Taking the Devil’s name in vain: how the government may be deliberately misleading members of parliament about the legality of its Northern Irish Protocol proposals – a follow-on from yesterday’s post

10th June 2022

Yesterday’s post was very popular.

It was not published until the evening, and it already has had over 20,000 hits.

And it has been promoted by a former Irish ambassador to the United Kingdom and the European Union, one of Ireland’s leading journalists, and a Conservative former Lord Chancellor – as well as by the reporters and member of parliament whose work I used for the post.

Thank you to all of you who read and shared the post, and a special thank you to those of you whose support means I can free up time to put together posts like that (which in that instance took three days).

Here is a follow-up to the post which has come out from the subsequent discussion.

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It would appear that one function of the Eadie ‘advice‘ is so ministers can try to convince unsure backbenchers.

This possibility has been put forward by the Conservative former Lord Chancellor I mentioned, David Gauke:

Gauke here links to his recent New Statesman piece – which you should read – where the relevant sentence is:

“The sidelining of Eadie is highly irregular, especially as some MPs had previously been reassured that Eadie had opined on the legislation (he has, but not on the international law aspects).” 

This is significant in two ways.

First, the government is now reduced to lying to its own backbenchers.

And second, if this is correct then it also means that government backbenchers simply do not trust the Attorney General to be getting the law right, and want the comfort of a further opinion.

If so, this shows the further fall in the credibility of the Attorney General.

You will recall that during the Brexit debates, the then Attorney General Geoffrey Cox – a successful barrister – took a leading role in seeking to convince backbenchers about the legality of the then proposed deal:

That legal advice was later published.

We now know that this advice was not enough to convince enough backbenchers to support then Prime Minister Theresa May’s deal.

But the point is that members of parliament did not then question the credibility of the Attorney General in being the source of legal advice, just that they did not like the import of what he and May were saying.

The current Attorney General has had less of an opportunity to develop a career in private practice and so is a far more junior lawyer than Cox.

And although she is understood to have commissioned advice from public international lawyers (lawyers who specialise in treaties and other international agreements), the fact that she is advising that the proposals are legal carries little or no weight with government members of parliament.

So, if Gauke is correct, there has been a decline – perhaps a collapse – in how seriously the office of Attorney General is regarded politically.

And so members of parliament are having to be assured that the Treasury Devil is also on side:

This may explain the possible compromise I mentioned yesterday, where Eadie was asked to give an advice based on assumptions that the advice commissioned by the Attorney General was correct.

The backbenchers would then presumably not be told about the assumptions.

The Devil’s name would be being taken in vain.

And so the leak of the actual advice, which showed Eadie’s doubts about the validity of the Attorney-General’s advice, undermined this underhanded ploy.

The cover was blown from the legal cover.

It would therefore appear that the government was seeking to mislead its very own backbenchers over the legality of the proposals for the Northern Irish Protocol.

That is an extraordinary situation for the government to be getting into, and it does not bode well for the legal robustness of what is being proposed.

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The real problem with Beergate – and with Partygate

9th May 2022

There are many ways to look at the ‘Beergate’ political story – about the police investigation into what Leader of the Opposition did and did not do at (or after) a campaign function.

One way is to follow the political soap opera – and to ponder if the Leader of the Opposition will resign if he faces a penalty, if this will then backfire on the government supporters who have made this such a political story, and if voters will get tired and dismiss this and ‘Partygate’ with the shrug that says ‘they are all the same’.

Another way is to anxiously scrutinise the applicable law and to query whether the gathering was for work purposes or not.

And there is a third way, which requires stepping back to wonder if something more significant is going on.

Do ‘Partygate’ and ‘Beergate’ signify a shift in standard political tactics towards using reports to the police of one’s political opponents and encouraging investigations and sanctions?

For it is one thing to campaign against one’s political opponents.

But it seems another to actively seek that they face police attention.

Of course, from time to time – and in a society under the rule of law – politicians will get arrested, prosecuted, convicted and punished.

And that can be in respect of ‘political’ offences – such as regulate electoral matters – or more straightforward criminal activity.

Sometimes such investigations may have potentially important political implications – such as the cash for honours scandal about fifteen years ago, or the more recent parliamentary expenses scandals.

But in each of these cases, the involvement of the police seemed exceptional – and not part of the mundane, day-to-day politicking of Westminster.

And generally it seemed police involvement was not weaponised for political advantage (though there were one or two exceptions of minor Members of Parliament who liked referring matters to Scotland Yard).

