Big “P” Party vs little “p” party

9th May 2023

I once listened to a Young Conservative’s spirited explanation to two passers-by about how the Conservative Party did not actually exist.

There was, you see, the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations; and then, you see, there is the parliamentary party, which is quite separate; and then, you know, there is Conservative Central Office.

As the Young Conservative then went onto explain how professional party agents did not fit into this neat scheme, I could tell those being canvassed-in-the-street were both impressed and bewildered.

Surely a “Party” is a thing?

Well, actually, the Young Conservative was more-or-less correct.

And “parties” are still quite difficult to define.

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Of course, there are legalistic definitions.

In the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, “party” is to be interpreted as including “any organisation or person” and “registered party” is defined as a party registered under that Act.

This is not illuminating.

Once registered, parties have certain obligations and rights, but that will not help us understand what is meant by “party”.

Halsbury’s Laws of England tells us the effect of that Act:

“In order to field candidates at elections, political parties must be registered.

“A party may not be registered unless it has adopted a scheme which sets out the arrangements for regulating the financial affairs of the party and which has been approved in writing by the Electoral Commission. The scheme must include such information as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Commission and must determine in particular whether the party is to be taken to consist of a single operation with no division of responsibility for the financial affairs and transactions of the party, or a central organisation and one or more separate accounting units. Where a registered party is a party with accounting units, each unit has a treasurer and an officer.”

Again, informative but not illuminating.

Elsewhere in the law, there are hints

For example, one of the (many) contributions by James Goldsmith to the law of defamation was to bring a case which resulted in it being established that a political party cannot sue for libel.

In this way political parties are like public authorities.

But again, this does not tell us what a “party” is.

Outside of law, we can point to the defintion of the eighteenth century Irish philosopher and British politician Edmund Burke:

“a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.”

One may quibble with at least a couple of words in this defintion – but it is helpful because it does not constrain us to just looking at professional politicians, professional staff, and/or volunteers.

It is a body of [people].

And once one adopts this broad and practical defintion, one can begin to see what are perhaps the real parties.

For example, the fluid movements between think tanks and media organisations and news desks and op-ed gigs and special advisors and hired consultants – and elected politicians and peers – show bodies of people united by their joint endeavours to promote what they see as the national interest upon various agreed principles and policies.

A Martian looking down at Westminster, Whitehall and (what used to be called) Fleet Street would assume, by observation alone, that the sum of the interactions and communications between various bodies of people were the real political parties – regardless of formal nomenclature.

And this is not necessarily a thing about the political right – for there is also, often on the political left and in the political centre – fluidity between pressure groups and campaign groups and trade unions and public bodies and campaigning organisations and civil servants.

These small-p Burkean parties can overlap and sometimes correspond to the big-P Parties.

The big-P Parties indeed seem to be coalitions of these teeming small-P Parties, sometimes spilling outside.

And as big-P Parties decline – for changes in media and communications mean the information-dissemination and organisational purposes of the big-P Parties are falling away – these small-p parties will become again more important, as they were in the days of Burke.

It will not be a complete reversion – big-P Parties will still be significant because of enduring brand loyalty (and recognition) and lingering tribal allegiances.

And these small-p parties – although highly influential – are impossible to regulate with ease.

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We will have to get used to the boundaries between media and politics and business becoming more blurred – individuals casually going from news rooms to parliament to commerce, and so on, working in tandem with others similarly moving around.

And if enough of us object to this trend in our political culture?

Well: we can form our own a body of people united, for promoting by our joint endeavours the national interest, upon this particular principle on which we are all agreed.

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The next eighteen months

18th April 2023

The next general election, we are told, is likely to be within the next eighteen months.

The last general election, back in December 2019, returned the Conservatives with a whopping, substantial majority.

That majority, in turn, can be seen as having been the electoral dividend of Brexit – of getting Brexit “done” – and also of seeing off the Faragist Ukip and then Brexit parties, as well as routing Corbyn’s Labour Party.

It was, in political turns, a highly successful partisan political manoeuvre.

Boris Johnson and his party in December 2019 had the very greatest prize the constitution of the United Kingdom could bestow: a large single-party majority in the House of Commons.

Something the Conservative party had rarely had since the governments of Margaret Thatcher.

And what has the governing party done with this huge majority since 2019?

The government has ****ed it away.

The Conservatives have, so far, nothing substantial to show for this big majority.

Zilch.

And time is now running out.

It may well be that the Conservatives will not have another opportunity with such a large majority – and some Conservatives perhaps know it.

There is perhaps not enough time for the governing party to force through any controversial legislation –  especially if there is opposition in the House of Lords.

But Conservative ministers will know that this is probably their last chance: to validate the the 2019 general election result, and perhaps to validate the Brexit that made that election result possible.

As the clock runs down, we can expect louder and more extreme positions to be announced – on “culture wars” and other things – notwithstanding there is almost no time to get legislation through.

There will be attempts to use (and misuse) ministerial powers and delegated legislation.

The government will be in a hurry.

For not only is the next general election at stake, but perhaps the validity of the whole enterprise of Brexit.

The next eighteen months are going to be frantic and noisy.

The more time runs out, the more frantic and noisy the government party will become.

And, if the Conservatives do lose the next general election, that frantic noise may come to be seen in retrospect as a death rattle.

 

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The failure of Brexit to return real power to Westminster: a worked example

16th March 2023

Yesterday this blog averred that Brexit so far has been about giving power to Whitehall than giving power to Westminster.

Ministers since 2016 have been using the rhetoric of “taking back control” so as to make government less accountable to parliament.

And today: a worked example:

You may have strong views about Brexit, and you may have strong views about the Windsor Framework.

(This blog has set out why, although the Windsor Framework is a Good Thing, the supposed ‘Stormont Brake’ is more likely to be an ornament than an instrument.)

Yet sensible people would want the Windsor Framework to be be properly considered and scrutinised by parliament.

For that is what sovereign parliaments should be able to do.

But, no.

The government is not giving parliament any adequate opportunity to examine the Windsor Framework.

This is more government by fiat, by ministerial decision.

You may think that is a Good Thing: that our government should be all-powerful between general elections with no or almost no accountability to parliament.

But, if so, do not pretend to others that Brexit was ever about giving power back to the Westminster parliament.

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Whitehall is the new Brussels – and Westminster is as weak as ever

15th March 2023

There are many things which were not true about Brexit.

Brexit was never going to be quick and easy: indeed, we were still this year re-negotiating the exit deal.

Brexit was never going to lead to a rush of new free trade deals.

Brexit was never going to make it easier for the United Kingdom to control its borders.And Brexit was not about reclaiming sovereignty: we had sovereignty all along, and that is how we were able to make the Article 50 notification.

But the untruth about Brexit which perhaps is the most irksome from a law and policy perspective is that it was about the Westminster parliament (re)gaining power from Brussels.

For what has happened instead is that Whitehall – that is ministers and civil servants – used Brexit as a pretext for its own power-grab.

There is a version of Brexit – unrealistic, of course – where parliament is given maximum powers over new trade deals and where parliament decides on a case-by-case basis which of the retained European Union laws it keeps or replaces.

A Brexit which was used to empower Westminster and our democracy.

In some ways – and this will annoy some of you – that would not have been a bad Brexit.

But the rhetoric of “taking back control” instead cloaked an increase in discretionary and unaccountable power by the government.

The Westminster parliament seems as powerless as ever against the executive.

Whitehall has become the new Brussels.

And we may have to “take back control” all over again.

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The Illegal Migration Bill is about political theatre, not serious law-making

 7th March 2023

Today we were supposed to see the government’s new Illegal Migration Bill.

According to today’s Order Paper, the Bill was to be presented to Parliament:

A minister told peers that the Bill was to be introduced today:

And there was even a Commons statement by the Home Secretary.

But.

There is no Bill – at least by mid-afternoon today.

This is odd.

That there is a delay was indicated by part of the Home Secretary’s statement:

“Mr. Speaker, I won’t address the bill’s full legal complexities today.  Some of the nation’s finest legal minds have been – and continue to be – involved in its development.”

And why would the “nation’s finest legal minds” still be “developing” something which was supposed to be published today?

The ministerial letter above provides a possible explanation:

Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides:

Nothing much of legal significance turns on section 19 statements either way – whether a minister views a Bill’s provisions as compatible or otherwise.

The lack of a compatibility statement will not make a statutory provision breach the ECHR, and the presence of a compatibility statement will not save a statutory provision from being found incompatible.

Section 19 is an ornament not an instrument.

Lord Hope in a 2001 House of Lords case said the following about one such statement of compatibility (emphasis added):

“It may be noted in passing that a statement of compatibility was attached to the Bill before second reading that its provisions were compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998. Statements to that effect are now required by section 19 of the Act, which was brought into force on 24 November 1998. But Mr Pannick QC for the Secretary of State did not seek to rely on this statement in the course of his argument. I consider that he was right not to do so. These statements may serve a useful purpose in Parliament. They may also be seen as part of the parliamentary history, indicating that it was not Parliament’s intention to cut across a Convention right […]  No doubt they are based on the best advice that is available. But they are no more than expressions of opinion by the minister.  They are not binding on the court, nor do they have any persuasive authority.

That was just after the Human Rights Act was passed – but it is pretty much the conventional wisdom of the courts and practitioners on such statements.

Of course, ministers will want to assure waverers in the Commons and the Lords that this is not yet another piece of legislation which will break international legal obligations.

More concerning will be the substance of the Bill, which may face heavy amendment in the Lords and litigation in the Courts.

But we cannot know what the Bill says, as it has not been published.

What we do know, in addition to the Home Secretary’s statement (and ignoring the media briefing) is this from the Order Paper:

And this on the Home Office website:

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The emphasis on media briefing for this Bill indicates that these proposals are more to do with political theatre, not law-making.

For the one thing which would do the most to stem any abuses of our asylum regime would be to have an adequately resourced and competent asylum system.

And until and unless we have an adequately resourced and competent asylum system, then everything else proposed by this government on asylum is hogwash.

The impression this Bill gives is that the government is not engaged in serious policy making and legal implementation, and it wishes to use its remaining months in office to play to various galleries and to evade any blame.

And this can be done by leaks, briefings, announcements and press releases – again, political theatre – with any actual legislation an afterthought.

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STOP PRESS

The Bill has now been published.

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Why the appointment of Sue Gray is both a mistake and not a mistake

6th March 2023

The senior civil servant Sue Gray has been appointed by the leader of the opposition as his chief of staff.

This, as you no doubt are aware, is the stuff of political controversy – not least because of Gray’s famous (infamous?) role in compiling the Partygate internal report.

From a policy perspective, however, is this controversial appointment a mistake?

Tactically and politically the appointment is an error.

It raises questions of propriety and timing for the leader of the opposition, and it opens up the  question of whether her role in the Partygate report was politically motivated.

It also distracts from any focus on the wrongdoing of Boris Johnson over Partygate.

But.

Strategically and governmentally the appointment is sensible.

If the leader of the opposition becomes prime minister then he needs aides who (genuinely) know the Whitehall machine, who are used the glare of the media, and who are unafraid of speaking truth to power, or at least to Prime Ministers.

As such Gray’s appointment can be compared to that of Margaret Thatcher’s aides, the recently deceased Bernard Ingham and Charles Powell, and Tony Blair’s appointment of Jonathan Powell.

Such appointments are a mark of taking government and policy seriously.

The timing of the appointment is dreadful, and it may be politically counterproductive in March 2023, but it may look less problematic if Labour win the next general election.

And in the run up to the next election, it means the party (currently) most likely to win that election will have guidance which enable it to better prepare for the realities of implementing manifesto promises and translating policy into practice.

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Government departmental reorganisations are a form of magical thinking

7th February 2023

Today we were supposed to have had a ministerial reshuffle.

But there was little ministerial shuffling or reshuffling.

Instead we had yet another exercise in creating and renaming government departments.

In reality, not a great deal changes when this happens.  The same civil servants will sit in the same buildings doing much the same things.  The signage on the doors will change, new email addresses will be created, and somebody somewhere will get a lot of money for a rebranding exercise.

The belief seems to be that changing the name of a department – no doubt to something more “eye-catching” – is a thing that by itself means something significant.

Yet it is not even rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic – it is more like changing the names on the back of the deckchairs.

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And sometimes, in the longer term, such reorganisations make things worse.

The creation of a “Ministry of Justice” – by combining what had once been the small Lord Chancellor’s Department overseeing the court system and the prisons part of the Home Office created a mid-sized spending department which, when austerity cuts were inflicted, meant that the court system became increasingly underfunded.

The supposed “synergies” from a “holistic” and “beginning-to-end” approach to the justice system never converted from management-speak waffle to hard policy implementation.

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At the start of Brexit you may recall the sudden creation of two pop-up departments: the Department for Exiting the European Union and the Department for International Trade.

Both must have seemed such really good ideas at the time.

But both were useless.

DExEU soon got dragged back into the Cabinet Office, which had a natural centre of gravity in Whitehall for the relevant negotiations.

The Department for International Trade had nothing to do for a couple of years, as trade deals could not be finalised and executed (and thereby meaningfully negotiated) until the United Kingdom actually left, and then the department spent its time doing what any business department (or foreign office) could have done with the rollover agreements and the few other opportunities.

Both were an exercise in pointlessness – as well as both illustrating the fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of Brexit by the then-government.

And from today the Department for International Trade is no more, even though we are now “free” to strike our own trade deals.

What a waste of time.

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Some wag once said that, in an office job, meetings are the practical alternative to work.

Similarly, reorganisations are often a manager’s practical alternative to, well, management.

It is perhaps not even worth learning the new departments’ names, and their acronyms, as soon they will change again, with little useful having been achieved in the meantime.

At least the Prime Minister will nod to himself as he thinks he has done something, while all around nothing substantial has changed.

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The Church of England seems more accountable on the floor of the House of Commons than most government ministers

26th January 2023

Now here is a curious thing.

The Church of England seems more accountable on the floor of the House of Commons than most government ministers.

This week there was an urgent question about the position of the Church of England on same-sex marriages.

And as in England, we have an established church there is a member of parliament charged with answering questions on behalf of the Church of England – from the backbenches:

In contrast to this exercise in parliamentary accountability, we have this week had the Prime Minister refer the Zadawi tax matter to the ethics adviser and the BBC mount an internal investigation into the relationship of its chair with a former Prime Minister.

This is in addition to the King’s Counsel looking at allegations against the Lord Chancellor.

There are various other inquiries and investigations, some now almost-forgotten.

And the thing is about these inquiries and investigations is that they are often exercises in political deflection and delay – deft manoeuvres so that there is no actual practical accountability of ministers, at least not immediately.

The consequence is that we are now in the extraordinary situation where the bishops of the Church of England are generally more accountable to members of parliament than the ministers of the crown.

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A look at Keir Starmer’s proposal for a “Taking Back Control” Bill

5th January 2023

Today the leader of the main opposition party in the United Kingdom gave a speech.

You can read a version of Keir Starmer’s speech on the Labour party website.

One part of it which seems possibly interesting from a legal perspective is a proposal for a “Taking Back Control” Bill.

This is what the speech said:

“So we will embrace the Take Back Control message. But we’ll turn it from a slogan to a solution. From a catchphrase into change. We will spread control out of Westminster. Devolve new powers over employment support, transport, energy, climate change, housing, culture, childcare provision and how councils run their finances.

“And we’ll give communities a new right to request powers which go beyond this.

“All this will be in a new “Take Back Control” Bill – a centrepiece of our first King’s speech. A Bill that will deliver on the demand for a new Britain. A new approach to politics and democracy. A new approach to growth and our economy.”

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This call for de-centralisation and devolution will face the two fundamental problems every such call has faced since the nineteenth century.

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The first problem for de-centralisation and devolution is the doctrine of the supremacy of the Westminster parliament.

This doctrine, which in good part was a Victorian innovation not known to earlier jurists, tells that all legislative power in our polity rests with the Crown-in-Parliament.

This means that no other body in the United Kingdom can legislate other than to the extent permitted by the Westminster parliament.

Recently this doctrine was illustrated by the Supreme Court decision on a reference by Scotland’s Lord Advocate.

In effect, the Scottish parliament is merely another statutory corporation, subject to the rule of ultra vires.

The Westminster parliament will not easily forego this legislative supremacy and – if we adhere to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy – it may be impossible for the Westminster parliament to do so.

This means that any de-centralisation and devolution is at the Westminster parliament’s command: Westminster can grant this seeing autonomy, and Westminster can easily take it away.

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What we do have are numerous devolution and local government statutes, all defining and limiting what various authorities can and cannot do.

There is no real autonomy – even for the Scottish parliament.

No ability to do things despite what the Westminster parliament would like an authority to do.

Ambitious projects by local authorities – such as when the Victorian town of Birmingham (not even yet a city) went and bought and operated its own gas and water industries – would be impossible now.

That is real de-centralisation and devolution – doing things the centre cannot stop.

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The second problem for de-centralisation and devolution is in respect of policy and administration, rather than law.

It is the sheer dominance of HM Treasury in Whitehall and the public sector more generally.

For example, HM Treasury has a monopoly in respect of almost all fiscal and financial – that is, tax-raising and borrowing – powers.

(Even the Scottish parliament has limited autonomy to vary income tax rates and the Scottish government power to borrow money.)

And no public body has complete fiscal autonomy – and, indeed, many public bodies rely on central government for grants and financing.

It is unlikely that Whitehall will happily allow regional authorities and devolved administrations absolute power to raise taxes and borrow money.

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And now back to the word “control”.

Unless regional authorities and devolved administrations have absolute power to raise taxes and borrow money, or to make rules and mount ambitions problems, then they do not have “control”.

Instead, “control” will stay – as it always does – with Westminster and Whitehall.

Westminster and Whitehall can extend the leash, but they can pull the leash back.

That is not “control”.

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Looking more closely at Starmer’s speech, it is not clear to whom this “control” is to be actually given.

Consider the following passages (emphases added):

“…the Britain that Labour can build. A fairer, greener, more dynamic country with an economy that works for everyone, not just those at the top. And a politics which trusts communities with the power to control their destiny.

