The Sunday after the elections before – and what, if anything, is the significance of the results

9th May 2021

Party support comes and goes.

It was not too long ago that an electorate very similar to the current one returned a hung parliament.

It was also not too long ago that the Conservatives had consistently failed to get an overall majority from 1997 to 2015.

And now the conventional wisdom is that the Conservatives are now so dominant that they will not easily be displaced.

That populist Conservatism from time to time does well is not unusual – like Benjamin Disraeli, Boris Johnson irks the liberals and progressives and attracts political support from those who political scientists tell us should be voting for the Left.

But.

If it is now the case that, given our electoral and parliamentary system, there is no viable alternative national government then that would be significant.

It it becomes politically impossible for any one opposition party to form an overall majority then this means either the Conservatives will continue to dominate Westminster or the opposition parties have to work together rather than compete with each other.

For the growing Green party (for which I voted, finally at fifty aligning my voting preference with my surname), this cross-party approach should come easily – as it does for Green parties elsewhere in Europe.

For the Liberal Democrats, however, perhaps the last thing they would want is the experience of coalition – for it was participating in the last coalition that seems to have effectively to have destroyed the credibility of the Liberal Democrats.

And for the Labour Party, it would seem that they are more than most parties already a coalition, though one which appears to be at the beginning of a civil war.

Our constitutional and electoral arrangements, therefore, make it difficult to see how the current governing party can be dislodged.

*

But.

As I averred in my quick and short post on Friday, there are two liberal points to make about the recent elections.

First, a decline in tribal partisan voting is a good thing – and people who have changed their vote once can change it again.

And second, the impact of regionalism is stronger now than for any time maybe since world war two.

Regional mayors now have followings and power bases in a way that Joseph Chamberlain and Herbert Morrison the other politicians whose power bases were in the regions would recognise.

Regional power bases are as much of a practical check and a balance to central government excess as much as the judiciary and the legislature, if not more so.

*

Just a final note about the unexpected legacy of Tony Blair and his governments in all this.

The Good Friday Agreement and Scottish and Welsh devolution and the first steps towards English regionalism unintentionally provided an extraordinary matrix for post-Brexit politics to play out in.

There is a non-trivial chance that both Scotland and Northern Ireland may leave the Union, not only because of Brexit but also because of policies and changes made a decade or so before in a different context.

Those changes, to a large extent, were intended by many at the time to strengthen the Union – as they may well have done, had it not been for Brexit.

But the unexpected addition of Brexit as an active agent may have the opposite effect to that first intended.

It is never easy to make solid forecasts about politics and constitutional affairs – the significance of the elections last week may seem very different in a few years or they may completely forgotten.

But there is a possibility, if not a probability, that the prospect of continued Conservative dominance will have an equal and opposite political and constitutional reaction.

And one day in hindsight, that reaction will no doubt be seen as having been inevitable all along.

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The mandate for a Scottish independence referendum

8th May 2021

During the Brexit political process – and especially during the (much-missed) hung parliament of 2017-2019 – one of the arguments for Brexit to take place without a further referendum was that if one added together the votes for the Conservatives and the United Kingdom Independence Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (or added up the parliamentary seats for the Conservatives and the DUP), one had a majority for Brexit without any further referendum.

In essence: it did not matter whether the Conservatives were a minority either in terms of the popular vote or parliamentary seats, there was still a mandate if you added parties together.

Now, as the Scottish National Party appears not to have an overall majority in the Scottish Parliament, there are those who contend that the lack of that majority means that there is no mandate for an independence referendum.

However: adding the SNP and Scottish Green seats together will give a majority, as both parties campaigned expressly for an independence referendum.

And, of course, had the anti-referendum parties formed a majority in the Scottish Parliament then those opposed to an independence referendum would have averred that this was a mandate for no referendum.

