Political accountability vs policy accountability: how our system of politics and government is geared to avoid or evade accountability for policy

24 September 2024

Over at Bluesky, the German writer and historian Helene von Bismarck, an acute observer of British politics, posted this interesting question:

“One question I have been asking myself for many years about UK politics: Why does it – regardless of who is in government – appear to be this hard to solve problems & get things done? Schools, the NHS, defence procurement, etc. Lack of money, you (probably) say. But surely this isn’t all of it?”

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One answer, of course, is that there is a lack of accountability.

On the face of it, however, there is a great deal. of accountability in the politics of the United Kingdom.

There are general elections, where the government of the day can fail to obtain a majority – as in 1997, 2010, 2017 and 2024 – as well as by-elections and regional and local elections which often (are said to) give governments a ‘bloody nose’ (or something).

And between general elections, Prime Ministers can come and go – as in 1990, 2007, 2016, 2019, and 2022 (twice).

And then, at the levels below Prime Minister, ministers come and go, often with undue frequency.

We also have the theatres of Prime Ministers Questions and the various political shows on television and the radio (and increasingly with podcasts), and we have a well-connected and ambitious lobby of Westminster journalists.

And so, superficially at least, we have a near-constant buzz of accountability – almost all day, every day.

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But.

If the word “accountability” is taken to mean (as it should be) that the accountable person can be required to give an account of what they are doing, then things look rather different.

For in the United Kingdom we have a great deal of political accountability, we have far less policy accountability.

And by policy, it is meant the formulation, implementation and administration of things by government.

The theatres of political debate and discussion do not often go to the substance of policy – and often policy only seems relevant to the extent that it offers a ready “gotcha” against a hapless or hopeless minister.

The lobby system of journalism – and there are some outstanding lobby journalists – necessarily requires a focus on the politics of Westminster, rather than on what is happening in Whitehall – and still less on what is happening outside SW1.

The doctrine of individual ministerial accountability provides a mutually beneficial pact where a minister can (plausibly) say that they were not aware of something while officials escape routine accountability for what they do.

Parliamentary questions are easily evaded either in written or oral form, with no sanction for tardiness or non-compliance.

And as for Freedom of Information, the departmental section 17 letters refusing disclosure are perhaps the most dismal and insincere – if not outright dishonest – official documents in the history of our domestic bureaucracy.

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One illustration of how weak policy accountability is in the United Kingdom are the now (all too frequent) public inquiries.

These inquiries – sometimes long after the events being investigated – often do little more than what could have been done at the time, if the organs of the state had had the necessary powers and the requisite will.

To take one glaring example: the Covid inquiry is forcing politicians and officials to give an account – ie provide accountability – about everyday decision- and policy-making during the pandemic.

This should have been done in and by parliament at the time.

Many revelations that come out of that and other inquiries is an indication of the weakness of our traditional forms of accountability.

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Why is all this so?

Part of the reason is legal(istic) – inquiries have formal legal powers which are not generally available to (say) parliamentary committees and still less available to journalists.

But the main reason is there is no real incentive for government and parliament and officials and the media to have it any other way: no careers will be benefited, there is no electoral advantage, there are no extra viewers or listeners, and there no more newspapers sold (or fewer copies left unsold).

And the primary reason for this lack of incentive is, well, us.

If voters (and viewers and readers) wanted more real-time policy accountability then there would be career, commercial and/or electoral advantages in there being more policy accountability.

But that would mean us taking policy seriously, which is dull and complicated.

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There are, however, grounds for some optimism.

Parliamentary select committees – especially in their online manifestations – are becoming increasingly impressive in what evidence is made publicly available in their ongoing inquiries.

The House of Commons library also make their outstanding briefings available to the public as well as to parliamentarians.

The decline in specialist journalists is – though only to a limited extent – being offset by specialist commentators – on Substack or elsewhere.

But, even taking all these positive points at their highest, there is generally little or no incentive for there to be real accountability, as opposed to superficial (and theatrical) accountability.

And so the massive policy problems identified by von Bismarck in her post do not have ready solutions – though, no doubt, there will one day be a scathing public inquiry about each of them.

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Seven changes for a better constitution? Some interesting proposals from some good people.

24th June 2024

In the Times today there is a letter published from various good sorts putting forward seven practical and easy-to-make steps for a better constitution.

