Category: Communications and Media & Law and Policy

The media and policy contexts of Tyrone Mings’ extraordinarily powerful tweet

13th July 2021

Yesterday the England international and Aston Villa footballer Tyrone Mings posted this tweet:

There is no equivocation: the express charge – that the home secretary is both stoking the fire of racism and a hypocrite – made by a senior and outstanding footballer is about as serious a thing that could be said by the one of the other.

That it is a quote tweet of the home secretary – and thereby both a direct response to and gloss of the minister’s tweet – makes it all the more striking.

Even without knowing anything more of the circumstances, it is a text of extraordinary power.

And at the time of posting this blog, the tweet had over 400,000 likes and 140,000 retweets/quote tweets – dwarfing the figures of the home secretary’s tweet.

It would appear our home secretary’s populism is not that popular.

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Understanding the various contexts for Tyrone Mings’ tweet adds to and does not diminish its force.

But such is the power of the tweet the contexts are also worth considering.

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One context is that this is the latest contribution from an individual with an open and long-standing interest in racial and social justice.

This is Tyrone Mings last year in Birmingham at the protests at the death of George Floyd:

Unlike politicians, for him this is no bandwagon.

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Another context is that social media allows there to be a countering and opposite reaction to the vile populism of politicians and their media supporters.

This is the media context of the tweet.

As this blog set out yesterday, the fragmentation of political parties and of the media enable knavish and foolish politicians an extensive reach for their culture war politics.

But it is not all one way.

The populists can be confronted and exposed.

The challenge for those who care for social justice and liberalism is to counter and oppose the illiberal populists on a sustainable basis.

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A further context is that Mings’ tweet undermines the attempts by the current government to evade responsibility for stoking the racism that manifested itself after England’s defeat – but is always present in our society.

This is the policy context of the tweet.

The government’s current ploy is to blame the social media companies with the threats, no doubt, of ‘tougher measures’ and perhaps even ‘crackdowns’.

But it is the ministers and their political and media supporters who derided as ‘gesture politics’ the direct moves by the footballers to show the watching supporters that racism was unacceptable.

Of course: social media companies need to take more responsibility – but they are conduits.

The footballers were instead confronting racism at its source – and government ministers mocked them for doing so.

Mings’ tweet exposed the emptiness and cynicism of the government’s political tactics.

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Any powerful political utterance will work on a number of levels.

But sometimes, that a statement has force in a number of contexts is an implication of someone having the courage and presence to say the right thing at the right time to the right person.

The implications and the contexts then take care of themselves.

The populism of illiberal politicians rarely have the substance and the effects of statements such as Mings.

It is almost as if the populism of the home secretary and others in the cabinet is the true ‘gesture politics’.

And they should remember that those who start culture wars can also lose them.

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When culture war combines with constitutional impotence: a warning from history

12th July 2021

The first time I heard about Otto von Bismarck was when I started my history A-level – until then I knew the name ‘Bismarck’ only as a name of a sunk battleship from world war two.

The first thing we learned about Bismarck the politician was that he launched a culture war – a Kulturkampf.

And the first things we learned about this Kulturkampf was that it created needless social divisions, that it was counter-productive and was quickly abandoned, and that Bismarck did not really have a sincere belief in any of it anyway.

Of course, what one gets to know from any A-level history course is often more simplistic than a more nuanced understanding that you can get from further reading and thought.

But this understanding of Bismarck and his Kulturkampf is more useful in understanding the policy of our current government than knowing the names of second world war battleships.

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At the time of my A-levels in the late 1980s, there was the political attack on the ‘loony left’ and then a decade or so later ‘political correctness’ was the target – ‘gone mad’ or otherwise – and now it is ‘deep woke’ or whatever.

And although from time to time this politics of nasty name-calling was translated into policy and law – for example, section 28 – it never seemed (at least to me, in my privileged state) the very essence of government policy until the current government.

Now there are a number of ministers who freely indulge in culture wars – playing like infants with matches.