Consistency may be the hobgoblin of little minds, as someone once said, but it appears to me that if one accepts that the 2017-19 hung parliament was entitled to proceed with Brexit without a further referendum, even though no party had an overall majority of either seats or the popular vote, then the SNP and Scottish Greens together are entitled to do the same with an independence referendum.

There are legal issues – including (adopting a Wednesday Addams smile) the prospect of a hard-fought constitutional case at the supreme court.

And there are practical policy issues, as the demands of the ongoing pandemic mean that there are more urgent policy proposals than an independence referendum.

But on the issue of mandate, it does not matter that the mandate for an independence referendum is formed by an aggregate of parties, just as it did not for Brexit in 2017-19.

The political argument now should be on the merits of independence, rather than on the issue of a mandate for a referendum.

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Illiberal times, liberal times

7th May 2021

Eighteen month after the general election result, there appears to have been another emphatic election result in favour of our illiberal government.

The results from Hartlepool and elsewhere indicate that many in the electorate – a significant amount – are quite at ease with the current governing party.

There has not been a massive ‘loss aversion’ in respect of Brexit – and not has there been any sizeable revolt against the government’s mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic.

It anything, the governing party is even more entrenched than ever.

But.

The same set of results also show that there is political volatility – a shunning of tribal political labels.

There are also indications that localism – for example the popularity of certain English mayors – is stronger than national political (tribal) loyalties.

And, of course, political support that is easily gained can also be easily lost.

So today’s electoral results are not brilliant from a liberal or progressive perspective – but also not an absolute disaster.

Liberalism and constitutionalism may not now be in political fashion, but they have not been utterly vanquished either.

 

 

 

Liz Cheney’s important statement about constitutionalism and politics

6th May 2021

From time to time an utterance by a politician becomes more important than the here-and-now of practical politics.

Such an utterance is an opinion piece in the Washington Post by the conservative congresswoman Liz Cheney.

This blog is written from a liberal perspective, and so there would normally be little if anything that this blog would politically commend about Cheney’s various policy positions.

But this is also a constitutionalist blog, and what Cheney says is spot-on – and it needs to be heard and understood by conservatives in the United States and elsewhere.

Cheney avers:

‘Trump is seeking to unravel critical elements of our constitutional structure that make democracy work — confidence in the result of elections and the rule of law. No other American president has ever done this. The Republican Party is at a turning point, and Republicans must decide whether we are going to choose truth and fidelity to the Constitution.’

She continues:

‘I am a conservative Republican, and the most conservative of conservative values is reverence for the rule of law. Each of us swears an oath before God to uphold our Constitution. The electoral college has spoken. More than 60 state and federal courts, including multiple Trump-appointed judges, have rejected the former president’s arguments, and refused to overturn election results. That is the rule of law; that is our constitutional system for resolving claims of election fraud.

‘The question before us now is whether we will join Trump’s crusade to delegitimize and undo the legal outcome of the 2020 election, with all the consequences that might have.’

And concludes:

‘…if Republicans choose to abandon the rule of law and join Trump’s crusade to undermine the foundation of our democracy and reverse the legal outcome of the last election.

 

‘History is watching. Our children are watching. We must be brave enough to defend the basic principles that underpin and protect our freedom and our democratic process. I am committed to doing that, no matter what the short-term political consequences might be.’

*

As this blog has set out before, constitutionalism is about there being constitutional principles that are distinct from and more important than political expediency.

The moment of truth for a constitutionalist is when one sees a distinction between the integrity of the constitution and political advantage and then sides with the constitution.

Constitutionalism is thereby, in this way, about choice.

It is easy – as some fogeys do – to say the words of constitutionalism: blah blah common law rights blah blah Magna Carta blah blah freedom under the law.

It is quite another to elevate constitutional principles above party and partisan advantage in a given practical situation – to say that a course of action should not be taken because it would violate constitutional norms.

One of the more unfortunate features of the authoritarian populist nationalism (and there are other words for it) that has been dominant recently in the United Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere recently, is that there has been no constitutional self-restraint.