One of the signatories, David Anderson, helpfully posted the letter on Twitter:

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Of course, changes to form and structure can only take us so far. The biggest problem of recent years has been an underlying lack of constitutionalism from government ministers (cheered and clapped by their political supporters). And until attitudes change, then rules will always be gamed or ignored and discretions abused.

But, there has to be a start somewhere to repair the damage, and these are interesting proposals.

The suggestions appear to be:

  • independent enforcement of a new ministerial code;

  • establishing new systems for managing conflicts of interest;
  • ditto, for lobbying;
  • improving regulation of post-government employment;
  • ensuring appointments to the Lords are only made on merit;
  • ensuring other public appointments are rigorous and transparent; and
  • strengthening the independence of the honours system, including by ending prime ministerial patronage.

The worthies aver that legislation is not necessary for most of these changes but a short bill would create the necessary powers and embed the independence of the ethics and integrity system.

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Some may say that these proposals are a little “apple pie” – but they would be a move in the right direction, the least that can be done.

Words like “ensuring” and “strengthening” are easy to type – and they are almost as easy to put at the start of a sterling bullet point.

But what is the actual check on misuse? Who in practice will have the power and authority to say “No” to a trespass by a minister of the crown (or by a former minister of the crown)?

The robustness of any regulatory system is not so much in the rules being themselves commendable, but in the rigorous enforcement of those rules and in the ready and realistic availability of sanctions for breach.

In a word: there needs to be tension.

And in our constitutional arrangements, as they stand, only parliament and the courts – rather than third party agencies – have the strength and the legitimacy to check the executive on an ongoing basis, and so for each of these seven laudable aims, one question is how they can be enforced against the government’s will by other strong and permanent elements of the state.

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Of majorities and “super-majorities”

21st June 2024

The greatest prize that the constitution of the United Kingdom can bestow is a substantial parliamentary majority at a general election.

With such a majority you can be confident to pass major legislation, not worry too much about backbench opposition, and even face down the House of Lords.

And so one of the most remarkable things about the current government – which brought about its own emphatic general election victory in December 2019 by (among other things) “Getting Brexit Done” is how little use it has made of this great prize.

Some people are suggesting that after this next general election (in less than two weeks now) the Conservative may now be out of government for a very long time. Who knows? But if so, that will be a lengthy period for the politically-right-of-centre to kick themselves for not having used their chance to drive through fundamental reforms when they had it.

Many people would find it difficult to name – other than Brexit – one fundamental reform which current government has driven through with primary legislation. The last few Queen’s and now King’s speeches have been limp affairs.

All that political and legislative power – as close to absolute power that our constitutional arrangements can admit – and nothing, or close to nothing.

Given that part of the reason for the Brexit referendum and for then “getting Brexit done” was for the political advantage of the Conservatives, it seems odd. What was the (party political) point? All that chaos and dislocation, for this?

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In the early 1990s the Conservatives lost their overall majority under John Major and then were out of office from 1997 – and in a long haul, and via a coalition, they eventually gained an overall majority only in 2015.

They promptly threw that away in 2017.

They then exploited an exceptional political situation in December 2019 and got that majority back, and then did nothing much with it.

And now that second chance at an overall majority is about to end.

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Over at Prospectplease click here to read – I have done a post on the fears of a Labour “super majority”.

But what Tories should fear is not the use of a “super majority” but just the effective use of a sustainable and substantial parliamentary majority.

And that can be quite the forceful thing, not that the outgoing government ever really cared to use it.

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The strange omission in the Conservative manifesto: why is there no commitment to repeal the Human Rights Act?

12th June 2024

As each party manifesto is published online, and for my own easy amusement, I like to search the pdf for words like “enshrine” and “clear”.

And after that easy amusement, I look for more serious things.

Yesterday the Conservative manifesto was published.

(Many “clears” but disappointingly only one “enshrine”.)

What were the Conservatives were promising (threatening) this time for the Human Rights Act?

 

Doing something to this Act has been a mainstay of every Conservative general election manifesto for as long as I can remember.

But the search return was…

…0/0.

I am a clumsy typist and so I thought: a typo. Let me try again.

And it was still a nil return.

Something must be up with the search function, I thought.

And so I tried “ECHR”.

I even typed out in full the “European Convention on Human Rights” and the “European Court of Human Rights”.

Nil, nil.

How odd.

Could it be that the manifesto actually did not threaten the Act or the Convention?

Well.

A closer look revealed one fairly oblique mention:

Of course, the European Court of Human Rights is not meaningfully a foreign court: it has British judges, British lawyers can appear, British residents can petition the court or appeal cases there, and its caselaw can be relied on in our domestic courts. Foreign law usually is a matter of expert evidence, but Strasbourg case law is part of our own jurisprudence.

It is an international court, of which we are part, rather than a foreign court.

But that is by-the-by.

What is significant is not this sort-of commitment, but the lack of any other promises (or threats).

It is an astonishing, unexpected absence for a Conservative manifesto – perhaps the manifesto equivalent to leaving a D-Day commemoration early.

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Over on Twitter, Adam Wagner noticed the same:

Of course, it must be noted that government has recently been disapplying the Act on a statute-by-statute basis, rather than making any full frontal attack.

But even taking that point at its highest, one would still expect an explicit manifesto commitment just for the claps and cheers of political and media supporters.

And this is a governing party that needs all the claps and cheers it can get.

It is a remarkable omission.

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And one suspects it is an accidental omission, for the governing party has little to gain by leaving it out, and something to gain electorally (or at least hold on to) by leaving it in.

If so, the possible significance of the omission is that the Conservative leadership, having got bored with the pretence that the Act will ever be repealed or substantially amended, simply are not thinking about it any more.

Their minds have moved on to other “red meat” for their more illiberal supporters.

But what it also means is that, in the highly unlikely event of the Conservatives staying in government after 4 July 2024, there is no manifesto commitment they can rely on in forcing any changes to the Act through the House of Lords.

What that in turn means is that the Human Rights Act will now be safe for the lifetime of the next parliament, whatever happens at the general election.

And that itself is quite a thing.

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How the government is seeking to change the law on Rwanda so as to disregard the facts

30th January 2024

The decisions of judges, other than about case and court management, can be divided into two sorts.

First, there are rulings. These rulings can be about the substantive law, or they can be rulings on the admissibility of evidence, or they can be rulings on procedural technical points. In each instance, the judge will identify the rule, apply it to the situation before the court, and decide the outcome.

Add second, there are findings. These are determinations of fact which are required for the case before the court to be decided at a trial. These facts are, in turn, based on the evidence admitted before the court.

If there is no dispute, then a judge can make a finding of fact based on the undisputed evidence before the court; but if there is a dispute of fact then the judge has to weigh the conflicting evidence and make a finding.

The judge will then apply the rules to the facts found.

(In a criminal trial – and some civil trials – where there is a jury, it will usually be the jurors that will determine any disputes of fact and thereby any consequential legal liability.)

A reasoned judgment by a court deciding a case can include both types of decision; though in a straightforward case there is normally only a dispute of fact.

The key point for the purpose of this post is that rulings and findings are different.

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Now let us go to the Supreme Court judgment on the Rwanda policy.

The court set out the statutory criteria for determining whether Rwanda is a safe third country (emphasis added):

A country is a safe third country for a particular applicant, if:

“(i) the applicant’s life and liberty will not be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion in that country;

“(ii) the principle of non-refoulement will be respected in that country in accordance with the Refugee Convention;

“(iii) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected in that country; and

“(iv) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention in that country.”

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After a detailed examination of the evidence, ultimately the Supreme Court decided (again emphasis added):

“As matters stand, the evidence establishes substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that asylum claims will not be determined properly, and that asylum seekers will in consequence be at risk of being returned directly or indirectly to their country of origin. In that event, genuine refugees will face a real risk of ill-treatment in circumstances where they should not have been returned at all. The right of appeal to the High Court is completely untested, and there are grounds for concern as to its likely effectiveness. The detection of failures in the asylum system by means of monitoring, however effective it may be, will not prevent those failures from occurring in the first place. We accept the Secretary of State’s submission that the capacity of the Rwandan system (in the sense of its ability to produce accurate and fair decisions) can and will be built up. Nevertheless, asking ourselves whether there were substantial grounds for believing that a real risk of refoulement existed at the relevant time, we have concluded that there were. The structural changes and capacity-building needed to eliminate that risk may be delivered in the future, but they were not shown to be in place at the time when the lawfulness of the policy had to be considered in these proceedings.”

In other words the Supreme Court made a finding of fact based on the evidence placed before it. The evidence “established” a thing, and that thing in turn determined the case.

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Let us now look at the government’s Rwanda Bill currently before the House of Lords on its passage through parliament.

Here is clause 2 (note a Bill has “clauses” as it passes through parliament, which then become “sections” when it becomes an Act):

You can see what the government is seeking to do.

Instead of it being a matter for a court to decide whether Rwanda is a safe third country, the Bill removes that discretion absolutely – regardless of any evidence. Indeed such evidence may not even be relevant with this deeming provision.

A court will not be able to make its own findings, it “must conclusively” decide Rwanda is safe – whatever the actual facts.

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And now let us go to a speech in the House of Lords from the former Conservative Lord Chancellor Kenneth Clarke:

According to Hansard, Clarke said:

“[Ministers] have decided to bring an Act of Parliament to overturn a finding of fact made by the Supreme Court of this country.

“If we pass this Bill, we are asserting as a matter of law that Rwanda is a safe country for this purpose, that it will always be a safe country for this purpose until the law is changed, and that the courts may not even consider any evidence brought before them to try to demonstrate that it is not a safe country.

“That is a very dangerous constitutional provision. I hope it will be challenged properly in the courts, because we have an unwritten constitution, but it gets more and more important that we make sure that the powers in this country are controlled by some constitutional limits and are subject to the rule of law.

“Somebody has already said in this debate that Parliament, claiming the sovereignty of Parliament, could claim that the colour black is the same as the colour white, that all dogs are cats or, more seriously, that someone who has been acquitted of a criminal charge is guilty of that criminal charge and should be returned to the courts for sentence. Where are the limits?

“As time goes by in my career, I always fear echoes of the warnings that Quintin Hailsham used to give us all about the risks of moving towards an elected dictatorship in this country.

“The sovereignty of Parliament has its limits, which are the limits of the rule of law, the separation of powers and what ought to be the constitutional limits on any branch of government in a liberal democratic society such as ours.”

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Yes, Clarke had at best a mixed record as Lord Chancellor – especially in respect of the severe funding cuts to legal aid.

But he is absolutely right to set out, with first principles, the fundamental danger this bill presents.

The government should leave findings of fact to the courts – and if the court’s findings are unwelcome, then ministers should work to change the facts.

Using the law to deem a country safe which the Supreme Court found to be unsafe after a detailed examination of the evidence, is an unwelcome move by this government.

And even a former Conservative Lord Chancellor can spot this.

 

 

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“Computer says guilty” – an introduction to the evidential presumption that computers are operating correctly

A modest proposal for helping the Prime Minister “keep on top of government” and “to push priorities”

3rd July 2023

Over on Twitter, the estimable Dr Cath Haddon is live-tweeting a talk from a former cabinet minister to the Institute of Government:

Here is an idea for a Prime Minister to have something to help him or her keep on top of what is going on in government and to push priorities.

The Prime Minister should form a committee of, say, about twenty-two individuals, each responsible for a specific government department or public function.

Those on this committee should report directly to the Prime Minister.

And the Prime Minister should be able to appoint and replace members of this committee as he or she chooses.

This committee should meet at least a couple of times a week – and this meeting should be at Downing Street chaired by the Prime Minister.

There can also be sub-committees dealing with matters where more than one government department is concerned – and these sub-committees can also be chaired by the Prime Minister or their designate.

So as to ensure that priorities are pushed – and as politics should be the language of priorities as one politician once said – these appointees should be politicians not officials.

And appointing members of parliament to this committee would also mean that the Prime Minister would have a useful direct line to what is said about the departments in parliament.

Meetings of this committee should also be attended by the head of the civil service, so that he or she can be part of the discussions and to provide advice and practical insight.

The deliberations should be confidential so that discussions can be frank and not leaked.

And there should be collective responsibility for those on the committee, so that there is a single overall direction to the course of the government.

Those on this committee should also be paid a substantial amount in addition to their parliamentary salary so as to recognise the additional work and to attract the brightest and best.

Such a model would, at a stroke, keep a Prime Minister on top of what is going on in government and for priorities to be pushed across government.

And this is the important thing…

…if a Prime Minister cannot effectively use such a committee to keep on top of what is going on in government and to push priorities, then no “Prime Minister’s Department” is going to be of any greater help.

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The only thing left is what to call this committee.

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Pic source.

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The government is running out of time

26th June 2023

In the words of the eminent jurist Paul Simon:

“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me

“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me
While I looked around for my possibilities”

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One hard structural fact about the politics of the United Kingdom is that the government is running out of time.

