Category: The Union, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales

The Northern Irish protocol is both legal and constitutional – the significance of today’s appeal decision

14th March 2022

One of the features of having an ‘unwritten’ (that is, uncodified) constitution is that there is not often ‘constitutional’ litigation.

Even cases of the highest political significance are decided on technical points of law, with judges affecting to not be concerned about any wider implications.

But sometimes there is a case where the court is conscious of the constitutional significance of the matter before it, and today one such case was decided at the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland.

We do not yet have the full judgment, though we have this detailed summary.

The case was about the legality of the Northern Irish Protocol.

At first instance the appellants – a group of pro-Union politicians – lost their challenge to the protocol’s legality, and so they appealed.

One ground was that the protocol was contrary to the Act of Union 1800.

Here part of the court’s summary reads as follows:

“The court said that Parliament was clearly sighted on the Protocol which was the end result of a “protracted, transparent, debated, informed and fully democratic process which decided arrangements for Northern Ireland post Brexit”.

“It said the terms were settled and made law after a long parliamentary process and it could not be suggested that Parliament was unaware of the changes that may be wrought.”

This is important.

Of course, there is a certain artificiality in saying MPs knew what they were voting for in detail – or even cared.

But – almost as a legal, or constitutional, fiction – parliament must have been aware of what it was doing.

And as such it would be wrong for a court to gainsay parliament.

In particular parliament had expressly legislated that previous legislation – including, by implication, the Act of Union – should be read so that they would be subject to the withdrawal agreement legislation.

And if they were subject to the withdrawal agreement legislation there was no conflict – parliament had already stated which provision would have the the priority.

The significance of this judgment is that the protocol is not only legal but also constitutional – which is not always quite the same thing.

The court has set out how the protocol fits within – and does not disrupt – the settled constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom.

And it has done so not in a judgment cloaked by technicalities and affectations, but with an open acceptance that parliament should prevail.

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No UK political leaders of any party seem to be taking Northern Ireland seriously

30th November 2021

Yesterday the opposition Labour party had a reshuffle of its shadow cabinet.

This would not usually be anything of note for this blog, as it is the stuff of politics rather than of policy and law.

But there was one change that caught the eye.

The shadow Northern Irish secretary Louise Haigh was switched to the transport brief.

This was, to say the least, a shame.

Haigh had developed expertise and insights into the post-Brexit problems for Northern Ireland and the border dividing the island of Ireland.

She made a particular point of visiting Northern Ireland and Ireland regularly, so as to listen and understand the issues surrounding the Northern Irish Agreement.

She also had not only read the Good Friday Agreement (unlike some ministers), but she also understood it.

There was no better opposition politician to be in place while during reckless, erratic antics of Brexit minister David Frost and his constant threats to trigger Article 16 for no good reason.

And now, all that is lost, and the opposition front bench has to start again.

Haigh, of course, will no doubt do well on transport policy – especially as a northern member of parliament affected by this government’s reversals on rail infrastructure.

But something has been lost, and the necessary impression is that the Labour leader Keir Starmer, like the government front bench, does not take the Northern Irish issue that seriously.

As Dr Laura McAtackney avers:

These are all the shadow Northern Irish secretaries since the Brexit referendum:

And these are all the Northern Irish secretaries:

The turnover of Northern Irish secretaries and shadow Northern Irish secretaries has not only been at a time of Brexit and post-Brexit uncertainty but also when for about half the period since the referendum there has been no devolved assembly in Northern Ireland.

Could the main two political parties show any less interest in Northern Ireland?

If and when there is a border poll, and if and when there is a majority in the poll for a united Ireland, British political leaders will only have themselves to blame.

And indeed by any such a poll in just a few years, at the current rate we probably will have had another three or four Northern Irish secretaries and shadow Northern Irish secretaries.

The consequences of Brexit on Northern Ireland and the issue of the Irish border should be taken with the utmost seriousness by the leaders of the main British political parties – and they, of course, will protest that they do.

But rapid turnover of both Northern Irish secretaries and shadow Northern Irish secretaries shows otherwise.