Now, however, police involvement could not be more central to politics.

The fate of the Prime Minister and of the Leader of the Opposition depend, in part, on exercises of police discretion.

Not even a court is involved – just decisions of police officers as to whether it is reasonable to believe covid rules were broken.

(It would only become a matter for the courts if those police decisions are not accepted.)

Perhaps all this is just a one-off – just an extraordinary result of intrusive pandemic regulations that are no longer in place.

Or perhaps this marks a shift to using police involvement as a regular aspect of political activity.

So before we get carried away – one way or another – with clamouring for penalties to be imposed on which politicians you like least, perhaps we should think about where this is going.

For it may not be a good place for our politics to go.

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The suggestion that the Prime Minister give evidence to the privileges committee under oath and pain of perjury

2nd May 2022

Did you know there is a Parliamentary Witness Oaths Act?

This 1871 statute – which is still in force – provides among other things that any committee of the House of Commons may administer an oath to the witnesses examined before such committee.

And, while an examination of witness by a parliamentary committee is not a judicial proceeding, it would still be perjury for a person to lie such an oath (or affirmation) – with the penalty being up to seven years in prison.

This information comes from a fascinating and informative article at the New Statesman by Alexander Horne, a former parliamentary legal adviser.

In that article Horne contends that such an oath could be administered to the Prime Minister for any evidence he gives to the privileges committee.

If so. this would mean that the Prime Minister would be (to use the glorious legal phrase) ‘under pain of perjury’ to tell the truth to the committee investigating whether he deliberately misled parliament and/or failed to correct the record at the first available opportunity.

(The latter point is where this blog has previously set out that the Prime Minister is vulnerable, for it may be hard for him to maintain that once he had the Sue Gray report and/or any briefing for the Metropolitan police investigation that he still did not realise that he had misled parliament.)

On the face of it, administering such an oath has its attractions.

No sensible person doubts that the current prime minister lies fluently and repeatedly, and so placing him ‘under pain of perjury’ would have the advantage of concentrating his mind wonderfully.

Such an approach would also have the broader advantage of reminding the Prime Minister and others that evidence to parliamentary committees should be taken seriously – especially as the sanction of ‘contempt of parliament’ is, well, held in contempt.

Horne mentions where such oaths have been used:

“Committees rarely administer the oath to witnesses, although it has happened in recent years. The Home Affairs Committee chose to take evidence under oath in respect of its inquiry into child sexual exploitation in Rotherham. The Public Accounts Committee also controversially administered the oath to the general counsel and solicitor to the Inland Revenue in 2011.”

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But.

It may be one thing for witnesses who are not members of either house of parliament to give evidence to a parliamentary committee ‘under pain of perjury’ – but for a parliamentarian and minister to also do so is constitutionally problematic.

That what parliamentarians say in parliament is absolutely protected at law is set out (some would say ‘enshrined’) in the Bill of Rights.

And there is the principle that the responsibility of a minister to answer questions in parliament is politically enforceable (or not enforceable), and not a matter for any form of litigation.

Imagine if the Prime Minister (or other minister or parliamentarian) is caught out in a lie before a parliamentary committee, what would then happen?

(And the 1871 legislation does not expressly provide that parliamentarians are exempt.)

Would an outside court have to adjudicate the conduct of a parliamentarian in respect of parliamentary proceedings?

It is difficult to see how such a prosecution could be easily brought – and it could result in another (for constitutional commentators, splendid) constitutional mess.

And regardless of the legal(istic) issues in this particular situation, there is a sensible wariness of converting political issues into court matters.

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That said, however, it is unfortunate that there is so little that can be done to get the prime minister to give truthful answers in parliament.

This is certainly a constitutional problem that needs a practical solution.

The suggestion of getting a Prime Minister to give evidence to the privileges committee investigating him ‘under pain of perjury’ has the appearance of being such a solution to that problem.

The fear would be that in seeking go solve one constitutional problem, another is caused.

And so the problem remains: what can you do – constitutionally and practically –  with a dishonest Prime Minister?

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POSTSCRIPT

Horne has provided a link to a useful post where he deals with the issues in more detail:

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Partygate and parliament: law and policy, tactics and strategy, privileges and penalties

21st April 2022

Well.

Those were an interesting few days in parliament.

We went from a government bullishly seeking to block the prime minister being investigated by the powerful committee on privileges, to supporting the opposition motion.

This government cannot even get political gangsterism right.

Great credit here should go to the opposition parties.

