The Lord Chancellor’s extraordinary tweet about the Tracey Connelly case

6th May 2022

Here is a tweet from the Lord High Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (and a qualified solicitor):

It is a tweet that goes to one of the most important issues for any constitution: the respective powers of the executive and the judiciary in individual legal cases.

Tracey Connelly, as is widely known, was the mother of Peter Connelly, who died in 2007.

In 2008 she was convicted of “causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable person” – though not of murder or manslaughter – and she was sentenced to indefinite imprisonment for public protection, with a minimum term of five years.

It was reported that the then Attorney General considered referring the sentence to the Court of Appeal for being unduly lenient – but it seems no such referral was ever made, no doubt because the sentence was appropriate for the offence for which Connolly was actually convicted.

(Steven Barker was also convicted of this and another offence involving another child – and in respect of Peter Connolly’s death the sentence was for twelve years.)

That minimum of five years for Tracey Connelly expired in 2013 – and it appears she was released on licence from 2013-15 – but almost ten years later she is in prison.

This is because the Parole Board has, until recently, repeatedly refused her parole.

As the parole specialist Andrew Sperling explains in this useful and important thread, the test for the Parole Board is preventative rather than punitive:

Sperling also helpfully sets out that the Ministry of Justice participated in the Parole Board’s deliberations.

The Ministry of Justice officials all supported Connolly’s release.

This is the Lord Chancellor’s very own department.

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The Lord Chancellor even had the opportunity to challenge the Parole Board decision – and that was rejected.

In a fully reasoned and detailed decision, each of the Lord Chancellor’s grounds for his application were rejected.

The judgment even contained these remarkable paragraphs:

Ouch.

The Lord Chancellor – seriously – instructed counsel to say that the Parole Board had not taken proper account of his views, but he did not and could not identify what those views were.

That is embarrassingly bad.

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The Lord Chancellor now wants to do things differently.

He wants to be able, as a politician and a minister, to personally overturn decisions of the Parole Board even when his own department’s officials support release.

Presumably this would be a power that would be exercised in those few cases that are selected by the media to be notorious.

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What is the Lord Chancellor’s motivation for wanting a ministerial veto?

Here, again, Sperling is spot on:

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Let us look again at the extraordinary tweet of the Lord Chancellor:

There is no sensible doubt that the cruelty in the Connolly case was substantial and warranted significant punishment.

And the court sentenced her for that offence.

A sentence which the government did not (and probably could not) challenge at the time as being unduly lenient.

The question is whether it is now safe for Tracey Connelly now to be released.

That question has been considered, with reference to relevant material, by the Parole Board, an independent body, with input from the Lord Chancellor’s own officials.

An answer was then reached by the Parole Board, which the Lord Chancellor could and did challenge in court, and the the Parole Board’s answer survived that challenge.

And the answer the Parole Board reached was ‘yes’.

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The issue is not that the executive should not have any role in questions of sentencing and probation in individual cases.

The executive should and does have a role.

The executive can refer seemingly unduly lenient sentences to the Court of Appeal.

The executive can make representations and submissions to the Parole Board.

The executive can apply so as to challenge a decision of the Parole Board.

This is how the separation of powers should and does work in practice.

Punishments should not be at the personal fiat of any minister, even that of the Lord High Chancellor.

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Russia’s flimsy constitution and the USA’s rigid constitution, and the notion that codified constitutions are necessarily a good thing

5th May 2022

From time to time this blog (and my commentary elsewhere) is accused of being against a codified constitution for the United Kingdom.

(A codified constitution is often also known – inexactly – as a ‘written’ constitution, but uncodified constitutions are usually written down, just not in one place.)

This accusation of being against a codified constitution for the United Kingdom is, in my view, unfair and incorrect.

A codified constitution for the United Kingdom may be a good and welcome thing.

Or it could be a horrible and unwelcome thing, entrenching domestic executive power yet further.

It all depends.

This is because codified constitutions can be good things or bad things.

The view of this blog (and my commentary elsewhere) is that a codified constitution of the United Kingdom is not necessarily a good thing.