Cheney’s article is a reminder that conservatives – as well as liberals and progressives – can take constitutionalism seriously too.

Perhaps the Republican Party will ignore this principled stand – and carry on with its frenzy of Trumpism.

But if that frenzy ever does come to an end, it will be because of warnings such as this from Cheney.

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The crown at a constitutional crossroads – my Prospect column this month

5th May 2021

My column at Prospect magazine this month is about the monarchy.

Please click here to read it – and leave any comments below.

In particular, I would be interested in any views on my broad point that – regardless of the succession – the monarchy is likely to have to change anyway, as the current model was very much a response to the specific (and challenging) conditions of the mid-twentieth century.

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The British Museum, looted artefacts, and the law

 4th May 2021

This post is prompted by an outstanding and thought-provoking book about museums.

The book is The Whole Picture: The colonial story of the art in our museums & why we need to talk about it by Alice Procter (Amazon page here – but do order from your local bookseller if you can).

Two thoughts that the book provoked for me were about the British Museum.

This post sets out those two thoughts and where those thoughts then led me.

*

The first thought was a recollection of this eloquent and plausible 2004 justification by the museum’s then director Neil MacGregor of the museum’s position relating to controversial items in its collection. 

The passage in that piece that struck me at the time and has stayed with me was this about the founding of the museum back in 1753 (and I have broken up the paragraphs for flow):

‘To ensure that the collection would be held for the benefit of citizens, and not the purposes of the crown, Parliament hit upon a solution of extraordinary ingenuity and brilliance.

‘They borrowed from private family law the notion of the trust. The decision that the museum would be run not as a department of state, but by trustees had – and still has – crucial implications.

‘Trustee ownership confers duties rather than rights. Trustees must derive no benefit for themselves, but hold the collection exclusively for the advantage of the beneficiaries.

‘The collection cannot be sold off.

‘The museum was set firmly outside the commercial realm, a position epitomised by the principle of free admission.

‘Even more astonishingly, it was in large measure removed from the political realm.

‘Trustees are not allowed by law merely to follow government orders: they have to act as they judge best in the interest of beneficiaries, including, crucially, future and unborn beneficiaries.

‘Who are the beneficiaries for whom the trustees hold the collection?

‘Startlingly, they are not just the citizens of Britain.

‘The British Museum was from the beginning a trust where the objects would be held “for the use of learned and studious men [in 1753 they were mostly men], both native and foreign”.

‘In his will, Sloane had declared his desire that his collection should be preserved “for the improvement, knowledge and information of all persons”.

‘The rest of the world has rights to use and study the collection on the same footing as British citizens.’

*

I have often thought about that passage.

It is convincing as far as it goes – once an item is part of the collection it is safeguarded and retained for the benefit of all.

But.

There was something missing.

*

Here we come to the second thought provoked by the book.

This is a legal principle – known to lawyers and also normal people – which is known in its Latin form nemo dat quod non habet.

In plain language: a person cannot have a greater property right (‘title’) in a thing than the person who provides them with the thing.

So if I provide you with a thing – but I do not own it to begin with – then you will not own it either.

Applied to the British Museum, it seemed to me that it was all very well the British Museum boasting of how well an item in its collection will be looked after under the terms of its trust – but that was no answer if the original acquisition was unsound.

Nemo dat quod non habet – or garbage in, garbage out in legalese.

*

So with these two thoughts I then wondered: what is the position in respect of an artefact in the British Museum if the acquisition was tainted?

That, for example, the person providing the item had stolen it?

And this query led me to the British Museum Act 1963 and the 2005 case of the Attorney General vs the British Museum.

In essence, once an item is part of the British Museum collection, the 1963 Act provides only only a narrow basis for the trustees to ‘dispose’ of the items.

This narrow basis is primarily set out in section 5 of the 1963 Act.

(There is also an exception for transferring an item to another museum – and there is an exception for the return of human remains.)

