Due process and ministerial matters

1st February 2023

The working title of this post was something like “Boris Johnson, Nadhim Zahawi, and the creeping judicialisation of ministerial matters” – but that was perhaps too provocative and over-stated, even though it does have an element of truth to it.

One starting point here is that ministers of the crown are appointed, at least in constitutional theory, by the monarch, on the advice of the prime minister.

Another starting point is that parliament is the master of its own procedures, and what happens in parliament cannot be gainsaid by any court.

Both of these things – the hiring and firing of ministers and the affairs of parliament – are firmly in the realm of politics, rather than part of the province of law.

And those commentators and politicians who are hard against things like “judicial activism” and “unelected judges” are usually the most vigilant about judicial intrusions into the realm of politics.

There is a “political constitution” we are told, and it is not the business of judges and lawyers to get involved in what are matters of politics.

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But.

In the recent political matters of, first, Boris Johnson and the privileges committee and then second, the sacking of Nadhim Zahawi we are hearing phrases such as “natural justice” and “due process”.

The contention is that neither parliament nor the prime minister should have unfettered discretion.

There are things parliament and the prime minister cannot do, it is averred, because of the procedural rights of the politician involved.

This blog covered, you may remember, the “legal” advice commissioned by Johnson and his criminal lawyers to the effect that parliament was acting with conspicuous unfairness in its dealings with Johnson, even though it would never be a matter for any court.

This advice, we were told at the time, was “absolutely devastating” but, in fact, it absolutely missed the point.

This weekend just gone saw a similar complaint from supporters of Zahawi:

One response to these protestations is simply to scoff, especially as both Johnson and Zahawi are the sort of politicians who otherwise would criticise lawyers for “getting people off on technicalities”.

(And many such “technicalities” are procedural points, as opposed to substantive points on the merits.)

Like the proverbial “foxhole atheists”, it can be remarked that politicians who otherwise would disdain, if not despise, clever lawyerly tricks seem to have a change of heart about procedural fairness when their own rights are at issue.

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But scoffing alone would be wrong: for it is actually heartening to see due process and procedural fairness being given emphasis in political matters.

Of course, taking due process and procedural fairness seriously does not (necessarily) mean political matters being dragged into the courts.

The prerogatives and privileges of both the crown and of parliament mean that such matters are not justiciable.

And there is the danger of due process being misused.

In particular, there is the problem of prime ministers using inquiries and investigations as the means of not taking decisions which they are supposed to make themselves under our constitutional arrangements.

And there is the problem that, like with the (infamous) wait for the Sue Gray report, inquiries and investigations can be used as an excuse to avoid and evade proper parliamentary scrutiny and political accountability.

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Taking due process and procedural fairness (more) seriously is a welcome development, given the alternative of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.

Yet taking such things seriously means it should not matter whether doing so is politically convenient or not.

Fairness should always a basic value, and not a means to an end.

And so the best way politicians could show us that they do take due process and procedural fairness seriously is not when it is in their own cause, but in the cause of those far less powerful in society whose rights are undermined or disregarded.

For if politicians cared as much about the procedural rights of the less powerful as they do about their own due process rights, then that would show their protests were not just cynical, self-serving expediencies.

No doubt, however, such politicians would shrug off such uneven-handed inconsistency as, well, just a technicality.

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Tax law should be as boring as constitutional law

31st January 2023

This is a very quick post, while I am writing something more substantial on natural justice and ministerial sackings (which I have not finished in time to post today, sorry).

Tax law, like constitutional law, should be dull.

And so that tax law is currently interesting is a Bad Sign.

Tax policy – as opposed to tax law – should be interesting, but once the policy has been determined, the practical implementation of that policy should not be remarkable.

The current emphasis in political debate about ministerial compliance with tax law will not end well.

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One-and-a-half cheers for the sacking of Nadhim Zahawi – and the calm, lethal prose of Sir Laurie Magnus

30th January 2023

In a summary, three-step form there seems nothing amiss about the sacking of Nadhim Zahawi from the cabinet: (1) he did some things wrong; (2) the things he did wrong were a breach of the Ministerial Code; and (3) he was sacked by the Prime Minister.