Faced with a law-breaking prime minister who has said – on any view – incorrect things to parliament about the facts relevant to that law-breaking, the opposition could have gone for censure motion, or a confidence motion, or a contempt motion.

And had the opposition done so, it would have been defeated – perhaps on a whipped vote.

But instead the Labour leadership put forward a motion to which no sensible member of parliament could object, and the motion even said any consideration by the privileges committee should await the end of the Metropolitan police investigation.

And the Labour chair of the privileges committee – who had been vocal in his disdain of the prime minister on this issue – said he would recuse himself, thereby removing another possible objection.

Against this tactical savviness, the government position collapsed.

First there was to be an amendment: but that went.

Then the vote was to be unwhipped: and that went.

And in the end, there was not even a vote.

The motion went through on the nod.

Let’s just think about that.

A motion of the house of commons that a sitting prime minister should be investigated by the privileges committee in respect of four statements he made in the house about the circumstances of that law breaking went through – and not a single member of parliament opposed it.

Of course: asking for an investigation is one thing – and the committee may well not find the prime minister in contempt.

But – in and of itself – that such a motion should go through without any objection is remarkable.

One reason for the opposition’s tactical success is that Conservative members of parliament do not want another situation like with Owen Paterson – where they were whipped to frustrate a report, only for the position to be reversed in front of their eyes.

Another reason is that – as this blog has previously averred – a parliamentary majority is no barrier to Nemesis following Hubris.

Other prime ministers in command of working majorities have been brought down before between elections – Thatcher, Blair – and so there is no reason this one cannot be either.

A privileges committee investigation is a serious matter, as they have the power to recommend suspensions from the house.

Another investigation – following the Sue Gray and metropolitan investigations – will also keep this issue alive – and that is, no doubt, the strategic goal of the opposition.

The constitutional Wednesday Addams in any of us can only smile at all of this not going away.

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What is happening here is – in effect – a parliamentary stress-test, an anxious examination of our constitutional arrangements.

What do you do with a law-breaking prime minister who has misled the house of commons?

Can this be checked and balanced?

The answer to this should not be a civil servant’s report – however independently minded the civil servant.

Nor should it be a decision by the police to issue a penalty, or not.

It is – rightly – a matter for parliament.

And this week’s deft parliamentary footwork by Labour and the other opposition parties has ensured that there will be a parliamentary answer to this particular parliamentary question.

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A balancing exercise in action – Chris Mullin defeats a disclosure request in respect of the Birmingham pub bombings

23rd March 2022

I was born and brought up in the Birmingham of the 1970s, and like many others I had family and family friends who could well have been killed in the Birmingham pub bombings.

There is a powerful public interest in that crime being properly investigated and those guilty being convicted.

Six innocent men were convicted for the bombings, and their prosecution and punishments was an appalling miscarriage of justice, perhaps one of the worst miscarriages of justice in English legal history.

There was a powerful public interest in that miscarriage of justice being exposed and corrected.

And the journalist (and later politician) Chris Mullin was the one who did most to expose and correct that miscarriage of justice.

What happens when two powerful public interests such as the above collide?

That was the issue before the recorder of London at the Old Bailey.

On one hand, those police officers investigating the bombings want access to materials held by Mullin.

You can see why the police would want this – especially if it would contain direct evidence that would aid a successful prosecution.

But that does not necessarily mean the police should get it.

The reason is that the material which Mullin holds was given to him on the basis of confidentiality, so that he could expose the miscarriage of justice.

Without that assurance to his source, Mullin would not have been given that information, and without that information the miscarriage of justice would not have been exposed.

And so the public interest in exposing that miscarriage of justice would have been defeated.

In a detailed and fascinating judgment, the judge shows how the competing – indeed contrasting – public interests in this case should be balanced.

And in a compelling conclusion the judge holds that in this case there should not be an order for disclosure of the material.

It is unfortunate that this means that any prosecution of those guilty of the bombings will not be assisted by this material – but such a prosecution should not be at the cost of undermining the public interest in exposing a miscarriage of justice.

Not only is the judgment compelling, it also is another recent example of a judge taking Article 10 of the ECHR and the right to free expression seriously.

It is a good judgment in a difficult case, and it is recommended reading for anyone interested in practical law and policy.

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What is SLAPP?

22nd March 2022

Sometimes I give blogposts the wrong titles.

Yesterday, the post here had the title: Is there a SLAPP problem in the English courts?

This is a good – and urgent – question.