A report published by the Fabian society today – of which I have only had a preliminary scan – offers a detailed analysis of the current culture wars and those who promote them:

These four summary bullet-points are especially plausible.

And the current configurations of media and politics seem to give each of these ‘peddlers’ more power than they may had before.

The decline in mainstream political parties as broad coalitions, moderating the extremes, means the grievance-mongers can rise quickly to political power – and that illiberal politicians can mobilise their illiberal bases directly and unashamedly.

(The political figures I remember from the late-1980s being the rent-a-quote members of parliament for ‘loony left’ hit-pieces – Beaumont-Dark, Dicks, Dickens – were all safely on the backbenches – now the quotes would come directly from the cabinet.)

The decline in traditional media as gatekeepers on who gets access to broadcasting and publication also mean that the perpetually outraged and the trolls have immediate and effectively limitless reach.

The grievance-mongers, the perpetually outraged and the trolls all existed (if with different labels) before the rise of the internet, but they did not perhaps have the easy access to media and political power.

A recent post on this blog averred that this political culture war has, in turn, constitutional – and constitutionalist – implications.

There is a reckless political belief that there are no constitutional rules or norms which are beyond being gamed for political advantage.

And when culture war combines with constitutional impotence then we have the politics of another German chancellor – you know, that one whose name you still do not need to have studied history to have heard of.

There is a worrying alignment of culture war and constitutional weakness, and unless one or both of these are addressed, it will not be difficult for knaves or fools to exploit their grim opportunity.

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“Deep Woke”, football, inclusive solidarity – and constitutionalism

8 July 2021

In the last week we have been introduced to the phrase ‘deep woke’.

It was used by my Financial Times colleague Gideon Rachman as an expression to describe the governing party’s disdain to this welcome and inclusive article by Gareth Southgate.

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A deep wookie.

(Source.)

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Southgate’s articulation of solidarity is everything that the facile populist nationalism of the current government and its supporters is not.

No wonder they have a phrase to deride it.

The practical approach of Southgate was set out in this detailed and insightful piece at The Athletic site (which is strongly recommended for its journalism-led content – and so subscribe to it rather than complaining about the paywall):

Reading Kay’s account of organisational change and inclusive solidarity, I was struck by its potential implications in respect of constitutionalism and political behaviour.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1412486141568245768

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One of the problems in the current politics of the United Kingdom is the hyper-partisan disregard for constitutional principles and practices that mean politicians of different views can work together.

The prime minister Boris Johnson and his former assistant Dominic Cummings, and their supporters, have promoted the weaponisation of constitutional matters – from misleading the Queen to attacking the judiciary and ignoring the house of commons.

In these toxic Bannon-ite circumstances, the solution is not a written (that is, codified) constitution – for the knaves would just seek to game that too.

The problem is not formal – still less legalistic – but cultural.

There is not a sense of constitutionalism in the government – the understanding that there are political norms and practices higher than party advantage.

Instead, we have childish glee as a government-supporting politician finds a new confrontation to force or contrives a culture war to stoke.

It does not have to be this way.

And it is strange that it takes footballers to point this out – not only the mature inclusivity of Southgate but also, for example, the thoughtful kindness of figures such as Marcus Rashford and Jordan Henderson, among others.

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There cannot be ‘Public Sector Reform’ without genuine transparency and a general duty of candour

20th June 2021

(This is the third in a trilogy of short posts about the accountability of the United Kingdom state – see Garbage in, Garbage Out and The Accountability Gap.)

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Every so often there will be some politician – usually Michael Gove but sometimes someone else – who will urge that there be ‘public sector reform’.

This reform should be ‘radical’ or ‘fundamental’.

Heads will nod, and hands may even clap.

Worthy pdfs will be clicked on earnestly, only for the tabs to be then left unread.

And then nothing really happens until the next time some politician – usually Michael Gove but perhaps someone else – will urge that there be ‘public sector reform’.

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What is often missing in many of these heady, fine-sounding proposals is the one thing that would genuinely be radical or fundamental.