*

So unless an item in the collection is within the scope of section 5 of the Act then, in effect, the trustees of the British Museum cannot at law give back the item – regardless of the circumstances of its acquisition.

What this meant in practice was illustrated in the 2005 case.

The museum had purchased after the second world war four items that has been looted by the Nazis from their owner.

The issue before the court was whether there was implicit exception to the terms of the British Museum trust in respect of when there would be a moral obligation to return the items.

The judge – the very head of the court of chancery and equity – held that the trustees did not have the power to do this, even if they wanted to do so (which they plainly did).

Any application of the principle of nemo dat quod non habet appears to have been precluded by operation of the Limitation Acts.

The judge did indicate in passing that if title in the items had not passed on acquisition then the items would not have (technically) formed part of the collection of the first place and thereby the terms of the trust and section 5 would not apply.

But it would presumably be out of time for title in respect of a 1945 acquisition to be contested sixty years later.

Happily, there was a (fascinating) recommendation by the (wonderfully named) Spoliation Advisory Panel that the heirs to the person whose art had been looted be compensated by an ex gratia payment.

And since the 2005 case, there is now the Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act 2009 that provides a statutory basis for the return of items looted by the Nazis.

*

For items looted by the Nazis, therefore, the legal position is now that the loot can be returned – even if it is part of the collection.

But what of items looted by others at other times and other places – why should the unfairness caused by only one manner of theft be addressed?

To its credit (to an extent) the British Museum is open that this is an issue.

On its press page, it has links to explanations as to its positions in respect of what it calls ‘contested items’.

(It also has a page setting out how it has settled the Nazi loot claims.)

The impression that the British Museum is no doubt seeking to promote with these pages is that it is taking the issues seriously and is sensitive to grievances.

But.

The attempt to give this impression is not convincing.

This is partly because the leadership of the museum is still wedded to the notion that the terms of the trust gives it some elevated status that means the grubby question of acquisition is not relevant.

In 2018, the current chair of the British Museum trustees wrote the Guardian in almost identical terms to those employed by MacGregor in 2005:

‘In what was one of the great acts of the Enlightenment, in 1753 parliament established the British Museum as a trust, the first of its kind in the world, which was to be run independently of politics and of parliament. This autonomy has been central to its scholarship and public purpose for the past 265 years. […]

‘Trustees today have three broad responsibilities: to conserve and enhance the collections for ever; to generate new knowledge, especially by supporting the kind of research that is only possible in a large encyclopaedic museum; and to make the collections accessible to the whole world. They work with colleagues across the UK and around the world to share knowledge and objects from their collections as widely as possible. But they don’t see the objects for which they are responsible as negotiating chips in a political debate.’

But again, this go-to ‘trust’ defence says nothing to the issue of how the items were acquired.

*

In 2019 one trustee resigned, and she gave as one of her reasons (which is broken up for flow):

‘In November 2018, a French report commissioned by President Macron recommended the full restitution of looted African artworks.

‘It burst open the debate over the repatriation of cultural artefacts. Museums, state officials, journalists and public intellectuals in various countries have stepped up to the discussion.

‘The British Museum, born and bred in empire and colonial practice, is coming under scrutiny. And yet it hardly speaks.

‘It is in a unique position to lead a conversation about the relationship of South to North, about common ground and human legacies and the bonds of history.

‘Its task should be to help us all to imagine a better world, and – along the way – to demonstrate the usefulness of museums.

‘This would go some way towards making the case for keeping its collection in London.

‘But its credibility would depend on the museum taking a clear position as an ally of coming generations.’

*

It is correct that the provisions of the 1963 Act prevent the trustees from giving away or giving back items in its collection.

And the operation of the Limitation Act means that, as the chair of the spoliation panel said in one report, the position of the museum is legally impregnable. 

Nemo dat quod non habet may well be a principle of law – but it is subject to statutory bars and exclusions.

But.

As with the items looted by the Nazis, where there is a will there is a way.

