The Post Office case is damning, but do not blame ‘computer error’ – it is very much the fault of human error of Post Office managers

23rd April 2021

There are few, if any, criminal appeal judgments as damning as today’s appeal judgment on the post office cases.

This is an appeal judgment that will (or should) sound through the generations, as a detailed description of how the criminal justice system can go wrong.

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But.

It would be an error to dismiss it as just a grand example of ‘the computer says no’.

Computers, like any automatic processes, will be prone to faults.

The problem was not so much the Horizon software but a sequence of horrible, deliberate decisions made by human beings – about whether to bring prosecutions, to contest civil cases, and to avoid the disclosure of relevant documents.

Every single manager involved in these prosecutions and in opposing appeals are far more culpable than any of the poor defendants.

Yet, unlike the defendants, the Post Office managers are not (generally) named in this judgment: they have their gongs and their pensions and their self-serving supposed exculpations of ‘lessons learned’.

So damning is this judgment that, no doubt, every person reading it will have a view on which of their legal and political opinions will be affirmed by the judgment.

For this blog, the damning Post Office judgment affirms that private prosecutions are generally a bad thing – whether they are brought by the Post Office or anyone else.

Some organisations – and individuals – enjoy the swagger and the bluster of being able to bring (and threaten) cases aimed at criminalising and penalising others.

But as the noted jurist Benjamin Parker averred: with great power comes great responsibility.

And the power to criminalise and penalise others is one of greatest powers and responsibilities of all.

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Lawyers often boast of being ‘fearless’.

Prosecutions should be – genuinely – fearless: but being fearless including being free of the fear of not proceeding with the prosecution because of the reason of embarrassment.

For, as the damning Post Office judgment shows, it was the fear of embarrassment that meant that things were not said and disclosed that should have been said and disclosed.

The damning Post Office judgment also shows what will happen when the power and the urge to prosecute is free from any checks and balances.

It shows what will happen when defendants do not get the materials and the advice that they need so as to be properly defended.

Yes: the appeal points to the dangers of automation and computerisation – but the appeal points harder at the dangers where managers and other decision-makers hide behind automation and computerisation.

And the delay in this appeal judgment – ten or so years after the miscarriages of justice – also shows the inefficiency of a criminal justice system that can often be so quick to impose criminal liability in putting right things when they go wrong.

Nobody – other than the defendants – come out of this judgment well.

Not least the criminal justice system itself.

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‘An uncomfortable chair’ – why the international trade secretary wrongly believes trade deals are quick and easy, and why this false belief matters

22nd April 2021

One of the consequences of politicians not having careers before entering parliament is that ministers can be over-influenced by unusual experiences.

For example, as home secretary Theresa May and her advisors had the benefit of the ‘pick-and-choose’ approach to European Union justice and home affairs matters, where the United Kingdom had a number of opt-outs.

And so when May and those advisors were translated to 10 Downing Street it appeared that they believed that the same à la carte approach could be taken to the single market in the Brexit negotiations, unaware that the European Union would instead have a more of an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach.

Similarly the current international trade secretary Elizabeth Truss has been misled by her experiences to date into thinking international free trade deals are easy.

This is because in the immediate post-Brexit period it was possible to ‘rollover’ a number of existing trade deals between the European Union and (so-called) third countries, almost on a ‘copy-and-paste’ basis.

 

Such a formative experience would also be informed by the basic error of post-2016 governments of the United Kingdom that Brexit itself was a quick and easy task.

But.

There is a significant difference between continuing with an existing trade arrangement and putting in place an entirely new free trade agreement from scratch, especially with another major economy.

The slowness, however, is a surprise and a disappointment to the current international trade secretary, who is a politician in a hurry.

And so we get this preposterous news story.

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‘…an uncomfortable chair’

The only normal reaction to the detail of this excruciating news story is to cringe with sheer embarrassment. 

(By the way, the use of ‘allies’ as a plural means that the pronouns for the ‘source’ are the less-revealing they/them – which are presumably the international trade secretary’s preferred pronouns.)

Of course, this daft intervention has not gone unnoticed by Australia.

Perhaps the ‘allies’ of the international trade secretary did not believe that these comments would ever reach the Australians.

Silly them.

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The serious point here is, well, about the lack of seriousness.

The United Kingdom needs to be taken seriously as a party to international agreements in this new, lonely post-Brexit period.

