The Church of England seems more accountable on the floor of the House of Commons than most government ministers

26th January 2023

Now here is a curious thing.

The Church of England seems more accountable on the floor of the House of Commons than most government ministers.

This week there was an urgent question about the position of the Church of England on same-sex marriages.

And as in England, we have an established church there is a member of parliament charged with answering questions on behalf of the Church of England – from the backbenches:

In contrast to this exercise in parliamentary accountability, we have this week had the Prime Minister refer the Zadawi tax matter to the ethics adviser and the BBC mount an internal investigation into the relationship of its chair with a former Prime Minister.

This is in addition to the King’s Counsel looking at allegations against the Lord Chancellor.

There are various other inquiries and investigations, some now almost-forgotten.

And the thing is about these inquiries and investigations is that they are often exercises in political deflection and delay – deft manoeuvres so that there is no actual practical accountability of ministers, at least not immediately.

The consequence is that we are now in the extraordinary situation where the bishops of the Church of England are generally more accountable to members of parliament than the ministers of the crown.

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Here is evidence that we are moving – at last – into post-Brexit politics and policy-making

23rd January 2023

Last week there was a (very popular) post on this blog about regulation and the supposed “bonfires” of “red tape”.

Most of the points in that post were general, but a particular point was made about the misconceived Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill.

That Bill contains this remarkable provision as clause 1:

In other words, laws – thousands of them – will all be repealed by automatic operation of law, unless specific exceptions are made.

And nobody knows how many:

Rarely has there been an approach to legislation this daft, and it is hard to think of any legislative exercise where daftness has been on this scale.

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Of course, this causes confusion, including to business.

One may think businesses would welcome such drastic deregulation – but, in fact, businesses are far more welcoming to consistency.

In his speech today, the director general of the Confederation of British Industry addressed the problems of this Bill.

First, he did not dismiss regulatory divergence in principle:

“…I must say something about the UK’s regulatory divergence from Europe. The Government is convinced this is a major opportunity for growth. And I agree it can be too.

“But it’s a bit more complicated, than scrapping overnight many of the terms of trade we’ve used for decades.”

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So this means he is not opposed outright to what the government calls “Brexit opportunities”.

But it has to be done in a measured, case-by-case approach, and with hard realism:

“Because divergence is high-stake politics and economics.

“Often, we don’t consider the EU’s possible counterplay, and where they could outcompete us. We also need to recognise that divergence will often shrink our market size and/or add a skip-load of red tape. The party of deregulation risks simply doubling the amount we have.

“So, while it can definitely work – witness the historic success of the City of London and our rapid Covid vaccine approval – you have to run the numbers to make sure it’s not a complete own-goal.

“And it will take far more than a regulation play to make the UK win global share of global sectors.”

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He then mentioned concrete examples:

“…the Retained EU Law Bill [is] creating huge uncertainty for UK firms.

“Companies are asking will we really erode maternity and paternity regulation or health and safety standards like the General Product Safety Directive?

“Or rapidly change regulations on REACH, which governs the use of chemicals? With billions of pounds of industry costs?

“Or create the potential for firms being underinsured because it’s harder for analysts – who don’t know what laws will be retained – to effectively price risk into products?

“Do we really want to subject the public – and industry – to another round of mass confusion and disruption, just when we’re trying to exit recession?”

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The speech, however, did more than offer a critique, it also offered a contrast.

It referred to a development which I (and perhaps also you) missed just before Christmas: the appointment of Patrick Vallance and others to consider post-Brexit regulation in five particular areas – digital technology, green industries, life sciences, advanced manufacturing and the creative industries.

The speech avers:

“The Chancellor has appointed Sir Patrick Vallance to lead a thorough review into securing possible prizes in five high-growth sectors. This is the right approach. Serious reflection and consideration.

“The complete opposite in fact of the Retained EU Law Bill […]

“Instead, let’s review, retain, reform and – where appropriate – repeal EU law the Vallance way. Smartly. Not the Retained EU Law Bill’s way. Foolishly.”

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This must be the correct approach in principle: “the Vallance way”.

Yes, the Vallance review may come to nothing.

Indeed, it may never be heard from again: such reviews come and go, and sometimes even disappear with anyone noticing, or caring.

But as a statement of principle, this approach is compelling.

And it shows that even this government is capable of going about legislative and regulatory reform the right way.

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The CBI cannot be regarded as a vehicle for remoaners.

And the speech today was not expressly or implicitly a call for the United Kingdom to rejoin the European Union – or even just the single market.

It was instead refreshingly post-Brexit – about how we go about making policy and laws within our shifted post-Brexit parameters.

The more our politics and policy-making moves in this direction, the better.

The absolutist clamour of Brexiters and the purist refusal of Remainers are both, in their ways, failures to practically deal with our post-Brexit situation.

The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill is now as much an artefact from yesteryear as a leaflet calling for a further referendum.

We are at last moving, slowly, into post-Brexit politics and policy-making – and the government needs to catch up.

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ESSAY “A decision so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have come to it”

15th January 2023

This is my essay this week at Substack.

The Wednesbury case of 1948 provides one of the most famous and influential judgments in English legal history.

Because of the case, the phrase “Wednesbury unreasonableness” has become well-known legal shorthand for decisions and rules made by public bodies that are so unreasonable that no reasonable public body could have made them.

Nearly two-and-a-half thousand cases on the BAILII public database use the phrase “Wednesbury unreasonable”.

Indeed, the one thing that many people outside the West Midlands know about Wednesbury is that it associated with this extreme legal standard.

But in the judgment, the town’s corporation was found not to be acting unreasonably – at least in the legal sense.

And the case was not even decided on the basis of reasonableness, but on the basis of normal statutory construction.

So how did the little town of Wednesbury get such legal infamy?

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To read the rest, you can go over to my Substack and subscribe.

Every week I will write an essay on an aspect of legal history, or on the relationship between law and lore/popular culture, for those kind enough to subscribe to my Substack.  The essay will be posted on Friday/Saturday/Sunday.  I will even sometime use multi-sentence paragraphs, like this one.

Last week’s essay was on the Malone case of 1979, which I reckon to be the most significant constitutional case of the last fifty years.

The weekly essay is also cross-posted on my Patreon page for Patreon supporters.

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Courts and politics and the job of judicial review

13th January 2023

What is the role of the courts when they are asked to look at decisions taken by our elected representatives?

From a legal perspective, the usual distinction is between “appeal” and “review”.

This means that a court should not examine the merits of the decision, but a court can (and should) ascertain whether it was a decision lawfully open to that decision-maker to make.

And so, the legal theory goes, as long as it is a decision within the scope of decisions open to that decision-make, it cannot (and should not) be quashed by the court.

The decision will stand, even if the court – and indeed the voters – disagree with that decision.

The decision may be unpopular but it will not be unlawful.

And therefore the role of the court should only be to judicially review a decision, rather than conduct an appeal on the merits of that decision,

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In practice the distinction is not as easily applied as it is stated above.

Of course, certain decisions can be quashed because the wrong or an unfair procedure has been adopted.

And as such “procedural impropriety” is a long-standing heading of judicial review.

A decision can also be challenged because of a want of legal power: if a decision-maker does not have the legal power to make a certain decision then a court can hold that there has been illegality.

And “Illegality” too is a long-standing heading of judicial review.

Neither of these headings are controversial.

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But there is a third heading (and possibly a fourth) which is often controversial.

That is when a decision is “unreasonable”.

From a lay (that is, non-lawyer) perspective, this can seem the same as a court looking at the merits of the decision.

For many lay people calling a decision is “unreasonable” is the same as saying that it is a decision you do not like.

For lawyers (supposedly) it has a different meaning: a reasonable decision is one which is reasoned in that the decision-maker can explain how the decision was arrived at.

It also means that the decision-maker only had regard to relevant considerations and disregarded irrelevant considerations.

Here, however, we are coming close to a judge second-guessing the decision-making processes of elected politicians.

And this is even more the case where fundamental rights of individuals are being interfered with, where a judge may have to assess whether the interference has been “disproportionate”.

By “disproportionate” it is often meant that the decision was not rationally connected to the supposed purpose of the legal power and/or the decision went further than necessary to achieve the public policy goal of the decision-maker.

As you can see, this is taking the judge close to the realm of politics.

And so this is where many of the flash-points in political-judicial relations occur.

Where do you think the balance should be?

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My essay tomorrow for paying Substack subscribers will be on the fascinating story of the Wednesbury case of 1947, the “grandfather” of English cases on reasonableness.

This was the case where a judge opined that a decision can be quashed for unreasonableness only when the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have made it.

This standard has since been called “Wednesbury Unreasonableness” – which is a little unfair on Wednesbury Corporation, as the court found in 1947 that the council had acted reasonably.

To read this essay tomorrow you can subscribe here.

(The essay will also be posted on Patreon – and anyone who has made a Paypal contribution to this blog in 2022 should leave a comment marked “Private” below for a year’s complimentary subscription to my Substack.)

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We have a coalition government, and we have had for some time

12th January 2023

Another day, another news report about the government not being able to get support from its own backbenchers for its legislative programme:

This is becoming a regular event.

The stuff of the politics of the governing party at the moment is pretty much U-turns and rebellions.

This is a governing party that was elected with a majority of 80.

Indeed, the governing party forced through Brexit in 2019-20 so as to to gain this party majority.

And this governing party has done almost nothing substantial with this nominal majority.

For despite the majority on paper, this is a government in constant negotiation with its own backbenchers.

If we drop the formalities, this is a coalition government, between the warring factions of the governing party.

And this has been the case since it was elected.

If we then look back before 2019 we also can see coalition governments: the 2010-15 formal coalition and the 2017-19 informal deal between the governing party and the Democratic Unionist Party.

Indeed, other than between 2015-17, an argument can be made that we have had, either formally or in effect, coalition government almost continuously since 2010.

Of course, this may seem counter-intuitive.

Coalitions are often seen as nice cuddly things, allowing centrists and environmental and regional parties to have disproportionate influence.

And one of the stock arguments for proportional representation is that we would have the benefit of more coalitions.

But we have had coalitions anyway.

We have just had, from a small-l liberal perspective, the wrong sort of coalitions.

But when a government cannot carry its own business without continual compromises and retreats caused by competing factions then there is perhaps no other good word for what we have.

For what we do not have is a party-based government able to implement a manifesto programme.

Indeed, other than in 2015-17, it is difficult to remember when we last had one.

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Banning the right to strike by key public sector workers

10th January 2023

The politics of striking provides one of the most enduring dividing lines in British politics.

On one side, there is support for, and solidarity with, unionised workers exercising their right to withdraw labour.

On the other side there is disdain for those same workers, especially if the workers are in the public sector or are otherwise providing public services, especially when it appears that the inconvenience of the wider public is being used as leverage in the dispute.

Some think the striking workers are entirely in the right, and some think they are entirely in the wrong.

And often there seems to be few in the middle (like me) who think both employers and unions are capable of getting things wrong and even of abusing their respective powers.

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But regardless of your view on the ultimate rights and wrongs of strikes by public sector and other public service workers, there is something fundamentally objectionable in the current government’s proposals to compel certain “key” workers to attend work when they otherwise would be entitled to strike.

And this is especially objectionable when this is being done as a “sticking plaster” so as to distract from the government’s failure to properly engage in respect of the current disputes.

There is, of course, a case for certain public sector workers – the armed forces and the civil police force – not to be able to strike.

But such workers foregoing their right to strike should have alternative entitlements and arrangements to balance this loss of a right.

Simply prohibiting other key workers from being able to strike, without sufficient alternative entitlements and arrangements to balance this loss of a right, is misconceived and illiberal.

It is an authoritarian gesture, rather than a solution to a problem.

To object to such a prohibition is not necessarily to side with the striking trade unions, but it is to say that removing the right to strike is generally wrong in principle and should never be done lightly.

The current government should be looking elsewhere for solutions to the current problems with industrial unions.

The proposals should be dropped and ministers should be thinking of other ways to address our present winter of discontent.

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New Essay at Substack: Perhaps the most significant UK constitutional case of the last fifty years

6th January 2023

Over at my new law and lore Substack, I have published an essay for paying subscribers on how the Malone case of 1979-1985 exposed the lie of our supposedly liberal constitution and changed the way we were governed.

The essay starts as follows:

Consider this simple, attractive proposition: in the United Kingdom, you are free to do as you will, unless there is a law against it.

What could be wrong with such a nice proposition: it is almost a perfect articulation of principled liberalism.

But.

This proposition can have a hidden and ugly implication.

For it also can mean that the State can do as it wishes, to you and other people, unless there is a law against it.

And the case which exposed this unpleasant truth – and helped put an end to it, so that the State was required to have a legal basis for interfering with our lives – is the 1979-85 case of Malone.

This is the story of that case, and of its effects.

You can read the rest of the essay with a paid subscription here.

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This essay is also being posted on Patreon for those who subscribe to this blog using that medium.

For those who subscribe and donate through either Patreon or PayPal, please leave a “PRIVATE” comment below confirming you want me to add your email address to the Substack system so you can have a one-year complementary subscription to the law and lore Substack.

It is important that nobody pays “twice” for my content.

From ornament to instrument – how current politics are forcing constitutions to work in the UK and USA

6th January 2022

This is just a short post, prompted by the ongoing inability of the Republicans in the United States House of Representatives to elect a speaker.

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There is usually no problem in a speaker being elected: the first day of the new House of Representatives is usually a ceremony, attended by the smiling families of new congressmen and congress women.

But now we are on the third day of voting, because a group of hardline Republicans are contesting what would normally be a coronation.

Two years ago today (as I set out in last week’s Substack essay), the counting and certification of electoral college votes was also converted from being a mere ceremony to something far more politically vital.

Indeed, a plan was in place to use what was normally (again) a coronation into an opportunity for the defeated president Donald Trump to somehow retain office.

And over here, during the last days before the United Kingdom left the European Union, there was an attempt to use a prorogation of parliament so as to force through a no-deal exit.

That (purported) use of the prorogation was contested and then quashed by the Supreme Court.

But usually prorogations are dull and straightforward affairs, of little interest even to political obsessives.

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Our current volatile politics keeps converting dull and ceremonial elements of our constitutions into things that matter.

Our constitutional arrangements are being forced to work, where they previously only had to decorate.

To an extent this is a good thing: like all the functioning parts of a car occasionally being tested for a MoT test.

But it also may be a bad thing, as too much stress may mean that element of the constitution buckles and breaks.

Either way, it is certainly exciting.

But, as we know, constitutional law should not be exciting, it should be dull.

Day-to-day politics should take place within the parameters of a constitution, not constantly pressing on the edges, straining them as far as they will go.

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A look at Keir Starmer’s proposal for a “Taking Back Control” Bill

5th January 2023

Today the leader of the main opposition party in the United Kingdom gave a speech.

You can read a version of Keir Starmer’s speech on the Labour party website.

One part of it which seems possibly interesting from a legal perspective is a proposal for a “Taking Back Control” Bill.

This is what the speech said:

“So we will embrace the Take Back Control message. But we’ll turn it from a slogan to a solution. From a catchphrase into change. We will spread control out of Westminster. Devolve new powers over employment support, transport, energy, climate change, housing, culture, childcare provision and how councils run their finances.

“And we’ll give communities a new right to request powers which go beyond this.

“All this will be in a new “Take Back Control” Bill – a centrepiece of our first King’s speech. A Bill that will deliver on the demand for a new Britain. A new approach to politics and democracy. A new approach to growth and our economy.”

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This call for de-centralisation and devolution will face the two fundamental problems every such call has faced since the nineteenth century.

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The first problem for de-centralisation and devolution is the doctrine of the supremacy of the Westminster parliament.

This doctrine, which in good part was a Victorian innovation not known to earlier jurists, tells that all legislative power in our polity rests with the Crown-in-Parliament.

This means that no other body in the United Kingdom can legislate other than to the extent permitted by the Westminster parliament.

Recently this doctrine was illustrated by the Supreme Court decision on a reference by Scotland’s Lord Advocate.

In effect, the Scottish parliament is merely another statutory corporation, subject to the rule of ultra vires.

The Westminster parliament will not easily forego this legislative supremacy and – if we adhere to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy – it may be impossible for the Westminster parliament to do so.

This means that any de-centralisation and devolution is at the Westminster parliament’s command: Westminster can grant this seeing autonomy, and Westminster can easily take it away.

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What we do have are numerous devolution and local government statutes, all defining and limiting what various authorities can and cannot do.

There is no real autonomy – even for the Scottish parliament.

No ability to do things despite what the Westminster parliament would like an authority to do.

Ambitious projects by local authorities – such as when the Victorian town of Birmingham (not even yet a city) went and bought and operated its own gas and water industries – would be impossible now.

That is real de-centralisation and devolution – doing things the centre cannot stop.

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The second problem for de-centralisation and devolution is in respect of policy and administration, rather than law.

It is the sheer dominance of HM Treasury in Whitehall and the public sector more generally.

For example, HM Treasury has a monopoly in respect of almost all fiscal and financial – that is, tax-raising and borrowing – powers.

(Even the Scottish parliament has limited autonomy to vary income tax rates and the Scottish government power to borrow money.)

And no public body has complete fiscal autonomy – and, indeed, many public bodies rely on central government for grants and financing.

It is unlikely that Whitehall will happily allow regional authorities and devolved administrations absolute power to raise taxes and borrow money.

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And now back to the word “control”.

Unless regional authorities and devolved administrations have absolute power to raise taxes and borrow money, or to make rules and mount ambitions problems, then they do not have “control”.

Instead, “control” will stay – as it always does – with Westminster and Whitehall.

Westminster and Whitehall can extend the leash, but they can pull the leash back.

That is not “control”.

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Looking more closely at Starmer’s speech, it is not clear to whom this “control” is to be actually given.

Consider the following passages (emphases added):

“…the Britain that Labour can build. A fairer, greener, more dynamic country with an economy that works for everyone, not just those at the top. And a politics which trusts communities with the power to control their destiny.

Giving communities the chance to control their economic destiny. The argument is devastatingly simple.”

“It’s not unreasonable for us to recognise the desire for communities to stand on their own feet. It’s what Take Back Control meant. The control people want is control over their lives and their community.

“We need to turbo-charge this potential, but Westminster can’t do that on its own, it can only do it with communities. That’s why Labour will give them the trust. The power. And the control.

And so on.

There is noting specific here as to who will get this supposed “control”.

Will it be existing local authorities or new regional bodies?

Will it be new legal entities smaller than existing councils?

And – most importantly if this really is about “control” – what will happen if those “communities” want to do something which Westminster and Whitehall do not want them to do?

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Starmer did list some of the topics where there could be devolution of powers: “employment support, transport, energy, climate change, housing, culture, childcare provision and how councils run their finances”.

But devolution is not granting “control”, as there will be limits to what even the most ambitious local authority will be able to do in the face of any opposition from Westminster and Whitehall.

And there is also a respectable argument – which you may or may not endorse – than on issues such as transport and housing, there needs to be far less local autonomy, not more, so for us as to escape the ongoing blight of NIMBYism.

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Starmer insisted in his speech that the “Take Back Control” will be turned from “a slogan to a solution”.

And it we missed the import of that rhetorical turn, Starmer then said it will be turned from “a catchphrase into change”.

(This is reminiscent of his predecessor Tony Blair’s wonderful statement once that “[a] day like today is not a day for soundbites, we can leave those at home, but I feel the hand of history upon our shoulder with respect to this, I really do.”)

But there is nothing in this speech which does go beyond slogans and catchphrases.

There is no substance to the supposed “controls” which are to be given “back”.

And there is nothing specific as to whom or what those “controls” are to be given.

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You may have Very Strong Opinions on de-centralisation and devolution.

You may welcome Starmer’s speech as a good and welcome signal of change.

You may oppose it as it may mean impediments to policies which may need to be directed at the national level.

But what one cannot say is that it tells us much, if anything, about how de-centralisation and devolution is to work in practice.

And it says nothing about how – at least in England – local authorities can break free from the real controls of Westminster and Whitehall.

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The law and policy of the return of the Parthenon marbles

4th January 2022

Photo credit

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The Parthenon marbles situated in the British Museum are back in the news.

From a legal perspective the following five points can be made – and have been made previously on this blog – here and here.

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First, there is no sound basis for the often asserted proposition that the marbles were lawfully acquired by Elgin before being given to the museum.

Any close look at the circumstances of the acquisition raises a series of issues.

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Second, if they were not lawfully acquired by Elgin then the marbles were not his to give to anyone – “title” in the property could not have passed at the time to the British Museum.

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Third, if the marbles were not lawfully acquired by the British Museum then the museum’s usual defence – that it is a serious and conscientious custodian of the world’s treasures for the public benefit – while admirable, is irrelevant to whether the marbles were lawfully acquired.

The later legal protections for possessions in its collection for the public benefit do not make good any deficiency in how the marbles were acquired.

Of course, it is far too late for this to be a practical legal issue – statutes of limitation and so on have long extinguished any legal claim against the museum for recovery of the marbles.

The museum will undoubtedly have now acquired title just by sheer passage of time: a sort of posh version of squatters’ rights.

Yet, just because there can now be no legal claim against the museum does not mean the marbles were lawfully acquired in the first place.

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But.

Where the British Museum have a stronger case is on the fourth and fifth points.

The fourth point is that the current legislation does make it difficult-to-impossible for the museum to dispose (to use the legal word) of the marbles as it wishes, either by returning them to Greece or otherwise.

An elaborate legal basis could, perhaps be provided, but – on balance – one suspects an English court would rule such a disposal as unlawful.

This means this is not a matter solely for the trustees of the museum (as I explain here).

For the marbles to be returned properly to Greece would require a change in primary legislation, which in turn means it has to have government support (or at least no government opposition).

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And this brings us to the fifth point: the future of the marbles is in the realm of politics, and not law.

It is a policy decision, where any legal changes would flow from a decision by ministers.

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The proposed work-arounds, of the British Museum loaning the marbles back to Greece, would fit within the current legislation.

Just as many things in the collection can be lent to other museums in other countries.

One can understand why the Greek government will not find such offers acceptable, despite the current hopeful leaks to the British political press.

Perhaps the Greeks will insist on there being a transfer of property – which would make it a legal issue.

But that is a legal issue which can only be practically resolved by politicians.

And as such it is a perfect example of a subject where law and policy mix and combine.

So perfect an example, in fact, that it should be on display in, well, a museum.

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