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The problem of Anglocentrism in law and policy commentary

11th November 2021

Earlier this week I did a podcast with some wonderful Irish lawyers – you can hear my high-pitched Brummie Wednesday Addams voice here:

https://twitter.com/sanzscript/status/1458449730900537351

On the podcast I set out why I aver that the Good Friday Agreement is more practically important as a constitutional text than, say, Magna Carta.

And at the end of my bit, I say something about the problem of Anglocentrism in law and policy commentary.

This is not a direct personal concern: I am from the English midlands (though like others from Birmingham I have Irish ancestors); I went to university in Oxford and then Birmingham; and I trained and still practice as a lawyer in London – and so I have spent almost all my life in a strip of England some hundred-or-so miles long.

It is more of an intellectual concern: an interest in getting things right and having the best possible understanding of what is going on.

And over time I have come to realise that an Anglocentric view of law and policy is a narrow, shallow and intellectually unsatisfying one.

It is not that is more ‘woke’ (or something) to avoid being Anglocentric, it is just about having a deeper, wider and intellectually satisfying appreciation of law and policy.

The United Kingdom in its current configuration is barely one hundred years old; and the United Kingdom is itself only from 1801.

There are buildings in Birmingham – a modern city – older than the United Kingdom.

It is a temporary – perhaps transient – polity in its current form, and to see it as being only about England is to miss what is distinctive about this particular union.

And to see Northern Ireland other than in the context of the island of Ireland is to understand very little about why and how the issue of the Irish border affects the politics of the United Kingdom.

The border issue is not some outside interference to an understanding of the politics of United Kingdom: it is a fundamental part of the politics of United Kingdom.

This is why the document that sets outs out the principles that are to be applied on the issue of the Irish border – the Good Friday Agreement – shapes what can and cannot be done by the government of the United Kingdom.

The instrument practically stops the United Kingdom from doing things it otherwise would want to do, but for the agreement.

And so only by seeing the agreement as a constitutional feature rather than as a constitutional bug can you fully appreciate the parameters of political action in the United Kingdom.

But to do that requires a non-Anglocentric approach – to realise there are features of the other constituent nations of the United Kingdom that are just as (if not more) important than anything that comes from England – or London – alone.

To understand the constitution of the United Kingdom you need to understand it as being about the whole of the United Kingdom, and not as about only England with appendages.

The less Anglocentric the approach to the constitution of the United Kingdom – and thereby to the law and policy of the United Kingdom – the better your understanding.

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The UK state’s admitted collusion in the death of Pat Finucane should inform public debate on immunities for state agents and operatives

31st October 2021

My column in Prospect this month is on the ‘licences to kill’ that exist in the law of the United Kingdom.

But in case any person thinks that article is alarmist or somehow academic in averring the existence of such provisions and their implications, reference should be made to the circumstances of the death of Pat Finucane.

These circumstances are not as well known as they should be, and they should inform any consideration of the law and practice of lethal force by or on behalf of the United Kingdom.

These are three things to know.

First: the lawyer Pat Finucane was killed in 1989.

Second: in 2012, Sir Desmond Da Silva, the author of a government-commissioned report, concluded:

“Overall, I am left in significant doubt as to whether Patrick Finucane would have been murdered by the UDA in February 1989 had it not been for the different strands of involvement by elements of the State. […]

“The real importance, in my view, is that a series of positive actions by employees of the State actively furthered and facilitated his murder and that, in the aftermath of the murder, there was a relentless attempt to defeat the ends of justice.”

(Paragraph 115 here.)

Third: the then prime minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron admitted and apologised for this collusion:

“The collusion demonstrated beyond any doubt by Sir Desmond, which included the involvement of state agencies in murder, is totally unacceptable.

“We do not defend our security forces, or the many who have served in them with great distinction, by trying to claim otherwise.

“Collusion should never, ever happen.

“So on behalf of the Government, and the whole country, let me say again to the Finucane family, I am deeply sorry.”

(Column 297 here.)

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There is, of course, a lot more that should be known about the killing of Pat Finucane by anyone interested in the history of Northern Ireland and in the history of the United Kingdom state.

But it should be more widely known that there is no doubt that the United Kingdom state colluded in the death of a civilian and the United Kingdom state has admitted and apologised for its collusion in this death.

This is therefore not the extreme accusation of some anti-government agitator but the confirmed position of the United Kingdom state itself.

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And so the possibility is not fanciful that powers and immunities that the United Kingdom state confers upon itself may be misused by the United Kingdom state.

The possibility of misuse is such that there should be anxious scrutiny of these powers and immunities.

The United Kingdom state does not say that it wants to kill people.

But by granting itself – and its officials and operatives – immunity from any legal liability, it is creating a situation where there is no legal disincentive from ensuring unlawful deaths do not happen.

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Are President Biden’s comments on ‘the Irish Accords’ a life line for the Human Rights Act?

22nd September 2021

Yesterday United States President Biden spoke about his concern about a possible change to what he called ‘the Irish Accords’.

From the context of the question and answer, Biden meant the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement – though the question was framed in terms of the Northern Irish Protocol of the Brexit withdrawal agreement.

The question and answer are here and you should watch and listen for yourself:

You will see in the tweet above that the estimable Sonya Sceats, the chief executive of Freedom from Torture, avers that the exchange is a life line for the Human Rights Act 1998.

Is she right?

And what is the connection between that exchange and the Human Rights Act 1998?

Here we need to see what the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement says.

In respect of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the agreement says the following:

‘There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including […] the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission [and] arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’

and

‘The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency’.

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These passages are explicit: the ECHR is a ‘safeguard’ and the ECHR has to be enforceable in the courts of Northern Ireland.

The agreement does not expressly mention the Human Rights Act 1998 – not least because that legislation had not yet been passed at the time of the agreement.

But one of the things that the act does in respect of Northern Ireland – as well as for the rest of the United Kingdom – is to make the ECHR enforceable directly in the courts.

This is instead of requiring a party seeking to rely on the ECHR to petition the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, as was the position before the act took effect.

Of course: you do not – strictly – need the Human Rights Act 1998 to be in place to fulfil the express requirements of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, as long as the ECHR remains enforceable locally in Northern Ireland.

But if the Act were to be repealed – which is a long-term goal of the new lord chancellor and justice secretary Dominic Raab – then there would need to be replacement legislation in place the very day the repeal took effect for ECHR rights to remain directly enforceable in the courts of Northern Ireland.

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So does this mean the Human Rights Act 1998 is safe?

I am not so sure.

I averred on this blog when Raab was appointed (and I am sorry to quote myself):

‘And one would not be surprised that one stipulation made by Raab in accepting the position as lord chancellor is that he get another crack at repealing the human rights act.

‘If so, then the act will probably be repealed – though there will no doubt be a less strikingly (and provocatively) entitled ‘European Convention on Human Rights (Interpretation and Incorporation of Articles) and Related Purposes Act’ in its stead – not least because the Good Friday Agreement provides that the convention has to be enforceable in Northern Ireland.’

Having seen the exchange with Biden, I am now wondering if my (dismal) view is correct.

A wise government of the United Kingdom will be anxious not to give the slightest indication that anything related to the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement was up for any change – and continuing local enforcement of the ECHR is an express provision of that agreement.

A wise government, concerned about its relations with the United States, would thereby not touch the repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 with a barge pole.

It would just take one credible complaint that the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement was at risk, and there would be an international problem.

Repealing the Human Rights Act 1998 would not be worth these risks – especially as it would have to be replaced immediately with legislation having the identical effect in respect of Northern Ireland.

But we do not have a wise government – we have a silly government.

And given the long-term obsession of the new lord chancellor with repealing the Human Rights Act 1998 – and that this may even be a reason for why he accepted his political demotion – one can see the repeal (and its immediate replacement) still going ahead in symbolic form – even if not in much substance.

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But the politics of symbolism does not just have one direction.

Against Raab’s fixation with the symbolism of repealing the Human Rights Act 1998 is the transatlantic symbolism of doing anything that could remotely affect the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.

So it may be that Sceats’ view is correct – and the Human Rights Act 1998 is safer than before.

But, on any view, repeal seems an unwise political path to take, given how much politically – and how little legally – is at stake.

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What is this “Article 16” that the United Kingdom is threatening to trigger?

