Category: Accountability

How the intervention of Boris Johnson has affected the stand-off between the Cabinet Office and the Covid Inquiry

1st June 2023

Yesterday this blog set out how the Covid Inquiry may have set an elegant spring-trap for the Cabinet Office.

In essence, the Cabinet Office was (is) being tardy in disclosing various materials, and the Covid Inquiry created a procedural situation that concentrates wonderfully the minds in the Cabinet Office.

The Cabinet Office had asserted last Friday that somehow documents – the content of which the Cabinet Office had only recently and confidently declared as “unambiguously irrelevant” – were not actually in the government’s possession.

This was, ahem, odd.

The Covid Inquiry then deftly put the Cabinet Office to the test on this, with the Inquiry chair insisting that senior officials set out a detailed explanation of how any of this made sense, with the explanation to be attested by a signed statement of truth, that is under the pain of perjury.

The deadline for these statements of truth, or delivery up of all the requested documents, is later today (Thursday 1 June) at 4pm.

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The Cabinet Office’s broader objection to disclosure was (is) that the Inquiry’s request was outside of the Inquiry’s legal powers, and the Cabinet Office says that part of this jurisdictional objection is on privacy law grounds.

This privacy argument, which the government is emphasising in press releases and briefings, is weak if not hopeless.

The disclosed documents will not necessarily be published, only assessed for relevancy by the Inquiry – and the government is already using external leading counsel to assess the relevancy of the documents.

Whether this relevancy assessment is done either by the government’s external leading counsel or by the Covid Inquiry makes little or no difference from a privacy law perspective.

That said, it would be quite interesting to watch the government go to court with a claim under the Human Rights Act and Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, especially as the government’s current policy is to repeal the former and to weaken the impact of the other.

(Perhaps the government could even apply to the European Court of Human Rights for an urgent interim ruling on privacy grounds, before the ability to make such applications is also curtailed.  Ho ho.)

Anyway, this was the stand-off as of yesterday.

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And then – enter a greased piglet, running towards a messy situation for once, rather than away from one.

It was unexpectedly announced that former Prime Minister Boris Johnson had not only provided the Cabinet Office with all the relevant materials, but also that he had no objection to the documents being disclosed in full to the Inquiry.

Indeed, he said that such non-redacted, full disclosure should take place.

Well.

This, at a stroke, placed the Cabinet Office in an awkward predicament.

The Cabinet Office could no longer say that it did not have the documents.

The Cabinet Office now had the documents – and it also had a deadline of today to disclose them to the Inquiry.

And Johnson’s consent to the disclosure of the documents undermined the privacy claim.

Of course, the other parties to the WhatsApp messages in question also have privacy rights, and so Johnson’s expressed consent is not absolutely fatal to the privacy argument.

But Johnson has pretty much pulled a rug from under the feet of the Cabinet Office’s privacy claim.

It will be difficult to maintain a privacy claim in court when Johnson himself has waived any privacy rights.

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Why did Johnson do this?

It is tempting to think that it was mere spite.

The Cabinet Office had, of course, referred Johnson’s diary entires to the police without any notice to Johnson.

And now Johnson has, in turn, undermined the Cabinet Office.

But there may be an explanation other than – or in addition to – spite.

Johnson’s new lawyers must have advised him that there was no solid legal basis to resisting disclosure to the Inquiry.

If there was a sound legal objection to disclosure then it would be surprising for Johnson to happily volunteer the documents in the way he did.

Given that there would be no sound legal basis to resist disclosure, then it would seem Johnson made a virtue – or perhaps in his case, a vice – out of necessity.

(It is should also be noted that this volunteered disclosure also perhaps undermines the legal claims that were briefed to the press by his supporters only days ago, about him bringing data protection and other claims against the Cabinet Office for the referral to the police.)

Of course, it may be that the volunteered disclosure of Johnson of the documents to the Inquiry is not full and complete, and it is never easy to take anything Johnson says at face value, but that does not effect the significance of his consent to the Cabinet Office’s legal position.

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What is the Cabinet Office now to do?

One suspects it will ask the Inquiry for yet another extension – or at least it will want to do so.

The Cabinet Office could now disclose the documents in accordance with the request of the Inquiry.

Or the Cabinet Office, without an extension of the deadline, could breach the deadline of the Inquiry.

This would create a serious situation, where either the Inquiry or the Cabinet Office (or both) would need to commence some form of contentious legal process.

Here the Cabinet Office is not on strong ground, especially because of Johnson’s intervention.

And if the Cabinet Office do go for judicial review, and lose, then that will create a precedent far worse for the government than compliance with the request.

The Cabinet Office may therefore disclose the requested documents on this occasion, while reserving the (purported) right to litigate in future.

We will see.

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How has the Cabinet Office ended up in this mess?

As this blog pointed out recently, government lawyers have a great deal of experience in dealing with inquiries and disclosure exercises, and they are usually quite good at this.

One suspects there is muddle at a more senior level in the Cabinet Office.

This is suggested, for example, by the after hours (and desperate) letter to the Inquiry late last Friday.

The most reasonable explanation for such a late letter is internal delays in decision-making within the Cabinet Office.

A muddle is also suggested by the Cabinet Office resorting to instructing the most senior external government lawyer – the so-called Treasury Devil – to submit a lengthy legal(istic) submission on the “unambiguously irrelevant” content of various documents.

Invoking the Treasury Devil, other than in actual litigation, is a sign of ministerial desperation – as the Northern Irish Protocol affair indicated.

Ministers treat calling in the Treasury Devil as akin to summoning the fifth emergency service.

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As Alan Hansen would say, the Cabinet Office seems all over the place.

The Cabinet Office has got itself into disarray.

And it would appear that this disarray is because of strategic and tactical clumsiness at a senior level within the Cabinet Office, which has now been exposed by the combination a canny resolute Covid Inquiry and the sudden incursion of a greased piglet.

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Will the Cabinet Office meet today’s deadline, absent another extension?

Or will there be litigation of some kind?

Will one side blink, or the other?

Will there be some form of face-saving, fudged compromise?

Who knows.

But it is not a good thing that this comedy of errors is being performed on an early stage of a public inquiry of such immense importance.

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Disclosure: I am a former central government lawyer.

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Why who controls the flow of evidence is crucial in any public inquiry

30th May 2023

Techies have a phrase for the principle: GIGO – garbage in, garbage out.

In essence, outputs tend to depend on inputs.

With legal(istic) processes – trials or inquiries – what this principle means is that the outcome of the process can be shaped (and often determined) by what is put in.

In the context of civil litigation, it is often possible to see which party is likely to win once all the evidence has been disclosed by the parties.

Sometimes, a civil case will still go to court for a trial, for one reason or another, but almost all civil litigation comes to an end before that final stage.

Inquiries are, of course, different to litigated cases – not least in that in an inquiry legal rights and liabilities are not determined, and there are not really remedies or sanctions.

Instead, an inquiry will set out the facts (as it has found them) in a report, and may make recommendations – and sometimes an inquiry can also point to (non-legal) culpability.

An affected party, therefore, has an interest in shaping the outcome of an inquiry.

And the most direct way an affected party can shape the outcome of an inquiry is by, in turn, shaping the flow of information available to that inquiry.

In practice, this comes down to what evidence that affected party is obliged to disclose to the inquiry – and to what evidence it can prevent other parties disclosing to that inquiry.

GIGO.

But.

The public interest is in the inquiry having access to all the relevant materials, so that its findings and any recommendations are as sound as possible.

The scope of what is relevant is, in turn, determined by the terms of reference (TOR) of the inquiry.

This means there is often a contest between what an inquiry wants to see and what an affected party wants to provide.

And this is the case for any affected party.

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But.

There is an additional practical problem when one of the affected parties is the government.

For the government is usually very good with inquiries.

The government – especially government lawyers – are skilled and experienced in dealing with inquiries.

This is not a surprise, if you think about it: the one affected party common to many matters for which there is a public inquiry is, well, the state.

The other affected parties will come and go, but the state – especially central government – will be involved in inquiries again and again.

And with this skill and experience comes accumulated insight – especially in how to manage the inquiry as a whole.

The knack is to think backwards from the outcome you want the inquiry to reach, and to then think through about how to shape the process at each stage.

That is why the early stages in any inquiry – the setting of the terms of reference and the disclosure exercises – are so fundamentally important.

For although unexpected things can – and do – happen during the course of an inquiry, the findings of an inquiry and recommendations – and the allocation of any culpability – will usually be largely determined by what happens at the early initial stages.

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This is why the current contest of the government and the Covid Inquiry is profoundly important.

The government wants to itself decide what evidence is relevant to the Inquiry.

Part of this stance is because it appears the government was wrong-footed (or were not thinking or were distracted) when the very wide terms of reference were set.

Had the terms of reference been tighter then the government would not now be as worried at this stage.

The Covid Inquiry – rightly, on any sensible view – instead wants to make the key relevancy decisions.

With an inquiry with a smaller scope, the government may have grounds for pushing back on such ambitious claims.

But this is an inquiry into the biggest public health issue of recent times, and so the benefit of the doubt should be with the inquiry.

The chair of the Covid Inquiry is also a former senior judge (presumably with security clearance) who is well placed to make decisions on relevance.

And it is certainly the case that what is provided to the inquiry will not be published unless it is deemed relevant.

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One can understand why the Cabinet Office officials and lawyers want to keep tight control on what is disclosed to the inquiry.

The government may even litigate to keep this control.

Yet any sensible person will want the government to lose such a case (though it is the nature of litigation that there is no absolute certainty that the government would lose).

For if we want this public inquiry to make the most robust possible findings, and the best possible recommendations, then it needs access to all available information.

And so the Covid Inquiry should not be hindered by the government deciding for itself what is and what is not relevant.

For whatever goes into this inquiry, the “out” should not be garbage.

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Disclosure: I am a former central government lawyer.

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“Not a promising start” – a close read of the Covid Inquiry ruling against the Cabinet Office, and why it may be very significant

24th May 2023

(This is the first in a planned series of posts on the Covid Inquiry – the next will be on Boris Johnson’s lawyer difficulty.)

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Today the Covid Inquiry made what may be a significant ruling that could shape how it will go about obtaining information and documents from unwilling to provide those documents.

This post explains today’s ruling – and sets out what the ruling may signal about the inquiry as a whole.

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To begin: public inquiries are powerful legal creatures.

Very powerful.

That is why governments tend to avoid having inquiries under the Inquiries Act 2005 if it can possibly be avoided.

For example, the Daniel Morgan panel inquiry was not under the 2005 Act.

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One of the immense powers of a public inquiry is in obtaining evidence.

The key provision here is section 21, which should be read in full by those following the Covid inquiry generally.

Section 21 provides:

We also need to look at Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 for how an Inquiry can obtain information without resorting to a section 21 notice:

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Real legal power, however, lies not so much in having a right to request something, but in what happens if that request is denied.

Here we go to section 35 of the Act:

Whack.

Not complying with a section 21 request is a criminal offence.

There are narrow exceptions to compliance with a section 21 request – for example if a document is privileged.

But subject to narrow exceptions, there is an obligation to comply with a section 21 request to provide evidence.

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In respect of documents, the Act provides that a person is required to provide documents “that relate to a matter in question at the inquiry”.

The crucial word here is “relate”.

It is a broad word, and it means that the scope is far wider than say a requirement to provide documents that are, say, directly relevant.

Documents that can “relate” to something can merely be documents that, although not directly relevant, contextualise other documents.

For example, a document may show what a decision-maker may have been preoccupied with at the same time a more relevant document was created, and so on.

And the provision prompts an obvious question: who decides whether a document “relates” to the work of an inquiry?

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The Covid Inquiry has broad terms of reference (and these also should be read in full by anyone following the inquiry).

And it seems earlier this year, the Inquiry was in correspondence with the Cabinet Office.

Significantly, the Inquiry was only relying at this early stage on requests under Rule 9 – and not (yet) the supercharged legal power under section 21.

According to documents released by the Inquiry today, there was substantial correspondence earlier this year between the Inquiry and the Cabinet Office.

But it seems the Inquiry was frustrated with what was (not) being disclosed and what was being redacted.

And so on 28 April 2023 (though not published at the time) the Inquiry chair issued a Section 21 notice:

Such a notice has to be taken seriously – very seriously.

The government, however, contended that it did not need to comply.

And instead made an application under the Act for the notice to be revoked.

The Cabinet Office even went so far to instruct the Treasury Devil – the government’s most senior external legal adviser – to set out the application.

And so we have a ten-page legal(istic) submission which looks far more like a court pleading than anything else.

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The primary objection of the government is what it calls “jurisdictional”.

In essence, the government contends that the Inquiry cannot order disclosure of documents which are “unambiguously irrelevant”.

The published application is very reliant on the phrase “unambiguously irrelevant” – even though that is not expressly mentioned in section 21 of the Act.

It is almost as if the government’s lawyers have devised this test for themselves, and now insist it has to be applied.

Of course, the section 21 power is for documents “that relate to a matter in question at the inquiry” – and here we have to remember that the Covid Inquiry’s remit is very wide.

In simple terms, the government’s position is that if a requested document does not relate to a matter in question at the inquiry then the Inquiry has no power to order disclosure.

And the crucial point is that the Cabinet Office says it is for them to decide whether a document is “unambiguously irrelevant” – and not the Inquiry:

“It is also important to note that the Cabinet Office has explained, in correspondence, the measures it has taken as a result of which the Inquiry can be assured that the appropriately high threshold has been, and will be, accurately and properly applied. The ability of parties to distinguish between potentially relevant material (including adverse material) and unambiguously irrelevant material is seen day in and day out in all litigation contexts. Such judgements are made by qualified legal representatives, owing professional obligations beyond those owed to their client, up to and including Leading Counsel.”

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The Application was considered by the chair of the Inquiry.

And the chair of the Inquiry said No.

Her ruling was published today, and it takes the government’s objections to jurisdiction head on.

The chair observes:

“The Notice was, as I have explained, premised on my assessment that the entire contents of the documents that are required to be produced are of potential relevance to the lines of investigation that I am pursuing.

“The essential thrust of the application therefore appears to be that this assessment is irrational, and thus there was no power to issue the Notice, because the Cabinet Office has reviewed the documents for itself and has concluded that those parts which are sought to be withheld from the Inquiry are “unambiguously irrelevant”. 

“I do not accept that my assessment was irrational.”

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(Please note I have broken up longer paragraphs from the quoted documents for flow.)

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The chair then makes a strong point about breadth and who makes the choice (emphasis added):

“First, it is self-evident that the Terms of Reference of this Inquiry are of great breadth. It is equally obvious that in order to discharge those Terms of Reference I will need to undertake a large number of extremely diverse lines of investigation.

“Those lines of investigation are bound to involve factual matters that are not specified in, and which may be collateral to, not only the issues identified in the Terms of Reference itself, but also the issues particularised in the published provisional scope document for any particular module of the Inquiry, and/or any more detailed lists of issues that the Inquiry may provide to Core Participants.

“For example, in order to evaluate the response of the government and/or of any individual Minister to the pandemic, it may be necessary for reasons of context for me to understand the other (superficially unrelated) political matters with which they were concerned at the time.

“Such matters may acquire greater significance where it appears to me, or it is otherwise suggested, that a Minister dealt with Covid-related issues inadequately because he or she was focusing (perhaps inappropriately) on other issues.

“For similar reasons, I may also be required to investigate the personal commitments of ministers and other decision-makers during the time in question.

“There is, for example, well-established public concern as to the degree of attention given to the emergence of Covid-19 in early 2020 by the then Prime Minister.

Moreover, the need for me to investigate allegations that have been aired publicly regarding disagreements between members of the government and breaches of Covid-19 regulations by those within government provides a further basis upon which material such as diary arrangements and content which may not appear to relate directly to the response to Covid-19 are of at least potential relevance to the investigations that I am conducting.

“The fact that the Cabinet Office has asserted that matters such as “entirely separate policy areas with which the Inquiry is not concerned” and “diary arrangements unconnected to the Covid-19 response” are “unambiguously irrelevant” to the work of my inquiry 4 demonstrates that it has misunderstood the breadth of the investigation that I am undertaking.”

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“Misunderstood.”

Ouch.

The chair continues:

“Second, it does not follow from the fact that the Cabinet Office has itself reviewed material, and considers it “unambiguously irrelevant”, that my assessment that the material is of potential relevance is irrational.

“The application seeks to establish a principle that the Chair of a public inquiry will be acting ultra vires in requiring the production of material where the recipient of a section 21 notice declares that material to be “unambiguously irrelevant”.

“I reject that proposition.

“The key flaw, as it seems to me, is that it wrongly allocates to the holder of documents, rather than to the inquiry chair, the final decision on whether documents are or are not potentially relevant to the inquiry’s investigations.”

Well, quite.

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She adds:

“It cannot be right that a mere assertion by such a person of “unambiguous irrelevance” has the effect of extinguishing any power in the inquiry to require the production of the documents so that it can determine for itself the relevance or otherwise of the material.

“In this case the document holder is a government department, but, in another, it might be, for example, a private individual or entity suspected of criminality.”

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And then the ruling gets very interesting, as she illustrates one particular point (again emphasis added):

“…it is apparent that some important passages (relating for example to discussions between the Prime Minister and his advisers about the enforcement of Covid regulations by the Metropolitan Police during the public demonstrations following the murder of Sarah Everard) were initially assessed by the Cabinet Office to be “unambiguously irrelevant” to my investigations and therefore redacted from copies of the WhatsApp messages initially provided to the Inquiry.

“Whilst those redactions have now (very recently) been removed, it was not a promising start.”

Not a promising start.

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The Application was dismissed, and the government has to disclose the requested documents by next Tuesday 30th May 2023.

The Cabinet Office may make a judicial review application to quash the notice – but unless it takes such a step, the only choice now is compliance or criminality.

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More generally, the chair’s ruling may be highly significant: an early sign that this Inquiry is not to be messed with, and that it will see through legalistic disclosure points of the government.

As such it is a very encouraging development.

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I plan to do a further post in the next day or two focusing on Boris Johnson’s particular problems with this disclosure decision.

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And if Braverman goes, then what?

22 May 2023

Another week, another senior cabinet minister facing demands to resign.

This time it is the Home Secretary Suella Braverman – and the key question is whether she misused her office and advisers in respect of dealing with what followed from a speeding offence.

And this means the key question is again not anything to do with policy.

Of course: this Home Secretary should not even be in office.

As this blog set out in plodding detail, her two accounts of that last incident did not add up.

In particular, the statement in her (last) resignation letter that “[a]s soon as I realised my mistake, I rapidly reported this on official channels, and informed the Cabinet Secretary” was simply not correct.

But it doesn’t matter; and it never now matters.

The detail of what happened last time is so much ancient history – even though it was only a few months ago.

The question of whether she stays on is one of pure politics – not law, not policy, not administration.

Does the Home Secretary have the political power to stay on?  Or does the Prime Minister have the political power to get rid of her?

One should not underestimate the Prime Minister in these situations: he deftly got rid of Dominic Raab by the expedient of delaying any decision to endorse him.

The Prime Minister did not become a head boy at a big school or a senior banker without knowing how to play certain games.

And so we may now also be seeing again the former Goldman Sachs banker “managing out” a troublesome junior colleague.

Who knows.

But perhaps those (of us) who would want to see Braverman no longer at the Home Office should be careful about what we wish for.

Her replacement might be an actually competent hardline Home Secretary.

Though, of course, it must also be said there are not that many potentially competent hardline ministers left for any department.

Cabinet ministers come and go, but the lack of any substantial policy and reform looks likely as if it will stay a while longer.

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Hurrah for this latest move towards transparency of the UK Supreme Court

27th April 2023

The test for whether an appeal reaches the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is that it raises “a point of law of general public importance”.

This means that, by defintion, the appeals are of wider interest than to the parties themselves.

It also means that it does not matter how interesting the facts of a particular case may be to judges or to the public, it will not get to the Supreme Court unless the outcome matters to others.

As such, all cases before the Supreme Court should be as transparent as possible.

But.

There is nominal transparency, and there is real transparency.

Being able to watch streamed proceedings, for example, is of little use if it is difficult – even impossible – to follow the submissions and lines of argument.

You may as well walk into the court from Parliament Square and try to work out what is going on at a hearing.

Real transparency comes from having access to the documents before the court – the skeleton arguments (setting out the legal argument), the statements of case (setting out the basis of the parties’ positions), and even the witness statements.

Only then do you have real transparency.

And so the latest news, as reported by Legal Futures, is welcome.

The Supreme Court is moving to putting documents online – subject to the usual (and usually understandable) exceptions for confidentiality in particular cases.

This would be a huge boon for the public understanding of law, and it will enable viewers to fully and constructively engage with what is going on.

A student – or a lay person – could sit with two screens – one watching the hearing, and the other toggling between documents, joyfully clicking onto hyperlinks to case reports and legislation.

There are few better ways than to grasp the nature of practical law and to understand how cases work.

There can be no argument in principle against this: for after all, these are cases which raise “a point of law of general public importance” – and these are documents referred to in open court.

There will be grumbles from some lawyers, who may not be willing to have their well crafted documents effectively become texts freely available in the public domain.

But that would be the cost of having a case before the Supreme Court – if you are litigating on “a point of law of general public importance” then it has to be on an open book basis.

And the general availability of such texts – which would otherwise often be stored in the exclusive precedent files of a small group of law firms and chambers – will promote best practice generally.

Lawyers at such law firms and chambers will be giving something back to the wider profession in a helpful and meaningful way.

Of course: pretty soon many people would get bored by the novelty of such access.

But in the longer term it generally would have a positive effect on legal study and professional development, as well as on the public understanding of law.

And, it must be admitted, it would be pretty great for legal bloggers too – and the readers of such blogs.

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The significance of the resignation of Dominic Raab

21st April 2023

The end, when it came, was not pretty.  But then again, endings rarely are.

The resignation letter was extraordinary:

The impression was that the letter was drafted in a rush – the sort of draft one would put together to get something out of one’s system, before composing something more measured.

The letter was accompanied by a 1,100 word piece in the Telegraph which was published eighty-or-so minutes later:

As a published article, it presumably would have been commissioned, edited and lawyered before publication – and so it may have been written before the letter.

But it said much the same.

One remarkable thing was that both the letter and the published article were in the public domain before the actual report – presumably to “frame the narrative” as a political pundit would put it.

And then the report was published:

And it became obvious why Raab was so anxious to “frame the narrative”– as parts of the report were, as a lawyer would put it, “adverse”.

This did not seem to be the usual, coordinated exchange of letters with a prime minister, which one would expect with such a senior resignation.

Instead, it looked a mess.

And one can only wonder about how this mess relates to the unexpected delay from yesterday, which was when the report was expected to be published and the prime minister was expected to make a decision.

What seems plain, however, is that Raab was pressed into a resignation.

If so, there is a certain irony, as it was the threatening of unpleasant outcomes to people who did not comply with his wishes/demands which was the subject matter of some of the complaints.

It therefore appears that Rishi Sunak was more skilful in this cost-benefit power-play than Raab.

In his resignation letter, Raab twice warns of the “dangerous” outcome if he did not get to continue on his way.

But in practice, Sunak by being silent and not “clearing” Raab yesterday placed Raab in an increasingly difficult situation, where it was becoming obvious even to Raab that unless he resigned he would be sacked.

Some may complain that Sunak “dithered” – but another analysis is that this former head boy and city banker patiently out-Raabed the school-cum-office bully.

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Beginnings, like endings, are also often not pretty.  And rarely are they ideal.

But, at last, the Ministry of Justice is free from perhaps the worst Lord Chancellor of modern times.

(Yes, worse even than Christopher Grayling or Elizabeth Truss.)

Over at his substack, Joshua Rozenberg has done an outstanding post on why – in substantial policy and administrative terms – Raab was just so bad.

And on Twitter, the fine former BBC correspondent Danny Shaw has also detailed the many failings in this thread:

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The Ministry of Justice is in an awful state.

The departing minister’s obsession with prioritising symbolic legislation such as the supposed “Bill of Rights” and a “Victims” Bill – which mainly comprises the shallow sort of stuff too often connected to the word “enshrining” – was demonstrative of the lack of proper direction for the ministry.

