such utterances – and the law has not deterred the threats from being made.

And even if individuals were arrested and convicted, there is no reason to believe the nastiness of the culture wars would abate.

The ultimate issue here is not a public order problem with a neat legal solution.

The issue is cultural and political and social – and so only looking to the law would be an error.

There is a need for cultural and political and social leadership: for arguments to be won, and for behaviours to be discredited.

Laws and law enforcement will be part of that, of course, but they are not a complete answer, or close to it.

Once we are deep inside the arena of the unwell, there is no set of law suits or prosecutions with which we can bound free.

Those who threaten doctors and nurses and lifeboat crews should be prosecuted fully and fearlessly.

But such prosecutions would not make the problem go away.

Something deeper and more disturbing is afoot.

Brace, brace.

**

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Why ‘there’s been so little thinking about this’ – the accountability gap again

24th July 2021

Read this tweet about Whitehall.

 

This sentiment also could have expressed many times during the course of Brexit.

This general thoughtlessness is now a feature of political decision-making and (lack of) policy-making in the United Kingdom – at least in that part which is governed from Whitehall and subject to the (lack of) scrutiny of the parliament in Westminster.

How has this come to pass?

One safe assumption is that human nature – even in the context of politics – has not changed.

Politicians – like people generally – will tend to be thoughtless unless there is a reason not to be.

Politicians will tend to seek to get away with what they can.

If this assumption is valid, then the question is what enables politicians to get away with such thoughtlessness.

Perhaps politicians have always been like this – one can think of the Poll Tax or the invasion of Iraq – as illustrations of thoughtlessness in policy-making.

Perhaps it is that Brext and Covid have both been so destabilising, all that has happened is that the general political gormlesssness has been exposed by being thrown into relief.

Perhaps.

But it also can be contended that – as this blog has averred many times – there is an accountability gap within the United Kingdom polity.

This means government departments know there is little or nothing to check and balance misdirections, misadventures and maladministration.

This gap – even if it has always been there – appears to be widening.

Ministers are now open in their disdain for parliament and for serious media scrutiny: they do not even now pretend.

The cabinet office increasingly seems to brazenly revel in being obstructive in respect of freedom of information and parliamentary select committees.

The public ombudsman system – expressly responsible for investigating maladministration – is so impotent that it may as well not exist.

And even those bodies which do show spirit and dedication in holding the government to account – some select committees and the national audit office – are ignored by ministers and much of media.

In between general elections there is no real accountability – and even the policy mandates conferred in general elections are ignored.

In all these circumstances, the wonder is not that we have so much thoughtlessness in the making of decisions and policy – but that we ever get any at all.

**

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The ejection of a Member of Parliament for pointing out the lies of the Prime Minister is a practical example of the function-failure of the UK constitution

The suspension of the member of parliament Dawn Butler from the house of commons is a significant example of the function-failure of the constitution of the United Kingdom.

Butler’s suspension was because she called the prime minister a liar on the floor of the house of commons.

But as the current prime minister casually and freely lies in the house of commons (and elsewhere) this suspension creates a constitutional mismatch.

In essence: there is no real sanction for a prime minister (or other member of parliament) for lying to the house of commons, while there is a real sanction for those members of parliament who point it out.

It is an extraordinary – and counter-intuitive – constitutional predicament.

There is something very wrong here.

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How did we get into this mess?

First, it must be understood and accepted that there is a problem with prime ministerial dishonesty.

Perhaps there always has been – and our current prime minister is no worse than his predecessors – but even if this shruggy view is accepted, there is no doubt the current prime minister lies and lies.

That Hamlet’s father and Jacob Marley were both dead to begin with, and that Boris Johnson  lies, are fundaments in English culture.

One source for the prime minister’s ongoing dishonesty is this particularised, non-sensational list put forward by leaders of six parties in the house of commons to the speaker:

There are similar examples in almost every session of prime minister’s questions.

