Category: United States Law and Policy

Has an American court recognised a ‘cocaine hippopotamus’ as a legal person?

1st November 2021

One of my interests in law is not about human beings and their constitutional ups and downs, but about something which (I aver) is of fundamental importance.

That is the extension of rights to animals that are recognised and enforceable by courts, and the acceptance that animals can be legal persons.

This should not be a strange proposition: after all, we confer rights and legal personality on corporations which do not actually (that is directly in a tangible form) exist.

This is not to say animals should have absolute rights (other than against human cruelty), but then again few human rights are absolute.

And if minors and the incapacitated (as well as corporations) can have their rights enforced on their behalf then there is no reason, in principle, why the rights of animals cannot be enforced on their behalf too.

It is just that, unless there is a reason not to do so, a court should be able consider the rights of an animal in any given situation.

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But, as a commentator, one has to take cases and other legal developments as you find them, and so that brings us to today’s subject.

The hippopotamuses of a drug lord.

This is the story of the hippopotamuses that descended from those that formerly belonged to Pablo Escobar.

(That is not a sentence I ever expected to type.)

This was the Guardian news report (based on a news agency report).

Huge, if true.

An American court conferring personality on an animal.

However, if you look at the report carefully, that is not quite what has happened – though what has happened is a welcome development.

The group which handled the American litigation is the Animal Legal Defence Fund.

Their press release is here.

In essence, the American court was asked to make an order in respect of litigation in Colombia.

The hippopotamuses are a party to the Colombian litigation.

From the press release, it appears that the American court had an application under this provision: Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such tribunals.

In that provision you will see this passage:

“The order may be made […] upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court.”

Stripped of the hippopotamus dimension, this is about a court in America making an order for the benefit of a party to litigation in another jurisdiction.

On this occasion, that party happened to be hippopotamuses, as opposed to a natural person or a corporation.

We have not seen the actual order of the American court (or a judgment), but going on the basis of the press release, that is more-or-less what the court did (with emphasis added):

“In granting the application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to conduct discovery for use in foreign proceedings, the court recognized the hippos as legal persons with respect to that statute.

“This U.S. statute allows anyone who is an “interested person” in a foreign litigation to request permission from a federal court to take depositions in the U.S. in support of their foreign case.

“The U.S. Supreme Court has said that someone who is a party to the foreign case “no doubt” qualifies as an “interested person” under this statute.

“The Animal Legal Defense Fund reasoned that since the hippos are plaintiffs in the Colombian litigation, they qualify as “interested persons” under this statute.”

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What the American court has decided, it seems, is not so much that an animal is a legal person but that the fact a party to foreign litigation happens to be an animal is not a bar to being an “interested person” under one statutory provision.

This does not mean the hippopotamuses are now legal persons for all purposes should they somehow manage to come to America.

Nor does it mean that the hippopotamuses have had any substantive rights (or perhaps even any procedural rights) recognised by the court.

The decision means only that hippopotamuses can be brought within a procedural definition.

In essence: a party to foreign litigation was accepted as being a party to foreign litigation.

They just happened to be hippopotamuses.

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Still: it is a start.

An American court could have (conceivably) have rejected the application on the basis that hippopotamuses are not capable of being persons, and so could not even be interested persons for this one procedural provision.

And a minor decision like this can be a move towards wider recognition in the next well-chosen case.

In America as in the United Kingdom we are some way off animals being accorded legal personality and having rights recognised by and enforceable in courts.

This case is a hippopotamus’s step towards that objective.

But on close examination the case perhaps does not live up to the news report headlines.

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A hard look at the latest Brexit speech of Lord Frost

13th October 2021

Yesterday the Brexit minister David Frost gave a speech – and it is a speech that is worth considering carefully.

One reason to consider it carefully is that – unlike many ministerial speeches (and articles) that are produced by advisors and other functionaries – it is plain that this speech is the product of the minister’s mind.

As such, the speech has more historical and probative value that the usual erratic yet dry sequences of banalities, evasions and misdirections that constitute most ministerial communications.