By automatic operation of law the next general election has to take place by 28 January 2025.

That gives the current government about 580 days left, maximum, before a general election which many forecast that the governing Conservative party will lose.

About 580 days sounds a lot, but it really is not – at least in parliamentary terms.

That date presupposes that the general election is called at the last possible moment – 17 December 2024 – leaving the longest possible election campaign.

Current speculation is that the next general election will be in October 2024, which means the last parliamentary session will need to be over by September 2024, and given summer breaks, that basically means legislation will need to passed by June/July 2024.

So that is about 365 to 400 days.

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We are still – remarkably – within the same parliamentary session that commenced two prime ministers and one monarch ago in May 2022.

And as the Hansard Society averred in May, few of the Bills announced in that speech have become law:

It is expected that there will be a new King’s Speech this November.

This means that it is highly likely that there is just one more parliamentary session left before a general election – November 2023 to June/July 2024.

(There is the theoretical possibility of more than one remaining parliamentary term if the government has a sequence of truncated parliamentary sessions, with multiple openings of parliament.)

One implication of there being only one more parliamentary session before an election is that it is probable that there is not enough time to force any new legislation through the House of Lords under the Parliament Act, for that requires a Bill to be approved in successive sessions.

And then there are the recesses:

As one adds up the delays and holidays, and the speculation of an election by October 2024, the gross figure of 580 days becomes a lot less in practical legislative terms.

The grand hourglass of parliamentary time is running out for the current government.

We are not talking years, we are now talking months – and soon we will be talking weeks.

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And not only time is against them – there is the problem of legislative preparation.

Put simply: this government is not very good at preparing legislation.

As the Hansard Society politely put it:

Parliamentary time for bills should not be, say, “step one’‘ of a process but about “step four” – after policy formulation, consultation and development – all within or by departments.

And so if you factor in the time to actually put together new practical – that is, passable – legislation then not even the maximum 580 days are really enough.

Even if following the conference season this year there is a “whizz-bang” King’s Speech with lots of legislative proposals, that whizzery and bangery needs to being prepared now in departments, and there is not a lot of evidence of any whizzery and bangery taking place anywhere in Whitehall at present.

Not only does the government need enough time to get legislation through parliament and implement it before the next general election, ministers and departments need lead-in times to get the legislation to be in any state to pass.

The time left looks very tight.

Too tight.

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What we have is a government that not only is running out of time, but in some ways has already ran out of time to do anything radical and substantial in its one (likely) remaining parliamentary term.

And what makes this even more remarkable that this is a government elected in December 2019, on the back of Brexit, which had a substantial majority – only the second overall majority the Conservatives had had since 1992.

In legislative and policy terms, that majority has been largely wasted.

(Which may be a good or bad thing, depending on your politics.)

This is a government running out of possibilities.

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“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me

“Time, time, time
See what’s become of me
While I looked around for my possibilities”

 

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This has been cross-posted from my (newly renamed) Empty City substack.

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Telling the story of how the “serious disruption” public order statutory instrument was passed

14th June 2023

Here is a story about law-making told in different ways.

The law in question is a statutory instrument made under the Public Order Act 1986 – the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 – which comes into force tomorrow.

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By way of background

A statutory instrument is what is called “secondary legislation” and it has the same effect as primary legislation, as long as it is within the scope of the primary legislation under which it is made.

Statutory instruments are, in effect, executive-made legislation.  They still have to have parliamentary approval, but they are not open to amendment and rarely have debate or a vote.

Often the parliamentary approval of statutory instruments goes through on the nod, but sometimes they need to have a positive vote in favour.

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The government’s version

The first way of telling the story is from the government’s perspective.

The statutory instrument was put to a vote in the House of Commons on Monday with the Home Secretary herself leading the debate.

At the end of the debate there was a contested vote, which the government won:The (elected) House of Commons having shown its approval, the House of Lords did not pass a “fatal” motion against the statutory instrument.

Instead the House of Lords passed a motion (merely) regretting the Statutory Instrument:

The vote (against the government) was as follows:

The House of Lords also had a specific vote on a fatal motion, which was defeated:
And when the official opposition was criticised by for not supporting the fatal motion, a frontbencher was unapologetic:

And this is the first way of telling this story: there was a Commons vote; the Lords showed disdain but did not exercise any veto inn view of the Commons vote; and so the statutory instrument became law as the result of a democratic legislative process.