And it is significant that it was only during the interruption of the Truss premiership, with a new (if temporary) Lord Chancellor that the barristers’ strike was resolved.

Joshua Rozenberg sums up that telling situation perfectly:

“We saw an example of Raab’s indecisiveness in the way handled the strike by criminal defence barristers last summer. Increasing delays — caused initially by government-imposed limits on the number of days that judges could sit — were rapidly becoming much worse.

“Raab seemed like a rabbit frozen in the headlights, unable to decide which way to turn. The problem was solved by Brandon Lewis, who replaced Raab for seven weeks while Liz Truss was prime minister. He simply paid the barristers some more money.

“It was not so much that Raab was ideologically opposed to making a pay offer. On his return to office, he made no attempt to undermine the pay deal reached by Lewis. It’s just that he seemed unable to take a decision.”

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Now decisions can be made.

Gesture-ridden draft legislation can be abandoned.

And the grunt-work of actually administering our courts and prisons and probation service can take place.

That grunt-work will also not be pretty, and the incoming Lord Chancellor will not get easy claps and cheers that come with attacking “lefty” lawyers and “woke” judges.

But a new start can be made, and all people of good sense should wish the new Lord Chancellor well.

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Waiting for yet another report

20th April 2023

This evening those who take an interest in Westminster politics are waiting for yet another report.

The report – this time into allegations against Dominic Raab, which he denies – has been delivered.

It is reported Raab has read it and sees no reason to resign, and so it is now up to the Prime Minister whether Raab should be sacked, and the Prime Minister has not decided.

It seems not vey long ago we were all waiting for the Sue Gray report, and there have been various other reports and inquiries, some of which have been quietly abandoned.

The purpose of this short post is not to preempt the report: I have not seen it and, as of today, almost certainly neither have you.

Instead it is to mark that, again, reports and inquiries are taking the place of traditional politics.

Perhaps this practice is a good thing: that information is compiled before a decision is made.

But perhaps it also a bad thing: for it enables ministers and others to avoid and even evade responsibility and accountability with an investigation takes place.

It almost a contracting-out of democratic and representative functions, at least in the short- to medium-term.

And the practice is now as much a part of our polity as the more formal elements that would be detailed in a constitutional text book.

Somebody should maybe commission a report into the practice, so that we too can put off doing anything about it.

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The problem of PDD – the Public Display of Defendants

5th April 2023

Let us start with the old adage: justice not only has to be done, justice must also be seen to be done.

The phrase is sometimes attributed to this very short judgment from 1923, which contained:

“…justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”.

The saying reminds us that justice is not only about process – it is also about performance.

An adjudication by a court not only resolves a dispute between parties (even if one of the parties is a prosecuting authority) but is also a social fact that, in turn, goes to whether there is justice in a community as a whole.

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In the last week there has been two striking examples of the performative element of justice.

One was in a Manhattan courtroom, where one defendant was photographed with his attorneys in a courtroom, but he was spared the “perp walk” and other humiliations.

Another was in an English courtroom, where the convicted murderer refused to come up from the cells to attend sentencing.

The Secret Barrister has written well and convincingly about the latter incident.

As the Secret Barrister indicates, this may be a problem which does not have an easy solution, despite the political and media clamour that something must be done.

There is no obvious way that a defendant can be coerced into respectfully attending their sentencing hearing.

Convicts facing life sentences have no real concerns about additional years.

And there is nothing straightforward that will prevent a prisoner gurning and grinning throughout a sentencing, so as to make the victims and their families yet more uncomfortable.

A judge ordering such a distracting and disruptive defendant to be taken back down to the cells defeats the purpose of forcing them to attend the sentencing, if you think about it.

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There is perhaps a deeper and more difficult question here.

At what point does the performative element of sentencing become a thing in itself, rather than the means be which we can see that justice is being carried out?

The history of punishment is full of examples where the PDD was geared to humiliate the convict as an objective by itself.

But.

This sometimes backfired.

For example, those being taken by cart to Tyburn to be hanged often became part of a carnivalesque spectacle.

There are even tales of prisoners playing up to the cheering crowds.