Legislation may be required – similar to the 2009 legislation for holocaust items.

And even without legislation, the position of the museum – but-for-the-legislation – could be made more clear – as it was in the 2005 case above.

But instead the impression one gains from reading around the subject is that the museum hides behind terms of the 1963 Act – that it is an excuse not for thinking seriously about the issue.

For even if the Limitation Acts rob the principle of nemo dat quod non habet from having practical legal consequences, it still has the full force of a moral imperative.

Instead of rhapsodising about the heady genius of the 1753 trust, the leadership of the museum should be conscious that nothing about the terms of the trust goes to how the items were acquired.

Of course, specific ‘contested’ items will raise specific concerns and objections.

And there is the possibility that items could leave the collection only to be destroyed or lost to the black market – though this risk should not be over-stated, still less assumed.

But as a general rule, the British Museum and other museums should accept morally (if not legally) that if an item was acquired when those from whom the item was taken did not give permission then, as a matter of principle, the item should be returned.

And if the law does not permit this, then the museum should be unafraid to aver that the law should be changed.

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Why public inquiries are often an admission that the other elements of the State have failed

2nd May 2021

It is a familiar routine.

Something horrible has happened and somebody is to blame, and so the demand is made that there is a public inquiry.

There is nothing wrong with this demand.

Indeed, this blog yesterday averred that the the inquiry into the Post Office scandal should be placed on a formal basis, with powers to compel evidence.

Similarly, all sensible people want an inquiry started as soon as possible into the government’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic.

There are also many other subjects that would benefit from the focus and dedication of a public inquiry.

But.

Many public inquiries, and most demands for public inquiries, are also implicit admissions of failure.

The admission of failure is that the other elements of the state – primarily the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary – have failed in their roles.

That there has been insufficient control and transparency within the government, and/or that there has been insufficient scrutiny by or accountability to parliament, and/or a sense of general injustice lingering after attempts to litigate specific matters in the courts.

Of course, there are certain discrete issues where inquiries are appropriate and do work which could not have been done otherwise – for example, the Cullen inquiries.

But if the other elements of the state had performed their proper constitutional functions, key issues of transparency and accountability – that are the stuff of many inquiries, and of most demands for them – could be addressed more directly and immediately by elected politicians.

This, I know, is wishful thinking and no doubt the counsel of constitutional perfection – yet each demand for an inquiry is, like the ringing of a bell, often an indication of wider state failure.

Politicians are comforted and protected by this habit of thought – as they can say and nod solemnly that there should be (or may be) an inquiry whenever something goes wrong.

Lessons will be given and then learned by having an inquiry – but we will never learn the lesson that perhaps we should be catching problems at an earlier stage of the political process.

How can we shift exercises in transparency and accountability back to earlier in the political process?

To be dealt with parliamentarians, holding the executive to proper account?

There is no easy and obvious answer.

Perhaps we should have an inquiry…

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The Post Office scandal: as the problem was about non-disclosure, then logically an inquiry with powers to compel evidence is required

1st May 2021

The Post Office scandal is being described fairly as one of the most widespread miscarriages of justice in legal history.

One of the fundamental problems that led to this scandal was non-disclosure.

The managers (and presumably the lawyers) knew information about the reliability of their Horizon software but did not disclose it.

Had that information been disclosed then (depending on the timing of the disclosure) prosecutions would not have taken place, or defendants would have been found not guilty, or convictions could have been more speedily appealed.

And so, given this fundamental problem of non-disclosure, it is remarkable that the government’s response is an inquiry that cannot compel the disclosure of evidence.

Just think about it.

The government’s non-statutory inquiry has its own web page and terms of reference.

And if you read through the documents on the page, what is said is fine as far as it goes.

But it does not go far enough.

For example, one of the terms of reference is expressly in respect of obtaining information:

‘[to b]uild upon the findings of Mr Justice Fraser, by obtaining all available relevant evidence from Post Office Ltd, Fujitsu and BEIS to establish a clear account of the implementation and failings of Horizon over its lifecycle’.