And it rejects the casual plea ‘and this is why we need a written/codified constitution’ that often follows some political outrage.

A codified constitution is not a liberal panacea.

It is not even necessarily better than our current constitutional arrangements – so the alternative plea of ‘at least it would be a step in the right direction’ is also misconceived.

A codified constitution could be, from a liberal perspective, very much a step in the wrong direction.

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Codified constitutions are relevant to two of the current main international news stories – the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the likely overturning in the United States of Roe v Wade.

As this blog has previously set out, there are few constitutions which on paper are as liberal and wonderful as that of Russia.

And yet the Russian president had unlimited illiberal powers at home and no check on what he orders to be done (or attempted) abroad.

In the United States, the fundamental right of a woman of access to the means of aborting a pregnancy may no longer be a constitutional right, and thereby enforceable in all the states of the union.

This is because its status as a constitutional right rests only on mere case law, and not on the express provisions of the constitution itself.

And that, in turn, is because the constitution of the United States is difficult to amend generally, and it is practically impossible to amend on the issue of abortion – and so the constitutional right depended on litigation rather than on any formal enactment.

Other rights that seemed significant in the eighteenth century are set out in writing and cannot (easily) be removed.

Americans have the right to a well-regulated militia, but not a right to regulated and safe abortions.

But…. but….

…those are different, will come the defiant response of the constitution-mongers.

A codified constitution of the United Kingdom would be just right – not too flimsy, and not too rigid.

Perhaps this ideal codified constitution will be drafted by Goldilocks.

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Again, nothing on this blog should be taken to mean a codified constitution will necessarily be a bad thing.

But one should be critical, and one should not even presume that a codified constitution would tend to be a liberal panacea.

The government – backed by the considerable resources of the government legal service and the treasury panel of barristers – would seek to game any written constitution in the executive’s favour.

And against such a concert, mere wishful thinking will be no match

But…. but….

…this should be different, will come the response of the gamed constitution-mongers.

But.

Be careful what you clamour for.

A liberal constitutional order is not easy to achieve.

And that it may be the current arrangements without codification are more liberal than anything that the government would permit to be put in place as a codified constitution.

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Fundamental rights vs legal rights vs constitutional rights – the case of abortion and the United States Supreme Court

4th May 2022

Those with too much interest in law or politics will talk about different sorts or rights – fundamental rights, legal rights, constitutional rights, and so on.

Some of those people will even know what they mean by each of these (similar) terms.

Others, however, may find the feast of terms confusing.

This post is for those who want to better understand such terms.

And for the purpose of exposition, I will take the topical issue of abortion in the United States (which this blog covered yesterday)

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First, what is a ‘right’?

A right is the absolute ability to elect to do something in a given situation.

If that ability can be withdrawn by another, then it is better understood as a privilege, and not as a right.

If you need to obtain the prior consent of another before exercising that ability then it is not a right but a permission.

What makes it a right is that no prior permission is required and it cannot (easily) be withdrawn.

Sometimes these rights are expressly articulated and set out in a formal code.

And sometimes they arise by implication because of a certain legal state of affairs.

The right to an abortion under Roe v Wade in the United States is an example of the latter.

The Supreme Court held that it would be unconstitutional for there to be certain legal prohibitions on abortion.

This rested on a right to privacy, which is not expressly stated in the constitution, but was implied into the constitution by the court.

The right to abortion therefore is the implication of it being unconstitutional for there to be certain legal prohibitions in respect of people’s private lives.

And because Roe v Wade was decided by the Supreme Court on the basis of what was constitutional, the right is a ‘constitutional right’ .

This means that it is not open to Congress (on a federal level) or individual states to interfere with the right.

A lower level of right would be a legal right – for example, a right to an abortion as provided for in laws made by Congress or an individual state.

But such legal rights are subject to the constitution, and so if they do not conform with the constitution then they can be quashed.

This means that, if the Supreme Court holds that it is a matter for individual states to regulate access to abortions, but Congress purports to enact a nation-wide right to abortion, such a legal right may be struck down by the Supreme Court.

(Legal rights are useful, but constitutional rights are stronger.)

A third category of rights are ‘fundamental’ or ‘natural’ rights – these are rights which exist (or should) exist, independent of whether they are posited by the legal system.

Sometimes these rights correspond with constitutional or legal rights, sometimes they do not.

From a liberal perspective (the perspective of this blog), the right of a woman to elect to have an abortion is a fundamental right.

The principle is that – in general – it is for the woman to decide, and not a legislature.

(And if a legislator or voter is opposed to abortion, then they are free to not have one – but it should not be an absolute rule imposed on another.)

This general principle is subject to a limitation of there being a point in a pregnancy after which no abortion should be normally be performed – and views will differ on when that limit is.

But the fact that views will differ as to when that limit is does not mean that there should not be a general right to elect to have an abortion before that limit.

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If the Supreme Court do remove the constitutional status of the implicit right to an abortion then it may still be a legal right in some states, and it still will be a fundamental right, even if an ineffective fundamental right in other states.

If the Supreme Court overrules Roe v Wade, the only other way to return the right to an abortion to being a constitutional right – and thereby exercisable in every American state is for the constitution to be amended.

That would then put it beyond the grasp of an illiberal Supreme Court and any illiberal Congress.

But until and unless that happens, you have a fundamental right which may be a legal right in some states and not others, but is not a constitutional right.

And that – well – would not be right.

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Why the ‘leaked’ Alito opinion will be especially worrying to supporters of a constitutional right to an abortion

3rd May 2022

I am not an American lawyer but I am a strong supporter of the fundamental right of a woman to choose to have an abortion, and so I have read what appears to be a leaked draft judgment by Alito published by Politico.

You can read the draft ‘opinion’ here.

If this opinion is adopted by the majority of the United States Supreme Court then the two key previous Supreme Court cases of Roe v Wade and Casey are overruled.

That would be bad enough.

But.

What is especially worrying for supporters of the right to choose is that the draft Alito opinion is not a flimsy piece of legal reasoning.

On its own terms, it is quite a solid and well-reasoned piece of legal writing, setting out in detail not only the limitations of the judgments in Roe v Wade and Casey, but also setting out why each basis for reversing a previous judgment of the court is met.

Some of this opinion is more plausible than other parts – the draft opinion is weakest (in my view) on some aspects of ‘stare decisis’ – the notion that a court should usually follow settled judgments of a previous courts, and some of its historical paragraphs are contestable.

But it is strongest when pointing out the weak legal reasoning of Roe v Wade.

As this blog has previously averred, the decision of Roe v Wade is not compelling.

A constitutional right to an abortion was implied into a constitution that does not expressly mention such a right, on the basis of a general constitutional right of privacy that also is not expressly mentioned, and this latter general privacy right has no firm basis – some judges think it is derived from a number of specific rights, while others derive it from the ‘due process’ clause.

Jurisprudentially, the Roe v Wade judgment is (sadly) all over the place.

All because – from a pro-choice perspective – the result in Roe v Wade was the right one, does not make the judgment itself solid.

And the worrying quality of the Alito opinion is not that it is a superficial counter-objection to Roe v Wade, but that it is detailed and reasoned in a way that the original judgment is not.

This in turn will mean, if adopted by the majority of the court, that reversing this reversal will be even more difficult.

And this creates a dreadful situation for supporters of the right to choose as a fundamental right across the United States, as opposed to the issue being left to different states.

It means that nothing less than a constitutional amendment is now needed – for even a federal law – ‘codification’ – may now be vulnerable to being struck down by the Supreme Court.

The problem is that constitutional amendments are almost impossible to achieve – especially when so many individual states are opposed to abortion.

But they may be no alternative for supporters of the right to choose as a fundamental right.

The Alito draft opinion not only will reverse Roe v Wade – but it also may close off the Supreme Court as the way of ensuring the a general right of access to an abortion.

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The suggestion that the Prime Minister give evidence to the privileges committee under oath and pain of perjury

2nd May 2022

Did you know there is a Parliamentary Witness Oaths Act?

This 1871 statute – which is still in force – provides among other things that any committee of the House of Commons may administer an oath to the witnesses examined before such committee.

And, while an examination of witness by a parliamentary committee is not a judicial proceeding, it would still be perjury for a person to lie such an oath (or affirmation) – with the penalty being up to seven years in prison.

This information comes from a fascinating and informative article at the New Statesman by Alexander Horne, a former parliamentary legal adviser.

In that article Horne contends that such an oath could be administered to the Prime Minister for any evidence he gives to the privileges committee.

If so. this would mean that the Prime Minister would be (to use the glorious legal phrase) ‘under pain of perjury’ to tell the truth to the committee investigating whether he deliberately misled parliament and/or failed to correct the record at the first available opportunity.

(The latter point is where this blog has previously set out that the Prime Minister is vulnerable, for it may be hard for him to maintain that once he had the Sue Gray report and/or any briefing for the Metropolitan police investigation that he still did not realise that he had misled parliament.)

On the face of it, administering such an oath has its attractions.

No sensible person doubts that the current prime minister lies fluently and repeatedly, and so placing him ‘under pain of perjury’ would have the advantage of concentrating his mind wonderfully.

Such an approach would also have the broader advantage of reminding the Prime Minister and others that evidence to parliamentary committees should be taken seriously – especially as the sanction of ‘contempt of parliament’ is, well, held in contempt.

Horne mentions where such oaths have been used:

“Committees rarely administer the oath to witnesses, although it has happened in recent years. The Home Affairs Committee chose to take evidence under oath in respect of its inquiry into child sexual exploitation in Rotherham. The Public Accounts Committee also controversially administered the oath to the general counsel and solicitor to the Inland Revenue in 2011.”

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But.

It may be one thing for witnesses who are not members of either house of parliament to give evidence to a parliamentary committee ‘under pain of perjury’ – but for a parliamentarian and minister to also do so is constitutionally problematic.

That what parliamentarians say in parliament is absolutely protected at law is set out (some would say ‘enshrined’) in the Bill of Rights.

And there is the principle that the responsibility of a minister to answer questions in parliament is politically enforceable (or not enforceable), and not a matter for any form of litigation.

Imagine if the Prime Minister (or other minister or parliamentarian) is caught out in a lie before a parliamentary committee, what would then happen?

(And the 1871 legislation does not expressly provide that parliamentarians are exempt.)

Would an outside court have to adjudicate the conduct of a parliamentarian in respect of parliamentary proceedings?

It is difficult to see how such a prosecution could be easily brought – and it could result in another (for constitutional commentators, splendid) constitutional mess.

And regardless of the legal(istic) issues in this particular situation, there is a sensible wariness of converting political issues into court matters.

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That said, however, it is unfortunate that there is so little that can be done to get the prime minister to give truthful answers in parliament.

This is certainly a constitutional problem that needs a practical solution.

The suggestion of getting a Prime Minister to give evidence to the privileges committee investigating him ‘under pain of perjury’ has the appearance of being such a solution to that problem.

The fear would be that in seeking go solve one constitutional problem, another is caused.

And so the problem remains: what can you do – constitutionally and practically –  with a dishonest Prime Minister?

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POSTSCRIPT

Horne has provided a link to a useful post where he deals with the issues in more detail:

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The false and misleading statements of Boris Johnson and Matt Hancock about the Covid care homes judgment

29 April 2022

On Wednesday the prime minister was asked by Daisy Cooper MP about the high court decision holding that the government had acted unlawfully in its covid guidance for care homes.

Hansard sets out the exchange as follows:

Note that key phrase from the prime minister:

“…we did not know in particular was that covid could be transmitted asymptomatically in the way that it was. I wish we had known more about that at the time.”

The former health secretary Matt Hancock gave an interview to ITV News, where he said:

“I wish that the knowledge about asymptomatic transmission had been…had been…I had known it earlier.”

(The switch midway that sentence is interesting – he seems to go from wanting to say that knowledge about asymptomatic transmission had not been known earlier to carefully stating that he personally did not know.)

Hancock then put out a statement to the press as follows:

“This court case comprehensively clears ministers of any wrongdoing and finds Mr Hancock acted reasonably on all counts. 

“The court also found that Public Health England failed to tell ministers what they knew about asymptomatic transmission.”

So: is what the prime minister and the former health secretary said in response to this judgment true?

Let us see.

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The judgment contains evidence about what was said and done, and when.

The evidence does not appear to have been contested by the government in the hearing, though the government’s lawyers would dispute the weight and meanings to be placed on that evidence.

What did the evidence say?

At paragraph 65 of the judgment (emphasis on date added):

“…on 9 March [2020] the Health Minister Lord Bethell, said in the House of Lords that “large numbers of people are infectious or infected but are completely asymptomatic and never go near a test kit.” “

At paragraph 69 of the judgment (emphasis on date added):

“On 12 March [2020] the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) published a paper entitled ‘Novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic; increased transmission in the EU-EEA and the UK- 6th update.’ It made a number of observations about asymptomatic transmission. It noted that “over the course of the infection, the virus has been identified in respiratory tract specimens 1-2 days before the onset of symptoms…”. Referring to the Japanese National Institute of Infectious Diseases’ field briefing entitled ‘Diamond Princess COVID-19 cases update March 10, 2020,’ it observed that the virus has “been detected in asymptomatic persons. On a rapidly evolving cruise ship outbreak where most of the passengers and staff were tested irrespective of symptoms, 51% of the laboratory confirmed cases were asymptomatic at the time of confirmation”.

At paragraph 73 (emphasis on date added):

“On the morning of 13 March [2020], on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme, Sir Patrick Vallance, the Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor, said this about the means of transmission of the virus:

” “It looks quite likely that there is some degree of asymptomatic transmission. There’s definitely quite a lot of transmission very early on in the disease when there are very mild symptoms”.”

At paragraph 78 (emphasis on date added):

“on 15 March [2020], an important paper from Imperial College and Columbia University was published. ‘Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel coronavirus’ by Li and Pei et al. discussed the transmission rate of undocumented infection.”

And so on.

The judgment also lists various papers that were published in March 2020, including a paper published on 31 March that stated:

“between a third and a half of transmissions occur from pre-symptomatic individuals.”

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That was all in March 2020 – now let us turn to April 2020.

Paragraph 286 of the judgment:

“On 2 April 2020, a week after the lockdown had been given legal effect (by the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 (SI 2020/350)) , the Admissions Guidance was published. As noted above, this included the following about new admissions (emphasis in the original):

” “Some of these patients [admitted from a hospital or from a home setting] may have COVID-19, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic.  All of these patients can be safely cared for in a care home if this guidance is followed.  If an individual has no COVID-19 symptoms, or has tested positive for COVID-19 but is no longer showing symptoms and has completed their isolation period then care should be provided as normal. … Negative tests are not required prior to transfers/admissions into the care home.” “

The court then states in the next paragraphs about this April guidance:

“there is no evidence that the Secretary of State or anyone advising him addressed the issue of the risk to care home residents of asymptomatic transmission. […]

“Since there is no evidence that this question was considered by the Secretary of State, or that he was asked to consider it, it is not an example of a political judgment on a finely balanced issue. Nor is it a point on which any of the expert committees had advised that no guidance was required. Those drafting the March Discharge Policy and the April Admissions Guidance simply failed to take into account the highly relevant consideration of the risk to elderly and vulnerable residents from asymptomatic transmission.”

“It is notable that on 25 and 28 March, days before the publication of the 2 April Admissions Guidance, the Minister for Social Care (Ms Whately) was raising concerns about this aspect of the guidance.

“It was not until 15 April in the Action Plan of that date that the Department recommended both testing and isolation for 14 days for new residents admitted to care homes, whether from hospital or from the community. Such isolation was to be either in the care home itself or using “local authority-based arrangements”, that is to say quarantine facilities.

“This was a significant delay at a critical period.

“We consider that the decision to issue the 2 April Admissions Guidance in that form was irrational in that it failed to take into account the risk of asymptomatic transmission, and failed to make an assessment of the balance of risks.

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And so, as this blog set out yesterday, the court held that the April guidance was irrational in that it failed to take account of a relevant consideration – and at a time where the government was seeking to discharge as many as possible from hospital and into care homes.

This is not about whether the government knew with absolute certainty whether there would be asymptomatic transmission.

But it is about that the government knowing there was a risk before the guidance was issued.

Government ministers and their advisers had spoken expressly of the risk.

Mounting scientific evidence stated there was a risk.

Given that all this can be shown as being known in March 2020, there can be no sensible reason for the April guidance to care homes not to have referred to this risk.

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And now let us come back to the statements from the prime minister and the former health secretary.

The prime minister:

“…we did not know in particular was that covid could be transmitted asymptomatically in the way that it was. I wish we had known more about that at the time.”

The former health secretary:

“I wish that the knowledge about asymptomatic transmission had been…had been…I had known it earlier.”

Both these statements are misleading, and indeed false.

The judgment puts together all the evidence possessed and available to the health department (and the health secretary) at the time.

The passages in the judgment where the court considers the government lawyer’s attempts to explain all this away (paragraphs 272 to 278 and 290) show just how weak the government’s position on this was.

Either the accumulated detail of the judgment of what was known and when – undisputed by the government in court – is true or the statements of the prime minister and the former health secretary are true.

But not both.

The government said it was throwing its protective arms around the care homes at that critical moment, when it was seeking to discharge as many as possible from hospital into care homes.

But the government instead issued guidance that made no mention of a risk that it knew existed – and that can be shown that the government knew existed.

And so people died.

Far from ‘clearing’ the former health secretary of ‘wrongdoing’, the judgment sets out that what was done was very wrong indeed.

**

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How one paragraph in the significant Covid and care homes judgment describes Matt Hancock’s lethal, unlawful policy

28th April 2022

One of the most outstanding lawyers I know works a lot with care home clients.

Sometime ago they told me about what happened when the hospitals started seeking to release patients into care homes at the start of the pandemic.

A hospital was trying to force a care home to take a potentially positive patient.

The lawyer advised their care home client to lock all the doors, and to not accept anyone from the hospital untested.

Robust advice yes – but it was a bleedingly obvious problem – and now the High Court has said, in effect, my friend’s legal advice was correct.

The Covid and care homes judgment handed down this week is long and complicated – 75 pages and 299 numbered paragraphs.

But one paragraph stands out – and goes to the heart of the relationship between policy on one hand and law on the other.

It is paragraph 289:

“Since there is no evidence that this question was considered by the Secretary of State, or that he was asked to consider it, it is not an example of a political judgment on a finely balanced issue. Nor is it a point on which any of the expert committees had advised that no guidance was required. Those drafting the March Discharge Policy and the April Admissions Guidance simply failed to take into account the highly relevant consideration of the risk to elderly and vulnerable residents from asymptomatic transmission.”

This is not an example thereby of a hard policy decision being made between competing options.

Most sensible people would say that is a matter for the government and not for the courts.

It was instead a decision which failed absolutely to take account of a relevant consideration.

As such, it was a policy decision that was not lawfully open to the decision-maker.

As those bringing the case set out, the secretary of state was the relevant decision-maker “and the public law duties fell on him personally to consider relevant considerations, exclude the irrelevant ones and be sufficiently informed”. 

How the court applied this legal principle in this case is interesting:

The court has held, in effect, that by the time the relevant guidance was issued, the risk of asymptomatic transmission was obvious and well-known – it was even being mentioned publicly by government scientific advisers.

But the government blithely put out guidance to care homes that did not even consider that risk, let alone provide for what care homes should have done to manage the risk.

The court elsewhere in the judgment rejects challenges on other grounds – and the court is careful to say that earlier stages of the pandemic, it would not have been fair or realistic for the government to have known that there was a risk.

But by the time of the April 2020 guidance, this was not the case – and the government could not pretend that was the case.

The government instead published guidance on which care homes were supposed to rely and did not care to consider the risk of asymptomatic transmission.

That took the decision out of the realm of administration and policy and into the realm of public law.

The judgment does not refer expressly to the famous Wednesbury principle, but this is an example of a decision so unreasonable no reasonable decision-maker could have made it.

And that is even after giving due latitude and deference to a government dealing with a pandemic – that offers no excuse to have got this guidance so completely – lethally – wrong.

Far from throwing their arms around the care home sector, the department of health instead threw their hands over their eyes.

And care homes should not have been placed in the dreadful predicament of having to decide whether it was safe to follow department of health guidance, or whether they should have locked their doors instead.

**

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What the next Queen’s Speech may tell us about this government

27th April 2022

Yesterday’s I newspaper had this interesting front page about the upcoming Queen’s Speech:

The article supporting the front page told us:

“At least a dozen Government bills which were promised at the Queen’s Speech a year ago will not become law in time for the next speech which takes place on 10 May. Downing Street is seeking to push through another 10 pieces of legislation in the next few days.”

What is especially interesting about this front page is its timing.

We are more-or-less at the midpoint of this parliament.

The last general election was on 12 December 2019, and the latest date for the next election, it would seem, is 24 January 2025.

The next Queen’s Speech – which has been set for 10 May 2022 – will mark the start of the last full parliamentary session where there would be adequate time for any significant reforms to be properly carried through after enactment.

In other words: if the government was to attempt major changes through legislation, this is the time.

But.

This government does not appear to have the appetite for major reforms.

Promised overhauls of, for example, our complex systems for planning or procurement will again not be put forward.

The (impartial) House of Commons Library provides the following list of Bills promised in the last Queen’s Speech that are yet to be introduced:

(‘Procurement Bill’ sounds like a bloke who works in supplier management in a less exciting sequel to Postman Pat.)

The library also lists the bills ‘foreshadowed’:

But as any decent scriptwriter will tell you, foreshadowing is not character (or story) development.

And it would seem that this government finds it easier to announce fundamental reforms than to actually take them forward and implement those reforms.

The ultimate reason for this is simple.

Reform is hard, policy is hard, law-making is hard.

Getting one’s thoughts together to the extent of actually having a Bill ready to introduce to parliament is hard.

The first reading in parliament of a Bill is not stage one of a process, but about stage seven or eight.

The hard work takes place on the departments and with parliamentary drafters.

Handing a Bill to ministers to pilot through parliament is not to be done lightly.

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The former Downing Street adviser Dominic Cummings had – regardless of his other merits and otherwise – ambitious plans to shake our planning and public procurement regimes.

No sensible person with knowledge of planning or public procurement would say the current arrangements are perfect.

An ambitious, reforming government would now be ready to grapple with fundamental reforms in planning, public procurement, and many other areas.

And this government would be in a strong position to do – on paper.

For this government has the greatest prize that the constitution of the United Kingdom can bestow: a large working majority in the House of Commons.

This means the government not only has all the advantages of extensive executive power (under the royal prerogative and otherwise), and access to the government legal service and the treasury panel of barristers for fighting cases in the courts.

It also means that the government can be confident of passing legislation through the House of Commons and, if necessary, forcing it through the House of Lords too.

Few Prime Minsters win this prize.

Clement Attlee had this prize, and used it to drive through welfare state legislation; Thatcher did with trade union and privatisation legislation; and even Tony Blair, in his first term, was able to get the Human Rights Act and other legislation on the statute book.

And our current government?

Here is a challenge: take a moment to name one flagship Act of Parliament passed since the general election.

Yes, there has been Brexit and Covid legislation – but this would have to have been passed whoever won the last general election.

Can you think of one?

I am a law and policy commentator – and I can can only think of a possible few – though various nasty laws on borders and protests are about to come enacted.