A more sensational compendium is in this widely viewed video from Peter Stefanovic:

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The reason to emphasise the prime minister’s actual dishonesty as a real concern is that the supposedly pragmatic constitution of the United Kingdom is supposedly good at practical (if inelegant) solutions to actual problems.

This, we are told by constitutional fogeys, is why our constitution is cuts above the formal codified constitutions of foreigners with their ‘rigid’ rules.

Well.

Here is an actual constitutional problem in need of a practical ‘flexible’ solution – and we ain’t got one.

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The second aspect of the problem is that the rules of parliament (which are distinct from the law of the land) in effect prohibit members of parliament from accusing other members of parliament of dishonesty – regardless of whether there is any dishonesty.

It would even be against parliamentary rules to say of a member of parliament that they are a liar even if the lies have been admitted.

The formal guide to the rules of parliament is known as Erskine May, and the relevant passage about accusations of dishonesty is:

‘Expressions when used in respect of other Members which are regarded with particular seriousness, generally leading to prompt intervention from the Chair and often a requirement on the Member to withdraw the words, include the imputation of false or unavowed motives; the misrepresentation of the language of another and the accusation of misrepresentation; and charges of uttering a deliberate falsehood.’

This is not an absolute bar to making accusations of dishonesty against other members of parliament – there is a formal but ineffective way:

‘If a Member wishes to pursue accusations of a kind not permitted because of these principles, the proper course is to table a distinct motion about the conduct of the other Member.’

The issue with such a motion is that – even if passed: so what?

Erskine May also does have a section on misleading the house, which provides:

‘The Commons may treat the making of a deliberately misleading statement as a contempt.’

To which the issue again is: so what?

One may as well cast a line into the Thames, catch an improbable and unpolluted fish, and slap that unfortunate fish on the dispatch box.

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The wider predicament is that the constitution of the United Kingdom is premised on what the historian Peter Hennessy has long characterised as the ‘good chap’ theory of government.

Here is Hennessy’s phrase being used back in the innocent days of 2005 where the concern was merely memoirs by former officials.

More recently, in 2019, here is Hennessy and another author explaining in detail the failures of the ‘good chap’ theory – a report which should be read by anyone with an interest in constitutional affairs.

In essence: the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom work as an honour-based system based on those with power exercising self-restraint.

All it takes is a knave to disrupt and undermine the system – and there is nothing within the system to check and balance such knavery.

This complacency is why there are more ready sanctions against those who accuse ministers of dishonesty than there is against the dishonesty of ministers – for the latter, according to constitutional fiction would not (or should not) happen.

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There is merit in having a general rule against lightly making serious accusations in the houses of parliament.

But the counterpoint to such a rule is that there should be a practical means of addressing the problem of ministerial dishonesty.

Otherwise we have the current situation: wonky, lop-sided and discrediting.

That Butler should face a serious a sanction while Johnson does not defies common sense and it should should defy our constitutional arrangements too.

Some may say all this shows that there is a need for a ‘written’ (or codified) constitution.

But the solution to this problem does even not need such a drastic (and unlikely) change – and the problem of executive dishonesty happens in states with written constitutions too.

The solution would be for constitutionalism to (again) be taken seriously by politicians generally.

Constitutionalism (a theme of this blog) is the notion that there are political rules and principle that are above partisanship.

The reason why the prime minister can get away with such dishonesty is that a majority of the house of commons let him.

If a majority of the house averred that such conduct was unacceptable, regardless of party or faction, then the speaker would have the powers to address the issue.

As it stands, the speaker is given the powers to deal with accusations of dishonesty, but not the dishonesty itself.

It would not need a written constitution to solve this problem.

It would instead take resolution – and, literally, resolutions.

It would need members of parliament to take constitutionalism seriously.

And until members of parliament take constitutionalism seriously again, we are going to have the now-familiar sight of our dishonest prime minister sitting safely at the dispatch box, dismissively shaking his head – while those who point out his lies are ejected.

And that is because the constitution is dismissively shaking its head too.

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