14th September 2021

The Brexit minister David Frost has said that he is considering triggering article 16 in respect of the ongoing discussions between the United Kingdom and the European Union.

 

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This sounds all very portentous.

But what does it actually mean?

What is article 16?

The blogpost below is based on an extract from an earlier longer explainer posted on this blog back in January 2021 (when the European Commission clumsily and perhaps inadvertently seemed to trigger article 16 and then promptly untriggered it).

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Let’s begin with what is an ‘article’.

One of the blessings of Brexit is dealing with ‘articles’ of international legal instruments – most famously article 50 of the treaty on European Union.

The word ‘article’ is somehow grander than the more mundane ‘section’ and the everyday ‘clause’.

Indeed articles tend to be more self-contained as legal provisions – sometimes like micro legal instruments within macro legal instruments like treaties.

And article 16 – together with a dedicated annex – is such a micro legal instrument.

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Article 16 is part of the Northern Irish protocol, which in turn is a protocol to the withdrawal agreement.

Instruments within instruments within instruments.

Article 16 provides in its entirety (and you should read every word, as they will matter): In essence: the ‘if [x] then [y]’ here is ‘if [there are certain difficulties in the application of the Northern Irish protocol] then [appropriate safeguard measures can be taken]’.

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The article is entitled ‘Safeguards’ – but straight away you will see that the provision is itself subject to its own safeguards – and this is important because, as you can see, what is or can be a ‘safeguard measure’ is not defined.

First.

In paragraph 1, the trigger for the safeguards has to be a serious situation that is likely to persist.

Second.

It then provides that any safeguards will be ‘restricted’ to what is ‘strictly necessary’ for the purpose of remedying that particular serious situation.

Third.

And ‘priority’ shall be given to what measures that cause the least disturbance.

One, two, three.

So: triggering article 16 does not mean anything goes.

Anything Frost proposes will have to meet these three substantive tests.

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And there is more.

In paragraph 2, any imbalances caused by the uses of the safeguards can be addressed with counter measures: so the article is not a unilateral tool.

If the United Kingdom takes measures under article 16 then the European Union can take countermeasures too.

Paragraph 3 then states that a prescribed process has also to be followed, as set out in an annex.

Strictly speaking: triggering article 16 does not trigger the right to take safeguard measures, but triggers a process that may in turn lead to such measures.

The annex supplements the substantive conditions on the use of Article 16 safeguards with procedural protections (and, again, this provision should be read in full): In essence: notification, talking shop, delay for a month, adoption of measures, further notification, regular consultations on measures, reviews of the measures.

Even in the event of ‘exceptional circumstances’ under point 3 of this annex, there is still a procedure to be followed.

Safeguards within safeguards within safeguards, and so on.

Article 16 ain’t no weapon – it is a remedial tool.

It really is not something to ‘threaten’.

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In summary: invoking article 16 is not to be done casually or by mere oversight.

There are many substantive and procedural conditions to be fulfilled before it can be invoked.

And unless those conditions are met, then article 16 measures are not available.

Even when all the conditions are met, the scheme of the article and the annex is that there would be a collaborative review-and-consultation to the use of the measures.

All this is – or should be – obvious from the title of the article: ‘Safeguards’.

And not Reprisals.

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Trident and Scottish independence

2nd September 2021

Imagine Whitehall obsessing about somehow salvaging a post-imperial policy delusion costing billions – which we cannot afford and probably serves no modern purpose.

But enough about Brexit.

This is a post about Trident.

In the event of an independent Scotland, what would happen with Trident?

(And for those who think Scottish independence ‘would never happen’, remember other things that would never happen, until they did – like Brexit.)

The Financial Times has published some information on what the current United Kingdom government sees as the options.

https://twitter.com/SebastianEPayne/status/1433151630157942785

https://twitter.com/SebastianEPayne/status/1433153845757104135

https://twitter.com/SebastianEPayne/status/1433154687482703873

https://twitter.com/SebastianEPayne/status/1433155450850136065

https://twitter.com/SebastianEPayne/status/1433163642665684994

 

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Dramatic stuff.