Those three steps are what is supposed to happen in these circumstances – and there are recent examples of one or both of the first two of these steps not actually being followed by the third.

But.

This government could not even get this quite right.

In particular: the things which were done wrong were known to the Prime Minister before the publication of the report from the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests which set out the details of the wrongs and how they breached the Ministerial Code.

That said, there is a certain satisfaction from reading the report, with its methodical approach, accumulation of detail, and particularisations of breach.

(Well, apart from the “The General Principles of the Ministerial Code are very clear” – and longer-term followers will know why.)

The report by Sir Laurie Magnus is a fine piece of work, and one can only wonder what other recent ministerial transgressions would look like in such calm, lethal prose.

But it really should not be the job of an adviser, however independent or distinguished, to work out whether a Prime Minister should sack a minister.

There was nothing substantial in the report which the Prime Minister did not already know, or could have known with a due application of diligence.

This out-sourcing of ministerial discretion – which is reminiscent of the Sue Gray report – is a bad thing for accountability of ministers to parliament.

And when done by a Prime Minister is a very bad thing indeed.

So, a single-and-a-half cheer for this report and the sacking.

But not the three cheers that would have followed the Prime Minister doing his job and doing this all for himself.

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This week’s Substack essay – the Taff Vale case of 1901

29th January 2023

Over at Substack, this week’s essay for paying subscribers is on the Taff Vale case of 1901, which is generally regarded as the important trade union case in British history.

In that case the House of Lords held that a trade union could be sued for the damages caused to an employer by wrongful acts.  This exposed trade unions to significant legal peril when taking industrial action.

In my post I set out how the law and world view of the time, especially in respect of “economic torts”, meant that the trade union lost the case and why the labour movement had to look to parliament for legal change.  I also put the case in a context of other trade union cases of the time.

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Every weekend I do an essay for paying subscribers, in addition to the free-to-read law and policy topical commentary on this blog every weekday.

The essays are on aspects of legal history or the relationship between law and lore or popular culture.

Previous essays have been on:

Malone (1979) – which is for me the one case from the last fifty years which signifies the most about our constitution;

The origin of Wednesbury unreasonableness (1948) – the notion that a public body can make irrational decisions, as long as those decisions are not so unreasonable that no public body would make them; and

Dr Bonham’s case (1610) where a great judge said that there were limits to what could be done with an Act of parliament.

Like a Marshall Cavendish part-work publication of yesteryear, I am hoping these essays will build up to be an interesting library and resource in their own right, but without the dinky plastic models

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I have also posted the essays at Patreon for my Patreon supporters, and Patreon supporters and anyone who made a PayPal contribution to this blog in 2022 can have a one-year full complimentary subscription – just leave a “Private” comment below.  It is important that nobody pays “twice” for my drivel.

Thank you all for following this blog.  I would like to keep the topical commentary free, and these essays on less immediately topical subjects are a way of cross-subsidising the daily free-to-read topical posts.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

Why historical cases are not only fascinating but instructive

27th January 2023

Over at my new Substack for the last few weeks I have been posting (what I like to call) an “essay” on a significant historical case.

Such cases are (for me) fascinating as each one shows what happened when law, litigation and public policy met at certain times and places in the past – almost like postcards of intellectual history.

With historical cases, however, it is important to remember that the litigants and the courts were not dealing with the case for the benefit of historians and other later observers.

Litigation is (usually) an immensely practical affair, with those involved focused on immediate concerns – the recorded judgment is a by-product of their joint endeavours.

And almost all judgments – and the hearings that precede them – are not inevitable.

A case only goes to trial or appeal because of certain decisions by the actors – decisions which could have gone differently.

In civil cases, there could have been settlement; in public law cases, there could have been a reason why a claim would not have been made; in criminal cases, there could be an early plea of guilty.