Yet the United Kingdom seems no closer to getting why this important.

We have a prime minister who is loudly and publicly denouncing as ‘ludicrous’ the very arrangements in respect of Northern Ireland that resulted from his own change of policy, which he negotiated and signed, and for which he campaigned for and won an electoral mandate before rushing into law.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1384419890161979394

There seems to be an unawareness that the world is watching these antics.

And although they may ‘play well’ to domestic political and media constituencies, that is at a cost to the United Kingdom’s interests as an actor on the international stage.

The prime minister and he international trade secretary need a period of reflection about these counterproductive utterances and gestures.

Perhaps they should sit down, and think hard about what they are doing for a few hours.

Perhaps, even, in an uncomfortable chair.

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The George Floyd murder verdict – and the problem of systemic racism in the legal system

21st April 2021

Yesterday a former police officer was convicted of the murder of George Floyd.

The evidence was overwhelming and, to most people who followed the televised trial, compelling.

Indeed, some would aver (in my view, correctly) that the evidence was compelling even before the trial.

But due process is due process, and even those charged with the most vile of crimes are entitled to due process.

And the former police officer received due process, and the former police officer was duly convicted – unanimously.

Yet.

Until the very last moment the verdict was uncertain.

Anyone watching the verdict being handed down was braced for an acquittal.

Regardless of the starkness of the evidence – and of the weakness of the defence case, even taking it at its highest – it seemed extraordinary that a white former police officer would actually get convicted of the murder of a black person.

And even if the evidence was as twice as compelling, and the defence case twice as weak, one would still realistically expect an acquittal.

For that seems to be the nature of the criminal justice system.

There is here a gap between knowledge and expectation – and this gap is systemic racism.

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By ‘systemic’ is meant that the racism is a feature of the system.

It would not matter which white police officer was accused, and which black person was the victim of a wrong, the operation of the system will tend towards certain outcomes.

Black people will tend to be the victims of police violence and there will never be any sanction against those who inflict the violence.

Any fatality will tend to be the subject of misdirection and misinformation by the police to the media.

Any victim will tend to be disparaged, if not demonised.

Any police violence will tend not to be filmed or similarly documented.

Any accused police officer will tend to be given the benefit of the doubt – and if there is no room for doubt, they will be given the benefit of some excuse.

Any other officers will tend to stay quiet.

Any prosecution will tend not to be brought.

And any prosecution brought will tend to lead to an acquittal.

The reason for each of these swerves away from justice will be different from case to case.

But the overall bias of the system will mean that the gravity pull will be against any conviction.

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The solution to this problem is not to dilute due process – but to be open and frank about the factors which will distort the process as a whole.

Indeed, everyone should have the benefit of the strict approach to due process that is accorded to police officers and other privileged defendants.

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It is all very good to say there are systemic problems, some will protest, but what about solutions?

Well.

There is plenty of sensible and constructive thinking out there about other faults in the system – for example, see these two threads which should be read carefully.

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A systemic problem needs a systemic approach to the solution.

Picking on any individual element of the system will not be sufficient, as long as other elements still tend towards injustice.

Accepting the importance of a systemic approach – and of the existence of system (or institutional) racism – will be for many an intellectual and emotional pain barrier.

Racism in legal systems is not just about the wrongness of individual acts – but a realisation of the impacts of swarms of wrongful acts which means that – unless there are exceptional circumstances – white police officers will get away with whatever violence they can against black people. 

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The European Super League and law and policy

20th April 2021

The proposal of a supposed European Super League is daft and dreadful.

Only the most partisan supporters of the clubs involved and those who will be making money out of the proposal are able to make a positive case for the idea.

Many supporters of the clubs involved, as well as the other football supporters, just see it as a cynical attempt to to exploit and develop cash revenues at the expense of the wider interests of the sport.

But.

An idea being daft and dreadful does not make it also illegal.

The law is not magic and there is no wand for any politician to say ‘I prohibit you thus’.

In particular, what is called ‘competition law’ – which prevents abuse by monopolies and the forming of cartels – is not likely to be of any use in preventing the initiative.

Indeed, competition law may help more than hinder the establishment of a rival international international football league.

Only a handful of clubs are involved, and there is no inherent reason why UEFA should have a monopoly on European club competition.