We have an actual insight into one key minister is thinking (or not thinking) at this key moment, and this is rare, and we should appreciate it.

And as he is the minister who negotiated the two Brexit agreements – the withdrawal agreement and the trade and cooperation agreement – an insight into his thought (and lack of thought) is especially important at this time.

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The explicit inspiration for the title of yesterday’s speech is a pamphlet by the eighteenth-century Whig writer and politician Edmund Burke.

And yesterday’s speech is, in turn, expressly a sequel to Frost’s Brexit speech in February 2020, which was also named after a publication by Burke.

In that February 2020 speech, English-born Frost described Burke as ‘one of my country’s great political philosophers’.

Burke was Irish.

And Burke died in 1797, before the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland.

This is just not a debating point: the slip is indicative of the shoddy combination of showiness and shallowness – about Ireland and other matters – in both of Frost’s speeches.

The Burke cited is the Burke of the quotation dictionaries, and of the beginnings and conclusions of C-grade A-level history essays, and not the Burke of history.

The Burke of history would probably have impeached this illiberal government in an instant.

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The two Frost speeches, looked at together, reveal tensions.

For example, the February 2020 speech praised agreement negotiation at speed.

Referring to the then-prospective trade and cooperation agreement, 2020 Frost said:

‘…we can do this quickly. We are always told we don’t have enough time. But we should take inspiration, I think, from the original Treaty of Rome back in 1957. This was negotiated and signed in just under 9 months – surely we can do as well as that as well as our great predecessors, with all the advantages we have got now?’

But 2021 Frost does not like agreement negotiation at speed: the Northern Irish Protocol was ‘drawn up in extreme haste in a time of great uncertainty’.

The problem here is that there is no deeper thought beneath the phrases employed.

Frost has a fine phrase for negotiation at speed, and he has a fine phrase against negotiation in extreme haste.

But he does not realise nor care that the two phrases conflict: they are both simple expedients to get him through to his next paragraph.

This explains why during the Brexit negotiations Frost has been so constantly wrong-footed.

There is no substance, for all the paraded erudition.

The big negotiation taking place here is not between the United Kingdom and the European Union, but between the David Frost of 2020 and the David Frost of 2021.

And, somehow, both are losing.

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Looking more closely at yesterday’s speech, you will see that it is structured (superficially) as a sequence of five ‘points’:

‘First to say that Brexit has changed our international interests and hence will change our patterns of European relationships – not necessarily fundamentally, but significantly. Second, that Brexit means competition – we will be setting a different path on economic policy. Third, that Brexit was about democracy – it is a democratic project that is bringing politics back home. Fourth, that the EU and we have got into a low-equilibrium somewhat fractious relationship, but that it need not always be like that – but also that it takes two to fix it. And fifth and finally, that fixing the very serious problem we have in the Northern Ireland Protocol is a pre-requisite for getting to a better place.’

Each of these points, however, turn out to be exercises in characterisation.

The United Kingdom position is characterised, and the European Union position is characterised.

Each characterisation is loaded and self-serving: the United Kingdom is portrayed as blameless and misunderstood, and the European Union is depicted as ignorant and even spiteful.

These characterisations are so extreme that both are better described as mischaracterisations.

And so the characterisations dissolve on closer examination as nothing more than excuses and accusations.

For example, take the issue of policy.

At one point Frost says that the United Kingdom will develop more substantial policy relationships with some European Union countries and not others, rather than the European Union as a whole.

But then he complains that the European Union is too rigid in binding the member states together in matters of policy:

‘In most EU member states many important things can’t be changed through elections – trade policy, monetary policy, fiscal policy, important elements of immigration policy, indeed some important aspects of industrial policy.’

Frost does not seem to realise that the United Kingdom is – and will be treated as – a ‘third country’.

The tactic of trying to circumvent the European Union and with engaging member states directly did not work during the Brexit negotiations, and there is no reason to believe it would work now.

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But the most important part of this speech is about Northern Ireland.