One misleading view which can come from reading too much academic law is that decided cases are somehow the perfect state of legal practice – whereas, in reality, cases that ever get to trial and a published judgment are a rarity.

Indeed, the key question to ask about any published judgment – especially in civil cases – is: how the hell did this case end up in court?

But even though the cases exceptional they can show us things about the times and places where they were decided.

Was this area of law uncertain?  Why did both parties risk going to trial rather than settle?  Did the parties not only disagree but also have radically different world views?  Was the court having to deal with something which was new or not usually contested?  And so on.

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The first of essays was on Malone (1979) – which is for me the one case from the last fifty years which signified the most about our constitution.

That was the case where government counsel (seriously) submitted to the court that it was open to the state to interfere with the rights of a citizen, as long as there was no law to prevent it.

(This was an application to the state of the classic liberal sentiment that one can do as one wishes, as long as there is no law against it.)

The government’s eventual defat in that case, when it went to the European Court of Human Rights, led directly to the placing of the state’s intelligence and security powers onto a statutory basis.

The second essay was on the origin of Wednesbury unreasonableness – the notion from a 1948 case that a public body can make irrational decisions, as long as those decisions are not so unreasonable that no public body would make them.

The third essay was about an example from as far back as 1610, where the court in Dr Bonham’s case said that there were limits to what could be done with an Act of parliament.

Tomorrow’s essay will about perhaps the most significant case in trade union history: the Taff Vale judgment of 1901 (case report here), where there was a clash of those two contrasting world views: individualism and collectivism.

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I know that these essays, being for paid subscribers, are not free-to-read for some of my followers, but I do seek to post free-to-read topical legal commentary here almost every weekday.  These essays are less (immediately) topical, and they do help subsidise the time and effort and opportunity cost of the daily commentary.  And the essays even encourage me to write in multi-sentence paragraphs, like this.

So please do subscribe to the Substack if you can, and each week we build up a view of the haphazard and interesting way our law has developed over time, and this may in turn help us understand the present.

And any suggestions for historical cases for future essays welcome.

(Please note that the essays are also made available to Patreon and Paypal supporters – as nobody should pay “twice” for my drivel.)

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The Church of England seems more accountable on the floor of the House of Commons than most government ministers

26th January 2023

Now here is a curious thing.

The Church of England seems more accountable on the floor of the House of Commons than most government ministers.

This week there was an urgent question about the position of the Church of England on same-sex marriages.

And as in England, we have an established church there is a member of parliament charged with answering questions on behalf of the Church of England – from the backbenches:

In contrast to this exercise in parliamentary accountability, we have this week had the Prime Minister refer the Zadawi tax matter to the ethics adviser and the BBC mount an internal investigation into the relationship of its chair with a former Prime Minister.

This is in addition to the King’s Counsel looking at allegations against the Lord Chancellor.

There are various other inquiries and investigations, some now almost-forgotten.

And the thing is about these inquiries and investigations is that they are often exercises in political deflection and delay – deft manoeuvres so that there is no actual practical accountability of ministers, at least not immediately.

The consequence is that we are now in the extraordinary situation where the bishops of the Church of England are generally more accountable to members of parliament than the ministers of the crown.

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The importance of giving important legislation very dull names

25th January 2023

In his informative post today on Dominic Raab and his “Bill of Rights”, Joshua Rozenberg quotes today’s important report by a parliamentary committee:

“What’s more, says the all-party committee, it’s not a bill of rights at all. If the government decides to press on with it, the bill’s title should be changed to something more meaningful — such as the European Convention on Human Rights (Domestic Application) Bill.”

And indeed the committee even states this as a conclusion:

The committee make a good point – and this is a missed trick by the justice secretary Dominic Raab.

Had Raab gone for a bill with such a boring title it may even now been an Act.

But he went for perhaps the most portentous title for legislation he could think of – other than Magna Carta II – and so looks like he will have no legislation passed at all.

Raab wanted to evoke and allude to the Bill of Rights of 1688-89 when all he was doing was fiddling around at the margins of how the European Convention on Human Rights was given effect in English law.

Had he been content with a more drab descriptive title, he may now have a legislative achievement to chalk up against his name.

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There is nothing wrong with dull titles for legislation.

For example, one of the most important statutes in property and contract law has the sterling, stirring title of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.

What matters is the substance of a statute, not what can be said in a press release with its title.

A less pompously named statute tidying up some of the acknowledged problems with the Human Rights Act may have actually been welcome.

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But.

The problem is not just with Raab.

The Human Rights Act itself has a needlessly provocative title.

Had it been called the European Convention on Human Rights (Domestic Application and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1998, then there would probably be far less political and media opposition, even if the substance was the same.

Part of the reason why the 1998 Act is still contested in some political and media quarters is because of its name.

So let us worry less about the the titles of legislation and more about the substance.

And perhaps “political” titles for legislations should be banned.

The prohibition could even be contained in a Banning Daft Legislation Titles Act.

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Nadhim Zahawi, his lawyers, and a blogger

18th January 2023

There is a certain intellectual satisfaction to be had from watching an investigation done well – especially if you have watched it unfold in real time.

The work of tax lawyer and blogger Dan Neidle (who I know) on the remarkable matter of the tax affairs of Nadhim Zahawi is to be savoured.

Click on this link and read the chronology of how Neidle went step-by-step from the moment he thought something here just was not right.

(I remember in prehistoric times, when I had the same moment in the Nightjack and the Saudi prisons contract stories.)

I am not a tax lawyer, but I do know a bit about media law, and from that perspective I would like to add a couple of points about this story.

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There is nothing wrong, in principle, with any person asserting their legal rights – in defamation or anything else – if their legal rights are being infringed.

And so, until and unless the law of defamation is abolished, Zahawi and anybody else – including you – can seek to defend their – your – rights.

The problem here is not that there were libel letters, but that Zahawi’s legal strategy was flawed to begin with.

And so, faced with someone who knew what they were doing, the legal strategy first had to keep changing, before falling apart.

Moreover, lawyers’ letters can often be more revealing in what they do not say, rather than what they do say – and, if read carefully, even the most robust-seeming lawyers’ letter can expose the weakness of the position of a hapless client.

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We do not know the extent to which Zahawi’s lawyers were acting under instruction – and although lawyers can advise, it is always the client who decides.

(That said, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority was absolutely right to remind the lawyers involved that legal correspondence should not be abused.)

And the wise litigation lawyer will already know that heading a letter “Not For Publication” can be often a triumph of hope over experience, especially when dealing with bloggers.

The aggressive legal strategy would have to have been approved by Zadawi.

And so the fault for Zahawi’s botched legal strategy must ultimately be with Zahawi.

He no doubt went to his lawyers instructing them to get the problem to go away, but by doing so, he made his own position far worse.

The gaps in the aggressive legal letters were telling, and they would have been better unsent.

The legal strategy adopted by Zahawi is as much a misjudgment as anything else in this matter.

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The fate of Zahawi is now in the realm of politics, not law.

He may survive, and the political circus may move on.

But whatever happens, the elegant and thorough blogging of Neidle will stand as an outstanding example of what can be done, over time, when an investigation is done well.

Bravo.

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Here is evidence that we are moving – at last – into post-Brexit politics and policy-making

23rd January 2023

Last week there was a (very popular) post on this blog about regulation and the supposed “bonfires” of “red tape”.

Most of the points in that post were general, but a particular point was made about the misconceived Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill.

That Bill contains this remarkable provision as clause 1:

In other words, laws – thousands of them – will all be repealed by automatic operation of law, unless specific exceptions are made.

And nobody knows how many:

Rarely has there been an approach to legislation this daft, and it is hard to think of any legislative exercise where daftness has been on this scale.

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Of course, this causes confusion, including to business.

One may think businesses would welcome such drastic deregulation – but, in fact, businesses are far more welcoming to consistency.

In his speech today, the director general of the Confederation of British Industry addressed the problems of this Bill.

First, he did not dismiss regulatory divergence in principle:

“…I must say something about the UK’s regulatory divergence from Europe. The Government is convinced this is a major opportunity for growth. And I agree it can be too.

“But it’s a bit more complicated, than scrapping overnight many of the terms of trade we’ve used for decades.”

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So this means he is not opposed outright to what the government calls “Brexit opportunities”.

But it has to be done in a measured, case-by-case approach, and with hard realism:

“Because divergence is high-stake politics and economics.

“Often, we don’t consider the EU’s possible counterplay, and where they could outcompete us. We also need to recognise that divergence will often shrink our market size and/or add a skip-load of red tape. The party of deregulation risks simply doubling the amount we have.

“So, while it can definitely work – witness the historic success of the City of London and our rapid Covid vaccine approval – you have to run the numbers to make sure it’s not a complete own-goal.

“And it will take far more than a regulation play to make the UK win global share of global sectors.”

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He then mentioned concrete examples:

“…the Retained EU Law Bill [is] creating huge uncertainty for UK firms.

“Companies are asking will we really erode maternity and paternity regulation or health and safety standards like the General Product Safety Directive?

“Or rapidly change regulations on REACH, which governs the use of chemicals? With billions of pounds of industry costs?

“Or create the potential for firms being underinsured because it’s harder for analysts – who don’t know what laws will be retained – to effectively price risk into products?

“Do we really want to subject the public – and industry – to another round of mass confusion and disruption, just when we’re trying to exit recession?”

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The speech, however, did more than offer a critique, it also offered a contrast.

It referred to a development which I (and perhaps also you) missed just before Christmas: the appointment of Patrick Vallance and others to consider post-Brexit regulation in five particular areas – digital technology, green industries, life sciences, advanced manufacturing and the creative industries.

The speech avers:

“The Chancellor has appointed Sir Patrick Vallance to lead a thorough review into securing possible prizes in five high-growth sectors. This is the right approach. Serious reflection and consideration.

“The complete opposite in fact of the Retained EU Law Bill […]

“Instead, let’s review, retain, reform and – where appropriate – repeal EU law the Vallance way. Smartly. Not the Retained EU Law Bill’s way. Foolishly.”

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This must be the correct approach in principle: “the Vallance way”.

Yes, the Vallance review may come to nothing.

Indeed, it may never be heard from again: such reviews come and go, and sometimes even disappear with anyone noticing, or caring.

But as a statement of principle, this approach is compelling.

And it shows that even this government is capable of going about legislative and regulatory reform the right way.

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The CBI cannot be regarded as a vehicle for remoaners.

And the speech today was not expressly or implicitly a call for the United Kingdom to rejoin the European Union – or even just the single market.

It was instead refreshingly post-Brexit – about how we go about making policy and laws within our shifted post-Brexit parameters.

The more our politics and policy-making moves in this direction, the better.

The absolutist clamour of Brexiters and the purist refusal of Remainers are both, in their ways, failures to practically deal with our post-Brexit situation.

The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill is now as much an artefact from yesteryear as a leaflet calling for a further referendum.

We are at last moving, slowly, into post-Brexit politics and policy-making – and the government needs to catch up.

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New Substack Essay: The 1610 case of Dr Bonham, and the question of whether parliament is really sovereign

 

22nd January 2023

The new essay at my Substack is up.

The essay is on the 1610 case of Dr Bonham, and the question of whether parliament is really sovereign:

These essays on legal history or law/lore are for paid subscribers, and they are additional to my weekday free-to-read topical commentary here on the law and policy blog.

Previous essays in this series are:

Malone (1979) – perhaps the most significant constitutional case of the last 50 years

Wednesbury (1948) – the origin of the modern principle of legal unreasonableness

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These essays are cross-posted on Patreon for my Patreon supporters.

Anyone who made a Paypal donation to this blog in 2022, as well as Patreon supporters, can be given a one-year free complimentary subscription – just leave a message marked “PRIVATE” below.

It is important that nobody pays ‘twice’ for my content.

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This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.