The problem was that the post did not answer the question, and instead it set out some preliminary views about SLAPP – that is an acronym for ‘strategic litigation against public participation’.

What I should have done before setting out these preliminary views was to explain SLAPP – and I am sorry I did not do so.

Some people even told me on Twitter that they had to google ‘SLAPP’ so as to understand my post.

This post seeks to remedy the deficiency of yesterday’s post.

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SLAPP is a term to describe the misuse of the litigation process for the purpose of minimising or eliminating public and media scrutiny.

It is an American term and it appears to date from 1996.

There have been, in turn, various anti-SLAPP laws in America.

The reason why SLAPP is now seen as an issue here is a spate of illiberal legal claims brought (or threatened) in the High Court in London which appear to have the ulterior motive of minimising or eliminating public and media scrutiny – in particular scrutiny of various oligarchs and foreign corporations.

The United Kingdom government has just announced that it is considering introducing anti-SLAPP laws here and it has put out the a call for evidence on SLAPP.

The government describes SLAPP as follows:

“The term SLAPPs is commonly used to describe activity that aims to discourage public criticism through an improper use of the legal system. SLAPPs have two key features:

• They target acts of public participation. Public participation can include academic research, journalism and whistle-blowing activity concerned with matters of societal importance, such as illicit finance or corruption.

• They aim to prevent information in the public interest from being published. This can be by threatening or bringing proceedings which often feature excessive claims.”

Another word for this phenomenon is the splendid portmanteau ‘lawfare’.

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Now that I have set out a defintion of the term, do have another look at yesterday’s post – which I have now re-titled.

You will see that I aver that although SLAPP is a pejorative and contested term, it is also a useful term as long as you bear its limitations in mind.

In further posts on this blog I am going to look at some recent cases that have been described as SLAPP cases so as to answer the following questions:

1. Is there really a SLAPP problem in the English courts?

2. If so, what is the nature of that problem?

3. And if it is a problem, is it a problem capable of being solved?

I think it is important to ground any consideration of reform in an understanding of actual examples, else one can end up with a mismatch between proposals and problems.

For such a mismatch is what happened, in my view, with the campaign which led to the Defamation Act 2013, where the eventual legislation that was passed would have done little or nothing in respect of the various poster-cases on which the campaign relied.

(With my old Jack of Kent blog I was part of the early part of that campaign for libel reform, though I had and have concerns about the law that was finally enacted.)

Whether there is an actual SLAPP problem and, if so, whether it can be solved is a key issue for our legal system and how that system impacts on public debate.

I would like this blog – with its posts and excellent commenters – to be part of informing the debate on that issue.

I am sorry my post yesterday was running before it was walking – and I hope this further post has put that right.

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SLAPP and English courts – some preliminary issues

21st March 2022

SLAPP – strategic litigation against public participation – is a new-ish name for an age-old problem.

Here is L. Ron Hubbard in 1955 advocating law suits against those who were using Scientology materials without authorisation:

“The purpose of the suit is to harass and discourage rather than to win. The law can be used very easily to harass, and enough harassment on somebody who is simply on the thin edge anyway, well knowing that he is not authorized, will generally be sufficient to cause his professional decease. If possible, of course, ruin him utterly”

(The Scientologist: a Manual on the Dissemination of Material, page 157)

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SLAPP is, of course, a pejorative term (as this blog recently averred) – but, for want of a better term, is the best name we have got for a certain thing.

The problem with SLAPP being a pejorative term is that, just as one person’s terrorist can be another person’s freedom fighter, one person’s SLAPP case is another person’s legitimate attempt to defend their reputation and/or privacy rights.

Few if any claimants will say expressly that their case is a SLAPP case – not many are as brazen as L. Ron Hubbard.

And it is possible that what one side considers to be a SLAPP case will genuinely not be considered to be a SLAPP case by the other side.

That said, SLAPP as a term has two useful qualities.

First, it is not limited to any one area of law – for example defamation – and so it implicitly recognises that various areas of law can be (mis)used – not only defamation but also misuse of private information, data protection, confidentiality, intellectual property rights, and so on.

Second, it indicates that certain decisions are being made strategically – or at least, tactically (though TLASS is a less handy acronym) – about the purpose to which law is being used.

Another problem, however, with SLAPP as a term is that its American origins may mislead people into thinking all anti-SLAPP legislation is the same.

In fact, much of what constitutes anti-SLAPP reform in the United States is already part of English law, including the ready availability of costs sanctions and early opportunities for meritless cases to be struck out.

There is no single anti-SLAPP reform that fits all jurisdictions.