Here he makes some general contentions about sovereignty and the role of the European Court of Justice.

He then insists that the import of these contentions is that the Northern Irish protocol needs to be replaced.

In a way this is a reversal of the usual caricature of continentals being obsessed with airy abstractions, in contrast to our robust Anglo-Saxon empiricism.

For the complaint as articulated by Frost does not amount to much more than a general objection to the European Court of Justice on conceptual grounds.

And, in the meantime, the European Union is proposing a range of practical measures to give efficacy to the Protocol but without removing the minor and residual role of the European Court of Justice.

And so he is wrong-footed again.

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The one thing in common between the two speeches is that Frost is brashly defiant in his support for Brexit.

He is certain that it was a historical necessity that the United Kingdom had to break free.

This, in turn, means he sneers at the European Union for not understanding the true nature of Brexit and its implications.

But both the 2020 and 2021 speeches reveal that the real failure to understand the implications of Brexit are with Frost and other United Kingdom ministers.

The European Union, on the other hand, seem to understand the (current) United Kingdom government all too well.

Frost complains about lack of trust: ‘we are constantly faced with generalised accusations that can’t be trusted and are not a reasonable international actor’.

But these accusations are not ‘generalised’ – instead they are, to use a phrase, ‘very specific and limited’.

And, according to statements today from a former Brexit adviser, the accusation of bad faith is well grounded.

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So, yes.

Frost’s speech has historical and probative value.

But it is not an impressive piece of work.

Characterisations (and mischaracterisations) do the work of propositions; accusations pile upon excuses; assertions are implicitly undermined by other assertions; and (ahem) very specific and limited concerns are dismissed as too general to matter.

And so the true historical and probative value of the speech is not as an insight into the thinking of the government at this stage of Brexit, but to its lack of thought.

Here it should be noted that Frost relies on the (supposed) popularity of Brexit as its ultimate justification:

‘That’s why I don’t see anything wrong with Brexit being described as a populist policy. If populism means doing what people want – challenging a technocratic consensus – then I am all for it.’

The wise counterpoint to this populism, of course, was once put as follows: that our ministers and representatives owe us their judgement – and that they betray us instead of serve us if they sacrifice their judgement to public opinion.

And who made this compelling counterpoint so eloquently?

Edmund Burke.

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Understanding the hostility to the Human Rights Act – and why this matters

7th October 2021

This week the lord chancellor and justice secretary – in 2021 – had to resort to a 2009 case – where the law had already changed in 2014 – to support his demand for an ‘overhaul’ of the Human Rights Act 1998.

That was telling.

Those opposed to the Act often seem to find it difficult to find topical examples of cases to substantiate their disdain.

Some resort to blaming cats (and I am not making this up).

And so, if it is not the actual substance of cases under the Act that explains the antipathy to the legislation, what is the explanation?

What are the actual reasons why the Human Rights Act 1998 is so hated?

I think there are four reasons.

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The first reason is its very title and its express mention of ‘human rights’.

For many this title seems alien – and provocative.

It is as if ‘human rights concerns’ are something you tell off foreigners about, rather than it being something that is of any domestic relevance.

The view seems to be that there is no need for ‘human rights’ in regard of the United Kingdom – for we have liberties.

This is, of course, misconceived – both in theory and practice.

In theory – because we have an executive under little or no day-to-day scrutiny, where state officials have unlimited power, and where the legislature has absolute power to make or unmake any law.

And in practice – taking torture, for example, there are documented examples of torture and inhuman treatment by United Kingdom agents in Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, Kenya, and elsewhere.

But we pretend that the United Kingdom is not like that – that we are always the good guys.

Yet the United Kingdom and its agents are as capable – both in theory and practice – of human rights abuses as in any other state.

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The second reason is that the rights that the are given effect by the Human Rights Act are (seen as) ‘European’.

This is a similar sentiment to the hostility to the European Union that contributed to Brexit.

And it is the ‘E’ word that seems to make all the difference.

The United Kingdom has human rights obligations under various United Nations instruments, and few know and fewer care.