This would be to force public sector bodies to disclose information against their will.

For as long as public bodies – politicians and officials – can pick and choose what information can be disclosed publicly, there can never be any meaningful reform of the public sector.

There needs to be a tension – a check and a balance – in respect of any public body’s estimation of itself and its performance.

Unfortunately – as typified by the cabinet office under Michael Gove – there is a general public sector disdain for transparency and freedom of information.

There always seems to be some reason to keep public sector information secret – from ‘national security’ to ‘commercial confidentiality’.

Indeed, the most dismal and insincere official documents in existence are freedom of information non-disclosure decision letters.

Everyone involved knows that the content of such letters is faithless guff – but nobody with any power seems to care.

When there is no duty of disclosure and no duty of candour there can be no holding of the public sector to account.

And if there is no way of holding the public sector to account then any ‘public sector reform’ will not succeed against the private interests of the officials and politicians involved – nor against the interests of external suppliers.

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So, to mimic David Hume, there is something to ask of any public sector reform, whether it is proposed by Michael Gove or somebody else:

Will the proposed public sector reform result in the public sector disclosing information that it otherwise would be unwilling to disclose?

No?

Will the proposed public sector reform mean that officials and politicians – and relevant third parties – being candid when they otherwise would not be?

No?

Then commit the proposed public sector reform to the flames, for it will contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

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Judicial review, Dominic Cummings and ‘Potemkin paper trails’ – and why courts require reasons for certain decisions

11th June 2021

In three tweets in a thread posted this week, Dominic Cummings, the former assistant to the prime minister, refers to ‘Potemkin’ paper trails and meetings.

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What does he mean?

And does he have a point?

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What he is alluding to, of course, are the ‘Potemkin’ villages, where things in bad conditions were dressed up to be in good conditions so as to mislead others.

In the context of judicial review, Cummings presumably does not mean that bad reasons would be dressed up as good reasons.

What he instead intends to mean is that there could be artificial reasons and contrived meetings the purpose of which was to make a decision judge-proof.

To a certain extent, he has a point.

In the judicial review case in question, had there been evidence of officials conducting any form of evaluation exercise then the tender award may have been harder to attack legally.

And such an exercise could, in reality, have been nothing other than going through the motions rather than anything that could have actually led to another agency actually getting this valuable contract.

But this is not the reason the courts require reasons for certain decisions – and it may not have changed the judgment in this case either.

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Judges and courts are not stupid and naive.

Judges and courts know full well reasons can be artificial and contrived.

The judges were once barristers and solicitors and, as such, they would have had considerable experience of advising clients on providing reasons for certain decisions. 

The purpose of requiring reasons for decisions – and for ministers and officials to say they are true reasons – is to make it more difficult for bad and false decisions to be made.

For example – take the decision by the government to seek a prorogation of parliament in 2019.

No minister or official – or adviser – was willing to sign a witness statement (under pain of perjury) as to the true reason for advising the Queen to prorogue parliament.

And without such a sworn (or affirmed) reason, the government lost the case.

Reasons also provide a reviewing court with a basis of assessing whether a decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision could have made it, and also of assessing whether relevant considerations had been included and irrelevant considerations were excluded.

Providing reasons does not provide an escape route for cynical and irrelevant and unreasonable decision-making.

But it is an impediment, and one that makes it harder for ministers and officials to get away with bad decision-making. 

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And in the recent judicial review, it is not clear to me (as a former central government procurement lawyer) that even an artificial ‘Potemkin’ exercise would have necessarily saved the decision from legal attack.

Awarding a high-value contract to cronies where a nominal (though documented)  exercise of discretion had not shown any actual objective advantage over other possible suppliers would still have been open to legal attack.

So this is not necessarily a case where the failure to provide a ‘Potemkin’ paper trail is to blame for the loss of a legal case.

The pram may well have fallen down the stairs anyway.