Giving communities the chance to control their economic destiny. The argument is devastatingly simple.”

“It’s not unreasonable for us to recognise the desire for communities to stand on their own feet. It’s what Take Back Control meant. The control people want is control over their lives and their community.

“We need to turbo-charge this potential, but Westminster can’t do that on its own, it can only do it with communities. That’s why Labour will give them the trust. The power. And the control.

And so on.

There is noting specific here as to who will get this supposed “control”.

Will it be existing local authorities or new regional bodies?

Will it be new legal entities smaller than existing councils?

And – most importantly if this really is about “control” – what will happen if those “communities” want to do something which Westminster and Whitehall do not want them to do?

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Starmer did list some of the topics where there could be devolution of powers: “employment support, transport, energy, climate change, housing, culture, childcare provision and how councils run their finances”.

But devolution is not granting “control”, as there will be limits to what even the most ambitious local authority will be able to do in the face of any opposition from Westminster and Whitehall.

And there is also a respectable argument – which you may or may not endorse – than on issues such as transport and housing, there needs to be far less local autonomy, not more, so for us as to escape the ongoing blight of NIMBYism.

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Starmer insisted in his speech that the “Take Back Control” will be turned from “a slogan to a solution”.

And it we missed the import of that rhetorical turn, Starmer then said it will be turned from “a catchphrase into change”.

(This is reminiscent of his predecessor Tony Blair’s wonderful statement once that “[a] day like today is not a day for soundbites, we can leave those at home, but I feel the hand of history upon our shoulder with respect to this, I really do.”)

But there is nothing in this speech which does go beyond slogans and catchphrases.

There is no substance to the supposed “controls” which are to be given “back”.

And there is nothing specific as to whom or what those “controls” are to be given.

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You may have Very Strong Opinions on de-centralisation and devolution.

You may welcome Starmer’s speech as a good and welcome signal of change.

You may oppose it as it may mean impediments to policies which may need to be directed at the national level.

But what one cannot say is that it tells us much, if anything, about how de-centralisation and devolution is to work in practice.

And it says nothing about how – at least in England – local authorities can break free from the real controls of Westminster and Whitehall.

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We are not only in the age of easy answers but also in the age of easy-to-avoid questions

28th November 2022

Somebody over on Twitter thoughtfully dug up something I wrote back in 2017:

https://twitter.com/sunildvr/status/1595914638109048832

I think the piece – which links Brexit with the Iraq invasion and other follies – holds up well.

But I also now think the problem identified is only part of the problem.

This because “easy answers” are only possible when hard questions are easily evaded.

For example, one of the most depressing features of contemporary political discourse is the frequency of answers that begin with “I will take no lectures from…”, “I give no apologies for…”, “what people want to know is…”, “what the public expects is….”, and, of course, “let me be absolutely clear….”.

These non-answers render almost all political interviews – and many parliamentary questions – pointless.

Few questions can land, and accountability is brushed off.

And what is most depressing: those watching and listening do not seem to care.

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This blog has previously averred that the problem is not so much that politicians lie but that voters do not seem to care about being lied to.

And so, until and unless voters care about being lied to, then politicians will get away with their dishonesty.

Similarly, until and unless voters care about politicians not answering questions, then politicians will get away with their evasions.

Often this is not the fault of the interviewer or other questioner.

There are some cracking questions asked of politicians.

But there are not many cracking answers.

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There is a fundamental disconnect about accountability in our politics.

At law, of course, a witness will be under pain of perjury.

(And the professional advocate asking the questions will be under their own rules about what questions can be properly put.)

There is an attractive notion that ministers, for example, should also be put under pain of perjury for their answers.

Attractive – but misguided.

The solution to the failure of accountability in parliament is not, in my view, to make parliament more like a court.

It is to make those in and watching Parliament care more about the standard of answers.

As it stands, neither the Speaker nor anyone else is personally responsible for ensuring that questions are properly answered in Parliament.

Instead, as with the investigation into Boris Johnson, it is left to a committee some months later to make a determination or not.

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Rather than some paper reforms or legislative changes, it is the culture of Parliament which is most urgently in need of reform.

Members of Parliament, on both sides of the House of Commons, need to care more about the answers they are given, and to be less tolerant of evasions – even if the questions are from political opponents.

For when questions have purchase – where questions cannot be deflected – then non-answers and easy answers have no hiding place.

Politicians showing leadership on this matter makes it more likely that the public will come to care more about what they are told – and what they are not told.

And that is the real answer to the hard question of how political accountability and scrutiny is made more effective.

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