Of course: Brexit and Covid have taken a lot of government and parliamentary time, as have Afghanistan and Ukraine.

But.

At this mid-term moment, a government with a large working majority should be raring to go.

Yet it is not.

It a government that cannot even be confident to block or amend a reference to the privileges committee about the Prime Minister.

As Norman Lamont once said of then Prime Minister John Major, we have a government in office but not in power.

And that was when Major government had a very small majority, not the working majority of nearly eighty of Boris Johnson.

So this could be a significant Queen’s Speech – but its true significance may be about what it does not contain, rather than what it does.

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Twitter after Elon Musk

26th April 2022

There is a standing joke among social historians that the middle class is always rising, and the gentry always declining, in whatever period of history you are looking at.

Similarly, social media seems always to have been in decline – even though it is, historically speaking, a recent innovation.

There will be people reading and commenting on this blogpost who were adults before Facebook and other social media platforms were even heard of – or even before the invention of the WWW in 1989.

(The WWW appears to have been first proposed just before my eighteenth birthday – so ahem: never such innocence again.)

Perhaps some parts of social media are improving, and some parts declining, and some parts are just the same.

But there is a moment where things do seem to reach a turning-point, even if only for individuals.

The recent news about the intended purchase of Twitter by Elon Musk seems like a good turning-point – although it is not yet completed.

Before this news, you could kid yourself that you were on a social platform that was still maintained by those who created it.

That made it seem different – at least to me.

But the prospect of providing free content for the benefit of reportedly the world’s richest person seems an odd thing to do.

I will keep my Twitter account, with its following of just under 250,000 – as it would be foolish to abandon it as I continue to develop my career as a writer.

But I suspect I will only now use it as a ‘broadcast’ medium, to promote my stuff here and elsewhere (and reply to other tweets when apt).

And it must be said Twitter can be a vile and annoying place – and it is difficult to see how that can ever end.

Just as our species was always violent – it just gained the capacity through technology to be lethal on an industrial scale not available to other animals – our species is also not very pleasant in its use of communications and media.

It is just that we now can all be unpleasant to strangers on a massive scale.

Some think regulation is the answer – but it is hard to see how regulation can change or buck human nature, and pre-moderation and verification for all is not likely or credible for any large platform.

Social media cannot be uninvented.

But people’s habits can change, and it may be that Twitter and other social media will be left to those either broadcasting or bickering, or hiding in private walled gardens.

So thank you for following me here on this blog, where I will post every week day.

I am also going to start doing a podcast from time-to-time.

We can keep up a polite and constructive conversation about law and policy here, even if nowhere else.

**

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Macron’s victory – and the ongoing predicament of liberalism

25th April 2022

For some the victory of Emmanuel Macron in France is not enough.

The victory over his illiberal opponent was not sufficiently crushing.

He is not an especially liberal politician himself.

And his illiberal opponents may do well in elections to come.

But.

An implicit assumption of those holding such views is perhaps that a ‘once-and-for-all’ blow could somehow be struck, knocking out the illiberals.

Unfortunately, like the poor, the illiberals will always be there.

The horrors of mid-twentieth century authoritarianism was not the only manifestation of illiberalism.

Nazism and Fascism were not the classic form of such illiberalism, but how it formed in certain places at certain times.

The price of liberalism, like that of liberty, is eternal vigilance.

And so: when there are wins, like there was in France – and Slovenia – yesterday, there is nothing wrong with cherishing and celebrating such victories.

But such elations and rejoicing are necessarily short-lived, for pretty soon liberalism is going to have to politically defend itself all over again.

And again, and again.

For if liberals – and progressives – become complacent, and think that history has ended with the right side winning, then you next get resurgent illiberalism – as in the United States and elsewhere.

The contest of liberalism and illiberalism is a struggle without end.

So after the claps and cheers, we return to the position of brace, brace, and we do what we can to avoid the crashes to come.

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Thank you for reading – and please support this blog so that it can carry on.

These free-to-read law and policy posts every week day take time and opportunity cost to put together, as do the comments to moderate.

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