Yet, as where there is blame there will be claims, the various entities mentioned will have reason to not disclose anything which could lead to civil or even criminal liability.

They will have engaged lawyers to advise them on their obligations in respect of the disclosure of information for the inquiry – and that advice would give them legal cover to refusals to share information.

And what goes for documentary evidence goes to witness evidence too, as this tweeter well observes:

What we therefore face is one problem that was caused by non-disclosure being followed by another problem caused by a different type of non-disclosure.

There is no good reason why the inquiry into the Post Office scandal does not have statutory powers to compel evidence.

And, given that non-disclosure was at the heart of the miscarriages of justice, every good reason why it should.

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How, in practice, can a prime minister be prevented from lying to the House of Commons?

30th April 2021

The relentless and casual dishonesty of the current prime minister Boris Johnson may still have political or parliamentary consequences.

But just as a thought-exercise, say, would it be a good idea to put the prime minister under oath (or affirmation) at PMQs?

Then, in theory, the prime minister’s mind would concentrate wonderfully, as he would be under some sort of punitive sanction in the event he knowingly said something false.

In this way, the position of the prime minister would be akin to a witness in a legal case, who is under pain of perjury in the event that they do not say the truth.

It is the sort of notion that can appeal to the mind’s eye.

*

But.

It would not work easily in practice.

For example: who would determine whether the prime minister is saying something untrue or not?

If the house of commons as a whole, they can do this by motion already – although this will not happen in practice to a prime minister with an overall majority.

And, if not the house of commons as whole, who?

The speaker? A committee? An official?

How would they go about assessing whether there had been a falsehood or not?

*

And then there is the deeper – almost categorical – problem.

The prime minister is not providing evidence in answer to parliamentary questions.

This by itself differentiates the prime minister from a witness in legal proceedings.

A prime minster may be asked to give an account of the government’s position – an explanation, rather than a list of facts.

Indeed, any statements of fact are merely incidental to this giving of an account.

A prime minister can thereby provide a full answer to a parliamentary question and not state any fact at all.

Accordingly, the witness-perjury model is not an exact fit.

*

But how do you stop a prime minister – or any other minister – from stating untruths at the dispatch box?

Thee polite constitutional fiction is that honorable and right honorable members do not lie in parliament – and that is why they cannot (other than by a parliamentary motion) be accused of lying. 

But this ‘good chaps’ theory is being flouted – brazenly so.

We therefor have a problem without an easy solution.

Putting the prime minister under oath may not work – but what would?

How can – in practice – there be a check and balance to a prime minister lying in the commons – if mere conventions do not matter any more?

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Some words of comfort to regular readers

29th April 2021

Regular readers of this blog will be aware that things are not well with the constitution of the United Kingdom, or with law and policy generally.

Regular readers will be braced for bad news – even without this blog’s frequent injunction of ‘brace brace’.

But.

There are, believe it or not, some grounds for optimism.

The grand Cummings-Johnson project of pushing prime ministerial power as far as to could go is close to collapsing.

Cummings has gone, and Johnson has few remaining internal allies in government.

Indeed, Johnson seems quite isolated even within the government.

Other parts of the constitution are still twitching with indications of life.

For example: the house of lords, as with the Overseas Operations Bill, has ensured that certain proposed unpleasant provisions will not be enacted – resulting in a minister departing office.

And although few will have high hopes of various inquiries and investigations into what has and has not happened in Downing Street, at least those inquiries are happening and that they are, to a certain extent, beyond ministerial control.

The illiberal 2016 project does not – necessarily – have easy purchase in 2021.

Constitutionalism may still yet reassert itself.

To mimic Johnson – constitutionalists need not be doomsters and gloomsters.

One day – perhaps soon – the constitution of the United Kingdom will still be there, and Boris Johnson will not be.

Even if it is a close run thing.