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How to treat the parliamentary evidence today from Dominic Cummings

26th May 2021

Dominic Cummings, the former assistant to the prime minister excites strong opinions – and it is difficult to escape those strong opinions when you write or think about him.

But the attempt should be made – as what he had to say at today’s remarkable parliamentary committee hearing may or may not be important.

The approach I would recommend is as follows:-

First – avoid confirmation bias – especially when it is from an unexpected source.

Many of the things he said confirm the prejudices of those critical of the current government generally and the prime minister in particular – and there was glee to hear him, of all people, say these things.

You should be especially wary of things which affirm what you think must be true.

Second – be aware of the selective nature of the evidence.

For example – some ministers were damned, but other ministers – such as the chancellor responsible for ‘eat out to help out’ and uncertainty over furlough payments – were not criticised

Nor was the cabinet office minister blamed for any difficulty in his department.

If this was a general critique of ministerial competence then it was lopsided – and almost vindictive.

Third – be aware also of motivation.

The former assistant to the prime minister wants, of course, to be vindicated – not least because of the Barnard Castle tarnish.

He has an understandable desire to have been right all along – and his failures only being that he did not do more sooner.

And fourth – there is the issue of honesty.

The former assistant to the prime minister once admitted that the £350million-a-week promise for the NHS was a convenient lie.

He was also one of those ministers and advisers who could not and did not sign the statement of truth (under pain of perjury) about the true reason for the prorogation – and it was the lack of such a witness statement that meant the government lost the case in the supreme court.

Indeed, the fact that if he said something untrue today may have been a contempt of parliament holds no fear for him – as he already has been held in contempt of parliament and with no consequences.

It was a win-win situation today from his perspective – he could take the benefit of absolute parliamentary privilege to make serious allegations, but with none of the sanctions for that benefit being misused.

Nonetheless, a lot of what he said ‘rang true’ – and it may be that there will be evidence that substantiates his many general and detailed claims of wrongdoing by others – some of which are highly serious.

And nothing he said should be dismissed out-of-hand just because he was the one who said it.

Everything he said may be true.

But everything he said, for the four reasons above, needs to be corroborated.

Today was great political theatre – but more is needed before any reliance can be placed upon this great political performance.

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The Daniel Morgan panel report will be the nearest we ever get to Leveson Part II

23rd May 2021

We have a lopsided view of the bad things that were happening in respect of the media around the turn of this century.

The focus has been on the press – journalistic ethics, newsroom culture and the breaches of the civil and criminal law.

But those did not happen in a vacuum.

What elements of the press did was part of a wider problem, which involved the metropolitan police and the private investigation industry.

Of course, the press took advantage of these relations and was the source of a lot of the money involved.

But there were wrongs being committed on the supply-side of the trade in personal information.

Had the Leveson inquiry continued with its phase two – that was to look at the dealings of the press with the police and so on – then we would now have a more rounded picture of what went on.

But the Leveson inquiry will now never continue to phase two.

And so the nearest we will get to a documented understanding of this supply-side will be the independent panel report on the Daniel Morgan case – a case which goes to the heart of the problematic relationship between the press, the police and the private investigation industry.

It may well turn out to be the best record we will ever get of what then happened – and how so many got away with so many things which they should not have done so.

 

The Crown and the Media – from phone hacking to the Dyson report

22nd May 2021

If anyone doubted the often indirect power of the crown in the public affairs of the United Kingdom then this week’s media news about the Dyson report is a useful reminder.

A reporter fabricated documents so as to engineer an introduction to a member of the royal family and then lied about it.

This sort of ‘blagging’ – as  some of those in the media would call it – was one of what was once euphemistically described as the ‘dark arts’.

And as a result of the exposure of this dishonesty, the future of the BBC (itself founded by royal charter) is now uncertain.

To throw the future of the United Kingdom’s state broadcaster into doubt requires a significant intervention.

It is an example of how the presence of a royal element to a story can electrify things.

And it is not the first time.

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The phone hacking scandal – which affected the press in a way that the Dyson report may affect the BBC – also came about because it had a significant royal element.