We are also subject to fundamental obligations as members of international organisations such as NATO and the World Trade Organisation.

And those who jeer at the ‘E’ word will somehow be horrified at suggestions that the United Kingdom renege on its obligations under NATO and the World Trade Organisation, even if they limit our autonomy in defence and trade matters respectively.

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), however, could not – for some – be more provocatively named.

Had it been called, say, the British convention – and many treaties are named after places – or the Winston Churchill convention, after one of the politicians who supported it – then, at a stroke, the regime would be less contentious.

That the the rights are seen as ‘European’ is, of course, a misconception.

The ECHR instead was formulated in part by British lawyers seeking to codify for post-war European what they perceived to be rights existing in our domestic law.

Had it been called the British convention or the Winston Churchill convention, it would not have been that misleading, given the United Kingdom’s contribution.

But instead the ECHR provisions – and thereby the Human Rights Act – are European.

‘Ugh.’

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The third reason is that the Human Rights provides rights for humans, including the humans many do not like.

The rights are not only for nice people but also for the Other: the people who are so bad or undesirable that many believe that they should be treated inhumanely.

For example: foreign criminals, domestic criminals, asylum seekers, and so on.

Why should these people have rights?

The sentiment is that such people should not have rights, because they don’t deserve them, or that they have forfeited them.

But that is the nature of human rights: you have them because you are a human.

But if the Other use their rights, then that ‘use’ is instantly converted to ‘abuse’.

You may ‘use’ your rights, but they – they ‘abuse’ their rights.

The notion is that those facing the coercive powers of the state – say incarceration or being separated from their families – should smile and nod along with that coercion, and certainly should not interrupt clapping and cheering those being coercive.

But it those who are facing the coercion of the state, especially those where there is no public sympathy, who are most in need of human rights.

If you think about it.

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The fourth reason is about the failure of the Human Rights Act to get ‘buy-in’ from certain media and political groups since its enactment.

Here there is a contrast with, for example, the United States – say if a citizen did not like a particular right in the Bill of Rights (for example, the right to bear arms), that citizen would be unlikely to be in favour of repealing the entire Bill of Rights.

But in the United Kingdom there are many who do not see that the rights in the Human Rights Act protect them as well as the Other.

And part of this is – in my view – the fault of the courts themselves.

After the Act took effect, the courts moved rapidly to ‘develop’ (that is, invent) a new tort of privacy.

A right that was enforced in cases against the media.

But the corresponding right of free expression enjoyed no similar ‘development’ – and over twenty years later, it is difficult to cite a case where the right to free expression has made a difference, let alone led to the ‘development’ of the law.

No United Kingdom journalist, unlike their American counterparts, would ever think to assert loudly and proudly their legal right under Article 10 to free expression.

Had the British courts made Article 10 (free expression) as meaningful as Article 8 (privacy) then the British press would be as horrified at the prospect of repeal of the Human Rights Act as the American media would be at the repeal of the entire Bill of Rights, including the right to a free press.

The populist media of the United Kingdom are not aware that the ECHR and the Human Rights Act protects (or should protect) them as well as the subjects of their coverage.

If the Article 10 right of free expression had been taken half-as-seriously by British judges as the Article 8 right to privacy, one suspects no politician would dare suggest ‘overhauling’ the Human Rights Act as a whole, let alone its repeal.

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As this blog recently averred, at the heart of the issue of the Human Rights Act is symbolism, not substance, and for both ‘sides’.

The Act does not actually do a great deal, but it does enough to make a difference in certain situations.

But the main reason for its repeal (or ‘overhaul’) seems to be the sheer symbolic value in doing so, and the main reason to oppose such moves is the equal-and-opposite sheer symbolic value in preventing those moves.

And so the Act is caught up in political and media battles that have little or no connection to the Act’s actual legal significance.

It is almost as if the Human Rights Act in the political and media imagination has an autonomous existence, distinct from the actual legislation and what that legislation does.

But.

There is a problem here.

A real problem, which sensible liberals should not ignore.

Some legislation – for example, equalities law – can start off controversial but will become less controversial as the years go by.

Laws such as the Race Relations Act were – believe it or not – controversial at the time.

The Human Rights Act – twenty-one years after it took effect  – remains controversial and – in good part – unloved.

It has not simply become embedded as part of the political consensus.

And that is a failure.

A failure that cannot be wished away.

So there is a question for all sensible people, who support human rights in general and the ECHR in particular: are there better ways of protecting these substantive rights than by the Human Rights Act?

For it is those substantive rights, and their availability to those who need to use those rights, that are the important things, and not their legal form.

The Human Rights Act 1998 is still not a popular piece of legislation in 2021, and unless those who value human rights think constructively about other ways of enforcing those same rights, there will be a risk that the Act and the rights it provides for will all topple together.

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“I’ve always thought that a free trade deal with the U.S. would be difficult” – and what this Prime Minister’s falsehood tells us about law and policy

23rd September 2021

Once upon a time a Brummie solicitor and pundit averred that a post-Brexit trade deal with the United States was ‘in the bag’.

That Brummie solicitor and pundit was not me – though I did have fun with this boast in a Financial Times piece.

Jones was not the only figure to assume that a post-Brexit trade deal with the United States would be easy.

Almost all Brexiters who had an opinion on the matter assumed that such a trade deal would be a given.

And one such Brexiter was the now prime minister Boris Johnson.

But now he denies he ever said it.

Here, this short video should be watched in full.

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Shameless stuff.

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There are at least two issues here.

The first was the readiness of Brexiters to assume international free trade deals were easy – that they would naturally follow from Brexit with the United Kingdom having a fully independent trade policy.

This sentiment may be derived from cod-historical notions about Victorian Britain – where it is imagined that the likes of Richard Cobden would pop across the channel to negotiate a free trade deal and still be home for tea.

In the mundane world of 2021 – as opposed to the giddy biscuit-tin world of nostalgic reenactments – new trade deals are rarely quick or easy, and often may not be worth having at all.

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The second is that the prime minister knows he can say things that contradict what he said before and that few, if anyone, will care.

And this is despite the internet making it easier to expose such lies and other discrepancies.

Other than for the sake of it as a public good, there is no real point in setting out the falsehoods.

This is one thing that George Orwell perhaps did not correctly anticipate in Nineteen Eighty-four – there would be no need to employ the likes of Winston Smith to go back and change the historical record, as it would make no difference as to whether people believed new false claims.

The future instead turned out to be President Trump and others waving away such inconvenient truths as ‘fake news’.

For as this blog has said many times: exposing lies is not enough when people do not mind the lies.

So we are now in a bubble of faux-historical sentimentality and hyper-partisanship, where the truth of the historical record makes no difference.

You may think the bubble cannot carry on, but yet it does.

It is the paradox of our age: it has never been easier to expose a falsehood, yet the falsehoods continue to have purchase.

And from this many of our current problems in law and policy follow.

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Are President Biden’s comments on ‘the Irish Accords’ a life line for the Human Rights Act?

22nd September 2021

Yesterday United States President Biden spoke about his concern about a possible change to what he called ‘the Irish Accords’.

From the context of the question and answer, Biden meant the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement – though the question was framed in terms of the Northern Irish Protocol of the Brexit withdrawal agreement.

The question and answer are here and you should watch and listen for yourself:

You will see in the tweet above that the estimable Sonya Sceats, the chief executive of Freedom from Torture, avers that the exchange is a life line for the Human Rights Act 1998.

Is she right?

And what is the connection between that exchange and the Human Rights Act 1998?

Here we need to see what the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement says.

In respect of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the agreement says the following:

‘There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including […] the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission [and] arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’

and

‘The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency’.

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These passages are explicit: the ECHR is a ‘safeguard’ and the ECHR has to be enforceable in the courts of Northern Ireland.

The agreement does not expressly mention the Human Rights Act 1998 – not least because that legislation had not yet been passed at the time of the agreement.