But from a constitutional perspective – rather than a defence policy perspective – the notion of the rump British state having some sort of ‘pocket’ in an independent country is a curious one.

Of course there are examples such as the Irish ports mentioned in the thread – or the two bases in Cyprus.

Such naval and related arrangements are not novel.

But.

There seems a difference in principle as well as scale in the notion that a base for nuclear warfare should in another independent country, where that country will be assuming the risk of being targeted by nuclear weapons in return.

That would be quite a significant thing to have within your polity over which you would not have any direct political control.

And given the propensity of post-Brexit politicians to overestimate their position on the world stage, one would not really want to take on the risk of the (literal and metaphorical) fall-out of nationalistic bombastic posturing.

That said: perhaps leasing the site to the London government during the necessary transition period could provide the very financial injection that would make independence more viable than otherwise.

And so it could be a boon for Scottish independence – as well as a predicament.

But on any view: what to do with an unwelcome nuclear warfare base in a newly independent state will raise constitutional and political issues – at least in the short-term.

At least Whitehall is thinking through these issues in advance.

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They are proclaiming Magna Carta at Edinburgh Castle

 

19th August 2021

Time for some summer fringe fun from Edinburgh (from my Twitter feed) – but also with a serious point at the end.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1427893171984470018

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1427895325382135812

[Sadly the link in the above tweet has now been deleted.]

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1427897234360881154

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1427898649305128961

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1427899636006670339

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1427909500179296263

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1427910530455457792

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1427911683918503936

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1427912438314373124

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The depressing political theatre of the United Kingdom as Kabul falls

15th August 2021

On this depressing day of news from Afghanistan, we also get the sorry spectacle of domestic performative politics.

As Kabul falls – in minutes and hours, as opposed to the ‘thirty to ninety days’ of some recent expert commentary – the United Kingdom government is convening a COBR meeting and parliament is to be summoned.

The foreign secretary has even cut short his holiday:

Why did we not realise before that we could just ‘tell’ the Taliban to protect human rights?

Well, that’s them now told.

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All this political theatre – this post facto posturing – misdirects us from an even more depressing truth.

That the government of the United Kingdom – for all its post-Brexit claims – is internationally impotent here as in other areas, but it cannot accept this.

It would not have mattered much – if at all – if the COBR meeting and the recalled parliament had happened before the fall of Kabul.

Only the sequencing would have been different.

We have the illusion of focus, and the pretence of control and influence.

We tell ourselves and others that we can do something, and that we will do something.

But it is only for show.

While Kabul falls, in real time and in fast-forward.

Our government cannot admit its international irrelevance – not even to itself.

**

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Four hundred years after the civil wars, Parliament is being asked to give power back to the Crown

3rd August 2021

You would think that the grand question of the relationship between the powers of the crown and of parliament had been more-or-less settled over the last 400 years of our history.

The trend has been for the ‘prerogative’ powers of the crown – those powers that have legal effect because the crown is said to have such powers – to be subject to regulation or control by parliament and the courts.

And this is not an unusual thing for a polity that has become more democratic.

Some of these powers have moved to being under parliamentary and judicial supervision or direction at different times – but the tide has generally been in one direction.

But.

As the historian Robert Saunders explains lucidly in this thread, we have a remarkable turn in the tide.

In particular:

The issue, is of course, the repeal of the unliked and unloved Fixed-term Parliaments Act.

This is the 2011 legislation which has never resulted in there being a parliament lasting an entire fixed-term.

Given how easily governments, through parliament, have circumvented the core provision of the legislation, it must be regarded – at least on the face of it – as one of the most singularly useless acts of parliament ever enacted.

(This blog has previously discussed this statute here.)

But.

The principle behind the legislation was – and is – valid and important.

It should be for parliament – and not the executive – to decide when there should be an early general election (that is, an election before the end of a fixed term).

That there have perhaps been frustrations and misadventures with the legislation so far does not mean that the law should be abandoned absolutely – no more than any other prerogative being handed back to the monarch (and by implication the prime minister).

The historical trend away from passing power away from the executive to supervision or control by parliament and the executive has been bucked.

And, fittingly, it is this cavalier (in both senses) government seeking this reversal.

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