So as long as the strengths and weaknesses of SLAPP as a term are borne in mind, it is the best description we have got of a certain thing.

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But – what is that thing?

Well.

One thing it usually is not about is the law or procedural rules being broken by lawyers or their clients.

In almost all SLAPP cases, the lawyers are using the laws and court procedures available to them: the issue is the ulterior purpose to which those laws and court procedures is being put.

This is why, in my view, attempts to ‘name and shame’ the lawyers involved are misconceived.

(Though, for completeness, I know and deal with many of those who are involved.)

The lawyers that have so far been publicly named are but a sub-set of the lawyers competent and willing to take on such claims.

And – frankly – you do not need parliamentary privilege to ‘name and shame’ the lawyers: all you need to do is look at the case reports to see who they are, and at their own websites to see how they promote their practices.

I happen to be a media defence lawyer (among other things) – acting for journalists, campaigners, and politicians – and I chose not to act for claimants in these sort of cases, but that is entirely a personal choice.

In my experience of seeing dozens of threatening letters (of varying quality), almost all the threats are within the scope of law and practice as it stands.

And if a threatening letter did not come from one firm, I can imagine pretty much the same sort of letter coming from a dozen other firms.

The problem is with the law and practice, and so – if you sincerely want to solve the problem – that is where the solution will be.

Although therapeutic, ‘naming and shaming’ the lawyers involved is a cul-de-sac.

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Another thing to note is that, in England, SLAPP is not just about costs – even if the amounts involved can be eye-watering.

Yes, London claimant lawyers are expensive – too expensive.

But: American lawyers are expensive too, sometimes even more expensive than English lawyers.

Media lawyers in other jurisdictions are also high-charging and highly paid.

Yet, it is in England that certain cases are brought – and threatened.

This is because the problem with SLAPP cases in London is not just the costs, but how those costs can be easily weaponised as part of of a legal threat.

London litigation is often not a game of thrones, but a game of costs.

The dynamics of many cases will come down to costs, and how costs consequences can be inflicted and deflected.

And how this happens comes down to the structure and practice of the relevant law.

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But perhaps the biggest difficulty about discussing SLAPP in England is that the discussion can sometimes seem abstract.

SLAPP is a bad thing, and nice people are against bad things.

Let’s boo at SLAPP!

But the challenge is to make any SLAPP reform work practically – to make a difference in actual cases.

There are a number of ways law and practice can be misused, and so any reform needs to be set against actual cases to see if the reform would make any practical difference.

One thing I recall from the campaign which led to the Defamation Act 2013 is that the key case for mobilising support – the misconceived and illiberal claim brought by the British Chiropractic Association against science writer Simon Singh – turned out not to be directly relevant to the legislation that was then passed.

Little in that Act would stop another such case being brought again – and indeed it was the court’s own decision in that case, and not any legislation, that has stopped further similar claims.

There can be a practical disconnect between cases that attract public concerns and the reforms then promoted for dealing with such concerns.

That is why this blog is going to look over the next few days at a ‘data-set’ of SLAPP cases, to see what the actual problems are and to see what, if any, solutions can be put in place to stop similar cases being threatened and brought.

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In the meantime, I would suggest anyone interested in SLAPP, and what practical reforms can be implemented to prevent such cases, look at the following:-

– the transcript of the oral evidence at the foreign affairs select committee on the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (or watch it here);

the excellent and comprehensive work by Susan Coughtrie and the Foreign Policy Centre on SLAPPS – including this policy paper;

– this House of Commons library briefing on SLAPP; and

– the UK government’s recent call for evidence on SLAPP.

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Can the period of the current Ombudsman be lawfully extended?

18th March 2022

One of the areas of focus of this blog is what I call the ‘accountability gap’ – that is the lack of genuine accountability in the arrangements of United Kingdom government and public administration.

And one element of this accountability gap is the problem of the ‘Ombudsman’ – the Parliamentary Commissioner for Public Administration.

This is a strange and fairly obscure office and it exists to deal with what is – from a legal perspective – a strange and elusive thing: ‘maladministration’.

(My post on the obscurity of the office is here and my post on the vague concept of maladministration is here.)

It is also an office that is not without its critics – as this link demonstrates.

Part of the problem with the Ombudsman seems to me to be structural – the relevant legislation provides a strange mix of strong powers and a weak sense of purpose.

But some of the problem may be operational – that the PHSO (as it is now known) does not operate as well as it could do, even with its curious legal regime.