But one of the things that the act does in respect of Northern Ireland – as well as for the rest of the United Kingdom – is to make the ECHR enforceable directly in the courts.

This is instead of requiring a party seeking to rely on the ECHR to petition the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, as was the position before the act took effect.

Of course: you do not – strictly – need the Human Rights Act 1998 to be in place to fulfil the express requirements of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, as long as the ECHR remains enforceable locally in Northern Ireland.

But if the Act were to be repealed – which is a long-term goal of the new lord chancellor and justice secretary Dominic Raab – then there would need to be replacement legislation in place the very day the repeal took effect for ECHR rights to remain directly enforceable in the courts of Northern Ireland.

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So does this mean the Human Rights Act 1998 is safe?

I am not so sure.

I averred on this blog when Raab was appointed (and I am sorry to quote myself):

‘And one would not be surprised that one stipulation made by Raab in accepting the position as lord chancellor is that he get another crack at repealing the human rights act.

‘If so, then the act will probably be repealed – though there will no doubt be a less strikingly (and provocatively) entitled ‘European Convention on Human Rights (Interpretation and Incorporation of Articles) and Related Purposes Act’ in its stead – not least because the Good Friday Agreement provides that the convention has to be enforceable in Northern Ireland.’

Having seen the exchange with Biden, I am now wondering if my (dismal) view is correct.

A wise government of the United Kingdom will be anxious not to give the slightest indication that anything related to the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement was up for any change – and continuing local enforcement of the ECHR is an express provision of that agreement.

A wise government, concerned about its relations with the United States, would thereby not touch the repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 with a barge pole.

It would just take one credible complaint that the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement was at risk, and there would be an international problem.

Repealing the Human Rights Act 1998 would not be worth these risks – especially as it would have to be replaced immediately with legislation having the identical effect in respect of Northern Ireland.

But we do not have a wise government – we have a silly government.

And given the long-term obsession of the new lord chancellor with repealing the Human Rights Act 1998 – and that this may even be a reason for why he accepted his political demotion – one can see the repeal (and its immediate replacement) still going ahead in symbolic form – even if not in much substance.

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But the politics of symbolism does not just have one direction.

Against Raab’s fixation with the symbolism of repealing the Human Rights Act 1998 is the transatlantic symbolism of doing anything that could remotely affect the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.

So it may be that Sceats’ view is correct – and the Human Rights Act 1998 is safer than before.

But, on any view, repeal seems an unwise political path to take, given how much politically – and how little legally – is at stake.

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9/11 x 20

11th September 2021

The general lot of law and policy in the last twenty years has not been a happy one.

Torture used and regularised; an invasion and occupation that not only had no legal basis but also greatly discredited politics itself; the growth of the surveillance state; and the general illiberal turn to nationalistic populist authoritarianism.

All this followed the terrorist attack twenty years ago today.

That these things followed that attack cannot be disputed, as a matter of chronology.

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But what about causation?

Did 9/11 cause the illiberal turn?

Anyone with an interest in the subject will have a view.

But I am afraid I think the illiberal turn would have happened anyway.

There was never any rational connection between 9/11 and the Iraq invasion – and so there would have just been another pretext instead of the ‘war on terror’.

Those with power will torture if they can get away with it – and how the United Kingdom so readily participated in torture would not surprise anyone with knowledge of what the British did in Kenya and Northern Ireland in the post-war period alone.

Those with power did not need a reason to use and regularise torture: they just need an excuse.

And the developments in computer and communications technology since 2001 would have meant the state seeking more surveillance powers, regardless of the attack on the twin towers.

So in essence: it is plausible that all the bad things in law and policy that have happened since 9/11 would have happened anyway.

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Why the Michigan election law judgment is a Judgment for the Ages

27th August 2021

The primary purpose of a reasoned court judgment is not to be a historical document.

The primary purpose of a reasoned court judgment is for the here-and-now: it is a practical document to explain why the court made a particular order (or did not make an order) or otherwise disposed of the claim or matter before it.

To the extent to which that judgment contains anything of general interest to future generations of historians is (or should be) incidental

Yet.

Every so often there are judgments that you hope will speak to the ages.

Judgments to tell future generations about things in the here-and-now that they may not otherwise understand.

And the judgment handed down recently by Honorable Linda V. Parker of the United States district court for the eastern district of Michigan is such a judgment.

It is a judgment for the ages.

It is a judgment that (one hopes) will tell future generations that the American courts of our time had not gone completely mad.

It is a long judgment – but once you start reading it is compelling, and you are well into it before you realise.

The first paragraph is itself a banger:

And then it gets better, and better.

In essence: it sets out in readable detail how pro-Trump attorneys deceived the court again and again, and it sets out why that was again and again wrong.

The flavour of the judgment can be gained in this outstanding Twitter thread:

Click on and read the judgment here – and (if it is the right word) enjoy.

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The thin threads of power – politics and policy in an age of impotence

17th August 2021

When I was at school in the 1980s, the well-meaning progressive teachers showed us the film Threads.

The purpose, no doubt, was to make us pupils think critically about the cold war and the (then) nuclear arms race.

The primary impact it had on me was, however, different – and this was because of how the film portrayed the telephones in the bunker.

The film gave me a life-long fascination about the nature of practical political authority and control.

Here on YouTube some helpful person has put together the bunker scenes from the film:

If you watch these scenes with special regard to the telephones, you will see the telephones going from an active means of communication, to an inactive means, to being discarded, and then to finally damaged beyond repair.

And this matches the collapsing political authority of those in the bunker.

To begin with there are other people at the end of the telephone, and then there is nobody, and then ultimately nobody cares – or knows.

The political authority of those in the bunker, like the communications, is cut off.

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The lesson I learned from this as a pupil was it was not enough to have people who want to be in control and to believe themselves to be in control – there also had to be infrastructure, and for there to be people to accept that control.

Without such infrastructure and deference, those ‘in control’ are akin to the motorist wriggling a gear stick or pressing the brakes when both have been disconnected.

Those ‘in control’ may as well be playing with some grand political simulator.

And so I became interested in processes and transmissions and logistics and policies and rules and laws, and less interested in personalities and partisanship.

To answer the question: just what happens when the telephone rings out but it is not answered?

I suspect that this not the intention of the film makers, or the teachers.

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I mention this because of the impotence many in the West now feel about the fall of Kabul.

There is a general sense that something should have been done.

Here is our current foreign secretary:

The phrase “no one saw this coming” could be the motto of the United Kingdom government since at least 2016.

And here is Susie Dent, the subtle genius who no doubt will be regarded by future historians as the best political commentator of our age:

All true: but even if we had the foresight, what could have been done?

Of course: the execution of the final departures could have been better.

But beyond the arrangements for the final exit, it is difficult to see what further control the West could have had.

And part of the problem for the United Kingdom is that not only do we have no control, we also have no meaningful policy for what we could do.

Here, there are some hard truths on the lack of any meaningful United Kingdom policy in this RUSI post:

‘This week’s ignominy may be set instead against some of the blithe statements made just six months ago in the Integrated Review: that the UK will be ‘a problem-solving and burden-sharing nation’; that it already demonstrates a ‘willingness to confront serious challenges and the ability to turn the dial on international issues of consequence’; that the UK will embody ‘a sharper and more dynamic focus in order to adapt to a more competitive and fluid international environment’; and that it will ‘shape the international order of the future’.

‘The UK’s Afghanistan experience demonstrates none of this.

‘Instead, it speaks to a generation of political leaders who have too easily fooled themselves that being Washington’s most reliable military ally constitutes in itself an effective national strategy.

‘Such a relationship may be one element of an effective strategy, but it cannot simply be the strategy.’

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Yesterday this blog looked back to a 2017 Financial Times post where I put the old calls for ‘regime change’ together with other simple notions from the first part of this century, as part of a general politics of easy answers:

Since 2017, with the ongoing experience of Brexit but also with Covid and many other things, we still see the politics of easy answers.