Told this way, the story is about how laws can and are made by such a democratic legislative process

Nothing to see here.

But.

But but but.

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The constitutionalist version

There is another way of telling this story.

This account starts with the Public Order Act 2023 when it was a bill before parliament.

At a very late stage of the passage of that bill the government sought to amend it so as to include provisions that were substantially similar to what ended up in the statutory instrument passed this week.

The government failed to get those amendments through the House of Lords. and so they were dropped from the bill before it became an Act.

As a House of Lords committee noted:

The Home Office could not answer these basic questions:For this committee to say that it believes “this raises possible constitutional issues that the House may wish to consider” is serious stuff.

What had happened is that the Home Office, having failed to bounce parliament into accepting these amendments into primary legislation by very late amendments, has come up with this alternative approach.

Told this alternative way, the story is not about how laws can and are made by a democratic legislative process.

Instead, the story is about how a democratic legislative process can be frustrated and circumvented by the executive.

Instead of using primary legislation so as to make substantial (and illiberal) changes to the law, the government has used statutory instrument which cannot be amended or considered in detail, and has used its whipped House of Commons majority to face down Lords opposition.

Plenty to see here.

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The story may continue

Yet this is not how the story (told in either way) may end.

The thing about statutory instruments is that, unlike primary legislation, they can be challenged at the High Court.

This means that there can sometimes be a sort of constitutional see-saw: the convenience of using statutory instruments (as opposed to primary legislation) can be checked and balanced by an application for judicial review.

And that is what the group Liberty is doing, and its letter before claim is here.

In essence, the argument is that – notwithstanding the parliamentary approval – the statutory instrument is outside the scope of the relevant provisions of the Public Order Act 1986.

Liberty seems to have a good point, but any challenge to secondary legislation is legally difficult and it is rare that any such challenge ever succeeds.

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The moral of the story?

The moral of the story, however it is told, is perhaps about the general weakness of our constitutional arrangements in respect of limitations placed upon rights and liberties.

A government, using wide enabling legislation, can put legislation into place that it cannot achieve by passing primary legislation.

This cannot be the right way of doing things, even if Labour is correct about these illiberal measures having the support of the House of Commons.

There are some things our constitutional arrangements do well – and here we can wave at Boris Johnson and Elizabeth Truss having both been found repugnant and spat out by our body politic.

But there are things our constitutional arrangements do badly – and the increasing use (and abuse) by the government of secondary legislation to do things they cannot (or will not) get otherwise enacted in primary legislation worrying.

And a government casually and/or cynically using (and abusing) wide enabling powers is not a story that usually ends well.

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Two set-backs for animal welfare law – and a consolation

25th May 2023

While I prepare a detailed post on Boris Johnson and the Cabinet Office lawyers thingie, this is just a quick post to note a couple of setbacks to another interest of this blog: animal welfare law.

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First, you may recall this blog covering the “Frankenchicken” claim, which I thought was a well-made application for judicial review.

Unfortunately the High Court did not, though the judgment is rather difficult to follow – and I may unpack the judgment at a later date.

But plaudits must go to the Humane League (and, yes, we all know the puns for the 80s pop band) for putting together such an impressively crafted case.

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Second, late today on a quiet parliamentary sitting, the government announced it was reneging on the Animal Welfare (Kept Animals) Bill – even though it was at an advanced parliamentary stage.

There are news reports on this here and here.

You may recall that the Conservative manifesto for 2019 devoted an entire page to animal welfare, making (specific) commitments:

And you may also recall two senior cabinet ministers recently insisting that the House of Lords had to accept that the (generalised) content of the Conservative manifesto as the “will of the people”:

But it would seem the government picks-and-chooses which of its manifesto commitments are serious enough to threaten the House of Lords with, and which the government cannot even be bothered with so that it can progress its own bill.

The reason for this pulling of a bill appears to be that the government does not feel confident that it can resist amendments that would further protect animal welfare beyond the protections promised in the manifesto.

It is a depressing moment for animal welfare law.

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On the bright side, however, there is consolation: the great Chris Packham – who does sterling work not only on animal welfare but also neurodiversity – won his libel case, and the judgment is well worth reading.

(The pic above shows him supporting the “Frankenchicken” claim which was coincidently heard at the High Court at same time as his libel claim.)

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