The fact that it is an artificial pop-up international league, where many of the participating clubs have not even won a European club competition before, is neither here nor there.

Nor is the fact that many clubs (such as my own, Aston Villa) that have won such competitions are excluded relevant (and I hope my view would be the same even if Aston Villa had been part of this misconceived project).

It is a new league that will be in competition to the existing arrangements, and the starting point of the relevant law is that competition is a good thing – rather than monopolies.

The European Super League may well rob the clubs, the players and the supporters involved of something valuable – genuine European football – and replace it with an artificial contest with regular matches against Tottenham Hotspur.

But that does not create a legal remedy.

If anything, competition law may undermine the attempts of the status quo to quash the innovation and provide a defence to threatened retaliatory or punitive measures.

If the proposal is to be defeated – it should be by means of politics and commercial realities, not litigation.

Perhaps this exercise in misplaced exceptionalism and a false sense of the international importance of those supporting the measure will collapse under the strain of its contradictions and impartibility before it gets going.

But then again, that is also what said would happen with Brexit, and it did not.

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What should we do with a former prime minister?

19th April 2021

The last former prime minister to go to the house of lords was nearly thirty years ago.

Margaret Thatcher became a peer in 1992, when she stood down as a member of parliament.

This followed the similar examples of other prime ministers who entered the house of lords when ceasing to be a member of parliament: Alec Douglas-Home (1974), Harold Wilson (1983) and James Callaghan (1987).

Edward Heath instead stayed on as a member of parliament after losing office in 1974 until 2001.

And, in general, this accorded with what had always happened – former prime ministers continued in parliamentary and public life.

(With the occasional exception such as Macmillan, and even he accepted a peerage eventually.)

Since the example of Thatcher, no former prime minister has become a member of the house of lords.

John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron: all promptly left the commons after losing office but have stayed – at least formally – outside of Westminster.

Only Theresa May – still a member of parliament – contributes to parliament as a former prime minister.

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Until recently there was no issue about what former prime ministers did, because former prime ministers became (willingly or not) elder statesmen and stateswomen.

Coming together from time to time to pose with the queen.

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But like police officers, former prime ministers seem to be getting younger.

And, perhaps because of the rules on disclosure of business interests, former prime ministers do not become members of the house of lords.

Former prime ministers instead appear to have business and public speaking careers instead – though, to his credit, less so with the example of Brown.

So we have a somewhat novel feature on the political landscape: the (relatively) young former prime minister commercially active outside of parliament.

And what, if anything, should we do with such individuals?

Should they be under special rules – distinct from other former ministers?

Should they have generous pensions – so that they do not resort to commercialising their unmatched connections?

Should they be compelled to become peers, so that the disclosure rules apply to them too?

Or should we just let them get on with whatever they wish to do?

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The office of prime minister is unique – and it thereby follows that the contacts and knowledge of a former prime minister will also be exceptional.

Of course: we could always rely on the ‘good chap’ theory of the British constitution – for, of course, no former prime minister would do such unseemly things as texting ministers for contracts for a business.

Ahem.

There is a problem – but less obvious is how to fix it.

What do you do with a former prime minister?

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It is time for lobbying to return to the lobby – why transparency is more important than more rules

18th April 2021

Consider the following two statements :-

‘There should be a law against it.’

‘It has not broken any laws.’

Both of these statements are common utterances in political conversation, and they are both possibly said by any of us on depending on circumstance.

Both statements seem to be different.

Yet both these statements are about the same situation: (a) a wrong has happened and (b) no law has been broken.

The difference between the statements is the attitude of the person making the statements, whether ‘something should be done’ or ‘there is nothing to see here’.

No principle or substance separates the two statements, only political expediency.

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The prompt for the observations above is, of course, the unfolding lobbying scandal in the United Kingdom.

The former prime minister David Cameron and certain former officials have been shown to be doing things which, in the view of the many if not the few, they should not have been doing.

But, as this blog and others have averred, the individuals concerned have not broken any rules because (it would seem) there are no rules to break.

A cynic would say that a this is the reason why the current prime minister has ordered an investigation, as it will be inevitable that the individuals will be ‘cleared’ of any rule-breaking.

But being ‘cleared’ of any rule-breaking is not the same as being exonerated of any wrong-doing.

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The alternative response to the current situation is to call for more rules.