The sense that all that needs to be done when something must be done is for politicians to want it to be done.

The hard and complicated work of policy and (meaningful) strategy is often not even an afterthought.

We have politicians in their modern-day bunkers, thinking that having telephones to hand will be enough for their will to be done.

But political power hangs on, well, threads.

And those threads snap easily, if they exist at all.

**

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Whatever happened to ‘regime change’?

16th August 2021

Once upon a time geopolitics seemed so much easier.

As Christopher Hitchens commented back in 2001, after 9/11:

‘The Taliban will soon be history. Al-Qaida will take longer. There will be other mutants to fight. But if, as the peaceniks like to moan, more Bin Ladens will spring up to take his place, I can offer this assurance: should that be the case, there are many many more who will also spring up to kill him all over again.’

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I was one of those who nodded-along with Hitchens at the time, but I quickly realised the reality of ‘regime change’ did not correspond to what was said in sterling newspaper columns and comment pieces.

And by the time of the Iraq invasion (with which I did not nod-along) it was plain that no actual thought was going into what happened next in any of these adventures.

Now, twenty years after the invasion of Afghanistan, the west are retreating in circumstances which show that there was never any practical, sustainable plan for ‘regime change’.

Indeed, instead of a changed regime in Afghanistan, we have a regime resumed.

And the full resumption only took a day, after some twenty years of occupation.

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Back in 2017, at the Financial Times, I put the calls for ‘regime change’ together with other simple notions from the first part of this century, as part of a general politics of easy answers:

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I remember as a United Kingdom government lawyer around 2003/4 being asked to help on a commercial procurement matter involving the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq.

I did not have much idea what I was doing, though I did my best – and it was soon obvious that nobody at the Coalition Provisional Authority knew what they were doing.

I remember thinking at the time that it is one thing to clap and cheer at ‘regime change’ but for it to happen in reality was quite different.

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This is not to argue absolutely against military interventions – either ‘liberal’ or otherwise.

What it is an argument against, however, is the notion that ‘regime changes’ are easy, or even effective.

Interventions are not political exorcisms, where the demons are expelled forever.

Instead, the notion of ‘regime change’ is a form of magical thinking.

And it always was.

**

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The last surviving transatlantic slaves and what their lives tell us about the law

11th August 2021

As part of my research into slavery and the law, I want to ascertain the chronological parameters of the transatlantic slave trade.

At one end, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is the emergence of the trade in the days when the legal system(s) were very different to now – with rights of action and forms of property with which many modern lawyers would not now be familiar.

But what of at the end?

Of course, we all know that the trade had (supposedly) ended by the early to mid nineteenth century.

But in fact the last victims of the trade were alive until modern times.

The last (known) living victim did not die until 1940 – within the lifetime of four currently serving United Senators

And if one looks at the lives of the last three of those who are known to have survived, you get some interesting insights into the role of (relatively) recent law in respect of transatlantic slavery.

The survivors names were Oluale Kossola (also known as Cudjo Lewis), Redohsi, and Matilda McCrear – see here, here and here.

The ‘legal’ insights one gets are:

– how transactions were still being made in Africa, and how the supply of slaves was still organised so as to meet demand;

– how the traders deftly evaded justice – by procedural delays, as well as destroying evidence and hiding the human evidence – and also by jury verdicts;

– how survivors did not have the automatic benefit of American citizenship after emancipation because they were born abroad; and

– how one of the survivors even sought compensation (presumably in the 1920s or 1930s) but the claim was dismissed.

These examples touch on modern legal issues – the existence of illegal markets, criminal prohibition and its avoidance (both in substance and by gaming procedure and evidence), rights of citizenship, and rights to compensation.

The story of the transatlantic slave trade lasted some five hundred years.

The story goes from the legal days of actions in trover and assumpsit to the laws that exist today.

It was far more extensive both in scope and duration than many would realise.

In a way, the story of the slave trade is the story of modern commercial law.

**

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