In short: the telephones of the royal household were hacked – just as the telephones of celebrities and newsworthy non-celebrities were hacked.

(Hacking was another of those ‘dark arts’.)

But because the target was the royal household, a different part of the metropolitan police became involved instead of those parts of the metropolitan police that the press then had a close (and mutually advantageous) relationship.

This in turn led to a police raid of a private investigator’s office, and the documents then seized in turn were a media-legal time-bomb which exploded when disclosed about the time of the Millie Dowler murder trial.

The story is set out in this thread by James Doleman, who reported on the trials (and with whom, I must add, I disagree on other issues):

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Had the mobile telephones of the royal household not been hacked then it is plausible that – even now – we would not know anything about the real extent of telephone hacking.

Such is the indirect power of the crown in our public affairs.

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The Daniel Morgan independent panel in effect tell the Home Secretary: ‘you have no authority here Priti Patel, no authority at all’

20th May 2021

Yesterday’s post was about the home secretary making an extraordinary intervention that would delay the long-awaited publication of report of the independent panel on the death of Daniel Morgan.

And then came further news that the panel were refusing to give the report to the home secretary:

This is a splendid and spirited response from the panel to what is an unconvincing attempt by the home secretary to intervene.

And alluding to that infamous parish council meeting, one wag caught it perfectly:

(Though, of course, in that other instance, the recipient of that comment was the one in the right, as this blog then explained.)

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The move by the home secretary may not only fail – it may be counter-productive.

Last week those who followed the Daniel Morgan case were wondering whether the impending publication of the independent panel report would get any press or public attention.

And then our clumsy bullying Home Secretary sought to clumsily bully the independent panel.

Well.

 

Such PR is priceless.Without her intervention, the report may have generated little interest beyond those who had an interest anyway.

Now there is far more interest.

And as someone was quoted in the news report:

“There are no national security issues involved. There are national embarrassment issues.”

If this is correct (and I have no idea) then, thanks to the home secretary, more people will now be aware of this.

Before attempting to intervene, the home secretary should have read the terms of reference of the independent panel – read them, and understood them.

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(With apologies to the great Jackie Weaver)

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The Post Office scandal: as the problem was about non-disclosure, then logically an inquiry with powers to compel evidence is required

1st May 2021

The Post Office scandal is being described fairly as one of the most widespread miscarriages of justice in legal history.

One of the fundamental problems that led to this scandal was non-disclosure.

The managers (and presumably the lawyers) knew information about the reliability of their Horizon software but did not disclose it.

Had that information been disclosed then (depending on the timing of the disclosure) prosecutions would not have taken place, or defendants would have been found not guilty, or convictions could have been more speedily appealed.

And so, given this fundamental problem of non-disclosure, it is remarkable that the government’s response is an inquiry that cannot compel the disclosure of evidence.

Just think about it.

The government’s non-statutory inquiry has its own web page and terms of reference.

And if you read through the documents on the page, what is said is fine as far as it goes.

But it does not go far enough.

For example, one of the terms of reference is expressly in respect of obtaining information:

‘[to b]uild upon the findings of Mr Justice Fraser, by obtaining all available relevant evidence from Post Office Ltd, Fujitsu and BEIS to establish a clear account of the implementation and failings of Horizon over its lifecycle’.

Yet, as where there is blame there will be claims, the various entities mentioned will have reason to not disclose anything which could lead to civil or even criminal liability.

They will have engaged lawyers to advise them on their obligations in respect of the disclosure of information for the inquiry – and that advice would give them legal cover to refusals to share information.

And what goes for documentary evidence goes to witness evidence too, as this tweeter well observes:

What we therefore face is one problem that was caused by non-disclosure being followed by another problem caused by a different type of non-disclosure.

There is no good reason why the inquiry into the Post Office scandal does not have statutory powers to compel evidence.

And, given that non-disclosure was at the heart of the miscarriages of justice, every good reason why it should.

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