(Image credit)

And this is the problem about justice as theatre: not everyone solemnly plays the solemn parts to which they have been solemnly allotted.

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There has to be a balance between justice as a process and justice as a performance.

Surviving victims and their families should be heard, and they should have a say.

They should see justice being done, as it is done.

This is fundamental.

But those who promise surviving victims and their families that defendants and convicts can be coerced into some performance of contrition or seriousness may be falsely raising the hopes of those surviving victims and their families.

And it may be better not to make such irresponsible promises.

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It should always be remembered that the sentence is the punishment.

By seeking to add performative elements to the process of justice, in addition to any sentence, there is a risk that the performance – the PDD – becomes an end in and of itself.

And if so, then the actual punishment – the sentence – becomes secondary, an afterthought.

The PDD becomes the thing.

And this would be a mistake.

For justice should not only has to be seen to be done, justice has to be done.

The old adage works the other way round too.

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A stitch in time saves…

24th March 2023

Yesterday’s post on the appearance of Boris Johnson before the committee of privileges was supposed to the last on that topic…

…but.

It is really such a delicious constitutional moment – the legislature holding the former head of the executive to account with contested views of whether there should be a judicial process is a heady concoction of the supposed separation of powers.

And so here is a further thought, brought about by the lethal questioning of Johnson by the Conservative backbencher Alberto Costa on exactly what advice Johnson had taken, and from whom.

Johnson admitted that he did not taken legal or any other official advice before telling the House of Commons that he had been advised that the applicable rules and guidance had been followed.

It seems the advice was merely from a political adviser.

Well.

Johnson has certainly taken a lot of legal advice since.

If only he had taken legal advice at the right time, then he would have been saved having to take all this legal advice afterwards.

A stitch in time saves the need for any stitch-up later.

Have a good weekend.

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The Committee of Privileges and the Equality of Arms

23rd March 2023

Here are some further – and perhaps final – thoughts about the appearance of the former prime minister before the committee of privileges of the House of Commons this week.

Boris Johnson not only “lawyered-up” – he was as lawyered-up as it is humanly possible to be.

At his side as he gave his evidence he had a senior partner of the leading white-collar criminal law firm, and just behind him he had one of the leading barristers on due process and fundamental rights of his generation.

Before Johnson’s appearance there had been submission after submission – all at the taxpayers’ expense.

For a politician who has routinely derided legal aid lawyers and activist judges throughout his career, he certainly ensured he had resort to the best possible legal advice when it mattered to him.

And the strange thing is that this was not even a legal proceeding: this was entirely a matter for parliament and not for any court.

But Johnson was not taking any chances: he was lawyered-up to the hilts when no lawyers were needed at all.

However, because he had lawyered-up, and his lawyers had come up with elaborate and technical arguments about fairness and evidence, then the committee responded in kind.

And the the committee had access to its own legal advice, not least that of Sir Ernest Ryder – the former lord justice of appeal and senior president of tribunals.

There are few, if any, lawyers with a better understanding of the rules of evidence and fairness.

And so yesterday saw that the heavily prepped Johnson met and confounded by an even better prepped committee.

The questioning was short and relevant, and rarely outpaced the disclosed evidence, and Johnson was often left at a disadvantage.

For example, Johnson was forced to concede that the “advice” on which he supposedly advised was not from any official or lawyer – but from a political appointed adviser.

Like a tag team, each member of the committee had prepared the ground they had to cover so that as much ground as possible was covered.

From a lawyer’s perspective, the committee hearing was a forensic treat.

But.

A parliamentary committee hearing should not be such a legalistic exercise.

How much better, from a political perspective, if Johnson had simply turned up to tell the truth to a committee of his fellow members of parliament – instead of this legalistic arms race.

As it was, the committee was more than a match to Johnson’s legalistic approach.

And, of course, Johnson is (as this blog has previously averred) playing the long game of trying to influence what sanction follows, if any.

Yet in the shorter-term, the only thing Johnson has gained by lawyering-up will be a more tightly robust and comprehensive committee report than otherwise would have been produced.

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If only others in our society had access to such an equality of legal arms.

Even those who are facing an actual legal or judicial process.

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