This in part stems from the view – almost a surviving form of magical thinking – that a thing will not happen because there is a rule against it.

Laws as spells.

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But what seems to be needed here is not so much more prohibitions, and more codes to (creatively) comply with, but more transparency.

There will always be lobbying – and there is nothing inherently wrong in a democracy with any person seeking to influence those with power.

The important thing is that it is not hidden from view.

That the public can see, if it wishes, the influences being exerted on public policy.

That there are public processes in place for those approaches and exchanges to take place.

In a word: a lobby.

Think about the word, which the internet tells us is defined as:

‘a room providing a space out of which one or more other rooms or corridors lead, typically one near the entrance of a public building’.

And this is the source of the word ‘lobbying’.

Lobbying took place in a lobby: a public or at least quasi-public space.

The time has perhaps come for the practice of lobbying to go back to its root – and for there to be a formal (and, if need be, virtual) lobby where there these exchanges happen and can be seen to happen.

It is perhaps time for the return of the lobby.

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Colin the Caterpillar and the Art of War – why it is sometimes sensible not to enforce your legal rights

17th April 2021

Marks and Spencer has decided to add to the gaiety of the nation by issuing a legal claim in respect of Colin the Caterpillar, a chocolate cake.

The actual legal claim does not appear to be publicly available, but the news reports are that the action was launched in the last week at the high court.

Marks and Spencer is quoted as saying:

“Love and care goes into every product on our shelves. So we want to protect Colin, Connie and our reputation for freshness, quality, innovation and value”. 

It must have seemed a good idea at the time.

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Hilarity has ensued.

The respondent to the claim, Aldi appears not to be taking the legal threat seriously.

And nor are many people on Twitter and other social media.

This mash-up of our old friends at Handforth parish council stood out in particular:

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This has all the signs of a publicity disaster for Marks and Spencer.

So why did Marks and Spencer issue the claim?

And what should the company have thought about before bringing the action?

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There is no doubt that Colin the Caterpillar is valuable to Marks and Spencer.

The product has recently celebrated its thirtieth birthday.

And Marks and Spencer have been long aware of competitors’ selling similar products, with the store itself telling us this on its dedicated Colin the Caterpillar page:

“We were the first to retailer to sell a caterpillar, with many supermarkets since trying to emulate this crowd-pleasing cake”.

Colin also has his own Wikipedia page.

And not only does he have these pages, he also has registrations on the trade mark registry.

(Trade mark has two words, by the way – we are not Americans, thank you.)

From a quick (no-exhaustive) search, it would appear that the term ‘Colin the Caterpillar’ was registered in 2009 – though given it had been on sale previously it may have had other intellectual property protection beforehand.

 

This search also showed that last year in 2020 there was a further registration for Colin’s packaging:

The happy news can also be revealed that Marks and Spencer has also registered the term Connie the Caterpillar – though not her packaging.

All three registrations are in respect of class 30:

These registrations in practice and in principle confer a commercial monopoly in products within that class.

(Please note: although I have general knowledge of trade mark law, I am not a trade mark specialist, and there will be things I will have missed – and I am happy to hear from any trade mark specialists in the comments below.)

Here it is important to note that what is protected with these registrations is the name and the packaging of the cakes – and not the cakes and their ingredients themselves.

Colin the Caterpillar and his box are protected, not the concept of a chocolate roll with a happy face on it.

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One of the problems with trade mark law and practice is, in very general terms, that if a protected thing becomes too generic, you can lose the legal protection.

That is why trade mark holders often seem over-vigilant in asserting their legal rights.

Disney for example will assert their rights fearlessly, despite the ridicule and opprobrium.

Readers of a certain age will also remember letters to the press from Portakabin.

No doubt Aldi itself has its own trade mark lawyers who will send out stiff letters to infringing competitors.

(Indeed there are marks registered to various Aldi entities that presumably they would want respected.)

And as Marks and Spencer itself admits on its own website, there are other stores seeking to ’emulate’ the Colin cake.

One tweeter helpfully provides us with examples:

As does another:

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So: the commercial predicament of Marks and Spencer was as follows.

The company had a popular, valuable and distinctive well-established product.

This was a product that took expense to make and also to promote.

The product was protected with registered trade marks for both its name and its packaging (as well as, no doubt, other intellectual property protections such as ‘passing-off’.)

The company faced competition from other stores with similar products.

Some of these rival chocolate caterpillars had similar names and packaging.

What was a company in that position do?

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Here we come to the old distinction between having a legal claim and asserting it.

In essence: just because you have a legal right, it does not necessarily follow that it should be asserted or enforced.

And if a decision is made to assert and enforce a legal right, you have to think through the implications and reactions.

Some companies like Disney will know there is a negative reaction to their enforcement of legal rights – but in such cases the cost-benefit analysis is that the rights are too valuable to lose to the public domain.

And such a robust approach is common in industries where the commercial value is largely in intellectual property.

A cartoon mouse and a portable cabin are not especially complicated things – so what is bought, sold and licensed is often the intellectual property of thing, rather than the thing itself.

And much the same can be said of a long chocolate roll decorated with sweets and icing.

One can imagine how the commercial and legal teams at Marks and Spencer knew that competitors with products with similar names and packaging was creating a commercial and legal risk.

It may well be Cuthbert today, but tomorrow it could be Colvin, and before they knew it there would be Colin the Caterpillars everywhere in every store.

And Colin the Caterpillar’s registration renewal was coming up in 2028. 

What else could they do?

#SaveColin

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But.

They should have thought it through.

Presumably there had already been pre-action correspondence between the parties – it is rare for a company to issue a claim in the high court without setting out the case first in correspondence, and there are costs implications if a party does.

And presumably Aldi had denied the claim in correspondence.

Aldi thereby knew what was coming – and not only its commercial and legal departments, but also its media teams and external PR advisers.

Marks and Spencer do not appear to have issued a press release about the claim, but somehow, some way the media soon knew about the claim.

Perhaps this was because of a vigilant court watcher, or a tip-off from somebody, or even part of a media strategy: who knows.

But once the claim was issued at the high court, the dispute went from one set out in private and confidential correspondence between the parties – and into the public domain.

In essence: you lose control of the story.

And when the story is as media-friendly as about chocolate caterpillars called Colin and Cuthbert then there is a high probability that the media will become aware.

But from the news reporting it seems that Marks and Spencer have been caught unawares – while the Aldi press office is having a party with social media generally.

So the question has to be asked: was/is protecting the Colin the Caterpillar name and packaging worth it?

Unlike a cartoon mouse or a portable cabin, Colin the Caterpillar does not go to the heart of Marks and Spencer.

Had Aldi promoted an own-brand range of goods called, say, St Michelle then that would have been different.

And – and I defer here to trade mark lawyers – it may have been perfectly possible to renew the trade mark in 2028 even taking the (current) challenge of Cuthbert at its highest.

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A view had to be taken on the risk of litigation against the risk of not litigating.

As the Art of War showed (and that is still the best practical guide to civil litigation) being able to attack is not the same as it being a good idea to attack.

Here one can ask McDonalds about McLibel – or the British Chiropractic Association and its illiberal and misconceived claim against Simon Singh.

And if the decision is made to litigate then a claimant must be prepared for what can happen next – in terms of commercial and media matters, as well as at law.

This is not to say that people and companies should not assert and enforce their legal rights – indeed, that is what legal rights (and lawyers) exist for – but that the decision to do so is always distinct and separate from being able to do so.

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Declaration: as the blogger ‘Jack of Kent’ I helped co-ordinate the defence campaign in British Chiropractic Association v Singh and I practise in media law as a solicitor, although not in respect of chocolate caterpillars or supermarket stores.

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Constitutions and court-packing

16th April 2021

Over in the United States there is a discussion about ‘court-packing’.

In particular, the question is about the new president should seek to nominate additional justices to the supreme court.

Some liberals and progressives are aggrieved at the current composition of the court.

A number of justices were nominated by Republican presidents who had not won a majority of the popular vote.

The Republican majority in the senate delayed one vote on a nomination and then rushed through another, with no regard to political consistency.

From a liberal and progressive perspective, these grievances are well-made.

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But.

From a constitutionalist perspective, there was nothing unconstitutional in a (Republican) president nominating new justices and a (Republican) senate deciding when to have the votes.

Both the delayed vote and the rushed confirmation were politically distasteful and discrediting.

But they were not unconstitutional.

Conservatives, however, should not take too much heart from this – as there is also nothing inherently unconstitutional about a president seeking to add justices.

This is because the constitution (though not federal legislation) is silent on the maximum number of supreme court justices.

If the Republican shenanigans about the appointment of supreme court justices was within the scope of the constitution, so may be any attempt to add new justices.

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A more fundamental question is about the role of the supreme court.

On the issue of abortion, for example, liberals and progressives have long depended on supreme court jurisprudence, especially Roe v Wade.

Yet it would be better and more sustainable to have fundamental rights sets out in legislation, rather than on the fragile basis of supreme court decisions.

A conservative majority on the supreme court is only as illiberal as the questions that will come before it.

If liberal and progressive policies are promoted and implemented by the route of legislation rather than litigation, then a conservative majority on the supreme court is less of a concern.

Liberal and progressive policies are always better secured by means of legislation rather than by court rulings.

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Cameron, May, Johnson – who, in constitutional terms, is the worst prime minister?

15th April 2021

Future students of history and politics will no doubt have to answer essay questions about who was the worst prime minister out of David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson.

And there is also no doubt there will be those who will aver that, say, Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair was worse than any of those three.

Over on Twitter the comedian and writer David Schnieder offered his view:

 

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From a constitutionalist (and liberal) perspective, there is a case to be made against each of the three.

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Johnson, for example, switched the government’s policy on Northern Ireland and Brexit, negotiated and signed the Northern Irish protocol, and rapidly passed it into legislation without any scrutiny – and we are currently watching the fallout from this.

One can also put against Johnson that it was his switch from supporting Cameron and his political ambition that led May to adopting the hardline positions that she did on Brexit.

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It was May, however, who was responsible for the ‘red lines’ that meant that the United Kingdom would leave the single market and customs union, which in turn necessitated there having to be elaborate provisions in respect of Northern Ireland.

She is also the one that triggered Article 50 prematurely and without a plan, and she even sought to make this momentous notification without an act of parliament.

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But.

Cameron is the most culpable.

However bad May and Johnson have been, they were and are merely dealing (badly) with a situation created by Cameron.

Cameron staked the entire future of the United Kingdom on a single turn of pitch-and-toss – a simple yes/no referendum – assuming that, of course, he would win.

No considerations – let alone plans – were made for the contingency of the votes being for leave.

It was perhaps the most irresponsible domestic political act one can imagine in peacetime.

A ‘macro’ decision that, in turn, led to the bad ‘micro’ decisions of May and Johnson as they sought to give effect to the referendum result.

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And so Schneider may be wrong on this, at least in terms of what the United Kingdom is going through constitutionally.

Looking at it in terms of other policies, one perhaps could take a different view.

But I suspect future generations will be aghast and bewildered at Cameron’s folly.

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The judges are only the ‘enemies of the people’ when it suits the government

14th April 2021

For the government. and its political and media supporters, the judiciary are the ‘enemies of the people’.

The view is that that it is no business of activist judges to interfere with what ‘the people’ want.

It is a view that led the London government to oppose the supreme court determining the two Miller cases.

It is also a view that informs the current attempts by the government to limit judicial review and the scope of the human rights act – to the claps and cheers of many who (frankly) should know better.

But it is a shallow view, adopted out of convenience and partisanship.

For, when the political boot is on a different constitutional foot, the government suddenly values an independent judiciary being able to assess the constitutional propriety of a measure:

See Joshua Rozenburg’s detailed piece here.

Also note the response of the London government’s former chief legal official:

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From a political perspective, this referral prompts mixed feelings.

My political view is that a Scottish parliament can and should be co-equal with the Westminster parliament – as the legislatures in Canada and Australia are, even if nominally under the same head of state.

As such, it is frustrating to see the emphatically supported view of the Scottish parliament potentially stymied in this way.

But a political view is not always the same as a constitutionalist perspective.

And under the current constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom, this is a question that can be referred to the supreme court – and as such there is nothing unconstitutional about the London government doing so.

(Whether those should be the constitutional arrangements is a different question.)

It is sheer hypocrisy – and there is not other word – for the London government, and its political and media supporters, to pick-and-choose when the supreme court gets to determine constitutional questions.

Either the supreme court is a constitutional court or it is not a constitutional court.

And it should not be regarded as only a constitutional court when the London government wants to face down Edinburgh, Cardiff, or Belfast.

A constitutional court is not and should not be regarded as an imperial court.

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