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The current Ombudsman has just had his term of office extended – and, as you can imagine, this has not been received well by the critics of the Ombudsman.

The extension is for a further period of two years, which will take his term in office to 2024.

One may doubt whether such an extension is wise – and the recent extension of office of the now-departing Metropolitan police commissioner comes to mind as an unwise extension of office.

I have been, however, asked to look at whether the extension is unlawful.

Here we need to look at section 1 of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967:

We also need to look at last week’s press release:

Curiously there seems no trace on the website of the Cabinet Office of the confirmation, or on the website of the parliamentary committee of such a recommendation – but let us assume that the confirmation and recommendation both actually happened.

And by way of background, the current Ombudsman was appointed in April 2017, and was widely reported that the original appointment was for a five-year term (which must be correct, else there would be no need for an extension).

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So, looking at section 1, what can we ascertain?

Section 1(2A) provides that the Ombudsman is shall hold office until the end of the period for which he or she is appointed.

On the face of it, that would mean the current Ombudsman’s term comes to an end next month, for that was the position of the original appointment.

Section 1(3B) provides that a person cannot be ‘re-appointed’ as Ombudsman.

So if the extension was a re-appointment that would be unlawful under section 1(3B).

And section 1(2B) provides that the period of appointment shall not be no more than seven years in total.

That provision means that if the current Ombudsman served beyond April 2024 then that would certainly be unlawful.

What is not clear on the face of the legislation is what the legal position is if an office holder has an extension beyond his or her original appointment, as long as that extension does not mean more than seven years in total are served.

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In practical terms, it could be argued that by extending the appointment before it expired, then the appointment is simply continuing.

It can also be argued that section 1(2A) does not say or necessarily imply that that an Ombudsman cannot hold office after the period for which he or she is appointed – section 1(2A) only says that they must hold the office until the end of the appointment.

On balance, I think that although the position is not clear, the extension does not look to be unlawful.

Nothing in section 1 expressly prohibits such an extension.

Had section 1(2B) said that the period of appointment shall never be longer than the duration of the original appointment, then such an extension would be unlawful.

But section 1(2B) does not say that – it instead expressly states that the duration should not exceed seven years.

And because there is this express long-stop, I do not think a court would easily imply into the Act an even shorter long-stop as a matter of law.

I also do not think the court would see the extension as a ‘re-appointment’, as it is a continuation of an existing appointment and not the start of a fresh term of office.

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Public law is full of these situations where the legal position is not clear – and it may be that my analysis above is incorrect – and you are welcome to put forward your view below.

But the fact that the extension is (probably) legal does not necessarily mean that it is a good decision.

What may be a legal thing to do is not always the right thing to do.

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“Russian influence in the UK is the new normal” – Did you know the Russia Report had actually been published?

9th March 2022

Another brief post today – am not well and Twitter today has used up what spare mental energy I had – and so here is another link with an explanation.

This is to the ‘Russia Report’ – a document that many did not realise had actually been published.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1500098105936654340

And if you cannot read its fifty-five pages, you can read the four page summary here.

And, if those four pages are too many, just read the bullet-points – especially the first:

“Russian influence in the UK is the new normal.

“Successive Governments have welcomed the oligarchs and their money with open arms, providing them with a means of recycling illicit finance through the London ‘laundromat’, and connections at the highest levels with access to UK companies and political figures.”

You would think such a conclusion of a senior cross-party committee would have made the political news.

But – unless you have a particular interest – you would have never known it had been published at all.

A wise civil servant once observed that if you want to hide something, just publish it – for nobody will read it.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome.

The United Kingdom government is rushing through anti-oligarch legislation without proper scrutiny

7th March 2022

Imagine a serious piece of proposed legislation, for serious times.

Imagine that legislation is substantial – a Bill of 64 pages.

Imagine that legislation is complex – 55 clauses and 5 schedules (the latter comprising 11 parts).

Imagine that legislation is coercive – creating at least 12 new criminal offences.

Imagine that legislation confers wide executive powers – with 20 “may by regulations” provisions for Secretary of State to legislate by fiat, including in respect of individual rights.

And now…

…imagine that proposed legislation being forced through all its stages in the House of Commons in a single day.

What could possibly go wrong?

Well.

We will now find out, for this is what is happening today with the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Bill.

This significant legislation is being rushed through with almost no opportunity for adequate scrutiny by Members of Parliament – just so the government can be seen be doing something about Oligarchs.

This is not how fundamental legislation should be put in place.

 

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome.