Annual birthday post

28th March 2023

As it is my birthday, I will be taking a break from doing a substantial post here today.

If you would like to help me celebrate, do think about taking out a Substack or Patreon subscription.

Subscribing helps me in providing daily free-to-read law and policy commentary – and paying subscribers also get regular long-reads.

My most recent essay was on Factortame and sovereignty.

And with that, I will be off here until tomorrow.

 

The prehistory of referendums in the United Kingdom – this week’s Substack essay on legal history

11th March 2023

Over at my Substack, this week’s essay on legal history for paying subscribers is on the prehistory of referendums in the United Kingdom.

The essay begins as follows:

For Philip Larkin a certain kind of intercourse began in 1963 – between the Lady Chatterley obscenity trial and the Beatles’ first LP.

Similarly referendums can appear to have started, at least in the United Kingdom ten years later in 1973 – not long after the Oz obscenity trial and the Beatles’ last LP.

For 1973 was the year of the border poll in Northern Ireland, which is usually considered to be the first referendum in the United Kingdom; and 1973 is also the year that the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (EEC), the membership of which was then to be subjected to a referendum in 1975.

For many of us in 2023, fifty years later, the most notable referendum was the one in 2016 on whether the United Kingdom should depart the successor to the EEC, the European Union.

Others are preoccupied with other referendums. Some are seeking a further Scottish independence referendum, to reverse the result of the result of the 2014 vote. And there is also the real prospect of a further border poll in Northern Ireland which may, in turn, lead to Irish unification.

Our recent politics are dominated by one referendum in particular, and the future of the United Kingdom itself may depend on two referendums yet to come.

And this is in addition to the referendums which led to the current devolved settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, all of which are now fundamental parts of our constitutional order.

But there was once a time before any of these referendums had been mooted or taken place or were even contemplated.

A time when 1973, and what then followed, was decades in the future.

And so this essay tells the story of the early history of referendum issue in the constitutional and political affairs of the United Kingdom.

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You can read the rest of the essay here.

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These essays are on topics to do with legal history and legal lore – and they are in addition to my free-to-read topical law and policy commentary here and at Substack every weekday.

Other essays include:

The lore of Lady Justice.

Dr Bonham’s case (1610) – and the question of whether parliament is really sovereign.

The 1712 case of Jane Wenham and the last of the English witch trials.

Taff Vale (1901) – perhaps the most important case in trade union history.

Wednesbury (1948) – the origin of the modern principle of legal unreasonableness.

Malone (1979) – perhaps the most significant constitutional case of the last 50 years.

How the courts improvised legal solutions in the hard case of George Blake between 1990 and 2000.

When William Rees-Mogg and James Goldsmith in 1993 asked the courts to declare that the United Kingdom could not ratify the Maastricht Treaty

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If you are not yet a paying Substack subscriber, please consider becoming one.

The subscriptions help support my daily free-to-read law and policy commentary on this blog.

Those of you who are Patreon supporters can read the essay here.

Anyone who donated money on PayPal to this blog in 2022 can have a free one year complimentary Substack subscription – just leave a comment marked “Private” saying when you donated below, with your email address.  (It is important that nobody pays twice for my drivel.)

If you are a regular reader of this blog and are currently not able to afford a paying subscription, also leave a comment below marked “Private” saying so, with your email address, and I will consider providing a short-term complimentary subscription.

When William Rees-Mogg and James Goldsmith asked the courts to declare that the United Kingdom could not ratify the Maastricht Treaty – this week’s Substack essay

2nd March 2023

Over at Substack, the essay for paying subscribers is on the 1993 case brought by William Rees-Mogg and James Goldsmith against the Maastricht Treaty.

You can read it here.

For the reasons set out in the essay, it is fair to see the case as one of the origins of Brexit.

The essay begins as follows:

The case was described by the party who brought it as “the most important constitutional case for 300 years”.

This was the application for judicial review brought by the life peer William Rees-Mogg in July 1993, where he sought a High Court declaration that the legislation giving effect to the Maastricht Treaty was unlawful. Lord Rees-Mogg wanted the courts to tell parliament that a Bill, which was then about to become an Act of Parliament, was invalid. It was to be a strike at the very principle of parliamentary sovereignty.

His lead barrister for this ambitious claim was a recently appointed QC called David Pannick, and the high costs of the claim was financed by James Goldsmith (a year before he founded the Referendum Party).

The legal claim so concerned the John Major government that, in addition to instructing the then Treasury Devil (the government’s usual barrister for such cases) it also instructed one of the most brilliant barristers of the day (and still, happily, our day), Sydney Kentridge.

The stated grounds for the application also so alarmed the then Speaker of the House of Commons Betty Boothroyd to take it upon herself to warn from the speaker’s chair of the House of Commons “that the Bill of Rights will be required to be fully respected by all those appearing before the Court”.

The timing of the case was significant. When the claim was brought the Bill giving domestic effect to the Maastricht treaty was still before parliament, though it received royal assent before the hearing could take place.

The Maastricht Treaty had been signed in February 1992, but there was a sense that it was not inevitable that it would actually take effect.

The Danes had rejected the treaty by referendum in June 1992, before approving it in a further referendum in May 1993, and the French referendum of September 1992 had approved the treaty with only a narrow 51% majority. Also in September 1992 the United Kingdom’s currency had been ejected from the exchange rate mechanism on “Black Wednesday”. The European Union project was not seen by its opponents as inescapable. Not only was the Maastricht treaty contested, it was seen as capable of defeat.

Domestically the government had had problems getting the Bill through the House of Lords (including defeating Lord Blake’s amendment for a referendum) and had suffered a number of rebellions in the House of Commons.

And when the Bill received royal assent on 20 July 1993 but there was still what then Prime Minister John Major called a “ticking time bomb” of a later vote on the Social Protocol which would mean the treaty could not be regarded as ratified. Major was to win that vote only by making it a vote of confidence.

This was all very exciting at the time, and a great deal of the above – spirited public law claims led by Pannick, judges being brought into political matters, calls for referendums, close commons votes – seems rather familiar at our own time of Brexit. The case is well worth looking back on thirty years later.

And so this is the story of R. v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex p. Rees-Mogg.

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Those of you kind enough to be paying Substack subscribers can read it here – and if you are not yet a paying Substack subscriber, please consider becoming one.  The subscriptions help support my daily law and policy commentary on this blog.

Those of you who are Patreon supporters can read the essay here.

Anyone who donated money on PayPal to this blog in 2022 can have a free one year complimentary Substack subscription – just leave a comment marked “Private” saying when you donated below, with your email address.  (It is important that nobody pays twice for my drivel.)

If you are a regular reader of this blog and are currently not able to afford a paying subscription, also leave a comment below marked “Private” saying so, with your email address, and I will consider providing a short-term complimentary subscription.

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Last week’s essay was on how the courts improvised legal solutions in the hard case of George Blake.

The week before the essay was on the lore of Lady Justice, here.

And the week before that it was on the case of Jane Wenham and the last of the English witch trials.

Other essays include (in chronological order of the subject):

Dr Bonham’s case (1610) – and the question of whether parliament is really sovereign

Taff Vale (1901) – perhaps the most important case in trade union history

Wednesbury (1948) – the origin of the modern principle of legal unreasonableness

Malone (1979) – perhaps the most significant constitutional case of the last 50 years

These essays are on topics to do with legal history and legal lore – and they are in addition to my topical law and policy commentary here every weekday.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

This week’s Substack essay: how the courts improvised legal solutions in the hard case of George Blake

 

This week’s Substack essay is on George Blake – and how the English court system and the government struggled to come up with a legal basis for depriving him of monies from his memoirs – and how the solution finally adopted then caused its own legal problems for the law of contract.

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Blake was rightly sentenced to 42 years’ imprisonment in 1961, and he was perhaps lucky not to be executed, and the only real fault with his sentence is that the prison authorities allowed his easy escape in 1966. Blake ended up in Russia, lauded first by the Soviet government and then by Putin. He died in 2020.

Given this background, it is not hard to sympathise with those who wanted somehow to deny him the proceeds of a 1989 book deal for his memoirs.

The general sense from reading about what then happened is that both the government (under Conservative and then Labour ministers) and the judges thought something should be done to prevent Blake getting the monies from the publisher of his memoirs.

The problem was that there was little-to-nothing that could be done on the basis of the then existing law. And so the government and the courts sought to improvise (or ‘develop the law’ to use the polite legal fiction) a legal basis for denying him the publisher’s payments, with the House of Lords in 2000 coming up with something that had eluded the High Court and the Court of Appeal.

But the way the House of Lords ensured something was done to deal with Blake’s case meant, in turn, that an element of uncertainty was introduced into English contract law which, again in turn, lasted until the Supreme Court effectively limited the case of Blake to its own exceptional facts in 2018.

Blake is perhaps a good example of how hard cases make bad law – or at least uncertain law.

My Substack post tells the story of this fascinating hard case.

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Those of you kind enough to be paying Substack subscribers can read it here – and if you are not yet a paying Substack subscriber, please consider becoming one.  The subscriptions help support my daily law and policy commentary on this blog.

Those of you who are Patreon supporters can read the essay here.

Anyone who donated money to this blog in 2022 can have a free one year complimentary Substack subscription – just leave a comment marked “Private” below with your email.  (It is important that nobody pays twice for my drivel.)

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Last week’s essay was on the lore of Lady Justice, and you can read it here.

The week before it was on the case of Jane Wenham and the last of the English witch trials.

Other essays include (in chronological order of the subject):

Dr Bonham’s case (1610) – and the question of whether parliament is really sovereign

Taff Vale (1901) – perhaps the most important case in trade union history

Wednesbury (1948) – the origin of the modern principle of legal unreasonableness

Malone (1979) – perhaps the most significant constitutional case of the last 50 years

These essays are on topics to do with legal history and legal lore – and they are in addition to my topical law and policy commentary here every weekday.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

This week’s Substack essay – About Lady Justice

14th February 2023

My latest essay over at Substack for those who kindly support my blogging is on lore rather than case law: the figure of Lady Justice.You can read it here.

You can also read last week’s essay, on the case of Jane Wenham and the last of the English witch trials.

Other essays include (in chronological order of the subject):

Dr Bonham’s case (1610) – and the question of whether parliament is really sovereign

Taff Vale (1901) – perhaps the most important case in trade union history

Wednesbury (1948) – the origin of the modern principle of legal unreasonableness

Malone (1979) – perhaps the most significant constitutional case of the last 50 years

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These essays for paying subscribers are in addition to my free-to-read, topical law and policy commentary every weekday.

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These essays are also crossposted on my Patreon.

And anyone who has supported my blog on Patreon, or on Paypal in 2022, can have a free one year subscription to my Substack – just leave a comment below marked private with your preferred email address.

It is important that nobody pays “twice” for my drivel.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

Substack Essay: The trial of Jane Wenham and the end of English witch trials

5th February 2023

Over at my Substack is this week’s essay on legal history for paying subscribers – these essays are in addition to my free-to-read, topical law and policy commentary.

The essay has also been sent to my Patreon readers, and anyone who has donated to this blog in 2022 can have a free one year subscription – just leave a comment marked private.

The introduction to the essay is below.

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ESSAY: The trial of Jane Wenham and the end of English witch trials

What a 1712 witchcraft case tells us about how substantial law and process can be used in a highly charged political context

In 1712 Jane Wenham was tried and convicted as a witch, and she was sentenced to be hanged.

Her case is well-known among historians and history students partly because it is usually held to be the last of the English witch trials: the last trial we know to have actually taken place that ended with a conviction where the offence was one of witchcraft.

(The are sometimes claims for a later English trial which seems to exist only in pamphlet form, and there were trials under surviving witchcraft legislation up to the twentieth century but for the deception offence, rather than for witchcraft itself – an offence which was abolished in 1735.)

But the main reason for the Wenham case being well-known among historians and history students is not so much that it was the last trial, but because of what happened with the trial.

This is the case which many point to as showing that the legal system no longer regarded witchcraft as credible, even if non-lawyers continued to do so.

The trial judge Sir John Powell is even quoted as saying – when faced with evidence that someone flew through the air – that flying through the air it was not an offence known to the laws of England.

Nonetheless the jury convicted, and Wenham was sentenced to die.

The combination of the case being the last trial/conviction for witchcraft and the amusing example of judicial scepticism, means that the case is a handy factoid for those want a marker for the end of witchcraft being taken seriously by the legal system, before we come to the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century.

But.

The case is more interesting than being a mere factoid, for looking at the case also shows that educated and lawyerly figures did take witchcraft seriously.

It is also a case that illustrates well what had to be practically done to secure a witchcraft conviction: mere assertion and denunciation was not enough.

The case also indicates that belief in witchcraft was totemic in what we would now call the “culture war” of the time: being sceptical about witchcraft was the “wokery” of the day.

And that fun quote attributed to Powell? It seems to be a later insertion.

This is the story of the trial of Jane Wenham.

For more click here.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

This week’s Substack essay – the Taff Vale case of 1901

29th January 2023

Over at Substack, this week’s essay for paying subscribers is on the Taff Vale case of 1901, which is generally regarded as the important trade union case in British history.

In that case the House of Lords held that a trade union could be sued for the damages caused to an employer by wrongful acts.  This exposed trade unions to significant legal peril when taking industrial action.

In my post I set out how the law and world view of the time, especially in respect of “economic torts”, meant that the trade union lost the case and why the labour movement had to look to parliament for legal change.  I also put the case in a context of other trade union cases of the time.

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Every weekend I do an essay for paying subscribers, in addition to the free-to-read law and policy topical commentary on this blog every weekday.

The essays are on aspects of legal history or the relationship between law and lore or popular culture.

Previous essays have been on:

Malone (1979) – which is for me the one case from the last fifty years which signifies the most about our constitution;

The origin of Wednesbury unreasonableness (1948) – the notion that a public body can make irrational decisions, as long as those decisions are not so unreasonable that no public body would make them; and

Dr Bonham’s case (1610) where a great judge said that there were limits to what could be done with an Act of parliament.

Like a Marshall Cavendish part-work publication of yesteryear, I am hoping these essays will build up to be an interesting library and resource in their own right, but without the dinky plastic models

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I have also posted the essays at Patreon for my Patreon supporters, and Patreon supporters and anyone who made a PayPal contribution to this blog in 2022 can have a one-year full complimentary subscription – just leave a “Private” comment below.  It is important that nobody pays “twice” for my drivel.

Thank you all for following this blog.  I would like to keep the topical commentary free, and these essays on less immediately topical subjects are a way of cross-subsidising the daily free-to-read topical posts.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.